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
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John Mac Intire V

THE
COMMENTARIES
OF
CÆSAR,

TRANSLATED into ENGLISH.

To which is prefixed a

DISCOURSE

CONCERNING

The ROMAN ART of WAR.

By WILLIAM DUNCAN,

Professor of Philosophy in the University of *Aberdeen*.

In Two VOLUMES.

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TO HIS
ROYAL HIGHNESS
G E O R G E
PRINCE of W A L E S.

S I R,

THOUGH I am far from thinking that any Performance of mine can be intitled to the Honour of Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's Patronage, yet, as the following Work is a Translation of the Memoirs of the greatest General of Antiquity, I hope the Merit of the Original, and the Name of *Cæsar*, will in some measure excuse the Presumption of this Address.

IN these Memoirs Your ROYAL HIGHNESS will see displayed all that is great and most consummate in the Art of War. The ablest Commander of the most warlike People upon Earth entertains You with

DEDICATION.

the History of his own Campaigns. You are informed of the Motives which determined him in all his Enterprises, of the various Difficulties he had to encounter, and of the Steps by which in the end he was enabled to surmount all Opposition. In a word, Prudence in Counsel, Courage and Intrepidity in the Field, a calm Presence of Mind in the midst of Dangers, and an amazing Dexterity in sudden and unforeseen Emergencies, are here exemplified in the Conduct of a Leader, whom all succeeding Ages have agreed to regard as the most finished Pattern of military Merit.

It is the Observation of one of the wisest of the *Roman* Historians, “ that
“ War is in a peculiar manner the Pro-
“ vince of a Prince; and that though
“ civil Accomplishments are by no means
“ to be neglected, yet to the Person of
“ the Sovereign more immediately be-
“ longs the Merit and Praise of being
“ a great General.” And indeed as it is
among the principal Duties of a King, to
protect his Subjects from foreign Inva-
sions,

DEDICATION.

sions, to baffle the Attempts of ambitious and aspiring Tyrants, and to guard against the Incroachments of powerful Neighbours, nothing can be more evident, than that a due Institution in the Art of War ought to be considered as an essential Part of the Education of a Prince.

SOME perhaps may be of opinion, that the Maxims of the present Age, which forbid Kings to appear in Person at the head of Armies, and injoin them rather to delegate their Power to others, render military Talents less necessary in the Rulers of Nations. But tho' this be in reality a very wise Policy, and excellently calculated to prevent those unjust Wars, which have no other Foundation but the personal Ambition and Glory of Princes, yet does it by no means dispense with the Obligation of applying to the Study of Arms. The due modelling of the Army, the introducing a proper Discipline among the Troops, and the Disposal of military Preferments, are intirely in the Breast of the Sovereign, who would be but ill qualified for the Exercise of so great a Trust,

DEDICATION.

if wholly unacquainted with martial Affairs. It is likewise well known, that in dangerous domestic Seditions, to which all States are at times liable, nothing tends more to confirm the well-affected in their Duty, and to check the Machinations of the Factious, than when a King every way qualified to command, appears in Person at the head of his Troops. In general Confederacies too, where many Nations unite to oppose some threatening overgrown Power, it is often impossible to reconcile their various Interests, and preserve the Unanimity necessary to give Force and Vigour to their Operations, unless some Prince of distinguished Reputation, and eminent Quality in the League, charge himself with the Conduct of the War, and employ his whole Authority to prevent those Competitions, Jealousies and mutual Animosities, which are every moment ready to break out in an Army composed of so many separate and divided Bodies.

HENCE it is that Valour and the military Virtues have always been considered

as

DEDICATION.

as Objects highly worthy the Pursuit of a Prince ; nor do they ever fail to meet with their due Share of Applause, unless where they degenerate into that hurtful Ambition, that immoderate Thirst of Conquest, which prompts Men rather to be the Destroyers than to be the Protectors of Nations. As the Commentaries of *Cæsar* furnish the best Lessons and Precepts of War, so the Example and History of the same *Cæsar* demonstrate, that the greatest Talents, when not directed to laudable Ends, are utterly insufficient, either for present Security, or future Fame. Tho' his Abilities as a General and a Statesman were never perhaps equalled before or since ; yet as he employed them, not to promote the Welfare, but to disturb the Peace of Society ; not to defend, but to overturn the Liberties of his Country ; he could neither escape the Hatred of the Age in which he lived, nor the Reproaches of Posterity. We find him often in Distress, and sometimes in Despair, ready to fly his Country, threatened with being tried and condemned as a public Criminal ; and at last, after a restless Life, full

DEDICATION.

of Anxiety and Care, cut off by a violent and untimely Death, just as he had established his Tyranny, tho' with it he could not establish his own Happiness. Had he employed his Authority and Address to preserve public Liberty; had he, for this glorious End, exerted his Industry and admirable Talents; how amiable must he have appeared, in what Security might he have lived, and with what Veneration would he have been regarded by all future Ages?

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS is born to govern a People, who have at all times distinguished themselves by their Love of Liberty; a People always obedient to just Laws, but impatient under Oppression, and infinitely jealous of their Privileges. *Tacitus* speaking of them fifteen hundred Years ago says, “ that they cheerfully complied with the Levies of Men, “ with the Imposition of Tribute, and “ with all the necessary Demands “ of Government, provided they received no illegal Treatment or In- “ sults from their Governors; for those “ they

DEDICATION.

“ they bore with Impatience: nor did
“ they acknowledge any other Subjection
“ to the *Romans*, than what consisted in
“ an Obedience to just Laws, not the
“ Submission of Slaves.” Such was the
Character of the *British* People at that
time, such has been their Character in all
Ages, and such it remains to this Day.
Princes who observed the Laws always
found them peaceable Subjects, and ready
to comply with their just Demands: but
when Infringements were made upon
the public Liberty, they grew uneasy and
discontented, and the Sovereign, by grasping
at too much, frequently lost all.

INDEED it appears in our History, that
the Design of assuming an Authority independent
of the Laws, was never entertained by any
of the best and ablest of our Princes; who
always esteemed it more glorious to rule over
a free People, than to command a Nation of
Slaves. Among many remarkable Examples of
this, that of the ever memorable *Henry the Fifth*
seems in a particular manner deserving of
Notice. He was a wise and valiant Prince,
who

DEDICATION.

who scorned to inroach upon the Liberties of the Subjects, and abhorred the unjustifiable Arts by which they had been impaired. He esteemed their Courage, Strength, and Love, to be his greatest Advantage, Riches, and Glory ; and readily joined with them to extinguish the mischievous Abuses that had been introduced by some of his Predecessors. He aimed at making good his Claim to the Crown of *France*, which he knew was only to be effected by the Bravery of a free and well-satisfied People. Slaves will always be Cowards, and, when they dare declare themselves, Enemies to their Master : by bringing his Subjects into that Condition, he must infallibly have ruined his own Designs, and made them unfit to fight either for him or for themselves. He desired not only that his People should be free during his Time, but that his Successors should not be able to deprive them of so valuable a Blessing. He knew that he did not reign for himself but for his People, and regarding their Safety as the supreme Law of Government, always passed with the utmost Chearfulness such
Laws

DEDICATION.

Laws as were presented to him in behalf of public Liberty. The Event was such as might be expected. Never Prince was better obeyed and served by his Subjects, more successful and formidable abroad, more beloved at home, or more sincerely lamented after his Death. In fine, History no where furnishes a more perfect Pattern of a wise, valiant, and virtuous King.

It has been the good Fortune of these Nations for some time past to be blest with a series of such Princes. The excellent Principles of Government adopted by King *William* at the Revolution, have been steddily adhered to by his Successors of your illustrious House. Nor has the Security of domestic Freedom alone employed their Attention. Like that glorious Monarch they have exerted their utmost Influence to preserve the Independency of the other States of *Europe*, and by a Conduct so truly noble merited the greatest of all Titles, that of being *The Patrons of Public Liberty*, and *The Friends of Mankind*.

YOUR

DEDICATION.

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS is now at an Age when Examples of this kind make the deepest Impression; and the early good Dispositions You discover, joined to the excellent Institution under which You have the Happiness to be formed, give the justest reason to believe, that they will not fail of having their due effect. The Public beholds with Pleasure the Seeds of your many ripening Virtues, and charmed with the Prospect of the Advantages to be reaped from their Maturity, seems to address You in the Words of *Æneas* to his Son *Ascanius*, a young Prince of great Expectation, in whose Person were centered the Hopes of a whole People.

-----*Te, Animo repetentem Exempla tuorum,
Et Pater Æneas, et Avunculus excitet Hector.*

THAT You may improve daily in every laudable and useful Quality, and that when by the Appointment of Providence You are called to the Exercise of the Government, You may long sway the *British* Scepter with uninterrupted Prosperity,

DEDICATION.

perity, and the intire Love of your Subjects, is the sincere and ardent Prayer of,

S I R,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's most humble

most dutiful, and

most obedient Servant,

WILLIAM DUNCAN.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Translation of *Cæsar's Commentaries* was done from the celebrated Edition of the late Dr. *Clarke*, printed for *J. Tonson* in 1712. All possible Care has been taken to render it exact, and to preserve the Distinctness and Perspicuity of Expression for which the Original is so justly famous. The Reader will perceive, that the very turn and manner of *Cæsar* has been copied with the utmost Attention; and tho' the Success may not always answer Expectation, yet Candor will induce him to make great Allowances, when he considers the inimitable Beauty of the *Latin*, and the Difficulty of expressing ancient Manners and Transactions in modern Language.

It was at first intended to accompany the Translation with Notes, explaining what was difficult and obscure in the *Roman* Art of War. But as a few loose scattered Remarks would have contributed little towards giving the
Reader

ADVERTISEMENT.

Reader a distinct Idea of what was necessary to be known on this Head, there is substituted in their place a Discourse concerning the military Customs of the Ancients, in which all that is curious and most interesting relating to these Matters is fully and copiously explained. Besides the ancient Authors; *Rollin, Fo-lard, Orrery, Feuquiere, Machiavel, Montef-quieu*, and several other Moderns have been consulted, and all such Passages selected, as tended to throw Light upon this Branch of the *Roman* Antiquities. As the Author, by his Situation in Life, is necessarily a Stranger to the practical Part of War, he pretends not to offer any thing of his own upon the Subject. If he has collected with Care from the Writers before-mentioned, and disposed the Materials they furnish in such a manner, as sufficiently to display the Proficiency and Improvements of the Ancients in military Knowledge, he has compassed all he intended, and the Reader will have no cause to complain.

THE ancient Names of Places are retained in the Translation, as well to avoid giving too modern

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modern a turn to the Author by a contrary Practice, as because they are sufficiently familiar to an *English* Ear, being constantly made use of by all Historians who treat of those Times in our Language. But as the following Work may perhaps fall into the Hands of Persons little acquainted with ancient Geography, and who would therefore be at a loss in comparing *Cæsar's* Descriptions with the present Face of the Country, the Reader will find at the End of the Book a large geographical Index, in which the ancient Names of Places, as near as can be discovered with any Certainty, are explained by the modern.

It may be just proper to mention, that besides the Seven Books of the *Gallic* War, and the Three of the Civil, written by *Cæsar* himself, the Supplements of *A. Hirtius* *Pansa* are likewise inserted in the following Translation, consisting of one additional Book to the *Gallic* War, and three Books of the *Alexandrian*, *African* and *Spanish* Wars.

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DISCOURSE

CONCERNING THE

ROMAN ART of WAR.

Vol. I.

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A
DISCOURSE
CONCERNING THE
ROMAN ART of WAR.

CHAP. I.

*Of the Undertaking and Declaration
of War.*

I. **T**HE *Romans*, from small Begin-
ings and an almost contemptible
Original, rose by degrees to be So-
vereigns of the World. If we
enquire into the Causes of this, we shall find,
that nothing so much contributed to it, as the
excellence of their military Discipline. War
is a Profession of the greatest Importance
to Society. The Security of our Lives, Liber-
ties, Properties, and indeed of all that is dear

CHAP. and valuable among Men, depends in a manner entirely on it. Good and wholsom Laws may establish Peace and Unity within, and if executed with vigour, will prevent the Inroads of Vice and Corruption; but are by no means sufficient to screen a State from powerful Neighbours, or secure it against the Assaults of the Ambitious and Aspiring. Hence in the most peaceful Times, it has ever been esteemed a maxim of sound Policy, to cultivate the Science of Arms with the same Application, as when we are threatened with War and Invasions. For however little we may ourselves be disposed to disturb the Tranquillity of the Nations around us, yet the Experience of all Ages makes it abundantly evident, that the most powerful and prevailing Argument to keep those quiet, from whom we have reason to apprehend any danger, is by letting them see that we are prepared to receive them, and capable of making them repent of their Rashness, should they unjustly seek a pretence of falling upon us. In all wise States therefore, the Profession of a Soldier has ever been held in honour: nor do we read any Part of ancient History with greater pleasure, than that by which we learn, how free Nations have defended themselves against the Attempts of incroaching Tyrants, and when roused to a thorough exertion of their Strength, overthrown in the end that very Power, which once threatened to crush them. It is not indeed

deed to be denied, that the military Virtues of a CHAP.
free People, have not always been confined to I.
Self-defence, and the avenging themselves of
their Enemies. Ambition, and a Conscious-
ness of Superiority, have sometimes prompted
even these to aspire at universal Dominion.
This is remarkably exemplified in the History
of the *Roman* Commonwealth, from whose
Constitution, and Love of Liberty, one would
naturally expect a very different Spirit. Who
more likely to become the great Patrons and
Defenders of the common Rights and Pri-
vileges of Mankind, than a People, whose
prevailing Passion was an Abhorrence of
Slavery; and who in a long series of Strug-
gles with the Nations around them, were
never weary of fighting in defence of that
Liberty, which is the Birthright and Inheri-
tance of every reasonable Creature? And yet
we find, that no sooner were they secure
of their own Freedom, than a thirst of Rule
took possession of their Minds, and they forc-
ibly imposed that Yoke upon others, which
they had disdained to submit to themselves.
The Superiority of their military Discipline
enabled them by degrees to accomplish this
unjust Design. Trained up in a continued
Succession of Wars, and equally attentive to
their own Victories and Defeats, they were
daily improving themselves in the Art of
Conquest, and attained at length to so great
a mastery in it, that no Nation was able to
withstand their Attacks. It cannot therefore

CHAP. but be an agreeable, as well as useful Inquiry, to trace out the military Customs of a People, so renowned for their Knowledge in the Art of War. And as it is my Design, to present the Publick with a new Translation of the *Commentaries* of *Cæsar*, who was confessedly the greatest General *Rome* ever produced, I imagine a Discourse of this nature may be not improperly prefixed to that Work.

II. LET us then take a view of the Conduct of the *Romans*, from their first engaging in a War, through all the different Branches of its Management, until they at last bring it to a happy Period. This will naturally lead us to consider the Ceremonies attending the Declaration of War; the Manner of levying Troops, and forming a *Roman* Army; the Precautions used in Marches and Encampments; their Order of Battle, Conduct in Sieges, and the Machines and other Contrivances made use of in the Attack and Defence of Places. Under these several Heads may be comprehended every thing that is material and important upon this Subject. It is not however my Design, to enter into Grammatical Niceties, or a minute Detail of particular Criticisms, but only to give a general Idea of the military Customs of the *Romans*, intermixed with such Remarks, as may serve to lay open the Wisdom and Policy of their first Contrivance, and show their natural Tendency

Tendency to that Superiority and universal CHAP. I.
Dominion, which they at length procured
the Commonwealth.

III. THE Ceremonies relating to the Declaration of War were instituted by *Numa Pompilius*, the second King of *Rome*. *Romulus*, the Founder of that Colony, was, during the whole course of his Reign, engaged in perpetual Contests with his Neighbours. The Necessity he was under, at his first setting out, of procuring Wives for his Subjects by the Rape of the *Sabine* Virgins, exasperated all the Nations round about, and begot no small Jealousy of the new Colony, which seemed to be founded on maxims of Violence and Injustice. We are not therefore to wonder, if this drew on him a Series of Wars, which continued almost without intermission to the end of his Life. Thus the *Romans*, who were originally in great measure a Band of Fugitives and Outlaws, improving their natural Fierceness by having their Arms constantly in their Hands, gradually grew to be a brave and warlike People. *Numa*, who succeeded *Romulus*, being a Prince of a pacific Temper, set himself to check this martial Ardor, and form them to Religion, and a Respect for the Gods. In order to stifle that impetuous desire of War, which he found so prevalent among them, he established certain Ceremonies, which were always to precede the commencing of Hostilities,

CHAP. and committed them to the care of a College
 I. of Heralds, called *Feciales*. The Chief or
 Head of this Society had the Name of *Pater Patratus*: and it was his peculiar Office, to make Peace, or denounce War. *Livy*, indeed, seems to consider him as a temporary Minister: for, in his Account of the Treaty concluded with the *Albans*, before the triple Combat of the *Horatii* and *Curatii*, he makes one of the *Feciales* choose a *Pater Patratus*, on purpose to perform that Ceremony. But as I have no design to enter into a Controversy of this nature, little important in itself, and not easy to be decided, I shall content myself with observing, that the Officer here mentioned, whether constant or temporary, was one who had a Father and Son both alive. Hence this Title of *Pater Patratus*, which may be interpreted to imply a more perfect kind of Father, as they seem to have imagined him to be, whose own Father was still living, after he himself had been a Father for some time. Such an one, it was believed, would be an equitable and moderate Judge in Affairs of this kind, and not over forward to plunge his Country into a War, in which so many Lives that must be dear to him, would unavoidably be exposed to hazard.

IV. AND indeed the Ceremonies themselves, as instituted by *Numa*, seem peculiarly calculated to render the *Romans* cautious and circumspect,

circumspect, in a Matter of so great Im-CHAP.
portance. For before they entered upon a I.
War with any State, the College of Herald
were to commission the *Pater Patratus*, to
go and demand satisfaction in the name of
the *Roman* People. Accordingly this Officer,
clothed in the Habit of his Order, set for-
ward for the Enemy's Country; and enter-
ing the Frontiers, proclaimed aloud the cause
of his Arrival, calling all the Gods to wit-
ness that he came to demand satisfaction, and
imprecate the Divine Vengeance on him-
self and Country, if he said any thing con-
trary to Truth. When he came to the chief
City of the Enemy, he again repeated the
same Declaration, adding fresh Oaths and
Imprecations, and withal desired satisfaction.
If his Demands were granted, he returned
immediately to *Rome*, and all Thoughts of
War were laid aside. But if they required
time to consider, he gave them ten Days,
and then came again to hear their Resolution.
This he did, in some Cases, three times: but
if after thirty Days, nothing was done to-
wards an Accommodation, he called Gods
and Men to witness the Refusal, and expressly
denounced, that the *Romans* would now
think themselves sufficiently authorised, to
take such Measures as the Case required, in
order to do themselves justice. Upon his
return to *Rome*, he repaired to the Senate,
attended by the whole College of Herald; and
having there made a report of his Embassy,
declared

CHAP. declared' the legality of the War. The Af-
I. fair was then debated among the Fathers :
and if the majority of Voices were for War,
the same Officer was sent back to the En-
emy's Frontiers, where in presence of at least
three Persons he pronounced the usual De-
claration, throwing a Spear at the same time
into their Territories, in Token of defiance.

V. THESE Institutions continued long in force
at *Rome*, even during the times of the Com-
monwealth ; and it must be owned, were
admirably well contrived to answer *Numa's*
great Design, of habituating the *Romans* to
Peace, and blunting the edge of their martial
Fury. For as a certain space of Time was
necessarily to intervene, between the Injury
received and the commencing of Hostilities ;
this left room for Reason and Reflection, and
gave them an Opportunity of weighing ma-
turely all the Consequences of the Step they
were about to take. The Imprecations too
to be denounced by the Herald against him-
self and Country, if he advanced any thing
contrary to Truth, would naturally make
them very cautious in their Demands, and
extremely attentive to the Equity and Justice
of them. Add to all this, the great proba-
bility of adjusting Matters amicably, and ob-
taining a reasonable Satisfaction, which can-
not by any means be expected, where the
Parties fly immediately to Arms, and by mu-
tual Acts of Hostility exasperate one another.
One

One would think, that a State under the ^{CHAP.} check of so many Restraints against Oppression, could not easily break out into violent or unjust Wars. Accordingly we find, not only the ancient Historians, but even many modern Writers of Name and Reputation, extolling the Moderation and Disinterestedness of the *Romans*; their Faith in Treaties; steady Adherence to their Allies; and care to have Equity on their side in all their Undertakings. It is however, methinks, a sufficiently obvious Reflection, that a People, who by degrees accomplished the Conquest of the Universe, and forced all Nations to submit to their Dominion, must in many Instances have been the Aggressors. For altho' in the first beginnings of their State, they were perhaps often unjustly attacked by their Neighbours, out of Envy and Jealousy; yet it is certain, that their Power at last became so very formidable, that no Nation was willing to enter the Lists with them. We find them notwithstanding still pushing on their Conquests, still engaged in new Wars, and extending the Limits of their Empire. Now both Reason and Experience tell us, that in a Controversy between States of unequal Strength, the weaker will submit to many Insults and Hardships, rather than draw upon themselves a War, which they foresee must end in the subversion of their Liberties. And indeed if we examine narrowly into the Conduct of the *Romans*, we shall find, that their Reputation

CHAP. Reputation of Justice is owing rather to an
I. exact Observance of certain outward Forms,
and the Partiality of their Historians, than
any steady Adherence to the Principles of
Equity. For as their Power and Dominion
increased, and they became conscious of their
Superiority, they readily gave way to the Dic-
tates of Ambition, and were never at a loss
in contriving some ground of Quarrel with
those Nations, whom in their Plan of uni-
versal Conquest, they had resolved to bring
next under subjection. But as all their At-
tempts of this kind were preceded by Com-
plaints of Injuries received, pretended Grievances, and formal Declarations of War; this gave a colour of Justice to their Undertakings, and effectually deceived the People; who, convinced that they had Equity on their side, followed their Generals with an assured Confidence, imagining themselves under the immediate Protection of the Gods. Add to this, that the Historians, partly misled by the same Notions, partly thro' a national and almost unavoidable Partiality, have vied with one another in extolling the Equity and Moderation of the *Romans*, and varnishing over such parts of their Behaviour, as seemed most liable to exception. The Merit of these Writers, and the Veneration paid them by succeeding Ages, have given a kind of Sanction and Authority to their Opinions. It looks like Presumption to contradict Authors of so established a Reputation: and being accustomed

customed to admire them from our Infancy, we are easily led to believe, that we cannot do better than blindly give into their Sentiments. It is only upon this Principle I am able to excuse some late Writers of great Name, who in treating of the *Roman* Commonwealth, have not scrupled to adopt the Prejudices of the ancient Historians, and represent that People as Patterns of Equity and Justice in all their Proceedings.

CHAP.
I.

VI. As nothing is of greater importance in History, than to form a right Judgment of Events and their Causes, and penetrate into the real Character of States and Nations, I shall take some pains to set this Matter in a true Light; and to that end shall lay before the Reader a short view of the Transactions between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*. It is well known, that these last were characterized by the *Romans*, as a faithless and perfidious People, regardless of Oaths, and whom no Ties or Treaties could bind. They even went so far as to make *Punick Faith* serve only as another Expression for *Insincerity*. Who would imagine, after such a representation of Things, that in all the *Punick Wars* the *Romans* were the Aggressors; and that, in the two last especially, they forced the *Carthaginians* into them by the most flagrant Acts of Injustice? But let Truth and an impartial Account of Facts determine. The occasion of the first *Punick War* was as follows. A

Body

CHAP. Body of *Campanian* Soldiers, known in History by the Name of *Mamertines*, and who had served under *Agathocles* Tyrant of *Syracuse*, upon the Death of that Prince retired to *Messina*: where being received as Friends, they treacherously massacred one part of the Inhabitants, expelled the rest, and seizing upon the Lands, Houses, and even Wives of those unfortunate Men, remained sole Masters of that important City. Some time after this, the People of *Rbegium*, to screen themselves from the Insults of the *Cartbaginians*, whose Fleets appeared frequently off their Coast, applied to the *Roman* Senate for a Garrison: A Legion of four thousand Men raised in *Campania*, and commanded by *Decius Jubellius*, was appointed to that Service. At first they behaved suitably to the Intention of those who employed them: but at length, tempted by the Wealth of the Place, emboldened by the example of the *Mamertines*, and strengthened by their aid, they acted the same perfidious and cruel Part towards the *Rbegians*, which the other had acted towards the People of *Messina*.

VII. As these two Cities were parted only by the narrow Strait which separates *Italy* from *Sicily*, and were not insensible of the Odium they had brought upon themselves by their Treachery, they entered into a strict Confederacy mutually to support each other in their Usurpations. This Alliance subsisted

for

for some time. But at length the *Romans*, CHAP. I. having disengaged themselves from the many Wars in which they were intangled, turned their Thoughts towards the Punishment of their perfidious Legion. *Rbegium* was invested, and after an obstinate Resistance, taken by Assault. All that remained alive of the Garrison, amounting to about three hundred, were carried to *Rome*, beaten with Rods, and then publicly beheaded in the Forum. The Destruction of this confederate City produced a mighty change in the Affairs of the *Mameritines*. While aided by their Friends at *Rbegium*, they had not only lived fearless of Danger, but had often made Inroads into the Territories of the *Cartbaginians* and *Syracusans*, putting many of their Towns and Villages under Contribution. The Case was now greatly altered: for being attacked by *Hiero* Prætor of *Syracuse*, they were overthrown in Battle, and their Army almost totally cut off. Humbled and reduced by so terrible a Blow, they thought themselves no longer in a condition to defend *Messina*; and differing in Opinion about what Measures to pursue, one Party surrendered the Citadel to the *Cartbaginians*, whilst another sent Ambassadors to implore the Protection of the *Romans*.

VIII. THE Affair was debated in the Senate; where being considered in all its Lights, it gave no small perplexity to the Fathers. On the one hand they thought it dishonourable,

able, and altogether unworthy of the *Roman* Virtue, to undertake the defence of Traitors, whose Perfidy was exactly the same with that of the *Rbegians*, which they had lately punished with so exemplary a Severity. But then again it was of the utmost Consequence to stop the Progress of the *Carthaginians*; who, not satisfied with their Conquests in *Africa* and *Spain*, had also made themselves Masters of *Sardinia*, and the adjacent Isles on the Coast of *Italy*; and would certainly get all *Sicily* into their hands, if they should be suffered to possess themselves of *Messina*. From thence, into *Italy*, the Passage was very short; and it was in some measure to invite an Enemy to come over, to leave him that Entrance open. These Reasons, tho' strong, could not prevail with the Senate to declare in favour of the *Mamertines*; and accordingly Motives of Honour and Justice prevailed over those of Interest and Policy. But the People were not so scrupulous. In an Assembly held on this Subject, it was resolved that the *Mamertines* should be assisted; and *Appius Claudius*, one of the Consuls, was ordered to conduct an Army into *Sicily* for that purpose. *Appius*, to learn the true state of Things, went over in person to *Messina*, and conducted himself so happily, as by some means to persuade the *Carthaginian* Officer to evacuate the Citadel. This so highly offended the People of *Carthage*, that they condemned their Officer to be crucified as a Traitor

tor and a Coward. At the same time they CHAP. I.
 invested the Place by Sea and Land, and entering into an Alliance with *Hiero* the new King of *Syracuse*, were joined by his Troops. Mean-while *Appias*, having by an artful Stratagem, eluded the Vigilance of the *Carthaginian* Admiral, crossed the Strait with all his Forces, and attacking the *Syracusans* and *Carthaginians* one after another, compelled them to abandon the Siege.

IX. SUCH was the beginning of the first *Punick* War, in which I think it evidently appears, that the *Romans* were the Aggressors. For they undertook the defence of a traitorous and perfidious set of Men, against a People with whom they were in Alliance and Amity. I deny not that Reasons of State, and the Maxims of Policy, plead strongly in their Behalf on this Occasion. It was certainly not their Interest, to suffer the *Carthaginians* to become too powerful, or get intire possession of an Island that lay so contiguous to *Italy*. But if we examine their Conduct by the Rules of strict Justice, it will be found no easy matter to vindicate it. And in fact we have seen, that the Senate absolutely declared against aiding the *Mamertines*, as inconsistent with Honour, and the Dignity of the *Roman* Name. Whether they acted sincerely upon this Occasion, or only to save Appearances, is not my business to determine. It is enough that the thing itself serves to justify

CHAP. I. the *Carthaginians*, and exempt them from the Charge of having been the first Aggressors in this War. Nor indeed do the *Roman* Writers throw the Blame of it upon them, but generally allow, that Jealousy, and an apprehension of each other's growing Power, embroiled the two States upon the present Occasion.

X. BUT let us now pass to the second *Punic* War. Here it is that the Charge of Insincerity seems to lie heaviest against the *Carthaginians*. The *Romans* exasperated by the Losses they received, gave a free vent to their Hatred, and spared no Endeavours to blacken their Adversaries, and lay the whole Blame of the War upon them. And indeed they have contrived to give a specious Colour to this Accusation, by representing the taking of *Saguntum* as the cause of the Quarrel. For to consider only the first appearance of this Step; *Hannibal*, contrary, as they pretend, to the express tenor of Treaties, and without any formal Declaration of War, falls upon a City in alliance with the *Romans*. But as *Polybius* has very judiciously observed, the taking of *Saguntum* is to be looked upon as the beginning, not the cause of the War: and if we trace Matters to their source, we shall find that the *Carthaginians* were provoked to this Step, by a series of the most unjustifiable Injuries on the side of the *Romans*. Soon after the conclusion of the Peace of *Sicily*, the Mercenaries

Mercenaries who had served in the Armies of *Carthage* revolting, brought that State to the very brink of Destruction. The *Sardinians* taking advantage of these Troubles, shook off the *Carthaginian* Yoke, and expelled all their Garrisons out of the Island. Things continued for some time in this situation, till at length the *Carthaginians*, having quelled the Rebellion in *Africa*, prepared to recover possession of *Sardinia*. The *Romans*, who during all the foregoing Troubles of *Carthage* had behaved with great Justice and Moderation, now seeing that People like to regain their former Strength, pretended a jealousy of the new Preparations, and declared War against them. The *Carthaginians*, unable at that time to enter the Lists with so powerful an Adversary, were forced to submit to a second Treaty, by which they gave up *Sardinia* to the *Romans*, and obliged themselves to an additional Payment of twelve hundred Talents.

XI. THIS Injustice of the *Romans* may be considered as the first and principal Cause of the second *Punic* War. For *Hamilcar* first named *Barcha*, highly exasperated on account of a Treaty, which Necessity alone had compelled the *Carthaginians* to submit to, resolved to break with *Rome* the first favourable Opportunity; and accordingly directed all his Views to the success of that Enterprize. How deeply he resented the Injury of which we

CHAP. I. speak, appears by his making *Hannibal* swear upon the Altar at the age of nine Years, that he would ever be an irreconcilable Enemy to the *Romans*. During his command in *Spain*, he brought the greatest part of that Country under the power of the *Carthaginians*: but falling in Battle before he had completed the Conquest of it, *Asdrubal* his Son-in-law succeeded him, and continued the War with success. This alarmed the *Romans*, who thinking it a necessary piece of Policy to check the growing Power of a rival State, obliged *Asdrubal* to enter into a new Treaty, in which it was stipulated, that he should attempt no Conquest beyond the *Iberus*. How this may appear to others, I cannot say, but to me it carries the Idea of a fresh Insult, as the *Romans* hereby claimed a manifest superiority over the *Carthaginians*, and assumed the power of setting Bounds to their Empire: a Point upon which they were always so very nice themselves, that no Excuse can be offered for their disregarding it in their Conduct towards others.

XII. *HANNIBAL* succeeded *Asdrubal* in the command of the Army; and having in a very short time completed the reduction of *Spain*, began to think seriously of avenging the many Wrongs done his Country by the *Romans*. To that end he contrived a pretence of Quarrel with the *Saguntines*, that by attacking their City, he might give occasion to a Rupture between

between the two States. For though *Saguntum* lay on this side the *Iberus*, and therefore was within the Plan of Conquest permitted to the *Carthaginians* by the *Romans*; yet these last, as if repenting of the Concession they had made to their Adversaries, concluded an alliance with the *Saguntines* soon after the signing of the Treaty with *Asdrubal*. Now as by an Article of that Treaty, neither State was to make War upon the Allies of the other, the *Romans* pretended that *Saguntum*, though on this side the *Iberus*, could not be attacked without violating the Peace. On the other hand the *Carthaginians* maintained, that the very Alliance with the *Saguntines* was a violation of the Treaty, as being no other than a mean Artifice to wrest the power of making War upon the *Saguntines* out of their hands, after it had been expressly conceded to them by that Article, which permitted the Conquest of all the Nations of *Spain* on this side the *Iberus*. I think it needless to enter into a Discussion of this nice point, because the taking of *Saguntum* ought to be considered rather as the beginning of the Quarrel, than the Cause of the War. The *Carthaginians* were determined upon Hostilities: and it appears by the above deduction, that the *Romans*, by a continued series of Insults and Provocations, had given them but too just ground to come to that Extremity. *Polybius* himself, a great admirer of the *Romans*, and who endeavours on all occasions

CHAP. to represent their Conduct in the most favourable Light, though he blames the Attempt upon *Saguntum* as an infraction of the Treaty, is yet forced to acknowledge thus much. " It would be a great mistake, says that judicious Historian, to consider the taking of *Saguntum* by *Hannibal* as the real Cause of the second *Punick* War. It was the beginning, but not the cause of it. The regret of the *Cartbaginians* for the loss of *Sicily*; the Violence and Injustice of the *Romans*, in seizing *Sardinia*, and imposing a new Tribute; and lastly, the Success of the *Cartbaginian* Armies in *Spain*, which inspired that State with Courage, and alarmed their Adversaries: these were the real Causes of the Rupture. If we consider only the Siege of *Saguntum*, we cannot avoid throwing the whole blame upon the *Cartbaginians*, whose attack of that City was a manifest Violation of the Treaty with *Asdrubal*. For though the *Saguntines* were not in alliance with *Rome* at the time of the conclusion of that Treaty, it is evident the *Romans* did not thereby divest themselves of the Liberty of making new Alliances. In this view of things, therefore, the *Cartbaginians* would be altogether inexcusable. But if we go back to the Times when *Sardinia* was forcibly seized, and a new Tribute imposed, it must be confessed, adds the Historian, that the Conduct of the *Romans* in these two points cannot be justified."

XIII. Thus we see that *Polybius* throws CHAP. I.
 the whole blame of the second *Punic* War upon the *Romans*; and I believe every thinking Man will be of the same Opinion: which ought to make us cautious of giving too easy Credit to the Representations of their Historians, when they charge their Enemies with Infidelity and Breach of Faith, and bestow such magnificent Elogiums of Justice and Moderation upon their own Commonwealth. For allowing the *Carthaginians* to have been the first in breaking the Peace, it may with reason be asked, whether the notorious Injustice of the *Romans* previously committed, did not justify them in no longer observing a Treaty concluded in all the Forms; and whether it was not a legitimate Reason for entering into a War. I cannot however but observe, that *Polybius* seems to be a little too severe in his Censure of the *Carthaginians* for attacking *Saguntum*. It will surely admit of debate, whether the Article relating to the Allies of both States could be extended any farther than to the Alliance actually subsisting at the time of the signing of the Treaty. If we extend it to all Alliances whatsoever, either made or to be made; this seems mutually to invest them with a Power of prohibiting each other from engaging in any War: because either of them contracting an Alliance with that People against whom War was intended, rendered them thereby

sacred and inviolable. But allowing the Reflection of *Polybius* to be just, that the two States by that Treaty did not absolutely divest themselves of the Liberty of making new Alliances; it seems yet pretty evident that the *Romans* did so, in respect of all the Nations lying on this side the *Iberus*. For by giving up to the *Carthaginians* the entire Conquest of those Countries, they plainly bound themselves not to come under any Engagements inconsistent with that Article. The Alliance therefore with the *Saguntines*, as it tended to divest the *Carthaginians* of a Power expressly conceded to them by the Treaty, ought to be considered as a direct Violation of it: and the *Romans* might with equal justice have contracted Amity with all the other Nations of *Spain* yet unsubdued, and thereby utterly deprived the *Carthaginians* of the Power of making War in that Country.

XIV. BUT it is now time to take a view of the Causes that gave rise to the third *Punick* War; in which, I believe, it will be abundantly manifest, that the *Romans* proceeded without the least appearance of Justice. Among the Conditions of the Peace granted by *Scipio* to the *Carthaginians*, there was one which imported, that they should not make War without the consent of the *Romans*. *Masiniſſa*, King of *Numidia*, taking advantage of this Article, made daily Incroachments upon their Territories, and dispossessed them

of

of several Towns and Districts. He was CHAP. I.
 himself in great favour with the *Romans*,
 on account of the many Services he had done
 them in the second *Punic* War: and being
 no Stranger to their Hatred and Jealousy of
 the *Carthaginians*, imagined they would not
 be displeased at his Attempts to weaken the
 Power of a Rival-State. The Event shewed
 that he was not mistaken in his Judgment.
 The *Carthaginians* not daring to do themselves
 justice, applied to the *Romans* for Redress. But
 all their Solicitations were to no purpose.
 Commissioners indeed set out for *Africa*, to
 examine the Pretensions of the two Parties,
 and bring Matters to an issue. These finding
Masniſſa already possessed of the Territories
 in question, chose rather to leave the Affair
 undecided, than either oblige the King to
 abandon his Conquests, or declare expressly
 against the *Carthaginians*. The same Conduct
 was observed in two following Deputations:
 whence it was generally believed, that the
 Commissioners acted in a manner by Order of
 the Senate, and had received private Instruc-
 tions to favour *Masniſſa*, who by this Delay
 had an Opportunity of establishing himself in
 his Usurpations.

XV. It was upon occasion of the last of
 these Deputations, that the elder *Cato*, who
 was one of the Commissioners, observing the
 flourishing Condition of *Carthage*, and its
 great Power and Riches, notwithstanding the
 many

many Losses it had sustained, could not help considering it as a very dangerous Rival to his Country. Accordingly at his return, he declared in the Senate, that *Rome* could never be safe, so long as *Carthage* should subsist. Nay so deeply had this Apprehension rooted itself in his Mind, that in order to keep alive in his Countrymen a sense of their danger, he never spoke upon publick Affairs, but he always concluded his opinion with this Sentence, *Carthage must be destroy'd*. And indeed the *Romans*, naturally averse to that City, and mindful of the many Calamities they had suffered from it, were easily persuaded to come into this Design. Nor was it long before an Opportunity offered itself. The *Carthaginians* exasperated to the last degree by the continual Incroachments of *Masmissa*, and seeing no hopes of Redress from the Senate, had recourse to Arms. A Battle was fought, in which they were defeated, their Camp taken, and their whole Army cut to pieces. The *Romans* resolving to take advantage of this Blow, and of the Pretence furnished by the Quarrel with *Masmissa*, declared War in form. All the Endeavours of the *Carthaginians* to mollify them were without effect. They even made an absolute surrender of their City and Territories; and in obedience to the Orders of the Senate, sent three hundred of their principal Nobility as Hostages, and delivered up, without Fraud, all their Arms. But these Acts of Submission were enjoined

enjoined, only in the view of weakening, and rendering them incapable of Resistance. For the *Romans* still peremptorily demanding, that they should abandon their City, and give it up to be demolished, compelled them at last to arm in their own Defence.

CHAP.

I.

XVI. I thought it necessary to be thus particular in my Account of the Wars between these two States, because they best serve to show what Credit is due to the pompous Accounts we meet with in Historians, of the Sincerity and inviolable Justice of the *Romans*. For here, if any where, we may expect to find Samples of that Equity and Moderation. Here we may look for a Conduct altogether clear and void of Reproach. It is certain that the *Romans* always valued themselves in a particular manner, upon their good Faith, and exact observance of Treaties with the *Carthaginians*. This evidently appears by the advantageous Testimony *Cæsar* gives of his Conntrymen in this respect, in that famous Speech of his in *Salust*, upon occasion of the Conspiracy of *Catiline*. *Bellis Punicis omnibus, cum sæpe Carthaginienses, & in Pace, & per Inducias, multa nefanda Facinora, fecissent; nunquam ipsi per occasionem talia fecere: magis quod se dignum foret, quàm quod in illis Jure fieri posset, querebant.*"

" Altho' in all the *Punick Wars*, the *Carthaginians*, both in Peace, and during Truces, were guilty of many Abuses and Violations

of

CHAP. I. " of their Engagements; the *Romans*, how
 " inviting soever the Opportunity might be,
 " could yet never be prevailed upon to retaliate
 " the like usage. They were more atten-
 " tive to their own Glory, than to the Revenge
 " they might have justly taken on such per-
 " fidious Enemies." We find likewise a
 great many Reflections to the same purpose
 sprinkled up and down the Writings of
Cicero: from all which it is easy to judge,
 how irreproachable they thought their Con-
 duct on this head, and what a Pattern of
 Justice and Moderation. But if notwithstand-
 ing all these favourable Representations, it
 still appears so very liable to Exception; how
 much less can it be justified with regard to
 other States? And, indeed, was I to enter
 into a particular Detail, I could easily evince,
 that it was no other than a continued train of
 Insults and Provocations, designedly calculat-
 ed to exasperate such States as were most
 obnoxious, and force them to have recourse
 to Arms. It will doubtless appear wonder-
 ful to the Reader, how amidst such a series
 of oppressive Conduct, the *Romans* still found
 means to preserve, in some measure, the Re-
 putation of Justice and Equity. But this, as
 we have before intimated, was chiefly ow-
 ing to their observance of certain outward
 Forms. They never failed to contrive some
 ground of Complaint against those Nations
 they intended to attack; to send Deputies to
 demand satisfaction; and to make formal
 Declaration

Declaration of War by a Herald, previous to CHAP.
 the commencing of Hostilities. It must in- I.
 deed be owned, that it required no small Art and
 Policy, so to involve and intangle themselves
 with all the Nations of the then known World,
 that they could at pleasure find some specious
 Pretence of Quarrel, when their Interest requir-
 ed them to break with any State. This gave a
 Colour of Justice to all their Undertakings,
 inspired their Armies with Assurance and
 Confidence, inviolably attached to them their
 old Friends, and procured them new Allies
 at pleasure. And as it seems to have been
 one of their Master-strokes in Politicks, and
 the principal Engine by which they pushed
 on their Conquests, it may not be amiss to
 give the Reader some little Insight into their
 artful Conduct in this respect, that he may
 the better comprehend the Motives and Ten-
 dency of it.

XVII. ALTHO' I cannot bring myself to
 think, with some modern Writers of pretended
 Depth and Penetration, that *Numa Pompilius*
 had a political view, in the several religious
 Regulations he established at *Rome*; yet I am
 ready enough to allow, that many of his In-
 stitutions were afterwards, by the prudent
 Management of the Senate, converted into
 Maxims of State, and rendered very service-
 able in the administration of the Government.
 Of this Nature particularly were the Cere-
 monies relating to the Declaration of War.
 Nothing

CHAP. Nothing is of greater consequence to an ambi-

I. bitious Republick, which aims at universal Dominion, and a gradual Subjection of all Nations, than to prevent such a general Confederacy against her, as might not only put a stop to her Conquests, but even threaten her in her turn with Destruction. This the Senate effected by their singular Address and Conduct, in the several Wars in which they were engaged. For they always found means to colour them over with such a specious pretence of Justice, as gave no Umbrage to the neighbouring States, nor begot any Jealousy of a Power, which seemed to have nothing in view but the redressing of its own Wrongs, or those of other Nations in alliance with it. That strong bent towards Religion, and the Worship of the Gods, which *Numa* introduced among the People, and which the Senate carefully cherished for many Generations, helped greatly to forward this Persuasion. Men were not apt to distrust a religious Republick, where Virtue was held in honour, and Vice of every kind discountenanced. Let me add, that in the early Ages of the State, this was more than mere Pretence. They were really distinguished by their Probity, by a steady adherence to Justice, and a faithful observance of Treaties. Most of their Wars were defensive, or undertaken for the sake of their Allies. And though in after-times, in proportion as their Power increased, they gave way to the Dictates

tates of Ambition; and became less scrupulous in their Conduct: yet as they never departed from those outward Observances, by which the appearance of Justice is maintained; and took care to signalize themselves from time to time, by such particular Instances of Moderation, as could not fail to make a deep Impression; their Reputation for Equity and good Faith continued still the same.

CHAR.

I.

XVIII. OBSERVE, I beseech you, the different Sentiments entertained of the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, at the time of the Rupture between the two States. The *Romans*, tho' they had gradually subjected all the Nations of *Italy*, and raised themselves to a very formidable Pitch of Greatness, were yet so far from being considered as an ambitious Republick, against which it was necessary for other States to be upon their guard, that the fame of their Virtue and Justice seems at this time to have been at the highest; insomuch that foreign Nations, instead of dreading their Power, courted their Alliance and Amity. It was otherwise with the *Carthaginians*. They had been less careful to conceal their Ambition, or cover their Breach of Treaties under a pretence of Injuries. Hence their Designs became suspected, all their Actions were viewed in the worst Light, and the general Prejudice against them was so strong, that every thing laid to their Charge by their Enemies

CHAP. Enemies found a ready Belief. By this means

I. it happened, that though in the Interval between the first and second *Punick* Wars, the *Romans* acted without the least regard to Justice and the Faith of Treaties, yet very little notice was taken of the Complaints of the *Carthaginians*: and when in consequence of repeated Insults and Provocations, they were at last obliged to have recourse to Arms; the whole blame of the War, though so manifestly flowing from the injurious Behaviour of the *Romans*, was nevertheless charged upon the Perfidy of the *Carthaginians*.

XIX. AFTER the entire Conquest of *Italy*, and the Reduction of the greatest Part of *Sicily* in the first *Punick* War, it required a more refined Policy in the *Romans*, to extend the Limits of their Empire, and at the same time keep up the Reputation of their Integrity. They were not immediately surrounded with those Nations, which it was their Interest to attack; and therefore could not easily provoke them to such Acts of Hostility, as might justify a Declaration of War. And should they upon slight Pretences transport an Army out of their own Territories, to fall upon a distant Prince, the design of Conquest would be visible, and beget a general alarm. Besides, their Power was become so very formidable, that foreign States did not care to contend with them, and therefore industriously avoided giving them any just ground of Complaint.

Complaint. In this Situation they took upon themselves the Title of Patrons and Protectors of all Nations, and by contracting Alliances with weaker States, found means to fall upon the stronger at pleasure, without seeming themselves to have any particular Interest in the Quarrel. It was upon this Principle that they attached themselves to the *Saguntines* and *Ætolians*, which afterwards furnished them with such a plausible colour for the *Carthaginian* and *Macedonian* Wars. To know the full Reach and Value of this Policy, we need only reflect, that though the second *Punick* War was unexceptionably just on the Part of the *Carthaginians*; yet the *Romans*, by diverting the attention of the Publick from the Usurpation of *Sardinia*, and the fixing it upon the Fate of *Saguntum*, threw the whole odium of that War upon their Adversaries, whilst themselves were considered as a humane generous People, actuated merely by a Concern for their Allies.

XX. AND here it is particularly deserving of our notice, that amongst the many Wars in which they were engaged, after the conclusion of that with *Hannibal*, we hardly meet with any that can be deemed personal. It was always, at least in appearance, to support the Cause of some of their Allies, or prevent their being crushed by a powerful Neighbour. One would be apt to think, that they had it not so much in view to aggran-

CHAP. I. dize themselves, as to prevent the Growth of any dangerous Power, from which weaker States might be exposed to suffer. Upon the conclusion of the first *Macedonian War*, they proclaimed Liberty to all the States of *Greece*. This Action, so magnificent in appearance, was in reality a refined Stroke of Policy. The *Greeks* were a warlike People, well disciplined, and capable of bringing great Armies into the Field. Had they suspected the *Romans* of a Design upon their Liberties, and united in their own defence, they must have been invincible. But this seeming Grant of Freedom effectually lulled them asleep, and by the artful Conduct of the *Romans*, gave birth to infinite Divisions among them; which ending commonly in an Appeal to *Rome*, furnished the Senate with frequent Opportunities of taking part in their Quarrels. Thus they insensibly grew to be Rulers and Dictators over them, and by slow imperceptible Steps accomplished their Subjection.

XXI. THEIR Ambassadors to foreign Princes, and such as had not yet felt the weight of their Power, commonly delivered themselves in such a haughty magisterial way, as could not fail to draw upon them some Indignity or ill Treatment; and thereby furnish a sure Pretext of War, when the Interest of the Commonwealth rendered such a Step necessary. If a People at any time had given them Umbrage, and afterwards repenting of their Rashness,

ness, surrendered up the principal Offenders; CHAP. I.
 they would often refuse to punish them, choosing rather to consider the whole Nation as guilty, and reserve to themselves an useful Vengeance. When they saw two Nations engag'd in War, although they were not in alliance, nor had any Contest with either of them, they would nevertheless appear upon the Stage of Action, and affected always to side with the weakest. It was an ancient Custom, says *Dionysius of Halycarnassus*, for the *Romans* to grant Succour to all who came to implore it. If Princes of the same Blood were at variance for the Crown, they seldom failed to make themselves Parties in the Dispute; and if one of them was a Minor, declared in his favour, proclaiming themselves his Guardians in quality of Protectors of the World. When Subjects oppressed and tyrannised over by their Sovereigns, were provoked to renounce their Allegiance, they immediately indulged them the Title of Ally, declaring themselves the professed Enemies of Tyranny and lawless Power.


XXII. THESE were the Arts and Policies, by which the *Romans* so intangled themselves with all Nations, that they could with pleasure engage in a War with any State, and colour it over with such an appearance of Justice, as not only prevented any general Confederacy against them, but even warmly engaged their Allies in the support of their Usurpations.

CHAP. I. Usurpations. Nor were they less politick in the choice of their Wars, and in the manner of conducting and bringing them to a period. For as their Power was very formidable, and they had contrived to draw many Nations over to their Interest: whatever State took up Arms against them, found it impossible to make any long Resistance, and was in the end forced to accept of such Conditions of Peace as they thought fit to propose. For this reason War was seldom declared against them, but themselves always made it, at a Season, with a People, and in such manner as best suited their Interest. If they were opposed by several Enemies at the same time, they granted a Truce to the weakest, who thought themselves happy in obtaining it, considering it as a great Advantage, that their Ruin was at least suspended. They never engaged in far-distant Wars, till they had first made an Alliance with some Power contiguous to the Enemy they invaded, who might unite his Troops to the Army they sent: and as this was never considerable with regard to Numbers, they always had another in that Province which lay nearest the Enemy, and a third, in *Rome*, ever ready to march at a Minute's warning. In this manner they hazarded but a small part of their Forces at once, and found it easy to repair any Loss they might sustain, whilst their Enemy was often ruined by a single Battle. It was this Consideration that inspired *Hannibal* with the Resolution

Resolution of attacking them in *Italy* itself, CHAP. I.
 the Center of their Dominions. He was sensible that a Blow struck there, must effectually weaken them; whereas distant Defeats, so long as the Capital remained unmolested, and was at liberty to send a fresh Supply of Troops to recruit the Army, were properly speaking little other than so many Lessons of Prudence to their Generals, who soon found themselves in a condition to renew the War, with greater Forces, and more Circumspection. Accordingly we find, that when the same *Hannibal* afterwards offered his Service to *Antiochus*, in his intended War against the *Romans*, there was no Principle he inculcated more earnestly, than the Necessity of sending an Army into *Italy*, and cutting them off from those continual Resources, by which in any other method of Attack they found themselves invincible.

XXIII. But nothing gives us a greater idea of the Address and Policy of this People, than the manner in which they terminated their Wars, when they had at last brought them to the point they desired. They sent the Garrisons out of the Strong-holds; had the Horses and Elephants delivered up to them; and if their Enemies were powerful at Sea, obliged them to burn their Ships, and sometimes remove higher up in the Country. If the Prince they had overcome was possessed of numerous Armies, and surrounded with

CHAP. I. warlike Nations, one of the Articles of the Treaty was, that he should not make War with any of the Allies of the *Romans*, but submit his Differences to Arbitration. And as they never refused their Alliance to any People who bordered on a powerful Prince, this Condition inserted in a Treaty of Peace, cut him off from all Opportunities of making War, or employing his Troops, and thereby deprived him of a military Power for the time to come. Nay they even bereaved their very Allies of this Force. The instant any Contest broke out amongst them, they sent Ambassadors who obliged them to conclude a Peace. It was in this manner they terminated the Wars between *Attalus* and *Prusias*; and whoever is in the least acquainted with their History, must be sensible, that they all along adhered strictly to this Policy. The Result was, that they alone were possessed of warlike and veteran Armies, whilst those of other Nations degenerated into a raw unpractised Rabble. When any State composed too formidable a Body from its Situation or Union, they never failed to divide it. The Republic of *Achaia* was formed by an Association of free Cities. The Senate declared, that every City should be governed by its own Laws, independent on the general Authority. *Macedonia* was surrounded with inaccessible Mountains. The Senate divided it into four Parts; declared those free; prohibited them every kind of Alliance among themselves by Marriage;

Marriage; carried off all the Nobles into *Italy*, CHAP.
I.
and by that means reduced this Power to nothing. 

XXIV. THESE Customs of the *Romans* were not certain particular Incidents which happened by chance; but so many invariable Principles, from which in a long Course of Years they never deviated. The Maxims they put in practice against the greatest Monarchs, were exactly the same with those they had employed in their infant State, against the little Cities which stood round them. They made *Eumenes* and *Masinissa* contribute to the Subjection of *Philip* and *Antiochus*, as they had before employed the *Latines* and *Hernici*, to subdue the *Volscians* and the *Tuscan*s. They obliged the *Carthaginians* and the Kings of *Asia* to surrender their Fleets to them, in like manner as they had forced the Citizens of *Antium* to give up their little Vessels. And indeed it is surprising to consider, that during the course of that long and mighty Prosperity which attended the *Roman* Arms, and in which it is so usual for Mankind to forget themselves, the Senate continued to act all along with the same depth of Judgment, and the same steady Views to the publick Interest. They were not dazzled by their good Fortune, nor moved to precipitate their Enterprises before the proper Season. Observe, I entreat you, the Wisdom and Policy of their Conduct. After the Defeat of *Antiochus*,
they

CHAP. they were possessed of *Africa*, *Asia*, and
 I. *Greece*, without having a single City in those
 Countries, that could be called immediately
 their own. They seemed to conquer with
 no other view but to bestow. But then
 they obtained so complete a Sovereignty;
 that whenever they engaged in War with
 any Prince, they oppressed him, as it were,
 with the weight of the whole Universe.
 The time proper for seizing upon the con-
 quered Countries was not yet come. Had
 the *Romans* kept the Cities they took from
Philip, the *Greeks* would have seen at once
 into their Designs. Had they, after the se-
 cond *Punick* War, or that with *Antiochus*,
 possessed themselves of Lands in *Africa* and
 in *Asia*, they could never have preserved Con-
 quests so slightly established. It was the In-
 terest of the Senate to wait till all Nations
 were accustomed to obey as free and as con-
 federate, and to let them blend and lose them-
 selves insensibly in the *Roman* Commonwealth,
 before they should attempt reducing them to
 the Condition of Subjects. After overcoming a
 Nation, they contented themselves with weak-
 ening it, and imposing such Conditions as con-
 sumed it insensibly. If it recovered, they de-
 pressed it still more, and it became subject with-
 out a possibility of dating the *Æra* of its Subjec-
 tion. This was indeed a slow way of conquer-
 ing, but founded in the deepest Policy. *Rome*,
 by a steady Adherence to these Maxims, gra-
 dually increased in Strength; and having at
 length

length got the better of all Opposition, se-CHAP.
curely took possession of the Sovereignty of II.
the Universe.

C H A P. II.

*Of the manner of levying Troops, and
forming a Roman Army.*

I. **T**HE Levies, during the times of the Commonwealth, to which Period we chiefly confine ourselves, were commonly made by the Consuls. Every Year they issued out an Edict, commanding all who had reached the military Age, to appear in the Field of *Mars*, or in the Capitol. Two Legions composed a consular Army: and as there were two Consuls, it was usual to raise four Legions yearly. The Age for serving in the Army was from seventeen to forty-five. None but Citizens were admitted: and all of that Rank within the Age prescribed by Law, were obliged to be present on the Day prefixed, under pain of a Fine. To fail in this respect was long criminal during the Commonwealth. The People being assembled, the Consuls began by nominating the military Tribunes, twenty-four in Number, six to every Legion. Of these fourteen were chosen out of the Body of the Knights, and the rest from among the People. The first were required to have served at least five Years, and the

CHAP. II. the others ten. They were divided to the four Legions in this manner. Of the fourteen youngest Tribunes, four were assigned to the first Legion, three to the second, four to the third, and three to the last. Of the ten eldest, two to the first and third Legions, and three to the second and last.

II. THE four and twenty Tribunes thus chosen and appointed, every Tribe was called out by Lot, and ordered to divide into its proper Centuries. Four Men, as much alike in all circumstances as could be found, being presented out of the Century on whom the Lot fell; the Tribunes of the first Legion chose one, then the Tribunes of the second another; the Tribunes of the third Legion a third, and the remaining Person fell to the Tribunes of the fourth. After this four more were drawn out. And now the right of choosing first belonged to the Tribunes of the second Legion: in the next four to the Tribunes of the third Legion: then to the Tribunes of the fourth Legion: and so continually, those always choosing last in every turn, who chose first the time before. From this manner of choosing the Soldiers one by one, the several large Bodies into which they were formed, obtained the Name of Legions, from the Latin Word *legere*, to *choose*; and the Levy itself was called *Delectus*, *Choice*. No Soldier was admitted under the height of five *Roman* Feet and ten Inches, except in an extreme want
of

of Troops, which would not allow of choos-
 ing. It is observed, that the Men of the
 first Cohorts of each Legion were not under
 six Feet high, which amounts to five Feet
 ten Inches of our measure, the *Roman* Foot
 making eleven Inches and six hundred and
 four decimal Parts of an Inch *Englisb*.

CHAP.

II.

III. THE Horse were chosen out of the
 Body of the *Equites*, into which Order, after
 the institution of the *Census* by *Servius Tullius*,
 all were admitted who were worth four hun-
 dred *Sestertia*. They had a Horse and Ring
 given them at the publick Charge, and formed
 a third and middle Order between the Senate
 and the People. They are known in History
 under the Name of *Roman* Knights, and were
 obliged to appear on horseback, as often as
 the State had occasion for their Service. Thus
 there was always a sufficient Number of Ca-
 valry in readiness, and it belonged to the Cen-
 sors to review them, and furnish what was
 necessary to complete the Legions. It is in-
 deed hard to conceive, that all the *Roman*
 Horse in the Army should be Knights; and
 therefore many learned Men are of opinion,
 that after the Siege of *Veii*, there were two
 sorts of Cavalry in the *Roman* Armies: one,
 whom the Publick supplied with Horses, and
 who were said to serve *Equo publico*: the
 other, who furnished themselves, and served
Equo privato. The former they allow to have
 been of the Order of Knights, the latter not.

But

CHAP. But *Grævius* has abundantly demonstrated by
II. the Course of History, that from the beginning of the *Roman* State, till the time of *Marius*, no other Horse entered the Legions but the true and proper Knights, except in the midst of publick Confusion, when Order and Discipline were neglected. After that Period, the military Affairs being new modelled, the Knights thought not fit to expose themselves abroad in the Legions, as they had formerly done, but generally kept at home to enjoy their Estates, and to have a hand in the Transactions of the City, leaving their Places in the Army to be supplied by foreign Horse. Or if they ever made Campaigns themselves, they held some Post of Honour and Command. Hence under the Emperors, a Man might be a Knight, and have the Honour of a publick Horse, without ever engaging in the publick Cause, or so much as touching Arms: which Consideration made some Princes lay aside the Custom of allowing the Knights a Horse, and leave them only the gold Ring to distinguish their Order, as *Pliny* the elder affirms to have been done in his time.

IV. WHEN the Levies were compleated, the Tribunes of every Legion obliged the Soldiers one by one to take the military Oath. The Form in this case was, to choose out a Soldier, who repeated the Oath aloud. By this Oath he engaged to hazard his Life
for

for the Commonwealth, to obey his General, and not to quit the Army without Leave. In pronouncing it he held up his right Hand, raising the Thumb of it upright; after which all the Soldiers of each Legion declared that they swore the same thing, but without repeating the Form. This was not a mere Ceremony, but a very solemn Act of Religion, and so essential to the military State, that no Man was deemed a Soldier, nor allowed to strike or kill an Enemy, if he had not taken the customary Oath. We have a remarkable Example of this in the Behaviour of *Cato* the Cenfor. A Legion, in which the Son of that illustrious Senator served, being dismissed by the Consul who commanded in *Macedonia*, young *Cato* chose to continue with the Army. His Father thereupon wrote immediately to the Consul, to desire, if he thought fit to suffer his Son to remain in the Service, that he would make him take a new Oath, because being discharged from the former, he had no longer any right to join in Battle against the Enemy. We find likewise, that among the *Greeks* the military Oath was accounted inseparable from the State of a Soldier. And *Xenophon*, in his History of *Cyrus* the Great, informs us, that that Prince exceedingly applauded the Action of an Officer, who having raised his Arm to strike an Enemy, upon hearing the Retreat sounded, stopt short, regarding that Signal, as an order to proceed no farther.

CHAP V. AFTER administering the military Oath,

II.

the next care of the Tribunes was, to form the Troops into Legions. The exact Number of Soldiers in such a Battalion was not always the same. *Romulus* fixed it at three thousand Foot, and three hundred Horse. It afterwards rose to four, five, and six thousand. Under the Consuls it was commonly four thousand two hundred Foot, and three hundred Horse. This was the Number in the time of *Polybius*, and here I shall fix it. In order thoroughly to comprehend the Nature of the Legion, so famous in History, we must begin with observing, that the whole Infantry of which it was composed, was divided into four Orders, the *Velites*, *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*. The *Velites* were young, active Soldiers, and formed the light-armed Troops of the *Roman* Commonwealth. They had their Name *à volando*, or *à velocitate*, from their Swiftnefs and Expedition. They were not divided into Companies, nor had any fixed Post assigned them in a Day of Battle, but hovered in loose order before the Army, or were disposed among the Cavalry and heavy-armed Troops, as occasion required. The *Hastati* were so called, because they used in ancient times to fight with Spears, which were afterwards laid aside as incommodious. These were taken out the next in Age to the *Velites*, and formed the first Line in a Day of Battle. The *Principes* were generally Men

Men of middle Age, in the prime and vigour of Life, whence probably they took their Name. Their Post in an Engagement was the second Line. The *Triarii* were old Soldiers of distinguished Valour, who had served long, and acquired great Experience. They had their Name from their Post in the Field of Battle, forming the third Line or Reserve. They are likewise sometimes called *Pilant*, from their Weapon the *Pilum*. CHAP. I.

VI. THESE several Divisions formed twelve hundred Men apiece in the three first Orders, and six hundred in the last, amounting in all to four thousand two hundred, the intire Infantry of a Legion. Each Body, the *Velites* excepted, was subdivided into ten Parts or *Maniples*, consisting of an hundred and twenty in the *Hastati* and *Principes*, and of sixty in the *Triarii*. Every *Manipulus* made two Centuries or Companies. Anciently, and at its first Institution by *Romulus*, the Centary had an hundred Men, from which it took its Name. But afterwards, it consisted only of sixty in the *Hastati* and *Principes*, and of thirty in the *Triarii*. Three *Maniples*, one of the *Hastati*, another of the *Principes*, and a third of the *Triarii*, composed a Cohort. Every Legion, therefore, consisted of ten Cohorts, besides the twelve hundred *Velites*, who, as we have already observed, were not divided into distinct Companies. The Number of Legions kept on foot was different, according to the different Exigences

CHAP. gences of the State. During the Common-
 II. wealth, four Legions were usually levied every
 Year, and divided between the two Consuls.
 But in case of Necessity, the Number was
 augmented, and we sometimes meet with
 eighteen in *Livy*.

VII. We have observed that every *Maniple* was divided into two Centuries or Companies. Over each of these presided an Officer called a Centurion. To determine the Point of Priority between them, they were created at two different Elections. Those of the first Election, as the most honourable, alway took the Precedency of their Fellows, and therefore commanded the right hand Orders, as the others did the left. He who commanded the first Century of the first *Maniple* of the *Triarii*, called also *Pilani*, was the most considerable of all the Centurions, and had a Place in the Council of War with the Consul and principal Officers. He bore the Name of *Primipilus*, or *Primipili Centurio*; and was called likewise *Primipilus prior*, to distinguish him from the Centurion who commanded the second Century of the same *Maniple* who had the Title of *Primipilus posterior*. This Distinction of *prior* and *posterior* had place also in all the other *Maniples*. The Centurion who commanded the first Century of the second *Maniple* of the *Triarii*, was called *secundi Pili Centurio*; and so on to the tenth, who was called *decimi Pili Centurio*. The same order was observed among the *Hastati* and

and *Principes*. The first Centurion of the *Principes* was called *primus Princeps*, or *primi Principis Centurio*. The second, *secundus Princeps*, &c. and so on to the last. So likewise among the *Hastati*, *primus Hastatus*, or *primi Hastati Centurio*, *secundus Hastatus*, &c. through all the different Orders. As it belonged to the military Tribunes to appoint the Centurions, so these last chose *Vexillarii* or Ensigns, two to every *Maniple*. They had likewise Officers under them called *Succenturiones* or *Optiones*, and who were in the nature of our Lieutenants. *Polybius* mentions them under the Name of *Tergiductors*, their Post being in the Rear of the Company.

VIII. THE Cavalry required to a Legion was three hundred. They were divided into ten *Turmæ*, or Troops, thirty to a Troop. Every Troop consisted of three *Decuriæ*, or Bodies of ten Men. Over each of these was a Captain, called *Decurio*. He that was first elected commanded the whole Troop, and had the Title of *Præfectus*. The Decuries had every one his *Optio*, or Deputy, under him, who in like manner as in the Foot, were called *Tergiductors*. These Squadrons often occur in History under the Name of *Alæ*, because they always formed the Wings of the Legion. At the time the Romans warred against the lesser Nations of Italy, their Horse was incomparably superior to that of their Enemies, for which Reason they were

composed of none but the most considerable among the Citizens, being, as we have observed, selected wholly out of the Order of the Knights. When they alighted, no Infantry was more formidable, and they very often turned the Scale of Victory. It must be owned, however, that their Cavalry were but few in proportion to their Foot; and though they served well enough for their *Italian Wars*, yet they became fully sensible of this Inconvenience when they had to do with *Hannibal*. It was chiefly by the Superiority of his Cavalry, and his manner of using it, that he gained so many Victories over them. Accordingly they applied themselves seriously to the improvement of this Part of their Strength, not only by intermixing Platoons of Foot with their Cavalry, and training them particularly to that Service, but likewise by taking foreign Horse into their pay, *Numidians, Gauls, and Germans*.

IX. BESIDES the Troops already mentioned, there were always in the *Roman Armies* a Number of Soldiers of a more eminent degree, known by the Title of *Evocati*. They were such as had served out the legal time, and been distinguished by particular Marks of Favour, as a Reward of their Valour. It was usual for the Consuls, especially in important Wars, to invite a great Number of these into the Service, by circular Letters dispatched for that purpose. The Reputation of a
General

General was what chiefly induced them to grant their attendance, and therefore it was considered as a particular mark of Honour. In the Field they usually guarded the chief Standard, being excused from all the military Drudgery of standing on the Watch, labouring in the Works, or other servile Employments. They had likewise the privilege of using the *Kitis* or Rod, which was the badge of the Centurion's Office, and indeed were in all respects rather superior to the Centurions. It was very common, when any General of an established Reputation, and who had long distinguished himself in the service of his Country, was appointed to the management of a difficult War, to see great Numbers of these flock to his Standard, and offer themselves anew to Dangers and Fatigues, in hopes of gaining fresh Laurels under the auspices of a Commander, who had often in their youth led them to Honour and Victory. Thus it happened to *Paulus Æmilius*, when he was charged with the Conduct of the *Macedonian* War. And thus also to the younger *Scipio Africanus*, when after a series of Disgraces before *Numantia*, the Romans cast their Eyes upon him, as alone capable of restoring the Reputation of their Arms.

X. BUT to return to the Legions. The Officers next in dignity to the Centurions were the military Tribunes, of whom we have already given some account. They

CHAP.

II.

owed their Name and Institution to *Romulus*, who having divided the whole Body of the Citizens into three Tribes, appointed an Officer over each, with the Title of Tribune. The Number afterwards increased to six in every Legion. During the Infancy of the Commonwealth they were nominated by the Consuls ; and afterwards, partly by the Consuls, partly by the People. Their Business was to decide all Controversies in the Army ; to give the Word to the Watch ; to see that the Soldiers observed Discipline, obeyed Orders, and did their Duty ; and to take care of the Works and Camp. None could attain this Dignity, who had not served in the Army five Years ; and of the twenty-four that were annually chosen, ten at least must have served ten Years. Care was also taken to distribute them in such manner, that in each Legion the most experienced were united with those who were younger, in order to instruct and form them for commanding. By this means the Legions were always provided with able Officers, which could not fail of having an excellent Effect upon the Troops, as it naturally tended to inspire them with Valour, and beget an Esteem and Confidence in their Commanders. During the Campaign, which lasted six Months, they commanded the Legion by turns, two at a time, for two Months together. The order in which they were to command was decided by Lot.

XI. THE Troops we have hitherto been describing, may properly be termed the natural Forces of the Republick, as consisting wholly of her own Citizens. They were indeed the original Armies of *Rome*, and all along constituted her main Strength. But this political Commonwealth, when she began to extend her Dominion over *Italy*, instead of reducing the vanquished Nations to Slavery, indulged them the Title of Allies, and the free enjoyment of their own Laws, upon Condition of supplying her in her Wars with a certain proportion of Men. These were called the allied Troops, and as to Number, were equal to the natural Forces in Foot, and double in Horse. The manner of levying them was thus. The Consuls, while they were employed in compleating the Legions at *Rome*, gave notice to the allied States what Number of Forces they would have occasion for, and appointed a time and place of Rendezvous. The States accordingly convened their Men, and choosing out the desired Number, gave them an Oath, and assigned them a Commander in Chief, and a Paymaster-general. When they arrived in the Camp, they were divided into two great Bodies, termed *Alæ*, or *Cornua*, from their position in the Army. For the *Romans* always reserved the Center to themselves, placing the Confederates, half on the right, and half on the left Wings. And because they were more

CHAP.

II.

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II.

numerous than the natural Forces, Care was taken farther to separate them, by selecting a third part of the Horse, and a fifth of the Foot, and posting them near the Consul's Person, under the Name of *Extraordinarii*. It is not certainly known how the smaller Bodies of the Confederate Forces were commanded. Most probably the *Romans* marshalled them according to their own Discipline, and assigned them Officers of the same nature with those of the Legions. This seems to follow from the manner in which they fought, it appearing evidently by the Course of History, that both as to their Arms, and order of Battle, they differed in nothing from the Troops of the Republick. We are assured, however, that the two *Alæ*, or great Divisions of the Allies, had each a Præfect appointed them by the *Roman* Consul, who governed in the same manner as the legionary Tribunes. In after-times, all the States of *Italy* were admitted to share the Freedom of the City, and their Forces incorporated with those of the Republick. From this Period, therefore, the Name of the Allies ceased, and in their stead the auxiliary Troops were procured. These were sent by foreign States and Princes, at the Desire of the *Roman* Senate, or Generals, and were allowed a set Pay from the Republick; whereas the Allies received no Consideration for their Service, but a Distribution of Corn.

XII. OVER these Armies of the *Roman* CHAP.
II.
 People, the two Cōsuls presided, who were
 the standing Generals of the Republick.
 They were created yearly, and in the Field
 possessed an unlimited Authority; the Senate
 reserving to themselves only the Power of
 making Peace, and decreeing War, unless up-
 on extraordinary Occasions. The annual
 Change of Generals was doubtless in some
 Cases an Obstacle to the Advancement of
 Affairs: but the danger of infringing the pub-
 lick Liberty, by continuing the same Man
 longer in the Command of all the Forces of
 the State, obliged them to overlook this
 inconvenience, from the apprehension of a
 much greater. The Necessity of Affairs,
 the Distance of Places, and other Reasons,
 reduced the *Romans* at length to continue
 their Generals in the Command, for several
 Years together, under the Name of Procon-
 suls or Proprætors. And as these Generals
 had often a great Extent of Country to
 defend, and were obliged to employ dif-
 ferent Bodies of Troops in different Places,
 they found it necessary to have Officers
 under them, of a more extensive Autho-
 rity than the military Tribunes. This
 gave rise to the Institution of the *Legati*,
 who commanded in chief under the General,
 and managed all Affairs by his Permission.
 We find them sometimes at the head of one
 d 4 Legion

CHAP. II. Legion, sometimes of three or four, and sometimes of only part of a Legion. Their Office was accounted very honourable, inso-much that the greatest Men of the State, and even such as had been Consuls and Dictators, did not disdain to accept of it. The great *Fabius*, as is well known, was his Son's Lieutenant; and *Scipio Africanus* served in the same Capacity under the Consul his Brother. The Number was according to the General's pleasure, on whom alone the Choice depended: and it appears, that they commanded under him, and received his Orders, as Lieutenant-Generals in our Armies serve under the Generalissimo. In the absence of the Consul or Proconsul, they had the honour of using the *Fasces*, and were intrusted with the same Charge as the Officer whom they represented.

XIII. HAVING thus sufficiently explained how the Armies of the *Roman* People were formed, and the different Degrees of Rank and military Service that prevailed in them; it is time to consider a little more particularly wherein their Strength consisted, and to what they were indebted for that Superiority, which rendered them victorious over the Troops of all other Nations. The first thing that offers itself to our Observation here is, the Nature and Form of the Legion; whose contrivance was so admirable, that *Vegetius* thinks

thinks nothing less than a God could inspire the Idea of it. The Soldiers of which it was composed, were armed with Weapons of a heavier and stronger kind than those of other Nations, as we shall have occasion to show more at large in the next Chapter. But because some things must be done in War, which a heavy Body is not able to execute, it was therefore made to include within itself a Band of light Forces, which might issue from it in order to provoke the Enemy to Battle, or draw back into it in case of Necessity. It was likewise strengthened with Cavalry, and with Spearmen and Slingers, to pursue those who fled, and compleat the Victory. The Troops were all of different experience and standing in the Service, and so mixed together in the Cohorts, that no Party of *Roman* Forces was without a sufficient Number of Veterans, to give Life and Vigour to its Operations. The Number of Men in a Legion seems likewise to have been the effect of a wise Policy. For these amounting to four thousand five hundred, formed a considerable Body of Troops, animated by one and the same Spirit, and who from their mutual Relation among themselves, would take a near Interest in each others Preservation. They were in effect Men of the same Regiment, and had all that Zeal and Concern for one another, which is usual among those lesser Divisions of our Troops.

CHAP. XIV. THE Marquis de Feuquiére in his
II. Memoirs observes, that the Regiments of
which modern Armies consist, are not sufficiently strong in the Number of Men. He thinks it might do well to form them of several Battalions: because such a Multitude of different Bodies, without any immediate Tie among themselves, seems directly contrary to that Union and Subordination, which constitutes the great beauty of military Discipline. It is certain that Troops always exert themselves more, in behalf of those of the same Regiment, than where the Party for which they are engaged belongs to a different Division. This the *Romans* were fully sensible of, and had an Eye to it particularly in the Constitution of their Legion. It was doubtless of great Advantage to them in a Day of Battle, that their Lines were made up of a few large Bodies, linked together by the strongest military Ties, and nearly interested in each others Preservation. Nor did the Number of Men in these Bodies render them unwieldy or unmanageable: because being judiciously disposed into Cohorts, they could be commanded with the same ease, and were no less nimble in their Operations, than if they had formed so many independent Battalions. And here it is worthy of notice, that in drawing up the Army, the Troops were so disposed, as tended wonderfully to their mutual Support and Encouragement. For as the *Romans* commonly fought

fought in three Lines, so in every one of those Lines, the Soldiers were always so posted, as to be sustained by others of the same Legion. This was owing to the manner of forming the Lines, not by intire Legions, but by the different military Orders that composed the Legions. The *Hastati* were placed in the first Line, the *Principes* in the second, and the *Triarii* in the third. By this means the *Hastati* of every Legion were supported by the *Principes* of the same Legion, and these again by the *Triarii*. What Spirit and Confidence this must add to the Troops, and how effectually it would tend to preserve them from Slaughter, when any particular Line was broken, will be evident upon the least Reflection. It is found by experience, that Soldiers never fight better, nor exert a greater share of Courage, than when they know themselves to be well supported; and if at last they are obliged to give way, yet still the Retreat is managed with less Terror and Confusion. The *Romans*, in case of a Repulse, retired through the Intervals of the Lines behind them: and these consisting of Men of the same Legion, advanced immediately to their Relief, and doubtless would do every thing in their Power to preserve their Fellows. This kept up the Spirits of those that fled, prevented their throwing away their Arms, and encouraged them to rally and renew the Charge.

CHAP. II. XV. THERE was also another Advantage in the Constitution of the Legion, arising from the several military Orders of which it was composed, with their Division into *Maniples* and Companies. For these being very numerous, and differing in point of Rank and Superiority, opened a large Field for Preferment, and thereby excited an incredible Ardor and Emulation among the Troops. A private Soldier, after passing through the different military Orders, came to be a Centurion among the *Hastati*; and rising from one *Maniple* to another, was at length promoted into the Rank of the *Principes*. Thence by a like Gradation he reached the Order of the *Triarii*, and in time attained the Dignity of *Primipilus*. Nor was he even obliged to stop here. For as military Merit was every thing at *Rome*, it seldom failed to raise those who possessed it in any eminent Degree, to the first Dignities of the State. The manner too in which Promotions were made, seems wonderfully calculated for the advancement of true Bravery. Every higher order of Officers created those next below them, and so in train continually, through all the different Steps of the Service. As therefore the Persons on whom the Choice depended, had the best Opportunities of knowing the Merit of the several Competitors, and were likely to be determined by that alone, in a matter that so nearly concerned their own Honour and Safety;

Safety; it is natural to suppose, that every one would endeavour to recommend himself by such Qualifications, as rendered him truly worthy of the Place to which he aspired. This progressive Choice of Officers, which established so just a Subordination in the Army, and gave a great ascendant to the principal Commanders, contributed more than any thing to the Perfection of military Discipline. It is worth while to observe how gradually the *Romans* proceeded herein. The People or State elected the two Consuls. The Consuls chose the military Tribunes: the military Tribunes the Centurions: and the Centurions their *Vexillarii* and *Tergiductors*. This method opened the fairest Prospect to Valour, and tended to beget that Spirit among the Troops, which is of all others the happiest that can be raised in an Army, an Emulation to surpass each other in deserving Honours.

CHAP.
II.

XVI. WHAT we have hitherto said regards chiefly the Form and Structure of the Legion. Let us now consider the Quality of the Troops of which it was composed. None but Citizens were admitted into this Body: and of all these the Tribunes had their Choice, from seventeen to forty-five Years of Age. We are to observe, however, that it was not every Citizen whom they judged worthy of this Honour. By the Institution of the *Census*, the whole *Roman* People were divided into distinct Classes, founded on a valuation of their

CHAP. their Estates. Those of the sixth and lowest
H. Class, consisting of the poorer Citizens, useful only by stocking the Commonwealth with Children, were not allowed to serve in the Army. The *Romans* were for having Soldiers, whose real Interest in the Preservation of the State, would prompt them to act with Zeal in its Defence. They had every one their portion of Land, and for the most part lived in the Country, to improve and cultivate it with their own Hands. Thus accustomed to the Toils of Husbandry; to endure Sun, Rain, and Hail; to handle heavy Instruments, dig Trenches, and carry Burdens; when they entered the Service they only changed their Arms and Tools, and came with Bodies inured to Labour, and seasoned to all the Fatigues of the Field. Besides, as War was the proper Profession of this People, and what they were all obliged to engage in, as soon as they reached the Age for bearing Arms, military Exercises made an essential part of their Education. They were trained up in them from their Infancy, and had a space of Ground within the City, called the *Campus Martius*, where, as if actually in the Field, they formed themselves to all the Branches of the Service. After their Fatigues they plunged into the *Tiber*, to accustom themselves to swimming, and cleanse away the Dust and Sweat. Hence the *Romans* were never obliged, on any sudden Emergency, to commit the Honour or Safety of the State to a raw undisciplined Multitude.

titude. They had always a sufficient Num-
ber of Men in readiness, trained and habi-
tuated to War, for the forming and recruiting
their Armies.

CHAP.
II.

XVII. IN reading the History of ancient Commonwealths, we can hardly forbear fancying, that we peruse the Annals of a set of Men, altogether different from ourselves. The prodigious Fortune to which the *Roman*s attained, seems incredible to us. We are amazed to see that Republick, from an obscure inconsiderable Village, rising insensibly to Power, extending her Dominion over *Italy*, and at last rendering herself Mistress of the Universe: to behold her Citizens, even those of weight and authority in the Administration, serving as private Men in her Armies: and to find that Soldiers, who in our Days are the Dregs of every Nation, were in that Commonwealth made up of the very same People, who at home, in times of Peace, created Magistrates, enacted Laws, and obliged the Senate itself to submit to their Decisions. Nor is it less a matter of wonder when we consider the number and greatness of her Armies. It is evident by experience with respect to modern times, that a *European* Prince who has a Million of Subjects, cannot, without destroying himself, keep up and maintain above ten thousand Men. But when we look into the Affairs of ancient States, especially those of *Sparta*, *Athens*, and *Rome*, the case appears

CHAP. II. appears to be quite otherwise. We there find, that this proportion between the Soldiers and the rest of the People, which is now as one to an hundred, could not in them be less than as one to eight. *Rome* was yet confined within very narrow Bounds, when the *Latins* having refused to succour her with the Troops which had been stipulated, ten Legions were presently raised in the City only. And if we examine the Histories of *Athens* and *Sparta*, we shall there meet with Instances no less surprising, of powerful and numerous Armies, when compared with the Extent of their Territories.

XVIII. To account in some measure for so wonderful a Revolution in the course of human Affairs, it behoves us to call to mind, that the Founders of ancient Commonwealths had taken care to make an equal Distribution of Lands, and that the several Portions were allotted to Individuals, upon Condition of serving the State in her Wars. This Circumstance alone raised a Nation to Power, gave Strength to its Armies, and made it a well-regulated Society. By this it became equally the Interest of every Member of the Commonwealth, and that a very great Interest too, to exert himself in defence of his Country. *Romulus*, after assigning one Part of the *Roman* Territory to the Expences of religious Worship, and another to the uses of the State, divided the remainder into thirty Portions, to
answer

answer to the thirty *Curia*. Under the Commonwealth, in proportion as the publick Domain increased, it was the constant practice of the Senate for several Ages, to allot part of the conquered Lands to the use of the poor Citizens; and share it equally among them. This was what at first enabled *Rome* to soar above its humble Condition; and the People were strongly sensible of it even in their corrupted State. We find them constantly struggling for an *Agrarian* Law, and contriving means to check the Artifices of those who endeavoured to elude it. The avowed Patrons of Liberty considered this Law as the main Bulwark of the State, and were ever sounding in the Ears of the Senate, the Mischiefs to which they exposed themselves by the violation of it. Tell me, would *Tiberius Gracchus* say to the Nobles, which is the most valuable Character, that of a Citizen, or of a perpetual Slave? Who is most useful, a Soldier, or a Man entirely unfit for War? Will you, merely for the sake of enjoying a few more Acres of Land than your Fellow-citizens, quite lay aside the hopes of conquering the rest of the World, or be exposed to see yourselves dispossessed by the Enemy of those very Lands which you refuse us?

XIX. AND in fact we find, that in proportion as the *Romans* deviated from this great and original Principle of Government, Affairs began to wear the very same face, under

CHAP. which they appear in our Days. The Avarice of some, and the lavish Profuseness of others, occasioned the Lands to become the Property of a few. Immediately Arts were introduced, to supply the reciprocal Wants of the rich and poor; by which means but very few Soldiers or Citizens were to be seen. For the Revenues of the Lands, that had before been employed to support the latter, were now wholly bestowed on Slaves and Artificers, who administered to the Luxury of the new Proprietors. But it was impossible that People of this cast should be good Soldiers, they being cowardly and abject, already corrupted by the Luxury of Cities, and often by the very Art they professed. Besides, as they might reap the fruits of their Industry in every Clime, and could not properly call any Country their own, they had no sufficient Tie to bind them to its Defence. Nor was this Revolution peculiar to the Republick of *Rome*. *Sparta* before her had experienced the like vicissitude. *Lycurgus* left no less than thirty thousand Citizens behind him, who in the time of *Agis* and *Cleomenes*, were reduced to seven hundred, scarce an eighth Part of whom was possessed of Lands. The rest were no more than a cowardly Populace. These two Kings undertook to revive the ancient Laws on this occasion, and from that time *Lacedæmonia* recovered its former Power, and again became formidable to all the States of *Greece*. Had *Tiberius* and *Caius Gracchus* equally succeeded
in

in their Design of reforming the *Roman* Com-CHAP.
monwealth, the loss of Liberty, and all the ^{II.}
Miseries consequent upon it, might have been
prevented. But their untimely fate discourag-
ing others from engaging in the same Cause,
Rome soon after, instead of being defended by,
became a Prey to her own Legions. Nor
ought we to wonder, if Men who had no
Property in the State, and might hope more
from its Overthrow than Preservation, were
easily induced to conspire its Ruin.

XX. But the equal Distribution of Lands,
was not that alone, which gave Strength to
the Armies of *Rome*. There were other Cir-
cumstances peculiar to the Times and Consti-
tution of that Republick, which contributed
not a little to its Grandeur. The Trade of a
Soldier was not then, as in our Days, a Slave-
ry for Life, attended with infinite Fatigue,
and scarce any Profit. As the Art of exactly
fortifying Places was little known, and less
practised; national Quarrels were decided by
Battle, and one gained often put an end to the
War. Hence the Service was properly speak-
ing little other than so many Summer Cam-
paigns. The Armies were renewed yearly,
and for several Ages never kept the Field du-
ring the Winter. A Battle was commonly at-
tended with the Conquest of an entire Province
or Kingdom; and the Pillage got in over-run-
ning the Enemy's Country, was often not only
sufficient to enrich the Conquerors, but some-

CHAP. times even served to aggrandise their Posterity. At the close of the Campaign, the Soldiers were dismissed, every one to his own home, to look after his domestick Affairs, and cultivate his Inheritance. Thus there were many Inducements to a military Life: the short Duration of the Service: the Prospect of Wealth and Affluence, to which it often conducted: the Necessity of defending their own Possessions: and the Hope of acquiring new ones from the Enemy. For, as we have already observed, it was the constant Practice of the Senate for several Ages, to assign part of the conquered Lands to the use of the poor Citizens; either dividing it among those who had no Patrimony of their own, or granting an additional Allowance to such whose Inheritance was but scanty. In our times the condition of a Soldier is very different. National Quarrels are not now decided by Battles, but most commonly by Sieges, which spins out the War to an immoderate length, and occasions an infinite loss of Men. Towns are seldom taken by Storm, or abandoned to be plundered, but given up by Capitulation, and the Inhabitants left in the quiet Possession of their Properties. A Country exposed to Pillage redeems itself by Contributions, no Part of which comes into the Hands of the private Men, whose Pay at the same time is so small, that the meanest Occupation yields a far greater Income. Thus the Miseries of Hunger, Heat, and Cold, which

which are inseparable from a military Life, CHAP
 the certainty of Blows, and the uncertainty II.
 of Plunder, renders the usual Parts of War
 full of Sufferings and Dangers, and of little
 or no Profit to the Soldiers.

XXI. INDEED in the latter times of the Commonwealth, War began to partake of those Inconveniencies, with which it is attended in the present Age. But then the Encouragements they had to face the Dangers of the Service, and the high Honours to which it paved the way, made all Difficulties vanish and disappear. For as the *Romans* devoted themselves entirely to the Profession of Arms, and considered it as the only Study worthy their Care, they omitted no methods to recommend and place it in Esteem. Innumerable Rewards and Distinctions were invented, suited to the different Stations of Men, and the several kinds of Valour in which they might render themselves conspicuous. Magistracies and Dignities were almost always conferred, according to the Reputation of the Candidate for Bravery in War. And at the same time that military Merit never failed to promote the Person in whom it was lodged, no one was capable of civil Employment in the Commonwealth, who had not served in the Army at least ten Years. We are not therefore to wonder, that amidst so many Incentives, which rendered the Life of a Soldier not only honourable, but in some measure necessary,

CHAP. necessary, Multitudes flocked to the Service,
 II. and strove with Emulation to be admitted into
 the Legions. Interest and Ambition are the
 two ruling Principles of human Life; and as
 both conspired to urge the *Romans* to War,
 it was easy for them to find Armies, and to
 increase and multiply them at pleasure. But
 in our Days, none of those motives operate
 upon the Minds of Men. The Condition of
 a common Soldier is of all others the most
 despicable: and even with regard to Officers
 of the first Rank, long Service is so far from
 being a Recommendation to State-Preferment,
 that they are on that very account, in the
 Judgment of many, the less fit for civil Em-
 ployments.

XXII. But what chiefly contributed to
 the Strength and Greatness of the *Roman* Ar-
 mies, was the Custom established by *Romulus*,
 of incorporating the vanquished Nations, and
 admitting them to the Privileges of Citizens.
 Without this it would have been impossible
 for *Rome*, to raise herself to that height of
 Grandeur, to which in time she attained.
 The Spirit of her Citizens, the Bravery of
 her Troops, and the admirable Discipline of
 her Armies, might have enabled her to subject
 the Nations around her, and extend her Sway
 over a considerable Part of *Italy*: but in pro-
 portion as she advanced in Conquest, she
 would have become sensible of her own Weak-
 ness; and the difficulty of maintaining herself
 in

in her new Territories, when they grew large enough to employ the whole natural Forces of the Commonwealth, would have either made her drop all Thoughts of farther Empire, or forced her to have recourse to mercenary Troops, which have always in the end proved the ruin of those States, who were imprudent enough to venture upon so dangerous an expedient. This is remarkably exemplified in the History of *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Carthage*. The two first of these Cities acquired considerable Dominion and Authority in *Greece*, and for some time maintained themselves in the Possession of that Power, to which their Valour and Abilities in War had raised them. But as the Number of Citizens in either State seldom exceeded thirty thousand, and they were unacquainted with the Policy of incorporating the vanquished Nations, it was impossible for them to enlarge their Territories in any extensive Degree. For great Conquests require great Armies to maintain them, which Cities so constituted as *Athens* and *Sparta*, were not able to furnish. Accordingly we find, that when Ambition prompted them to Undertakings beyond their Strength, they were so far from being able to increase their Dominions, that their very Conquests proved their Ruin, and they sunk under the weight of their own Greatness. For the Countries they had brought under Subjection, not considering themselves as Parts of the State, but rather as Tributa-

CHAP. ries and Slaves, were glad of an Opportunity
 II. of shaking off the Yoke; and therefore seldom failed to revolt, when they saw them engaged in any difficult War. By this means they were not only deprived of a considerable Part of the Revenues, at a time when they stood most in need of Money and Supplies; but obliged likewise to divide their Forces: which was a great Check upon their Designs, and in the end so weakened them, that they were no longer able to maintain themselves in that Grandeur and Reputation they had acquired,

XXIII. THE case of *Carthage* was indeed somewhat different. That Commonwealth, by its Riches and Commerce, was able to set great Armies on foot, and make extensive Conquests. But as the Genius of the Citizens was turned more to Traffick than War, and as they never admitted the conquered Nations to the Privileges of natural Subjects, they were under a Necessity of employing mercenary Troops, both for enlarging their Territories, and holding the vanquished Countries in Obedience. Hence the many Shocks and Convulsions to which that State was liable. For as her Armies had no other Tie to the Republick, but that of their Pay, they were easily induced to throw off their Allegiance, when any more advantageous Prospect offered itself. Their Revolt more than once brought *Carthage* to the very brink of Destruction. Instead of contributing

contributing to secure the Tranquillity of the tributary Countries, they often spirited them up to Rebellion; and, which is indeed a necessary Consequence of employing mercenary Troops, upon any sudden reverse of Fortune, they were ever ready to abandon the Service. Thus the *Carthaginians*, though absolute Masters at Sea, possessed of immense Territories, and able to set on foot numerous Armies, were in reality rather a rich than a powerful Republick. They were successful indeed for a time against a Number of barbarous States and Nations, without Discipline or Experience in War: but when they came to enter the Lists with a brave and a military People, their Undertakings almost always miscarried. Witness their many Attempts upon *Syracuse*; the Extremity to which they were reduced by *Agathocles*; and the ease with which they were in a manner totally driven out of *Sicily* by *Pyrrhus*. Indeed in their first and second War with the *Romans*, they make a very considerable figure in History, whether we regard the greatness of their Victories, or the strength of their Armies. But the merit of that seems rather owing to the Abilities of their Generals, than to the intrinsic Power of the Commonwealth itself. Accordingly, in the third *Punick* War, when they had neither a *Hamilcar* nor a *Hannibal* at the head of their Troops, they in a very short time fell a Prey to their Enemies.

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II.

XXIV. BUT now the *Romans*, by the admirable Policy of incorporating the vanquished Nations, avoided all the Inconveniences to which the above-mention'd Cities were liable, and built their greatness upon a sure Foundation. The Forces of the State increased with their Territories, insomuch that it is amazing to consider, in how short a time from small beginnings, they rose to an incredible multitude of Citizens. The conquered Provinces were so far from being an Incumbrance upon them, by exhausting their Strength in Guards and Garrisons, that, on the contrary, they became real Parts of the Commonwealth, and contributed greatly to her Power, by augmenting her Revenues, and adding to the Number of her Subjects. Thus in proportion as *Rome* grew in greatness, and stood in need of mighty Armies to support the weight of her Enterprises, she found within herself an inexhaustible Stock of Men and Riches, and without having recourse to mercenary Troops, could furnish more than sufficient to answer all the Demands of the State. *Polybius*, when he comes to speak of the War with the *Italick Gauls*, takes occasion to describe the mighty Preparations made by the *Romans*, to oppose that formidable Enemy. We there find, that the Forces of the Commonwealth at that time, amounted to about seven hundred thousand Foot, and seventy thousand Horse. Compare this Account with the Histories of
Athens

Athens and *Sparta*, and it will soon appear, CHAP II.
 what a disadvantage these two States lay under, for want of such an Institution as that of *Romulus*. For as they never admitted the vanquished Nations to the right of Citizens, but always reduced them to the Condition of Tributaries, the multitude of their Conquests served only to enlarge their Territories, without adding to the number of their natural Subjects. Hence even in the most flourishing Period of their greatness, they could seldom bring into the Field above thirty thousand Men. *Rome* on the other hand, by a contrary Policy, increased daily in the multitude of her Citizens, and in time was enabled to furnish out Armies, adequate to the Conquest of the Universe.

C H A P. III.

Of the Arms and Discipline of the Romans.

I. **I**T is generally allowed among the Writers upon the Art of War, that as in many other things, so particularly in their Arms, the *Romans* excelled all other Nations. I shall not here confine myself to the usual Distinction into offensive and defensive, but rather

CHAP. rather describe them according to the several
 III. military Orders of which the Legions were
 composed. By the *Velites* we are to understand all the light-armed Troops of the Commonwealth, of whatever Rank and Denomination. They were equipped with *Bows*, *Slings*, *Javelins*, a *Spanish Sword*, a *Buckler*, and a *Helmet*. The *Bow* is of very remote Antiquity, and has been used by almost all Nations. *Crete* in particular was famous for its excellent Archers. It does not seem to have been much regarded by the *Romans* in the earliest times of the Republick, and when it was afterwards introduced, was confined chiefly to the auxiliary Troops. We find however, in the Description of Battles, frequent mention made of the *Sagittarii*; and it appears, that they sometimes contributed not a little to the Victory. The *Sling* was also an Instrument of War much used by many Nations. The *Baleareans* especially, who inhabited the Islands now called *Majorca* and *Minorca*, are beyond all others celebrated for their Expertness at this Weapon. They were so attentive in exercising their Youth in the use of it, that they did not give them their Food in a Morning till they hit a Mark. These *Baleareans* were much employed in the Armies of the *Carthaginians* and *Romans*, and greatly contributed to the gaining of Victories. *Livy* mentions some Cities of *Achaia*, particularly *Egium*, *Patrae*, and *Dymæ*, whose Inhabitants were still more dexterous

dexterous at the Sling than the *Balearians*. CHAP.

They threw Stones farther, and with greater Force and Certainty, never failing to hit what Part of the Face they pleased. Their Slings discharged Stones with so much Force, that neither Buckler nor Head-piece could resist their Impetuosity. Instead of Stones, they sometimes charged the Sling with Balls of Lead, which it carried much farther, and with greater Impetuosity. The *Javelin*, or *Hasta*, was the proper missive Weapon of the *Velites*. It was a kind of Dart not unlike an Arrow, the Wood of which was generally three Foot long, and one Inch thick. The Point was four Inches long, and tapered to so fine an end, that it bent at the first Stroke in such a manner, as to be useless to the Enemy. Every Man carried seven of them to Battle. The *Spanish Sword* was for a close Encounter. The *Romans* judged this Weapon the fittest for execution, as having both Edge and Point. It was short, of excellent temper, and in shape not unlike a *Turkish* Scimeter, only sharper at the Point. *Livy* tells us, that though it was principally intended for stabbing, it would yet serve likewise to cut off Arms, Legs, and Heads at a Blow. The *Buckler*, or *Parma*, was of a round form, about three Foot in Diameter, and made of Wood covered with Leather. The *Helmet*, called *Galea*, or *Galerus*, was a light Cask for the Head, generally made of the Skin of some wild Beast, to appear the more terrible.

CHAP. II. THE Arms of the *Hastati*, *Principes*,
 III. and *Triarii*, were in a great measure the same;
 for which reason we shall not divide them in
 our Description, but speak of them all together.
 Those most deserving our Notice are the
Sword, the *Scutum*, the *Pilum*, the *Galea*,
 and the *Lorica*. The *Sword* was the same as
 that of the *Velites*, and therefore requires not
 any particular Description here. It was usual
 with the *Romans* to wear it on the right side,
 that they might be the more at liberty to manage
 their Shields. In ancient Monuments how-
 ever we sometimes meet with it on the left.
 The *Scutum* was a Buckler of Wood, oblong,
 and bending inward like a half Cylinder. Its
 Parts were joined together with little Plates
 of Iron, and the whole was covered with a
 Bull's Hide. An Iron Ring went round it
 without, to keep off Blows; and another
 within, to hinder it from taking any Damage
 by lying on the Ground. In the middle was
 an Iron Boss, or *Umbo*, jutting out, very ser-
 viceable to glance off Stones and Darts, and
 sometimes to press violently upon the Enemy,
 and drive all before them. It appears that
 these Bucklers were large enough to cover
 almost the whole Body. *Polybius* makes them
 four Foot long, and two and a half broad.
 And in *Livy* we meet with Soldiers who stood
 on the Guard, sometimes sleeping with their
 Head laid on their Shield, having fixed the
 other Part of it on the Earth. Some make
 the

the *Scutum* the same with the *Clypeus*: but this is evidently a mistake; since in the Institution of the *Census* by *Servius Tullius*, we find the *Clypeus* given to those of the first Class, and the *Scutum* to those of the second. In fact, the *Scutum* was long and square, and came at last to be the only Shield of the heavy-armed Troops. The *Clypeus* was of a smaller size, and quite round, belonging more properly to other Nations, though for some time used by the *Romans*.

III. THE *Pilum* was a missive Weapon, which, in a Charge, they darted at the Enemy. It was commonly four square, but sometimes round; composed of a Piece of Wood about three Cubits long, and a Slip of Iron of the same length, hooked and jagged at the end. They took abundance of care in joining the two Parts together, and did it so artificially, that it would sooner break in the Iron itself, than in the Joint. Every Man had two of these *Pila*, which they discharged at the Enemy before they came to close Fight. When they had neither time nor room they threw it upon the Ground, and charged the Enemy Sword in Hand. *Marius*, in the *Cimbrian* War, contrived these *Pila* after a new Fashion. For whereas before, the Head was fastened to the Wood with two Iron Pins; he suffered one of them to remain as it was, and pulling out the other, put a weak wooden Peg in its Place. By this means, when it stuck in the Enemy's

CHAP. III. Enemy's Shield it did not stand outright as formerly : but the wooden Peg breaking, the Javelin hung down, and sticking fast by its crooked Point, drew after it the Shield. Next to the *Pilum* we mentioned the *Galea*. This was a Head-piece, or Morrion, coming down to the Shoulders. It was either of Iron or Brass, open before, and leaving the Face uncovered. Some of them were so contrived, that they might be let down, on occasion, to cover the Face. Upon the top was the *Crista*, or Crest, in adorning of which the Soldiers took great Pride. In the time of *Polybius* they wore Plumes of Feathers, dyed of various Colours, to render them beautiful to their Friends, and terrible to their Enemies. The Officers in particular were extremely curious and splendid in their Crests, which were usually worked in Gold and Silver, and so contrived as to represent Animals of various kinds, Lions, Leopards, Tigers, and Griffins. If we might speak of those of foreign Commanders, the Crest of King *Pyrrhus*, as very singular, would deserve our notice. It was made, according to *Plutarch's* Description, of two Goats Horns. *Alexander the great*, as he is represented on ancient Medals, wore a Crest of the same Nature.

IV. WE come now to the *Lorica*, which was a defensive Armour for the Body, as the *Galea* was for the Head and Neck. In our Language it is called the *Cuirass*, and was generally

generally made of Leather, covered with Plates of Iron in the form of Scales, or Iron Ringstwisted within one another in the form of Chains. These are what we call Coats of Mail, in Latin, *Lorica Hamis conferta*, or *Hamata*. Sometimes the Cuirass consisted of Thongs, with which the Soldier was girt from the Armpits to the Waste, and whence probably it took the Name of *Lorica*, from *Lorum*, a Thong or Strap of Leather. We find likewise that it was oftentimes a sort of Linen Cassock, made with many Folds, which resisted, or very much broke the Force of Blows. Among the *Greeks* this Piece of Armour had the Name of *Thorax*, and was made either of Iron or Brass, in two Pieces which were fastened upon the Sides by Buckles. *Alexander* left the Cuirass only the two Pieces which covered the Breast, that the fear of being wounded on the Back, which had no defence, might prevent the Soldiers from flying. Some of these Cuirasses were of so hard a Metal, as to be absolutely proof against Weapons. *Zoilus*, an excellent Artist in this way, offered two of them to *Demetrius Poliocertes*. To show the excellency of them, he caused a Dart to be discharged from a *Catapulta*, at the distance of only twenty-six Paces; which though it struck the Cuirass with the utmost Violence, yet made no Impression, and scarce left the least Mark behind it. After all it must be owned, that the *Thorax* of the *Greeks* was much less capable

of Motion, Agility, and Force; whereas the Girts of Leather, successively covering each other, left the *Roman* Soldier entire Liberty of Action; and fitting him like a Vest, defended him against Darts. The poorer Soldiers, who were rated under a thousand Drachms, instead of the *Lorica*, wore a *Pectorale*, or Breast-Plate of thin Brass, about twelve Inches square: and this, with what has been already described, and Greaves and Gantlets upon their Legs and Arms, which were common likewise to the rest, rendered them compleatly armed.

V. WHAT we have hitherto said regards only the Foot. It is now time to speak of the Cavalry, who at first were but very indifferently armed, either for Offence or Defence. They used only a round Shield, with a Helmet on their Head, and a couple of Javelins in their Hand, great part of the Body being left without defence. But as soon as they found the many inconveniences to which they were hereby exposed, they began to arm themselves like the *Grecian* Horse, or much in the manner of their own Foot, only their Shield was a little shorter and squarer, and their Lance or Javelin thicker, with spikes at each end, that if one miscarried, the other might be serviceable. It is remarkable, and what indeed we are hardly able to comprehend, that amongst the Ancients, the Horse had neither Stirrups nor Saddle. Education, Exercise,
and

and Habit, had accustomed them not to want those aids, and even not to perceive that there was any occasion for them. There were some Horsemen, such as the *Numidians*, who did not know so much as the use of Bridles to guide their Horses: and who, notwithstanding, by their Voice only, or the use of the Heel or Spur, made them advance, fall back, stop, turn to the right or left; in a word, perform all the Evolutions of the best disciplined Cavalry. Sometimes, having two Horses, they leaped from one to the other even in the heat of Battle, to ease the first when fatigued. These *Numidians*, as well as the *Parthians*, were never more terrible than when they seemed to fly thro' Fear and Cowardice. For then, facing suddenly about, they discharged their Darts or Arrows upon the Enemy, and often put them to flight with great slaughter. The *Romans* were more than once surprised by these unexpected Attacks, and on some occasions suffered considerably. But they at last found out a method of securing themselves, by holding their Targets over their Heads, and forming what Historians call the *Testudo*. It was to this Invention that *Marc Antony* owed the preservation of his Army, when miscarrying in his Expedition against the *Parthians*, he found himself obliged to retreat into *Syria* before a great Body of their Horse.

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III.

Romans conquered the World: and I believe it will be readily owned, that they were admirably well calculated both for defending themselves, and offending their Enemies. *Polybius*, in more Places than one, gives them the advantage in this respect over all other Nations, and expressly affirms, that the many Victories they obtained over the *Gauls*, was owing entirely to the superiority of their Arms. It is true, the cutting Swords of that People terrified them greatly at first, and was the cause of a fatal Overthrow. But they soon learnt from Experience, what a contemptible Weapon that was, when employed in close fight, against Troops substantially armed for defence. For the *Gauls*, to give force and vigour to their Blows, were obliged to avoid too near an approach to the Enemy, that they might have room to wield their Swords. Their first Ranks therefore only could do execution, because the *Romans* knowing their safety to lie in close fight, advanced continually under cover of their Shields, and crouded upon them in such manner, that they left them not sufficient space for the free use of their Weapons. It is besides observed, that the Swords of the *Gauls* were of so ill a temper, as after two or three strokes to stand bent in their Hands, and thereby become wholly useless to them, if they had not time to straighten them on the Ground with their Foot. This was not to be expected in the heat

heat of fight, against an Enemy that pressed hard ; so that the *Romans* closing in with them, stabbed them in the Face and Breast with their pointed Swords, and made terrible slaughter. The Chevalier *Folard* is astonished, that under all these Disadvantages, his Countrymen should obtain so many Victories over the *Romans*. He can hardly forbear fancying, that had they so far improved by their Defeats, as to change the fashion of their Weapons, and arm themselves after the manner of their Adversaries, we should not have heard so much of the boasted Exploits and Conquests of that People. Be that as it will, it is certain the *Gauls* wanted neither Bravery nor military Conduct, and if we except the single Article of their Arms, shewed themselves on many occasions no way inferior to the *Romans*.

VII. BUT let us now compare their Arms with those of the *Greeks*. Here, it must be owned, the Advantage does not appear so manifest. Many are rather of opinion, that the *Greeks* excelled the *Romans* in this respect. The Earl of *Orrery* particularly, in his *Treatise of the Art of War*, wonders much that the *Romans*, who borrowed most of their Weapons whether offensive or defensive from the *Greeks*, did not also follow their example in furnishing some of their Infantry with long Pikes, which he observes are the best offensive Arms, either to charge or defend, and of excellent use against Horse. It is well known

CHAP. that the *Macedonian* Phalanx, to which *Philip*
III. and *Alexander* were indebted for most of their
Victories, fought always with this Weapon.
One would therefore be apt to think, that an
Experience so much in its favour, could not
have failed of recommending it powerfully to
the *Romans*. And yet it is certain, that after
making tryal of it for some time, they laid
it aside as incommodious, ordering the *Hastati*,
who at first were equipped with it, and thence
took their Name, to arm themselves after the
fashion of the rest of the legionary Foot.
This could not arise from any scrupulous at-
tachment to their own Customs, or dislike of
foreign Manners; because no People were
ever less tenacious in this respect, or shewed
a greater readiness to adopt the Institutions of
other Nations, when they saw any real Bene-
fit likely to accrue from them. The princi-
pal Reason seems to have been, that they found
the use of the Weapon incompatible with that
of the Shield. For as it necessarily required
to be managed with both Hands, those who
fought with it were obliged to lay aside the
Buckler; which piece of Armour appeared
to the *Romans* of greater consequence than
the Pike, because this last was in some mea-
sure supplied by the Sword and Javelin. If
we might judge of things by the Event, the
Romans reasoned very justly on this occasion;
since without the assistance of the Pike, they
not only gained greater and more numerous
Victories than the *Macedonian* Phalanx, but
even

even beat that very Phalanx itself, so formidable by the use of this Weapon. As this is a very curious and interesting Subject, and capable of furnishing many useful Reflections in relation to the ancient Art of War, it will not, I believe, be disagreeable to the Reader, if we enlarge a little upon it.

VIII. THE *Macedonian* Phalanx was a Body of sixteen thousand Men, armed with Pikes four and twenty foot long, which Historians describe under the Name of *Sarissæ*. This Corps was generally divided into ten Battalions, each consisting of sixteen hundred Men, an hundred in front, and sixteen deep. To form some idea of their strength and order of Battle, we need only reflect upon what passed a few Centuries ago in *Europe*, when *Italy* was a continual Theatre of War, by reason of the different Pretensions of *France*, *Spain*, and the *Emperor*. The Battalions of *Switzerland* were then in great Reputation, and generally looked upon as the best Infantry in the World, chiefly on account of the many Victories they had gained by the Pike. They were forced at first to have recourse to this Weapon, in order to secure themselves against the Ambition of the *German* Princes, who were daily making Attempts upon their Liberty. For these Princes being rich, and able to bring into the Field a numerous Cavalry, the *Switzers*, whose whole Strength on the contrary lay in their Foot, saw them-

CHAP. III. selves under a necessity of contriving Arms, that might defend them against the Enemy's Horse. None appeared so proper for this purpose as the Pike; and so successful were they, by the Perfection they attained to in the use of it, and their admirable Orders and Discipline, that with fifteen or twenty thousand Foot, they would often venture to attack a vast Body of Horse, and generally came off victorious. From that time the Pike became famous, and was introduced into all the Armies of *Europe*. We find that they usually had one half of their Infantry Shot, and the other half Pikes; and it is particularly deserving of our notice, that for several Ages, the chief Dependence of the General in a Day of Battle seems to have been upon the Pikes. By degrees the Musket began to prevail over the Pike; yet gained ground so very slowly, that it is not much above half a Century, since we find one third of the Infantry still Pikes.

IX. BUT tho' the Pike was found to be of admirable service in Engagements with Horse, Experience constantly made it appear, that it was by no means sufficient against a resolute and well-armed Infantry. For as this Weapon required to be managed with both Hands, and therefore necessarily excluded the use of the Target, those who carried it were left altogether without defence, if in the course of an Engagement, the Enemy should chance to get

get within their Pikes. Hence the Generals CHAP.
III. who were acquainted with this Weakness in the *Swiss* Battalions, and could bring their Troops to press the Charge vigorously, seldom failed of defeating them with great slaughter. We have a remarkable Example of it in the case of Count *Carmignola*, General to *Philip Viconti* Duke of *Milan*. That brave Officer being sent against a Body of eighteen thousand *Switzers*, with only six thousand Horse, and a few Foot, advanced boldly to the Encounter : but tho' the Attack was resolute and well conducted, he was repulsed with considerable loss. *Carmignola* quickly perceived the advantage which the Enemy had in their Foot over his Horse. As he was a Man of determined Courage, and rather roused than dispirited by the Check he had lately received, he soon rallied his Men, and led them on again to the Charge. When he came within a certain distance, he ordered his Cavalry to dismount ; and engaging the *Switzers* smartly in that Posture, put them all to the rout, and most of them to the Sword. Only three thousand were left, who finding themselves past remedy, threw down their Arms. It will be proper to take notice on this Occasion, that the Cavalry led by *Carmignola* were all Men at Arms, and therefore compleatly provided both for Offence and Defence. Now such a Body of Troops was well enough able to deal with the *Switzers*, if they but once got close up with them, and came to use their
Swords.

CHAP. P. Swords. For then the Enemy being without
 III. defensive Arms, and deriving no assistance
 from their Pikes, whose very length rendered
 them unserviceable, were exposed to unavoidable slaughter. Considering therefore the Advantages and Disadvantages on both sides, it will appear, that they who have no defensive Arms are without Remedy, if the Enemy charges but home, and passes their Pikes. This cannot miss to happen in an Engagement with resolute Troops: because Battles always advancing, and the Parties on each side pressing on perpetually, they must of necessity come so near at last, as to reach one another with their Swords; and tho' some few perhaps may be killed or tumbled down by the Pikes, yet those that are behind still pressing on, are sufficient to carry the Victory.

X. FROM these Reasons it will be easy to conceive, why *Carmignola* overcame with so great a slaughter of the *Switzers*, and so little of his own Army. Nor is this Example singular in its kind. We meet with many others in History, all tending to demonstrate, that an Infantry armed with Swords and Bucklers, have great advantages over the Pike. When *Gonsalvo* was besieged in *Barletta* by the *French*, a detachment of *Spanish* Foot was sent out of *Sicily*, and landed in the Kingdom of *Naples*, with Orders to march to his Relief. Monsieur *d' Aubigny* had notice of their Approach,

proach, and went to meet them with his Men, CHAP.
 at Arms, and a Body of about four thousand III.
Switzers. These last press'd upon them with
 their Pikes, and at first put them into some
 disorder; but the *Spaniards*, by the help of
 their Bucklers, and the agility of their Bodies,
 having, at length got under the Pikes of the
Switzers, and so near as that they could come at
 them with their Swords, defeated them with
 great slaughter, and very little loss on their
 own side. Every one knows what terrible
 havock was made of the *Switzers* at the Battle
 of *Ravenna*, and all upon the same account,
 the *Spanish* Foot having got to them with their
 Swords: nay, it is certain they must have
 been all cut to pieces; had they not been hap-
 pily rescued by the *French* Horse: and yet
 the *Spaniards*, drawing themselves into close
 order, bravely sustained the Assaults of the
 Cavalry, and retired without loss. It appears
 therefore, that tho' the Pike be excellent
 against Horse, it is yet insufficient in an En-
 counter with Foot; whereas an Army judi-
 ciously armed for Offence and Defence, at the
 same time, that it can very well deal with Ca-
 valry, is likewise an overmatch for a Body of
 Pikes.

XI. AND hence it was that the *Macedo-
 nian* Phalanx, which seems to have been just
 such an order of Battle as the Battalions of
Switzerland, experienced likewise the same
 Fate, when it came to encounter the warlike
 and

CHAP. and well-armed Troops of the *Romans*. Historians ascribe the defeat of it to several Causes: the advantageous disposition of the *Roman* Troops, who fought in separate Bodies, yet so drawn up, that they could unite and join upon occasion: the artful Conduct of the Generals, in drawing it into rugged and uneven Places, where it could not preserve itself entire, but became disjointed and broken: the opportunity this gave of charging it in the openings and void spaces, whereby it was totally disunited, and being attacked in front and rear, fell an easy Prey to its Enemies. These things doubtless contributed in part to the Overthrow of which we speak: but the principal defect of the Phalanx lay in its disadvantageous Armour and order of Battle. In reality, the Pikes of the two first Ranks only were serviceable in an Engagement: those of the rest scarce availed any thing. The Men of the third Rank could not see what passed in the front, nor had any command of their long Pikes, which were intangled and locked up between the Files, without a possibility of moving them to the right or left. Hence the *Romans* found no great difficulty in surmounting an Obstacle, formidable indeed in appearance, but at bottom very trifling. They had only to gain upon the Pikes of the two first Ranks, that they might join the Enemy, and fight hand to hand. This they were enabled to do by the help of their large Bucklers, with which they

they bore up the Pikes of the *Macedonians*, and forcing their way under, reached them with their Swords. All resistance was then at an end. The Phalanx, unprovided for defence, and rather embarrassed than aided by their Pikes, could no longer stand the furious Charge of the *Romans*, who made dreadful havock with their pointed Swords. We find at the Battle of *Pydna*, where *Paulus Æmilius* gained so compleat a Victory over *Perseus*, that no less than twenty thousand *Macedonians* were slain, with the loss of only a hundred Men on the side of the *Romans*. This agrees so exactly with what we have above related of the *Switzers*, that it is impossible not to ascribe it to the same Cause, namely, the insufficiency of the Pike, when opposed to an Infantry armed with Swords and Bucklers.

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XII. WE come now to speak of the military Discipline of the *Romans*, to which, no less than to their Arms, they were indebted for their many Victories and Conquests. If we compare this with other Nations, we do not find that they surpassed the *Gauls* in Number or Boldness, the *Germans* in Stature, the *Spaniards* in Strength of Body, the *Africans* in Stratagem, or the *Greeks* in Learning and the Arts of civil Life. Nay it is evident from History, that they were inferior in all these Respects. But as to what regards the use and exercise of Arms, the choice of Soldiers, and the training them up in all the Duties of War ;

CHAP. here indeed lay their chief Excellence, and

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by this they were enabled to baffle all the Advantages of their Enemies, whether derived from Nature or Education. We have already observed, that none were admitted into the Legions 'till they had reached their seventeenth Year. But tho' this was the age for entering the Service, it was not that when they began to learn. For as War was the darling Study of the *Romans*, they habituated their Youth to it from their Infancy, and carefully instructed them in all its Branches, having set apart the Field of *Mars* for this purpose, which was a kind of military School within the City. We are not however to imagine, that they looked upon this early Institution as sufficient, or were less assiduous in exercising their Men, after they were admitted into the Service. They knew that constant Practice alone makes Troops expert, and brings them to the habit of applying their Knowledge with readiness upon all occasions. Hence not only among the young Soldiers, but even among those of oldest standing in the Army, the military Exercises were continued without intermission. These Exercises had a threefold Tendency: to inure the Men to Labour, and render them robust and active: to instruct them in the use of their Arms: and lastly, to teach them the necessary Evolutions, and how to preserve their Ranks and Orders, in Marches, Battles, and Incampments.

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XIII. As to the first, the *Romans* took great pains to form their Youth to be nimble in running, active to leap, strong to throw the Bar and to wrestle, which are all necessary Qualifications in a Soldier. For running and nimbleness fits them to get possession of a Place before the Enemy, to fall upon them on a sudden in their Quarters, and to pursue them with more execution in a Rout. Activity enables them with greater ease to avoid Blows, leap a Ditch, or climb a Bank. And Strength makes them carry their Arms better, strike better, and endure the Shock better. Swimming was likewise considered as an essential part of a military Education. Armies are not sure of Bridges wherever they come, nor are Boats always to be had; so that if Men cannot swim, they will necessarily be deprived of several Conveniences, and lose many fair Opportunities of Action. One principal Reason why the *Romans* made choice of the *Campus Martius* to exercise their Youth in was, its nearness to the *Tiber*; into which they plunged after their Fatigues, to accustom themselves to Swimming, and cleanse away the Dust and Sweat. But of all their Exercises of this kind, none was pursued with greater attention, than the inuring the Troops to the military Pace; that is, to walk twenty miles, and sometimes four and twenty, in five Hours. This habituated the Soldiers to a certain stated and regular Progress in their Marches, taught them to keep close together, and prevented their

CHAP. their exposing themselves scattered and dispersed to the Enemy. They were obliged likewise on these Occasions, to carry Burdens of threescore Pound weight, which not only accustomed them to bear Fatigue; but was found serviceable in many other respects. For whether it might be necessary in an Expedition to take along with them several Days Provisions, or to carry a certain quantity of Water thro' a desert and sandy Country, or to provide a number of Stakes for the Execution of any particular Enterprize; against all these Exigencies they had prepared themselves by the Practice of which we speak: and hence great Dangers were many times avoided, and great Victories many times obtained.

XIV. THE second Particular we mentioned in the *Roman Exercises* was, the instructing the Men in the use of their Arms. Here also we meet with many Proofs of the Industry and Sagacity of that People. They set up a great Post about six Foot high, suitable to the stature of a Man, and fastened it so strongly, that no Blows might be able to batter or shake it. This the Soldiers were wont to assail with all the Instruments of War, as if it had been indeed a real Enemy. Sometimes they would aim their Blows at the Head, sometimes strike it on the Face, then on the Sides, Legs, before and behind, now retreating, and then advancing again; during all which

which they were taught to proceed with so much Caution, that in directing their Weapon against their Adversary, they should not mean-while lay themselves open to Wounds.

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By this Contrivance they learnt how to place their Blows aright, and became dexterous and nimble, both at defending themselves, and offending their Enemies. They were instructed rather to thrust than to cut with their Swords: because Thrusts are more mortal, harder to be defended, and he that makes them is not so easily discovered, and is readier to double his Thrust than his Blow. We must not here forget, that in these Exercises they made use of Helmets, Shields, and Swords, double the weight of common Weapons. This made them ready and alert in Battle, which they found so far from being attended with any unforeseen Incumbrances, that it was rather an ease from the fatigue of ordinary Duty. Nor let any one wonder, that the *Romans* were so extremely attentive to these little things, since according to the manner of fighting then used, in which the Troops encountered hand to hand, every small Advantage was of great Importance. They were besides sensible, that Experience in this kind makes Men bold and courageous; for no one fears to do that which he thinks he understands. A Soldier who had often made trial of himself in these imaginary Combats, grew impatient to come to action in good earnest, that he might the better

judge of his own Proficiency, and have an opportunity of putting that in practice, which he had so well learnt in Theory. Hence Battles were not what they dreaded, but what they desired: and Generals often found it more difficult to restrain their Men from fighting, and check the Ardor of their Courage, where Prudence obliged them to decline the Onset; than to prevail upon them to face the Enemy, when they judged it necessary to come to an Engagement.

XV. BUT it is not sufficient to inure Men to Labour, to make them strong, swift, and expert at the use of their Weapons: they must learn likewise to keep their Ranks well, to obey Orders, and follow the Directions and Signals of their Commanders. This was the third Branch of the *Roman* Exercises, about which they were no less solicitous, than about the other two. I shall not here enter into a minute Detail of the common Evolutions, the opening and closing of the Files, doubling their Ranks, turning to the right and left, Marchings, Wheelings, &c. because they differed but a little from the Practice of the present Age. Their manner of forming too in order of Battle, their Conduct in an Attack or Repulse, with the general disposition of their Marches, will come in more properly under other Heads of this Discourse. Let it suffice for the present to observe, that they exercised their Men without intermission
in

in all these different Branches of the Service, and by the force of constant Habit, brought them to that degree of Expertness, that they could' practise without Hurry and Confusion in the heat of Fight, what they had been so thoroughly trained to in the Field. Above all it was their particular Care, to accustom the Troops to rally and recover their Order readily when broken. To this end, besides distinguishing the several Companies by peculiar Ensigns, every Man had his fixed and invariable Post in the Battalion, and was taught by long Practice, to know in a manner habitually, the number of his File, his Place in that File, his right and left-hand Man where he belonged to the front Rank, and both these and his File-Leader where he belonged to the other Ranks. Nay so very curious were the *Romans* in this Point, that to imprint these things the deeper upon the Minds of the Soldiers, they caused them to be engraven in great Characters upon their Helmets and Bucklers.

XVI. Nor were they less careful in training up the Cavalry, whom they taught particularly to ride well, and sit fast when they came to a Charge. To this end they had Horses of Wood upon which they were exercised, vaulting upon them, sometimes with their Arms, and sometimes without, very neatly and exactly, without any assistance; so that upon a Signal from their Captain they were

CHAP. immediately on horse-back, and upon another
III. Signal as soon upon the Ground. As they
fought in Squadrons, like the Cavalry of our
time, their Evolutions were much the same
with those in use at present, allowing only the
difference of Armour; and among the Horse,
as well as the Foot, were carried on without
intermission. Indeed there is nothing more
admirable in the whole *Roman* Discipline,
than the continual Exercise to which the
Troops were kept, either within or without
the Camp; insomuch that they were never
idle, and had scarce any respite from Duty.
The new raised Soldiers performed their Ex-
ercises regularly twice a Day, and the old
ones once: for it was not, in the Opinion of
this People, length of Service that constituted
warlike and veteran Troops, but the uninterr-
rupted Habit and Practice of Arms; nor did
they consider an unexercised Soldier, after what
number of Campaigns you will, as any other
than a Novice in the Profession. Accordingly
they were constant and indefatigable in training
their Men to all the different Operations of
the Field. They obliged them to make hasty
Marches of a considerable length, laden with
their Arms and several Palisades, and that
often in steep and craggy Countries. They
habituated them always to keep their Ranks,
even in the midst of Disorder and Confusion,
and never to lose sight of their Standards.
They made them charge each other in mock
Battles, of which the Officers, Generals, and
even

even the Consul himself were Witnesses, and in which they thought it for their Glory to share in person. When they had no Enemy in the Field, the Troops were employed in considerable Works, as well to keep them in Exercise, as for the publick Utility. Such in particular were the Highways, called for that reason *Vie militares*, which still subsist, and are the fruits of that wise and salutary Custom.

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XVII. How much the *Romans* relied upon this manner of training and employing their Troops, appears evidently from the Conduct of their Senate and Generals, during a course of several Ages. For in all their Difficulties and Straits, this was that to which they had immediate recourse, as their surest Refuge, and the only means by which they could hope to extricate themselves. Did they think themselves exposed to any Danger, or were they desirous to repair some Loss? It was a constant Practice among them, to invigorate and give new Life to their military Discipline. Are they engaged in a War with the *Latines*, a People no less martial than themselves? *Manlius* reflects upon the best Method of strengthening the Command in the Field, and puts to death his own Son, for conquering without his Orders. Are they defeated before *Numantia*? *Scipio Æmilianus* immediately removes the several Blandishments which had enervated them. Have the *Roman* Legions passed under the Yoke in *Numidia*? *Metellus*

CHAP. wipes away the Ignominy, the Instant he has.

III. obliged them to resume their ancient Institutions. *Marius*, that he may be enabled to vanquish the *Cimbri* and the *Teutones*, begins by diverting the course of Rivers: and *Sylla* employs in such hard Labour his Soldiers, who were terrified at the War which was carrying on against *Mithridates*, that they sue for Battle, to put an end to their Hardships. *Publius Nasica* made the *Romans* build a Fleet of Ships at a time when they had no occasion for such a Force. In a word, Industry, Diligence, and a Perseverance in all kind of military Toils, was the very Characteristick of this People: they dreaded Idleness more than an Enemy.

XVIII. THESE Men thus inured were generally healthy and vigorous. We do not find by Historians, that the *Roman* Armies, which waged War in so great a variety of Climates, fell often a prey to Diseases; whereas in the present Age, we daily see Armies, without once engaging, perish and melt away, if I may use the Expression, in a single Campaign. Nor can I forbear taking notice, that the Dexterity and Address the Soldiers attained, by means of their continual Exercises, served not only to render them skilful and active in the Duties of the Field, but inspired them likewise with Boldness and Intrepidity. In the Battles fought in our Age, every single Soldier has very little Security and Confidence, except

except in the Multitude : but among the *Romans*, every Individual, more robust and of greater Experience in War, as well as more inured to the Fatigues of it than his Enemy, relied upon himself only. He was naturally endued with Courage, or in other Words, with that Virtue which a sensibility of our own Strength inspires. To the same admirable Discipline too were they indebted, for a certain Haughtiness and Opinion of Superiority, which made them rank themselves above the Troops of all other Nations, and despise the service of any foreign Prince or State, compared with that of their own Country. Desertions are very common among us for this Reason, because the Soldiers are the dregs of every Nation, and not one of them possesses, or thinks himself possessed of a certain Advantage, which renders his Condition preferable to that of his Adversaries. But among the *Romans* they were less frequent; it being scarce possible that Soldiers, raised from among a People naturally so imperious and aspiring, and so sure of commanding over others, should demean themselves to such a degree as to cease to be *Romans*. We may likewise observe, as a necessary Consequence of their being so carefully trained, that 'twas next to impossible in a Battle, how unfortunate soever, but some Troops must rally in one Part or other of it, or the Enemy be defeated in some quarter of the Field ; either of which was often sufficient to secure the Victory. And indeed we

CHAP. find every where in History, that whenever
 III. the *Romans* happened to be overpowered in
 the beginning, whether by numbers or the
 fierceness of the Onset, they seldom failed at
 last to wrest the Victory out of the Enemy's
 hands.

XIX. THERE are still many other Particulars that might be mentioned to the advantage of the *Roman* Discipline: their strict Regulations with regard to all the different Branches of the Service: their admirable Policy in making Motives of Honour and Shame operate strongly upon the Troops: their steady adherence to the received Maxims of War, so as never on any occasion to abate of the rigor of military Severity, where the Soldiers were found to have neglected their Duty, abandoned their Post, thrown away their Arms, or surrendered themselves to the Enemy. History abounds with Examples of his kind. As their Armies were for the most part but small, the Commander had a better Opportunity of knowing the several Individuals, and could more easily perceive the various Faults and Misdemeanors committed by the Soldiery, against which care was taken to provide immediately. Nor were they so tenacious of their own Customs, as not to pay a due attention to those of other Nations, which they adopted without hesitation, wherever they appeared attended with any real Benefit. In their War with *Pyrrhus*, they improved

improved themselves in the knowledge of CHAP. III.
 Posts and Incampments: in that with *Hannibal* they learnt the true use of Cavalry, and how to apply Address and Stratagem in the conduct of a Campaign. If any Nation boasted, either from Nature or its Institution, any peculiar Advantage, the *Romans* immediately made use of it. They employed their utmost Endeavours to procure Horses from *Numidia*, Bowmen from *Crete*, Slingers from the *Balearean* Isles, and Ships from the *Rhodians*: so that it may with justice be said of them, that no Nation in the World ever prepared for War with so much Wisdom, and carried it on with so much Intrepidity.

XX. Thus have we endeavoured to give some account of the Arms and Discipline of the *Romans*, and to point out their excellency over those of other Nations. How much they were indebted to them for their Grandeur and Successes, appears evidently from this: that so long as their Armies adhered strictly to these primitive Institutions, they were invincible; but in proportion as they deviated from them, became like other Men. When they began to look upon their Armour as too weighty and cumbersome, and their Discipline as attended with too many Restraints, and of course to relax in these two important Articles, they gradually sunk to a level with the Troops of their Enemies, and at last so totally degenerated, that we find not
in

CHAP. in their Behaviour the least traces of their original Bravery. I know it is a Maxim of long standing, that *Money is the Sinews of War*. How far this may suit the Constitution of the present Age, I will not pretend to say; but it seems by no means to agree with Antiquity. I am sure the whole current of History is against it. Had this been the case, *Cyrus* could never have prevailed against *Craesus*, nor the *Greeks* against the *Persians*, nor the *Romans* against the *Carthaginians*. It is true Money is requisite for the carrying on of a War, but not principally and in the first place. Good Soldiers and good Discipline are of infinitely greater avail. Where these are, it will be easy to find Money; but Money is not always sufficient to procure them. Had not the *Romans* done more in their Wars with their Iron than their Gold, the Treasures of the whole World would not have been sufficient for them; considering their great Enterprises abroad, and their no less Difficulties at home. But having good and well disciplined Troops, they were never in want of Money; for those who were afraid of their Armies, strove with Emulation to supply them. Nay it is remarkable, that their most celebrated Victories, and those which required the greatest exertion of Strength, were gained during the period of their Poverty. It was then that they subdued the *Samnites*, forced *Pyrrhus* to quit *Italy*, and cut in pieces the mighty Armies of the *Carthaginians*.

thaginians. After they became possessed of the Treasures of the Universe, they had for the most part only weak and effeminate Nations to deal with, and were so far from increasing in real Power, that by the concurrent Testimony of all Historians, they are to be considered from that time as upon the decline. *Livy*, in that famous Question relating to the *Greeks* and *Romans*, where he endeavours to determine what would have been the Event, had *Alexander the Great* turned his Arms against *Italy*, observes that in War there are three things fundamentally necessary; good Soldiers, good Officers, and good Fortune; and then arguing whether *Alexander* or the *Romans* were more considerable in these three Points, concludes without the least mention of Money. It is well known that the *Spartans*, so long as they adhered to their primitive Institutions and Poverty, were the most powerful People of all *Greece*, and never proved unsuccessful in their Wars, till they became possessed of great Riches and Revenues. I conclude therefore, that it was by the Bravery of their Troops, the Advantage of their Arms, and the Excellence of their Discipline, that the *Romans* rendered themselves victorious over all Nations: and accordingly we find, that when they ceased to have the superiority in these, the Revenues of the whole World were not sufficient to defend them.

CHAP.
III.

C H A P. IV.

*Of the Spirit and Bravery of the
Roman Troops.*

I. **A**LTHO' military Discipline, and the continual Exercise of Arms, naturally conduce to make a People bold, daring, and intrepid; yet there is something so peculiar in the Spirit and Character of the *Romans*, that I flatter myself it will not be unacceptable to the Reader, to offer a few Reflections on this Subject, and give him some insight in to those Institutions and Maxims of Conduct, which chiefly contributed to exalt their Courage, and animate their Bravery. Two things here naturally present themselves to our consideration. First, the admirable Principles upon which the Commonwealth was founded. Secondly, the Succession of great Men that for several Ages prevailed in it, and who supported, invigorated, and from time to time gave new Life to these Principles. Among the Principles of the *Roman* Polity, none seems to have taken deeper root, than the fear of the Gods, and a veneration for Religion. This perhaps, at first sight, may not be thought so immediately to

to concern a martial People : but if we examine the effect of it upon their Armies, and the many valuable Purposes it was made to serve in War, we shall have reason to conclude, that of all their Institutions, not one contributed more to the Grandeur of the State. For hence in particular it was, that the military Oath was held so sacred among the Troops, and became an inviolable bond of Fidelity and Subjection. The Soldiers, however displeased and enraged, did not dare to quit their Generals, so long as this Tie was supposed to remain in force ; nay so very tender and scrupulous were they, that even in their greatest Impatience to be discharged, they would yet never admit of any Interpretation, that carried in it the least strain or appearance of Deceit. We have a remarkable Example of this, in their Behaviour to *Quinctius Cincinnatus*, after the defeat of *Appius Herdonius*. That *Sabine* had seized the Capitol with four thousand Men. The Danger was imminent, and required speedy redress : but the Tribunes, who were then pushing the *Terentian* Law ; in order to force the Senate to a compliance, opposed the Levies. The People however, partly by Promises, partly by remonstrating the danger of the City, were at length prevailed upon to take an Oath of Fidelity to the Consuls ; and marching against *Herdonius*, soon recovered possession of the Capitol. *Publius Valerius*, to whom the charge of the Attack fell, chancing to be slain, *Quinctius Cinnatus*

CHAP. *cinnatus* was immediately chosen in his room ;
 IV. who to keep the Troops employed, and leave
 them no room to think of their Law *Terentilla*,
 ordered them out upon an Expedition against
 the *Volsci*, alledging, that the Oath they had
 taken to the late Consul obliged them to follow
 him. The Tribunes, to evade the Engage-
 ment, pretended that the Oath bound them
 only to the person of *Valerius*, and so was
 buried with him in his Tomb. But the
 People, more sincere and plain-hearted, could
 not resolve to shelter themselves under so
 frivolous a Distinction, and therefore pre-
 pared every Man to take Arms, tho' very
 unwillingly. *Nondum* (says *Livy*) *hæc, quæ*
nunc tenet seculum, negligentia Deum venerat,
nec interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum, &
leges aptas faciebat. " That neglect of the
 " Gods, which so much dishonours the pre-
 " sent Age, was not known in those Days,
 " nor had Men learnt the pernicious Art
 " of interpreting the Laws of Religion ac-
 " cording to their own Purposes."

II. I could produce many Instances of the
 like nature, all tending to shew, how ser-
 viceable Religion was, to the governing of
 Armies, the uniting of the People, and the
 keeping them in due subjection to their Of-
 ficers and Magistrates : infomuch that should
 it fall into dispute, whether *Rome* was more
 indebted to *Romulus* or *Numa*, I am clearly
 of Opinion that *Numa* would have the pre-
 ference.

ference. For where Religion is once fixed, military Discipline may be easily introduced; but where Religion is wanting, Discipline is not brought in without great difficulty; and never can be carried to perfection. If we enquire into the nature of the Religion professed by the *Romans*, we find that it ran much upon the Answers of Oracles, Divinations, Soothsaying, Sacrifices, and innumerable other Ceremonies, that argue more of Superstition, than any just knowledge of the Deity. But absurd as this Religion may appear, it had nevertheless a wonderful Influence upon the Minds of Men, and was often made use of with success, to inspire Courage in Battles and Dangers. It is well known that all their military Expeditions were preceded by the Auguries and Auspices; and according to the Omens that offered on these Occasions, did the People judge of the issue. Hence their wisest and best Generals, by a strict Regard to these Observances, and accommodating the Ceremonies of Religion to their own Designs, generally found means to give a favourable turn to the Omens; which greatly contributed to exalt the Courage of their Troops, and made them face the Enemy with Confidence. On the contrary, it is observed, that where the usual Forms were neglected, and Generals affected to act in Contempt of the Auspices, they seldom succeeded in their Designs. This may well enough be accounted for, without allowing any real Influence to these Ceremonies,

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IV.

or

CHAP. or supposing that the flight and chirping of
IV. Birds could in the least affect future Events.
Nothing in truth can be more trifling, than the pretended Presages of which we speak : but as they were firmly believed by the bulk of the Army ; where at any time they appeared unfavourable, it could not fail of casting a great damp upon the Spirits of the Soldiers. And yet this does not seem to me to have been the principal cause of those Miscarriages, that were usually observed to follow a neglect of the Auspices. The Ignorance and Incapacity of the Generals will much better account for them ; nor need we a stronger Proof of this Incapacity, than the Contempt with which they affected to treat Religion. War is necessarily attended with so much Uncertainty, and requires such a multitude of different Attentions, that a prudent General will be far from neglecting any Advantages, which he sees may be drawn from the established Prejudices of those under his command ; much less will he turn these very Prejudices to his own hurt, by an ill-judged Contempt : and the General who is so indiscreet as to act in this manner, plainly discovers himself unfit for the conduct of any great Enterprize. I know it is asserted by some, that Religion checks the natural Fierceness and Obstinacy of Men, and renders them poor-spirited and abject : but whoever talks in this manner, shews himself little conversant in the History of Mankind. Consider the *Romans* in the best times

times of the Republick, the *English* under Queen *Elizabeth* and *Oliver Cromwell*, the *French* in the Age of *Henry* the fourth, the United Provinces in that of *Philip* the second, and the *Suedes* under *Gustavus Vasa*, and then tell me, whether the most flourishing and formidable periods of Nations, be not those when a Spirit of Religion has strongly taken possession of the Minds of the People.

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III. NEXT to a veneration for Religion, love of their Country was the prevailing Characteristick of the *Romans*. This Virtue naturally rouses Men to great Designs, and begets Vigour and Perseverance in the execution of them; and as it had taken a deeper root among the People of whom we speak, than in any other Nation mentioned in History, no wonder we here meet with so many Instances of Magnanimity, publick Spirit, Fortitude, and all the Virtues that tend to form a race of Heroes. It is certain that the Constitution of the *Roman* Commonwealth was peculiarly fitted to nourish this Spirit. The People had many Ties and Obligations to the State, many endearing Connections to inspire the love of it. They chose the Senators by whose Counsels the Republick was governed, the Magistrates by whom Justice was administered, and the Generals who conducted and terminated their Wars; so that the publick Successes were in a manner their own Work. Hence the Principle of which we

speech became so strong in them, that they were ready to sacrifice every other Consideration to it, whether of Interest or Ambition. No Hazards, no Sufferings appeared great, where their Country stood in need of their Assistance. We find even in the Disputes between the different Orders of the State, where the Passions of Men are wont most strongly to be engaged, and where particular Animosities are but too apt to get the better of Reason, that the Consideration of the publick Safety was always sufficient to calm their Resentments, and bring them to Temper and Moderation. How violent soever the Contest might be, however much the Parties appeared exasperated against one another, they were yet sure to unite, when any Danger from without threatened the Commonwealth. This is evident thro' the whole course of the *Roman* History, and requires not to be illustrated by particular Examples. I shall therefore only add, that a Principle so powerful and universally diffused, as it could not fail of having many desirable Effects upon the People, so did it in a particular manner tend to render them brave and resolute: for Courage being of indispensable necessity to the defence of our Country, wherever the love of that predominates, there we are sure to find the other likewise.

IV. BUT if the *Romans* are remarkable for the love they bore their Country, they are
no

no less so when we consider how passionately CHAP.
fond they were of Liberty. This Spirit sub- IV.
sisted from the very foundation of the State. }

Tho' *Rome* was at first governed by Kings, these Kings were far from being absolute: for besides the Authority enjoyed by the Senate, the People too had a considerable share in the Administration; since to their Assemblies were committed the creation of Magistrates, the enacting of Laws, and the resolving upon Peace or War. Indeed under *Tarquin the Proud*, the Government degenerated into a real Tyranny: but this, instead of extinguishing, served only to rouse the love of Liberty; and the Behaviour of *Brutus*, who put his own Sons to death, for attempting to restore the royal Authority, made so strong an Impression upon the Minds of the People, that they henceforward considered Slavery as the greatest of Evils, and bent all their Thoughts to the preserving and enlarging the Freedom they had acquired. I need not here say, how much Liberty tends to ennoble the Mind, and how necessary it is to the Prosperity and Greatness of a State. It is well known that *Athens*, so long as it continued under the Tyranny of *Pisistratus* and his Descendents, made scarce any figure in *Greece*; and whereas soon after their Expulsion, it rose to so astonishing a pitch of Grandeur, as not only to baffle all the Efforts of the *Persians*, but even to render itself formidable to that mighty Empire. And if we look

CHAP. into the History of the *Roman* Commonwealth, we find, that in proportion as Liberty
IV.  increased, and the People got from under the dominion of the Nobles, they became inspired with a more elevated Courage, a more unwearied Fortitude, and pushed their Conquests with greater rapidity. Nay in the very infancy of their Freedom, when *Tarquin* was endeavouring to recover his lost Authority, they gave manifest indications of that Spirit, for which they are so justly admired by succeeding Ages. It is upon this Occasion that we read of the astonishing Valour of *Horatius Cocles*, the intrepid Firmness of *Scævola*, and the masculine Boldness of *Clelia*; insomuch that *Porfenna* King of the *Clusians*, who had undertaken the reinstating of *Tarquin*, admiring their Bravery, would not any longer disturb them in the enjoyment of a Liberty, to which their Merit gave them so just a title, and which he found them so resolutely bent to defend.

V. AND here I cannot but observe, that this passionate desire of Freedom gave rise to a peculiar Circumstance in the *Roman* Constitution, which tho' seemingly inconsistent with the Prosperity of the State, was yet in reality one of the principal causes of its Grandeur, as it more than any thing contributed to exalt the Character of the People; and produce among them the most finished Models in every Species of Merit. What I mean is,
those

those continual Dissentions between the Nobles and Commons, of which we meet with so frequent mention in the early Ages of the Commonwealth. Two Bodies at *Rome* divided the whole Authority: the Senate and the People. A mutual Jealousy, founded on the one side upon a desire of governing, on the other upon that of keeping themselves free and independent, raised between them Contentions and Quarrels, which ended not but with the Republick itself. These Contests, tho' attended with many Inconveniences, procured notwithstanding a considerable Advantage to the State, in forming a number of Persons of distinguished Merit, and perpetuating a succession of them in the Commonwealth. The Patricians, who were obstinately bent to keep to themselves alone the Commands, the Honours, the Magistracies; as they could not obtain them but by the Suffrages of the Plebeians, were obliged to use their utmost Endeavours to prove themselves worthy by superior Qualities, by real and repeated Services, by illustrious Actions, of which their Adversaries themselves were Witnesses, and to which they could not refuse their Esteem and Applause. This necessity of depending on the Judgment of the People for admission to Posts, obliged the young Patricians to acquire all the Merit capable of gaining the Suffrages of Judges, who examined them rigorously, and were not inclined to have a remiss Indulgence for the Candidates, as well out of love to the

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Honour and Welfare of the State, as out of an hereditary Jealousy of the Patrician Order. The Plebeians on their side, in aspiring to the highest Dignities of the State, were forced to prepare themselves so as to convince their Brethren, that they had all the Qualities necessary to fill them with Honour. Proofs were to be given of a distinguished Valour, of a wise and prudent Conduct, of a Capacity to discharge all the Functions of Government, and to pass with Reputation thro' the several Offices, which led by degrees to the highest. It was needful to have not only the military Virtues, and Ability to conduct an Army; but the Talent of haranguing the Senate and People, of reporting the great Affairs of State, of answering foreign Ambassadors, and entering with them into the nicest and most important Negotiations. By all these Obligations, imposed by Ambition on the Plebeians, to qualify them for the Posts to which they aspired, they were under necessity of making proof of an accomplished Merit, at least equal to that of the Patricians.

VI. THESE were some of the Advantages arising from the sharp Contests between the Senate and People, from whence resulted a lively Emulation between the two Orders, and a happy Necessity of displaying Talents, which perhaps by a continual Concord and Peace would have lain dormant and fruitless; just as, if I may use the Comparison, from
a Steel

a Steel struck with a Flint, Sparks of Fire fly out, which without that Violence would remain for ever concealed. This is not all. It was by means of these Contests that the publick Liberty was improved and settled, without which the Commonwealth would never have become great and flourishing. By the Revolution which expelled *Tarquin the Proud*, the Commons of *Rome* were delivered from a Tyrant, but not from Tyranny. The Patricians still held them under subjection: and tho' while their Fears of *Tarquin's* return were alive and strong, they behaved with great Lenity and Moderation, yet no sooner were they informed of that Prince's death, than the weight of Oppression was renewed, and fell as heavy upon the People as ever. The *Valerian Law*, to permit Appeals from the Sentence of the Magistrates to the People assembled, was not sufficient to protect the Plebeians from Injustice and Cruelty. They found it necessary to have Magistrates of their own Body, to screen them from the Tyranny of the Great, and therefore extorted from the Senate a consent to the establishment of the Tribunitian power. The institution of the *Comitia Tributa*, and the practice of bringing into Judgment, before those Assemblies, the most exalted of the Nobles, upon Accusations of Treason against the People, was another Bulwark against the overflowings of Ambition. The publication of the Laws of the twelve Tables, gave some Check to the

abuse of that Prerogative, which the Patricians tenaciously kept, of being the sole Judges in civil Causes : and on many other Occasions we find, that the Commons, urged by Oppression to Fury, exerted their natural Strength in such manner as proclaimed them sovereign Masters of the Administration, and gradually extended their Privileges.

VII. BUT the Commonwealth of *Rome* was never truly a free State, 'till after the publication of the *Licinian* Laws, those Laws which, in their Consequences, made Merit alone the ordinary Scale whereby to ascend to the highest Offices ; and which, by admitting the Plebeians to a reasonable share of what was purchased with their Blood, delivered them from that servile subjection to the wealthy Nobles, in which their Indigence had so long detained them. From this Period, the *Roman* People, when they made Laws, or elected Magistrates for the execution of them, were generally speaking free from all undue Influence ; not overawed, as before, by the Rich and the Great, nor constrained by any Force, but that of Reason and natural Justice, in the most absolute subjection to which is the most perfect Freedom. No Citizen, who had shewed superior Talents and Virtue, stood excluded, on account of the low degree of his Birth, from the Dignities of the State : and hence proceeded an Emulation among the Individuals to surpass each other in deserving Honours.

Honours. Indeed the haughty Patricians, as, CHAP.
when vanquished by the Plebeians, they had IV.
given ground with an angry Reluctance, and retired fighting, so they afterwards, from time to time, shewed a strong Disposition to renew the War, in order to regain their unrighteous Sovereignty: but their Efforts were faint and ineffectual: and at length acquiescing in what they could not undo, there ensued domestic Peace and Union, and an established Liberty. Union at home gave new strength to the State; and Liberty seems to have inspired the People with a nobler Spirit, a more exalted Courage, and a greater Ardor to enlarge the Bounds of their Empire. For whereas before, during the space of four hundred Years, they had not pushed their Conquests beyond a few Leagues round the City; we find that from this period, in the course of seventy Years, they by a series of Victories made themselves masters of all *Italy*. And tho' destitute of naval Strength and naval Skill, their next Enterprize was against a rival Republick beyond the Continent; a Republick that with greater Riches, and more ample Territories than theirs, had possession of the absolute Dominion of the Sea. The Boldness of the Undertaking, and the amazing Constancy with which they supported it, in spite of the most terrible Adversities, are not to be paralleled in the History of any other Nation: but the *Roman* Legions were, at that time, Legions of free Citizens, whose predominant Passion was
Glory,

CHAP. Glory, and who placed the highest Glory in
IV. facing every Danger, and surmounting every
Difficulty, to preserve their Liberty, and extend
their Empire.

VIII. THE love of Glory is indeed a natural Consequence of Liberty, and if to this we join that remarkable disregard of Wealth, which prevailed for so many Ages among this People, we shall have reason to conclude, that these likewise contributed not a little, towards forming in them that firm and intrepid Bravery, which makes a distinguishing part of their Character. For the love of Glory pushes Men on to great Actions, and a disregard of Wealth prevents their being biased by mean sordid Views, or shaken by the low Considerations of Self-Interest. It is certain that Glory was the main Spring of all those noble and illustrious Undertakings, which have rendered the *Romans* so famous. By this Motive, the Republick, after Liberty prevailed, made an incredible progress in a short time. The frequent Examples of Patriotism, and of an inviolable attachment to the publick Good, of which *Rome* was witness in those critical times, and which she rewarded in so eminent a manner, kindled not only in the Patricians, but likewise among the Plebeians, that noble Fire of Emulation and Glory, which dares all things, and influenced all along the whole Nation. Greedy of Praise, they reckoned Money as nothing, and valued it only
to

to disperse it. They were content with moderate Fortunes, says *Salust*, but desired Glory without measure. Accordingly we find, that for four hundred Years after the building of *Rome*, the City was in very great Poverty : and of this the probable Cause seems to be, that Poverty was no impediment to Preference. Virtue was the only thing required in the election of Magistrates, and the distribution of Offices ; and wherever it was found, let the Person, or Family be ever so poor, he was sure to be advanced. *Quinctius Cincinnatus* was taken from the Plough, and raised to the Office of Dictator, tho' his Estate did not exceed four Acres of Land. *Fabritius* and *Attilius Regulus* are likewise Examples of this kind ; and indeed the *Roman* History every where abounds with them.

IX. THE Thirst of Glory usually produces that of Dominion. It appears noble to be Masters, to command others, to compose Laws, to be feared and obeyed. This Passion, natural to Mankind, was more strong and active in the *Romans*, than in any other People. One would think, at seeing the air of Authority that they very early assume, that they already believed themselves destined to become one day Lords of the Universe. Nay it appears from many Indications in their History, that this Notion subsisted from the Foundation of the State. The Answers and Interpretations of the Augurs frequently glanced this way.

CHAP. IV. A Head was found in digging for the Foundations of the Capitol. This was given out to imply the eternity of their Empire, and that the City to which that Temple belonged, was to become the head of the Universe. We see likewise in the Speech of *Coriolanus* to the Deputies of the Senate, upon occasion of his investing *Rome* with an Army of *Volsicians*, that the Conceit of universal Dominion not only strongly prevailed in his time, but was carefully cherished among the People. Nor was it without reason that the Senate contrived to raise and propagate this Persuasion, as it tended wonderfully to exalt the Courage of the Citizens, and not only animated them in the pursuit of Conquest, but kept them firm and steady under the severest Strokes of Adversity. Thus at the same time that Poverty and a disregard of Wealth rendered them modest, the love of Glory and Dominion inspired them with Magnanimity. When put into Command, and placed at the head of Armies, Kings appeared but little before them; nor was any Danger, Difficulty, or Opposition able to dismay them: but when their Commissions expired, and they returned to a private Station; none so frugal, none so humble, none so laborious, so obedient to the Magistrates, or respectful to their Superiors as they; insomuch that one would think it impossible the same Minds should be capable of such strange Alterations.

X. FROM these distinguishing Characters of the *Roman* People, it will be easy to perceive, how Courage and a sense of Honour came to be so prevalent in their Armies. And here I cannot but observe, that the military Rewards were wonderfully calculated to promote this Spirit; since without being considerable for their intrinsic Value, they were yet extremely coveted by the Troops, because Glory, so precious to that warlike People, was annexed to them. A very small Crown of Gold, and generally a Crown of Laurel or Oak-Leaves, became inestimable to the Soldiers, who knew not any Marks more excellent than those of Virtue, nor any Distinction more noble, than that which flows from glorious Actions. These Monuments of Renown were to them real Patents of Nobility, and descended to their Posterity as a precious Inheritance. They were besides sure Titles to rise to Places of Honour and Advantage, which were granted only to Merit, and not procured by Intrigue and Cabal. We have already had occasion to take notice of the large Field there lay for promotion in the *Roman* Armies, and that such as distinguished themselves by their Valour had reason to hope for every thing. What an agreeable prospect for an inferior Officer, to behold at a distance the chief Dignities of the State and Army, as so many Rewards to which he could aspire.

CHAP.

IV.

CHAP. XI.

IV.

AND indeed if any thing be capable of inspiring Men with Bravery and a martial Ardor; to pass thro' a succession of different Honours, and to be entitled to a number of military Rewards, which were all considered as so many standing Monuments of Renown, seems to bid fairest for it. I cannot better represent the Effect this had upon the Troops, than by the following Relation, from which the Reader may form some Idea of what a *Roman Soldier* was. When the War against *Perseus*, the last King of *Macedonia*, was resolved upon at *Rome*; amongst the other Measures taken for the success of it, the Senate decreed, that the Consul charged with that Expedition, should raise as many Centurions and veteran Soldiers as he pleased, out of those who did not exceed fifty Years of Age. Twenty-three Centurions, who had been *Primipili*, refused to take Arms, unless the same Rank was granted them, which they had in preceding Campaigns. As it was impossible to gratify them all, and they persisted obstinately in their refusal, the Affair was brought before the People. After *Popilius*, who had been Consul two Years before, had pleaded the Cause of the Centurions, and the Consul his own, one of the Centurions, who had appealed to the People, having obtained permission to speak, expressed himself to this effect.

XII. " I am called *Spurius Ligustinus*, of
" the *Crustumine* Tribe, descended from the
" *Sabines*.

“ *Sabines*. My Father left me a small Field CHAP.
 “ and Cottage, where I was born, brought IV.
 “ up, and now live. As soon as I was at age
 “ to marry, he gave me his Brother’s Daugh-
 “ ter to Wife. She brought me no Portion,
 “ but Liberty, Chastity, and a Fruitfulness
 “ sufficient for the richest Houses. We
 “ have six Sons, and two Daughters, both
 “ married. Of my Sons four have taken the
 “ Robe of Manhood, the other two, are still
 “ Infants. I began to bear Arms in the Con-
 “ sulship of *P. Sulpicius* and *C. Aurelius*, and
 “ served two Years as a private Soldier in the
 “ Army sent into *Macedonia* against King
 “ *Philip*. The third Year *T. Quintius Flami-*
 “ *ninus*, to reward me for my Services, made
 “ made me Captain of a Century in the
 “ tenth Maniple of the *Hastati*. I served
 “ afterwards as a Volunteer in *Spain* under
 “ *Cato*; and that General, who is so excel-
 “ lent a Judge of Merit, made me first Cen-
 “ turation of the first Maniple of the *Hastati*.
 “ In the War against the *Ætolians* and King
 “ *Antiochus*, I rose to the same Rank amongst
 “ the *Principes*. I afterwards made several
 “ Campaigns, and in a very few Years have
 “ been four times *Primipilus*: I have been
 “ four and thirty times rewarded by the Ge-
 “ nerals, have received six Civic Crowns,
 “ have served two and twenty Campaigns,
 “ and am above fifty Years old. Tho’ I had
 “ not completed the number of Years re-
 “ quired by the Law, and my Age did not
 “ discharge

CHAP. " discharge me, substituting four of my
 IV. " Children in my place, I should deserve to
 " be exempt from the necessity of serving.
 " But by all I have said, I only intend to
 " shew the justice of my Cause. For the
 " rest, as long as those who levy the Troops
 " shall judge me capable of bearing Arms, I
 " shall not refuse the Service. The Tribunes
 " may rank me as they please, that is their
 " Business: mine is to act, that none be
 " ranked above me for Valour; as all the Ge-
 " nerals under whom I have had the honour
 " to serve, and all my Comrades can witness
 " for me, I have hitherto never failed to do.
 " For you, Centurions, notwithstanding your
 " Appeal; as even during your Youth you
 " have never done any thing contrary to the
 " Authority of the Magistrates and Senate,
 " in my Opinion, it would become your Age,
 " to shew yourselves submissive to the Senate
 " and Consuls, and to think every Station ho-
 " nourable, that gives you opportunity to
 " serve the Republick."

XIII. It is easy to discern in this Speech, the Spirit and Magnanimity of a true *Roman*; and particularly a certain Boldness and Confidence, derived from a sense of his many Services, and the Rewards and Honours with which they had been attended. And if this be so conspicuous in the inferior Officers, what may we not expect in those of a more eminent degree? If Civic and Mural Crowns, Collars,

Collars, Chains, Bracelets, and such like, were sufficient to rouse these Sentiments of Heroism among the lower Order of Troops, what would not the prospect of a Triumph effect in the Mind of the General? This Honour was granted only to Dictators, Consuls, and Prætors. After the General had distributed a part of the Spoils to the Soldiers, and performed some other Ceremonies, the Procession began, and entered the City thro' the Triumphal Port, to ascend to the Capitol. At the head of it were the players upon musical Instruments, who made the Air resound with their Harmony. They were followed by the Beasts that were to be sacrificed, adorned with Fillets, and Flowers, many of them having their Horns gilt. After them came the whole Booty, and all the Spoils, either displayed upon Carriages, or born upon the Shoulders of young Men in magnificent Habits. The Names of the Nations conquered were written in great Characters, and the Cities that had been taken represented. Sometimes they added to the Pomp extraordinary Animals, brought from the Countries subjected, as Bears, Panthers, Lions, and Elephants. But what most attracted the Attention and Curiosity of the Spectators, were the illustrious Captives, who walked in Chains before the Victor's Chariot: great Officers of State, Generals of Armies, Princes, Kings, with their Wives and Children. The Consul followed upon a magnificent Chariot, drawn by four

CHAP.

IV.

Triumph, his Head incircled with a Crown of Laurel, holding also a Branch of the same Tree in his Hand, and sometimes accompanied with his young Children sitting by him. Behind the Chariot marched the whole Army, the Cavalry first, then the Infantry. All the Soldiers were crowned with Laurel, and those who had received particular Crowns, and other Marks of Honour, did not fail to shew them on so great a Solemnity. They emulated each other in celebrating the Praises of their General, and sometimes threw in Expressions, sufficiently offensive, of Raillery and Satire against him, which favoured of the military Freedom; but the Joy of the Ceremony entirely blunted their Edge, and abated their Bitterness. When the Procession arrived at the Capitol, the Consul immediately upon his entering the Temple, made this very remarkable Prayer to the God. "Filled
" with Gratitude and with Joy, I return you
" thanks, O most good and most great *Ju-*
" *piter*, and you Queen *Juno*, and all the
" other Gods, the Guardians and Inhabitants
" of this Citadel, that to this Day and Hour
" you have vouchsafed by my Hands, to pre-
" serve and guide the *Roman* Republick hap-
" pily. Continue always, I implore you, to
" preserve, guide, protect, and favour it in
" all things." This Prayer was followed by sacrificing the Victims, and a magnificent Feast, given in the Capitol, sometimes by the
Publick,

Publick, and sometimes by the Person himself who triumphed. It must be allowed, that this was a glorious Day for a General of an Army; and it is not surprising that all possible Endeavours should be used to deserve so grateful a Distinction, and so splendid an Honour. *Rome* had not any thing more majestick and magnificent than this pompous Ceremony, which seemed to raise the Person in favour of whom it was granted, above the Condition of Mortals.

CHAP.
IV.

XIV. THE *Romans*, in War, knew how to make use of Punishments, as well as Rewards. The steddiness of a Dictator with respect to his General of Horse, who could not be saved from death but by the Intreaties and urgent Prayers of all the People: the inexorable Severity of the Consul *Manlius* to his own Son, whom he unmercifully put to Death, tho' victorious, for fighting contrary to his Orders: these Examples made a terrible Impression of Fear upon the People, which became for ever the firm Bond of military Discipline. Wherefore never was it observed in any Nation so inviolably as among the *Romans*, nor did any thing contribute so much to render them victorious over all their Enemies. How should they have been otherwise than victorious with Troops formed as we have seen, and above all guided in their Operations by Principles the most proper to make Conquerors? One of which was, not

CHAP. to know any other end of War but Victory,
IV. and for its sake to surmount by an indefatiga-
ble Perseverance, all the Obstacles and all the
Dangers by which it can be retarded. The
greatest Misfortunes, the most desperate
Losses, were incapable of daunting their Cou-
rage, or making them accept a base and dis-
honourable Peace. To grant nothing by com-
pulsion, was a fundamental Law of the *Roman*
Policy, from which the Senate never de-
parted; and in the most melancholy Junctures,
weak Counsels, instead of prevailing, were
not so much as heard. As far back as *Corio-
lanus*, the Senate declared, that no Agree-
ment could be made with the *Volsi*, so long
as they remained on the *Roman* Territory.
They proceeded in the same manner with
Pyrrhus. After the bloody Battle of *Cannæ*,
wherein above fifty thousand of the *Romans*
lay dead on the Field, it was resolved no Pro-
posal of Peace should be listened to. The
Consul *Varro*, who had been the Occasion of
the Defeat, was received at *Rome* as if he had
been victorious, because in so great a Misfor-
tune he had not despaired of the *Roman* Af-
fairs. Thus, instead of disheartening the
People by an unseasonable Instance of Seve-
rity, these generous Senators taught them by
their Example, to bear up against ill Fortune,
and assume in Adversity the Haughtiness with
which others are inspired by Prosperity.

XV. ONE thing indeed has been generally considered, as tending greatly to obstruct the Conquests of the *Roman* People: I mean the too limited space of the Consulship, which often afforded not the General time to finish a War he had begun, a good part of the Year being sometimes spent in Preparations. This Inconvenience was afterwards remedied, as far as possible, by prolonging the Command to the General as Proconsul, and sometimes continuing him in the Consulship itself. But this was practised sparingly in the wiser Ages of the Republick; the danger of infringing the publick Liberty, making the frequent change of General appear necessary to the safety of the State. If the Generals had been long continued at the head of the Armies, they might have been able to usurp all the Authority, and become masters of the Government, as happened under *Cæsar* in the latter end of the Commonwealth. We are likewise to call to mind, that these annual Commands were well enough suited to the earlier times of *Rome*, when Wars seldom lasted above one Campaign; and though perhaps they might not be without their Inconveniences afterwards, yet they had this one manifest Advantage attending them, that thereby a number of great Generals was formed in the State, and the *Romans* were not often reduced to the necessity of placing all their Hopes in the Abilities of a single Person. For this quick circulation of Authority, by

CHAP. raising many in their turns to the highest
IV. Offices of the Republick, excited an incredible Emulation among Individuals, to qualify themselves for the conduct of Armies; and at the same time furnished them with frequent Opportunities of acquiring Experience in supreme Command, which is one of the most requisite Accomplishments in a great General.

XVI. Thus every thing at *Rome* led to great Conquests: the Constitution of the Government; the admirable political Principles on which it was founded; the nature of the Troops; the ability of the Generals; and above all, the steddiness of the Senate, in an attachment to the ancient Maxims of the State. This last Particular leads me to the second thing I mentioned, as the cause of that noble Spirit which we so much admire in the *Roman* Armies, namely the succession of great Men that for several Ages prevailed in the Commonwealth, and who supported, invigorated, and from time to time gave new Life to the fundamental Principles of the Constitution. Happy is the State that is blessed with this Privilege! and it was the good Fortune of the *Romans* to enjoy it in a supreme degree. It were endless to recount all the Names that History furnishes on this Subject. I shall therefore content myself with mentioning only two; *Mankius Torquatus*, and *Valerius Corvinus*; the one famed for his
Severity,

Severity, the other for his Clemency. *Man-*CHAP.
lius commanded with Rigor, excused his Sol-IV.
 diers from no Labour, and never remitted
 any Punishment. *Valerius*, on the other side,
 used them with as much Gentleness and Fa-
 miliarity. *Manlius*, to support the Vigour of
 military Discipline, executed his own Son.
Valerius acted upon Principles so different,
 that he is said never to have offended any
 Man. Yet in this great diversity of Conduct,
 the Effects were the same, both as to the
 Enemy, the Commonwealth, and themselves.
 For none of their Soldiers ever declined fight-
 ing, none of them rebelled, none so much
 as disputed their Orders, tho' the Discipline
 of *Manlius* was so severe, that afterwards all
 excessive and arbitrary Commands were from
 him called *Manliana Imperia*. If *Manlius* be
 considered as he is represented by Historians,
 we find him to have been very valiant, pious
 to his Father and Country, and submissive to
 his Superiors. This appears by his defence
 of his Father, at the hazard of his own Life,
 against a Tribune who accused him; by his
 readiness to offer himself to single Combat
 with a *Gaul*, where he thought the Honour
 of his Country concerned; and by his first
 applying to the Consul for Leave, before he
 would accept the Challenge. Now when a
 Man of this Constitution arrives at Command,
 he desires that all Men may be as punctual as
 himself; and being naturally brave, he com-
 mands brave things, and when they are once
 commanded,

commanded, requires that they be executed exactly ; this being a certain Rule, that where great Things are commanded, strict Obedience must be exacted ; in which Case Mildness and Gentleness will not always prevail. But where a Man has not this Greatness and Magnificence of Mind, he is by no means to command extraordinary Things, and may therefore safely exercise the Virtue of Clemency, with which ordinary Punishments are compatible enough, because they are not imputed to the Prince, but to the Laws and Customs of the Place. *Manlius* then was a severe Man, and kept up the *Roman* Discipline exactly ; prompted first by his own nature, and then by a strong desire to have that obeyed, which his own Inclination had constrained him to command. *Valerius Corvinus*, on the other hand, might exercise his Gentleness without Inconvenience, because he commanded nothing extraordinary, or contrary to the Customs of the *Romans* at that time. For, as those Customs were good, and not very troublesome to observe, he was seldom necessitated to punish Offenders, because there were but few of that sort ; and where they were, their Punishment was imputed to the Laws, and not to his Cruelty. Hence *Valerius* had an Opportunity by his Gentleness, to gain both Affection and Authority in the Army ; which was the Cause, that the Soldiers being equally obedient to the one as the other, tho' their Tempers and Discipline were so
very

very different, they could yet do the same things, and their Actions have the same effects. I shall only add, that could a State be so happy, as to have always Persons succeeding one another within a reasonable time, who however different in Inclination and Temper, would yet by their Examples renew the Laws, restrain Vice, and remove every thing that tended to its Ruin or Corruption, that State must be immortal.

XVII. IN thus ascribing the Bravery and Successes of the *Romans*, to the excellent Principles of their Constitution, and the great Men by whom these Principles were supported, I do no more than follow the Opinion of their own Writers upon this Subject. *Salust* tells us, “ that after much Reading and Reflexion, upon the Causes of the Growth and Grandeur of the *Romans*, he found reason to conclude, that the distinguished Virtue of a few Citizens had effected all that mighty run of Prosperity.” *Cicero* too, in his Reflexion upon that Verse of the Poet *Ennius*,

Moribus antiquis res stat Romana, virisque,

makes the same Observation. “ It is, *says he*, “ the union of these two Advantages, which “ has produced all the Grandeur of *Rome*: “ on the one hand, the good Manners, the “ wise political Principles established from “ the

CHAP. " the beginning : on the other, a succession
 IV. " of great Men formed upon these Princi-
 } " ples, and employed by a State in the ad-
 " ministration of Affairs. Before our times,
 " that happy Union was always the same,
 " and these two Advantages ever existed to-
 " gether ; otherwise a Republick so power-
 " ful and extensive as ours could not have
 " subsisted so long with Honour, nor so con-
 " stantly kept up its Reputation amongst all
 " Nations." I omit the Complaints *Cicero*
 subjoins to the degeneracy of the Age in which
 he lived, and of the total decay of ancient
 Manners. Every one knows, that these soon
 after occasioned the ruin of the Republick.
 Mean-while it may not be improper to observe,
 that these two Advantages were not only the
 chief Causes of the *Roman* Greatness, but
 likewise produced that slow and gradual in-
 crease of Power, so necessary to lay a solid
 Foundation of Strength, and support the
 weight of their many and extensive Conquests.

XVIII. For there never was an Empire,
 either more flourishing, or more extensive
 than the *Roman*. From the *Euphrates* and
Tanais to *Hercules's Pillars*, and the *Atlantick*
 Ocean, all the Lands, and all the Seas, were
 under their Obedience. It is astonishing to
 consider, that the Nations which at present
 make Kingdoms so considerable, all *Gaul*, all
Spain, almost the whole Island of *Great-Britain*,
Illyria to the *Danube*, *Germany* to the *Elbe*,
Africa

Africa to the frightful and impassable Desarts, ^{C H A P.}
Greece, Thrace, Syria, Egypt, all the King- ^{IV.}
doms of *Asia Minor*, and those between the
Euxine and *Caspian* Seas, with many others,
became *Roman* Provinces, almost all before
the end of the Republick. I have often
wondered to observe in Historians a certain
Affectation of ascribing the Successes of the
Romans to Fortune, as if that, rather than
Valour and Wisdom, had been the Occasion
of their Prosperity. To me it evidently ap-
pears, thro' the whole course of their History,
that the unusual pitch of Grandeur to which
they arrived, was the necessary result of the
Talents and Accomplishments of which they
were possessed, whether they are considered
with regard to moral Virtues, or to a political
Government, or to martial Merit and the Art
of War. For, as *Livy* observes in the Preface
to his History, there never was a Republick
more religious, or more abounding in good
Examples, or where Avarice and Luxury
gained ground so late, or where Simplicity
and Poverty were so much and so long held
in honour. All the Debates and Transactions
of the Senate, shew to a Demonstration, how
much wisdom of Counsel, love of the Pub-
lick, steddiness to the Maxims of the State,
Lenity and Moderation with regard to the
conquered Nations, prevailed in that august
Assembly. Courage, Boldness, Intrepidity in
the midst of the greatest Dangers, an invinci-
ble Patience in the hardest Labours, an inex-
orable

CHAP. orable Firmness to maintain the military Discipline in its utmost Rigor, a settled Resolution to conquer or die, a greatness of Soul, and a Constancy proof against all Misfortunes, have at all times constituted the Character of the *Romans*, and rendered them in the end victorious over all other Nations. *Cyrus* and *Alexander*, it is true, founded great Empires : but the Qualities proper for the execution of such a Design, being confined to the persons of these two illustrious Conquerors, and not inherited by their Descendants ; the Grandeur to which they gave a beginning, did not support itself long with any Reputation. It was very different with the *Romans*. Their Empire was not founded, nor raised to the state of Grandeur it attained, by the rare Endowments, or rapid Conquests of a single Person. The *Roman* People themselves, the Body of the State, formed that Empire by slow degrees, and at several times. The great Men that helped, each in their time, to establish, enlarge, and preserve it, had all different Characters, tho' in the main they followed all the same Principles : and hence the Empire itself, was both more extensive, and of longer duration, than any that had ever gone before it.

C H A P. V.

Of MARCHES.

I. **W**HAT we have hitherto seen, relating to the raising of Troops, their Divisions and Subdivisions, Armour, Discipline, and Exercises, is in a manner only the Mechanism of War. There are other still more important Cares, which constitute what is called the higher detail of the Service, and depend more immediately upon the General's Ability and Experience. To him it belongs to settle the general disposition of Marches; to encamp the Troops advantageously; to draw them up in order of Battle, provide against the Exigencies of the Field, pursue with Caution, or retreat with Judgment; and lastly, in conducting an Attack or Defence, to put in practice all the Arts, Stratagems, and Address, that long Experience in the Service, and a consummate Knowledge in all the parts of War, are jointly able to suggest. I shall offer some Reflexions upon the Practice of the *Roman* Generals in all these great Points of military Conduct, and begin with that which follows immediately after the rendezvous of the Troops, I mean the marching of an Army. This Subject naturally divides itself into three Branches: the general Order
of

CHAP. of Marches in advancing against an Enemy ;
V. the Knowledge and Choice of Posts ; and
lastly, the Disposition and Conduct of a Retreat. We shall speak of each in order.

II. THE marching against an Enemy supposes many preliminary Cares in the General, and many previous Steps taken, in order to his own Safety, and the success of his Designs. I shall suppose the Plan of the War settled, as likewise the manner of acting, and Measures concerted accordingly. Yet still it is incumbent upon a wise Commander, before he puts his Troops in motion, to provide every thing necessary for their Accommodation and Subsistence ; to acquire an exact knowledge of the Country thro' which he marches ; to inform himself of the Number and Quality of the Enemy's Forces ; to penetrate, if possible, into his Designs ; to study the Character of the Generals employed against him ; and by a wise Foresight to be prepared for all the Events and Contingencies that may happen in the course of a Campaign. Now tho' these things come not so properly under fixed Rules, but depend in a great measure upon the Ability and Prudence of the Commander in chief ; yet we find every, where in History, that the *Romans* had many Regulations about them, and always treated them with particular Attention. To begin with the care of Provisions, which is of principal account in an Army ; it appears to have been the constant Practice,

Practice, to furnish the Soldiers with a cer-
tain proportion of Corn, which they were
obliged to carry along with them in their
Marches. This on extraordinary Occasions
amounted to four Bushels, or a Month's Al-
lowance, and seldom was less than what might
serve for fifteen or twenty Days. They chose
rather to give them Corn than Bread, be-
cause it was lighter, and might therefore
be carried with greater ease. Indeed this put
them to the trouble of grinding and baking
it themselves; but then they were used to it,
and could upon occasion make it into I know
not what variety of Dishes. Besides the com-
mon Bread, they made a kind of soft boiled
Food of it, very agreeable to the Troops;
they mingled it with Milk, Roots, and Herbs,
and made Pancakes of it, upon a small Plate
laid over the Fire, or upon hot Ashes, as was
anciently the manner of regaling Guests, and
is still practised throughout the East, where
these kind of thin Cakes are much preferred
to our best Bread. Their Drink was answer-
able to this Diet, being no more than a mix-
ture of Vinegar and Water. It was called
Posca, could at all times be easily procured,
and was particularly serviceable to quench
the Thirst immediately.

III. I have heard it observed, that no-
thing gives greater Difficulty to military Men,
in the reading of ancient History, than the
Article of Provisions. *Cato's* Maxim, that
the War feeds the War, holds good in plenti-
ful

CHAP. V. ful Countries, and with regard to small

V. Armies: yet still it is more generally true, that the War does not furnish Provisions upon command, or at a fixed time. They must be provided both for the present and the future. We do not however find, that either the *Greeks* or *Romans* had the precaution to provide Magazines of Forage, to lay up Provisions, to have a Commissary-General of Stores, or to be followed by a great number of Carriages. But then we are to consider, that in the Wars of the *Greeks* against each other, their Troops were little numerous, and accustomed to a sober Life: that they did not remove far from their own Country, and almost always returned regularly every Winter: so that it is plain, it was not difficult for them to have Provisions in abundance, especially the *Athenians*, who were masters at Sea. The same may be said of the *Romans*. The care of subsisting the Troops was infinitely less weighty with them, than it is at present with most of the Nations of *Europe*. Their Armies were much less numerous, and they had a much smaller number of Cavalry. A Consular Army consisted of near seventeen thousand Foot, to which they had not above eighteen hundred Horse. In our Days, to seventeen thousand Foot, we have often more than six thousand Horse. What a vast difference must this make in the consumption of Forage and Provisions! Let me add, that the sober manner of Life in the Army, confined to mere Necessaries, spared them an infinite

finite multitude of Servants, Horses, and CHAP. V. Baggage, which now exhaust our Magazines, starve our Armies, retard the execution of Enterprises, and often render them impracticable. Nor was this the manner of living only of the Soldiers, but likewise of the Officers and Generals. Not only Consuls and Dictators in the early Ages of the Commonwealth, but even Emperors themselves; *Trajan, Adrian, Pescennius, Severus, Probus, Julian*, and many others, not only lived without Luxury, but contented themselves with boiled Flour or Beans, a piece of Cheese or Bacon, and made it their Glory to level themselves, in this respect, with the meanest of the Soldiers. It is easy to conceive how much this must contribute to diminish the Train of an Army, to support the Taste of Frugality and Simplicity amongst the Troops, and banish all Luxury and idle Shew from the Camp.

IV. BUT tho' the care of Provisions was less burdenson to the Ancients, we find that both it, and all other Accommodations proper for the march of an Army, were not less attended to by their Generals. *Xenophon*, who was himself a Soldier, and whose Writings abound with Maxims of War, is frequent in his Reflexions upon this Article. One of the principal Instructions he makes *Cambyses* King of *Persia* give his Son *Cyrus*, who afterwards became so glorious, was not to embark

CHAP.

V.

in any Expedition, 'till he had first informed himself, whether Subsistence were provided for the Troops. In his Account of the Behaviour of the same *Cyrus*, after his arrival in the Camp of his Uncle *Cyaxares*, he enters into an immense Detail, with respect to all the Necessaries of an Army. That Prince was to march fifteen Days thro' Countries that had been destroyed, and in which there were neither Provisions nor Forage. He ordered enough of both for twenty Days to be carried, and that the Soldiers, instead of loading themselves with Baggage, should exchange that Burden for an equal one of Provisions, without troubling themselves about Beds and Coverlets for sleeping, the want of which their Fatigues would supply. They were accustomed to drink Wine; and as a sudden and total disuse of it might be attended with ill Consequences, he ordered them to carry a certain quantity with them, and to use themselves by degrees to do without it, and be contented with Water. He advised them also to carry salt Provisions along with them, Hand-mills for grinding Corn, and Medicines for the sick: to put into every Carriage a Sickle and a Mattock, and upon every Beast of burden an Ax and a Scythe: and to take care to provide themselves with a thousand other Necessaries. He carried also along with him Smiths, Shoemakers and other Workmen, with all manner of Tools used in their Trades. For the rest, he declared publickly, that whoever would

would charge himself with the care of sending Provisions to the Camp, should be honoured and rewarded by himself and his Friends, and even supplied with Money for that Service, provided they would give Security, and engage to follow the Army.

V. THE Reader will here be pleased to observe, that as I am now entered upon the higher Detail of War, I shall not so intirely confine myself to the *Romans*, as not from time to time to mention the Practices of other Nations, where they any way tend to illustrate the Point in hand. For as the *Roman* Writers upon this Subject are but few, and have not entered very circumstantially into Matters, we are often at a loss with regard to some of the most important parts of their Discipline. This however we may be certain of, that as they excelled particularly in the Art of War, and readily adopted the Improvements of other Nations; the more we know of the Progress and Attainments of the Ancients in this respect, the better we shall be able to judge of the uncommon Proficiency of the *Romans*. We have already seen some of their wise Precautions with regard to the Subsistence and Accommodation of the Troops, for which they provided no less by fixed and general Regulations, than *Cyrus* does in the particular Instance recorded by *Xenophon*. I shall only add, that History abounds with Examples of this prudent Care and Foresight in their Generals.

CHAP. V. *Paulus Æmilius* would not set out for *Macedonia*, 'till he had fully settled every thing relating to Provisions. *Cæsar*, in all his Wars, was extremely attentive to the safety of his Convoys, and the keeping up a free communication with those Countries, whence he received his Supplies. We find that he regularly distributed Corn to the Army, and always took care, before the time for a new Distribution arrived, to have it brought to the Camp by means of his Allies : or if he chanced to be disappointed here, so contrived his March, as to pass by some great Town, where he could readily be furnished with whatever he stood in need of.

VI. BUT besides the care of Provisions, it is further incumbent upon a wise General, to acquaint himself thoroughly with the nature of the Country thro' which he is to march. I take it for granted that the *Romans* omitted none of the usual and obvious Methods for this Purpose : that they furnished themselves with Guides ; interrogated the Natives ; and, where such were to be had, procured exact Maps of the Country, delineating the Towns, their number and distance, the Roads and Mountains, the Rivers, the Fords ; and the nature and qualities of them all. But what particularly deserves our Notice in the *Roman* Policy ; they scarce ever entered into a War with any distant State, 'till they had first contracted an Alliance with some contiguous Power,

Power, who might unite his Forces to their CHAP.
in the intended Invasion. This Practice was V.
attended with numberless Advantages. They
had hereby timely Notice of the Enemy's
Designs: they were made acquainted with the
number and quality of his Forces: and when
they approached with their Army, were not
only plentifully supplied with all kind of mi-
litary Stores, but joined by a considerable
Body of Troops perfectly acquainted with
the Country, and able to inform them where
they might make their Impression with
greatest probability of Success. Thus when
they invaded *Philip* King of *Macedon*, they
took care to secure the Friendship of the
Ætolians, whose Troops were of unspeakable
Service to them in that War. In their Ex-
pedition against *Antiochus* they made use of
the same Policy, having previously contracted
Amity with several of the petty Princes and
States of *Asia Minor*. Every one knows what
use *Cæsar* made of the pretended Alliance
with the *Æduans*, and that it was one of the
principal Engines by which he completed
the reduction of *Gaul*. Indeed nothing can
fall out more fortunately for an Army, about
to invade a Country to which they are
strangers, than to act in conjunction with
Troops contiguous to the Territories they
attack: because as by this means they make
War with all the Advantages of Natives, they
are not only the better enabled to guard
against Ambuscades and Surprises, but can in
k 3 their

CHAP. V. their turn make use of all those Stratagems and favourable Opportunities of Action, which the particular nature of the Country furnishes. Whoever therefore considers the artful Conduct of the *Romans* in this respect, will find himself necessitated to own, that Designs concerted with so much Wisdom and Foresight merited all the Success with which they were for the most part attended.

VII. THESE preliminary Cares settled, it is now time to put the Troops in motion. The *Romans* were very exact in the Order of their Marches. In the Morning, at the first sounding of the Trumpet, every one took down his Tent, and began to make up his Baggage: at the second sounding, every one loaded his Baggage; and at the third, the Legions moved out of their Quarters, and put themselves in the form and order they were that Day to march in. But none were to take down their Tents, 'till the Consul and military Tribunes had first taken down theirs; whether for the greater Respect, or because their Tents and Baggage being larger than the rest, it was necessary they should be the first at work, that their Baggage might be in a readiness to march at the third sound of the Trumpet, as well as that of the private Soldier. For Commanders, who give Rules to all the rest, ought to be very exact in observing them themselves; since, if they break their own Orders, they encourage others to do
the

the like; Example always operating more strongly than Precept. Hence that constant care in the *Roman* Generals, to be themselves Patterns to the Troops, with regard to all the Duties of the Service; nor do we meet with any thing in their whole Discipline, more truly deserving of imitation, or better calculated to promote Submission and Obedience in the Army. For when Soldiers find the General keeps strictly to the Rules he gives, they are the more careful to observe them likewise, concluding, that as he therein grants no Indulgence to himself, he certainly will not do it to others: nay they implicitly believe such Orders good and necessary, because he that gave them is so punctual an observer of them.

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VIII. As to the particular Form and Disposition of the *Roman* March, we meet with very little on that Subject in ancient Authors. In the general it appears, that whether they marched in a Friend's or Enemy's Country, whether they believed the Enemy near or far off, they proceeded with the same Care and Circumspection: and this certainly was a very wise Policy. For a General may be mistaken in his Intelligence or Intelligencers; nay, may think those Friends, who want but an advantageous Opportunity of declaring themselves Foes: so that all imaginable Caution ought to be observed, in all Times, and in all Places. To which let me add, that were there nothing else as a Motive to it, but

CHAP. V. the keeping up exactly the military Discipline, yet for that Reason singly, it ought constantly to be done. The Method followed most commonly by the *Romans* in their Marches seems to have been this. They had always some Troops of Horse scouting abroad in order to discover the Roads. After them followed the right Wing, with all its Carriages immediately in the Rear. Then came a Legion with its Carriages; after that another; and so a third, a fourth, &c. in order. Last of all came the left Wing and its Baggage, with a Party of Horse in their rear. If, during the March, the Army happened to be assaulted in the front, or in the rear, they caused all their Carriages to withdraw to the right Wing or the left, as they found it convenient, and most agreeable to the nature of the Place: and then, when they were cleared and disincumbered of their Baggage, all of them unanimously made head against the Enemy. If they were assaulted in the flank, they drew their Carriages on that side where they were like to be most safe, and then addressed themselves to the Fight.

IX. THIS, I say, was the most common order of their Marches: for as to any fixed and standing Rule, none could possibly be established; because the Form must vary, according to the Country you are in, and the Enemy you have to do with. *Julius Cæsar*, when he marched against the *Nervians*, so long

long as he thought the Enemy at a distance, proceeded exactly according to the Disposition here described. But upon a nearer approach he changed it entirely. For then all the Cavalry were sent before. After them followed six Legions without Baggage : and last of all the Carriages, guarded by two new raised Legions. This was an excellent Method, as he was sure the Enemy could only attempt him in the van ; but might be of ill Consequence, where the rear of the Army was liable to be attacked. One thing the *Romans* particularly attended to, and that was, that the Troops did not straggle or march unequally, some too fast, others too slow, which very much weakens an Army, and exposes it to great Disorder. Hence their Care, in training up their Men, to inure them to the *military Pace* ; that is, to the walking over a certain stated space of Ground within a fixed and limited time. This, as we have already observed, amounted to twenty miles in five Hours, which made the usual Day's March of a *Roman Army*. To accustom the Soldiers to it, three times a Month, the Foot as well as Horse were obliged to take this March. Upon extraordinary occasions they were wont to march four and twenty Miles in the same space of time. By an exact Calculation of what *Cæsar* relates of a sudden March, which he made at the time he besieged *Gergovia*, we find that in four and twenty Hours he marched fifty Miles. This he did with the utmost expedition. In
reducing

CHAP. reducing it to less than half, it makes the
V. usual rate of an extraordinary Day's March.

X. IT is remarkable with regard to modern Wars, that they not only impoverish the Princes that are overcome, but even the Conquerors themselves: for as one loses his Country, so the other loses his Money. In ancient times the case was otherwise; it appearing that the Conqueror always enriched himself by the War. The reason of this difference seems to be, that in our times no publick account is taken of the Plunder; or indeed rather, that the barbarous Custom of pillaging the conquered Countries, is not now so much practised as formerly. Amongst the *Romans*, all the Spoil was delivered in and appropriated to the Publick, which afterwards distributed it as it saw cause: To this purpose they had their *Quæstors*, in whose hands all the Pillage and Taxes were deposited, of which the General disposed as he thought good, for the payment of his Soldiers, the curing of the wounded or sick, and discharging the other Necessities of the Army. 'Tis true the Consul had power to give the Plunder of a Town to his Soldiers, and he frequently did it; but that Liberty never bred any Disorder. For when a Town was taken, or an Army defeated, all the Spoil was brought into a publick Place, and distributed Man by Man, according to every one's Merit. This Custom made the Soldiers more intent upon Victory than

than Plunder. The Practice of the *Roman* CHAP. V.
Legions was, to break and disorder an Enemy, but not to pursue; for they never went out of their Ranks upon any occasion whatever. Only the Horse, the light-armed Troops, and what other Soldiers were not of the Legions, followed the Chace. But had the Plunder of the Field belonged to whoever could catch it, it would have been neither reasonable nor possible to have kept the Legions to their Ranks, or to have exposed them to so many Dangers. Hence it was, that upon a Victory, the Publick was always enriched. For when a Consul entered in triumph, he brought with him great Riches into the Treasury of *Rome*, consisting of Taxes, Contributions, Ransoms and Plunder. The *Romans* had likewise another Custom well contrived for the preservation of Discipline; and that was, to deposit a third part of every Soldier's pay, with the Ensigns of their respective Companies, who never restored it 'till the War was at an end. This served two very excellent Purposes: First, every Soldier had a Stock of his own, which without this Precaution would have been squandered away, as they were most of them young and profuse. Secondly, knowing their Stocks to be in their Ensign's hands, they were the more careful to defend and keep by him, whether in the Camp, in the Field of Battle, or upon a March. This Custom contributed much to their Valour, and is necessary to be observed

CHAP. served by any General, who would reduce his
 V. Soldiers to the Discipline of the *Romans*.

XI. AMONG the various orders of the *Roman* Marches, one particularly deserves our Notice, which is frequently mentioned by Historians, and which they term forming the Army *itineri & praelio*. It was, when the Line of March was so contrived, as to correspond exactly with the Line of Battle; or, to express myself a little more clearly, when the Columns of Horse and Foot were disposed in such a manner, that upon the sudden appearance of an Enemy they could fall immediately into an order proper for fighting. There is not perhaps any thing in the Science of Arms more subtle and useful than this, and the *Romans* seem to have made it their particular study. I do not at present recollect in any of their Historians, a minute and circumstantial Account of a March of this kind, where the disposition of the Columns is exactly marked, and the manner in which they formed in order of Battle, upon the approach of the Enemy. What most readily occurs to my Memory is, the fine March of *Hamilear* against *Spendius*, which has been so judiciously explained by the Chevalier *Folard*, in his admirable Comment upon *Polybius*. As the whole *Art of War* furnishes nothing more compleat in its kind, whether we regard the boldness of the Attempt, or the well-concerted Motions by which it was accomplished,
 I am

I am satisfied I shall do the Reader a particular Pleasure, in laying a full and distinct Account of it before him.

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XII. UPON the conclusion of the first *Punic* War, the *Carthaginian* Mercenaries revolting, chose *Matbo* and *Spendius* for their Leaders. *Hanno* was sent against them with an Army; but receiving a considerable Check, the Rebels blocked up *Carthage* on every side; and possessed themselves of all the Passes leading to the Peninsula on which it stood. In this Exigence the *Carthaginians* had recourse to *Hamilcar* the Father of *Hannibal*, who had given eminent proof of his Abilities when he commanded their Armies in *Sicily*. Accordingly he took the Field with ten thousand Men, and seventy Elephants; but was for some time at a loss how to meet with the Enemy upon equal Ground. For besides the other Places of Advantage which the Mercenaries had seized, *Hanno* had suffered them to get possession of the only Bridge by which the River *Bagradas* was passable to those who were to travel from *Carthage* into the Continent. This River had not many Fords, and the few it had were so well watched, that it was not easy for even a single Man to get over without being seen. As for the Bridge itself, the Enemy guarded it with the utmost Care, and had built a Town close by it, for the more commodious lodging of the Troops that were appointed to that Service. *Hamil-*
car

CHAP. *car* having in vain tried all means possible to
 V. force a Passage, at length bethought himself
 of an Expedient to gain one by stealth. He
 had observed, that upon the blowing of certain
 Winds, the Mouth of the *Bagradas* used to
 be choaked up with Sand and Gravel;
 which formed a kind of Bar across it, and
 rendered it fordable. Remaining therefore in
 his Camp between the Sea and the Mountains.
 he waited the Opportunity of these Winds;
 which no sooner arrived, than marching sud-
 denly in the Night, he passed the Stream un-
 perceived, and the next morning appeared in
 the Plain, to the great Astonishment both of
 the *Carthaginians* and the Enemy.

XIII. HAMILCAR by this Step put all to
 the hazard. Had he failed in his Attempt
 against *Spendius*, his whole Army must in-
 evitably have been destroyed, for a Retreat
 was now become impossible. But neither
 was the Danger less great to his Country by
 continuing inactive: and therefore he wisely
 considered, that in such an Extremity, it was
 better to try some way where Fortune and his
 own ability in War offered a prospect of Suc-
 cess, than by a timorous diffident Conduct ex-
 pose himself to the same Ruin, without a
 single Effort to evade it. He was now upon
 the other side the *Bagradas*. The Plains
 were favourable to him, because he had a
 considerable Body of Horse. The River it-
 self too was of no small Advantage, as it
 served

served to secure his Baggage, and cover one
 of his Flanks. *Spendius* was advancing to
 meet him at the head of ten thousand Men.
 Besides these, he understood that a Detach-
 ment of fifteen thousand was marching with
 all diligence from *Utica*; and as it was their
 business to come upon his flank and rear,
 rather than to join *Spendius*, he made no
 doubt of their proceeding accordingly. Up-
 on these Considerations he regulated his order
 of Battle, and the disposition of his March.
 To make head against *Spendius*, he placed his
 Elephants in the first Line, and immediately
 behind them his Cavalry, intermixed with
 Platoons of light-armed Foot. The heavy-
 armed Infantry formed the third Line, in
 order to oppose the Detachment he expected
 upon his rear from *Utica*. By this Disposi-
 tion he was enabled to make head on all
 sides. For as he made no doubt but his first
 Line of Elephants, of which *Spendius* was
 totally unprovided, would be sufficient to
 break the Body he commanded; and that the
 Cavalry, aided by the light-armed Foot, fall-
 ing in immediately, would serve to compleat
 the Rout: so his third Line consisting of the
 flower of his *African* Infantry, he thought
 himself strong enough likewise to deal with
 the Rebels from *Utica*.

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XIV. EACH of these Lines marched in four
 Columns, the Columns of Cavalry following
 immediately behind the Elephants, and those
 of

CHAP. of the Infantry immediately behind the Cavalry. The distance between the Columns was equal to the space they were to occupy in the Line of Battle. By this Disposition, upon the first appearance of the Enemy, the Army could form in an Instant. For the Columns being commanded to halt, and wheel at once into their place in the Line, were in order of Battle presently. *Hamilcar* continuing his March, perceived, as the Enemy approached, that the Detachment from *Utica*, instead of coming in upon his rear, had actually joined *Spendius*, and formed a second Line of Foot behind that he commanded. As he had foreseen that this might happen, his order of March was contrived to furnish a speedy Remedy. It now became necessary to change his whole Disposition, and oppose a strong front of Infantry to the Enemy, with the Elephants at the head of all, according to the usual Custom. To that end the Columns were ordered to halt, and the Elephants forming in front, the Cavalry mean-while fell back between the intervals of the Foot, ranging themselves in two Divisions behind the two extremities of the Line of Infantry, which was formed in an instant by the wheeling of the Columns. The Rebels deceived by this artful Motion, and mistaking the Retreat of the Cavalry for a real Flight, advanced briskly to the Attack, broke thro' the Elephants, and charged the *Carthaginian* Foot. Mean-while the Cavalry, which, as
we

we have already observed, had ranged itself CHAP.
 in two Columns behind the two Wings of the V..
 Infantry, wheeling to the right and left from the Rear, appeared all on a sudden in the same Line with the Foot, covering the Flanks of the *Carthaginian* Army, and considerably overwinging the Enemy. The Rebels astonished at this extraordinary Motion, quickly fell into Disorder, and at last betook themselves to Flight. *Hamilcar* pursued them with his Horse and Elephants, and following them quite to the Town and Bridge, easily got possession of that important Pass.

XV. FROM this Recital it appears, to what a degree of Perfection the Ancients had arrived in the Science of Marches, which is a capital Article in the grand operations of War. And tho' the Instance here given be of an *African* Commander, and therefore does not so immediately regard the *Roman* People, yet if we consider, that these last are allowed to have excelled all Nations in the knowledge of Arms, and that they often regulated their Marches upon this Plan, it seems reasonable to believe, that had their Historians entered into particular Details of this kind, we should have met with many Examples of military Conduct in their Generals, no less surprising than that now before us. Indeed as it frequently happens in War, that the Enemy, tho' not actually in fight, is yet hourly expected, this way of ordering an Army seems

very necessary; and the General who excels in it, and is at the same time sufficiently on his guard against Surprises, will seldom or ever be worsted. I have often admired, in reading *Cæsar's Commentaries*, the consummate Prudence and Circumspection of that great Man, especially in relation to Surprises. Tho' he was the ablest General of his time, and commanded the finest Army that perhaps ever appeared in the World, yet he always proceeded with the utmost Caution, and was extremely careful of believing any thing too easily, that was not reasonably to be supposed. If a great number of the Enemy was beaten and pursued by a few of his Men, if a few of them attacked a greater Party of his, if they ran unexpectedly, and without any visible Cause, on these occasions he was always very much upon his Guard, and never fancied his Enemy so weak, as not to understand his own Business. It seems in the general a good Rule, the weaker and more careless an Enemy appears to be, the more to apprehend and dread him. In Cases of this kind, an experienced Commander will comport himself in two different manners. He will fear the Enemy in his own Thoughts, and order his Affairs accordingly; but in his Words and outward Behaviour, he will affect to despise him. This last way gives courage to the Soldiers, and makes them confident of Victory. The other keeps the General upon his guard, and renders him less liable to be circumvented:

circumvented: for to march thro' an Enemy's Country is more dangerous, and requires greater Address and Foresight, than to fight a pitched Battle.

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XVI. WE proceed now to the second Particular mentioned on the head of Marches, namely, the knowledge and choice of Posts. As this will again fall under our notice in the next Chapter concerning Incampments, we need say the less of it here. It has however a strict and necessary Connection with the marching of an Army. For whether we are to retreat or advance, or which way soever our Rout lies, it often happens, that the safety of the Army depends upon seizing some advantageous Posts that command the Country thro' which we march. The *Romans* applied themselves with particular Attention to this part of War, and we meet with several very early traces of it in their History. *Livy* relates an Example of this kind in the Person of *Publius Decius*, who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Consul *Cornelius* commanded against the *Samnites*, and finding the Consul and Army falling by accident into a Vale, where they might have been encompassed and cut off by the Enemy: " Do you see, (said he to *Cornelius*,) that
" Eminence which commands the Enemy's
" Camp? there lies our Hope. It is a Post
" that may serve to extricate us out of our
" present Danger, if we are careful only to

CHAP. V. "seize it quickly, and avail ourselves of the
 "blindness of the *Samnites*, who have neglected it." The Historian had before informed us, that *Decius* observed a Hill over the Enemy's Camp, not easily to be ascended by those who were compleatly armed, but to those lightly armed, accessible enough. The Consul ordered him to take possession of it with three thousand Men. He obeyed the Order, secured the *Roman* Army, and designing to march away in the Night, and save both himself and his Party, addressed himself in these Words to some of his Companions: "Follow me, Fellow-Soldiers, that whilst we have yet Light, we may explore where the Enemy keeps his Guards, and which way we may make our Retreat." Accordingly he went out in Person upon this Design, and habited like a Soldier, that the Enemy might not know his rank in the Army, took an exact view of the Ground, and the situation of their Camp. Whoever attentively considers this Relation, will find how useful and necessary it is for a Commander, to be acquainted with the nature of Coasts and Countries, and that not only in a general, but in an exquisite and more particular way. Had not *Decius* understood those things very well, he could not so suddenly have discerned the advantage of that Hill, and of what importance it would be to the preservation of the *Roman* Army. Neither could he have judged at that distance, whether it was accessible or not: and when he had

had possessed himself of it, and was to draw off afterwards; as the Enemy environed him on every side, he could never have found out the best way for his Retreat, nor have guessed so well where the Enemy kept his Guards. *Fabius Maximus* is another Example of a consummate knowledge this way. He commanded the *Roman Army* six Months against *Hannibal*, and by a series of well-concerted Motions, and a judicious choice of Posts, conducted himself so happily, that during all that time he never suffered any considerable Disaster, nor could be compelled to fight against his Will, tho' the artful *Carthaginian* left no Stratagem untried, to draw him to an Engagement, or intangle him in an Ambuscade. But of all the *Roman Generals*, none seems to have been a greater master in this part of War than *Julius Cæsar*. We meet with many Instances of it in his Commentaries, particularly in that famous Campaign in *Spain*, where by a happy choice of Posts, and an exquisite Address in improving the Advantages the nature of the Country afforded, he compelled a veteran Army to surrender themselves Prisoners of War without striking a Blow.

XVII. THE third and last Particular we mentioned in relation to Marches, was the Disposition and Conduct of a Retreat. This is, without dispute, the nicest Point in the whole Business of War. For besides all the

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Attentions requisite in ordinary Marches, you are under the Disadvantage of being continually pressed by an Enemy, commonly superior in Force, and flushed with Success. The finest Retreat we meet with in ancient History, is that of the ten thousand *Greeks* under the conduct of *Xenophon*, who has left us a particular Account of that famous Expedition. We there see that the hollow Square, which was invented purposely for a Retreat, is very incommodious when the Enemy is directly in your Rear. *Xenophon* says so in express terms, and that the *Greeks* were obliged to discontinue that Order, and march in two Columns, with a Body of Reserve of six hundred Men, who were not confined to the space between the Columns, so as to compleat the figure of the Square, but formed sometimes the Van, sometimes the Rear, filed off by the two Flanks where the Columns were obliged to approach, or posted themselves in the interval when they extended to the Right and Left; in a word, without being tied down to any fixed Post, ran wherever their assistance was wanted. What surprises most in this Retreat is, that upon a computation of the way made by the Troops, which *Xenophon* regularly sets down, we find their Day's Marches one with another, to fall but little short of twenty-four Miles. Our Armies seldom advance half the way, even when they have no Enemy upon their hands, nor any of those other Disadvantages

vantages the *Greeks* laboured under. We find CHAP. V.
likewise in the *Roman* History, several Ex-
amples of well conducted Retreats, in which
their Generals have happily extricated them-
selves out of Dangers that seemed to threaten
their Armies with unavoidable Destruction.
Quintus Lutatius having the *Cimbri* upon his
Heels, and being arrived at a River; that
the Enemy might give him time to pass, pre-
tended a resolution to fight them, pitched his
Camp, intrenched himself, set up his Stan-
dard, and sent out parties of Horse to provide
Forage. The *Cimbri* believing he meant to
incamp there, came and incamped by him,
and divided themselves into several Parties,
to go in quest of Provisions. *Lutatius* having
notice of this, seized the opportunity so fa-
vourable to his Design, and throwing Bridges
over the River, passed it before the Enemy
could have time to disturb him. *Lucius Mi-
nucius* a *Roman* Consul was in *Liguria* with
an Army, and shut up by the Enemy between
two Mountains, insomuch that he could not
disengage himself. Being sensible of the
danger he was in, he sent certain *Numidians*
which he had in his Army, upon small ill-
conditioned Horses, towards the places where
the Enemy had their Guard. At first fight
they put themselves into a posture to defend
the Passes: but when they observed the *Nu-
midians* in ill order, and ill mounted in re-
spect of themselves, they began to despise
them, and to be more remiss in their Guard;

CHAP. V. which was no sooner perceived by the *Numidians*, than clapping Spurs to their Horses, and charging them suddenly, they passed on in spite of all opposition, and by the Mischief and Devastation they made every where in the Country, constrained the Eaemy to give free passage to the whole Army. I shall mention only one Instance more, and that is the Retreat of *Marc Antony*, when he was pursued into *Syria* by a great Body of *Parthian* Horse. He observed that every Morning by break of Day they were upon his back as soon as he moved, and continued skirmishing and molesting him quite thorough his March. In order to deceive them, and obtain some respite, he resolved not to remove before Noon; which the *Parthians* observing, concluded he could not stir that Day, and returned to their Posts, insomuch that he had opportunity of marching all the rest of the Day without interruption. But this was only a temporary Expedient, calculated for present Relief; and therefore to screen himself from the Arrows of the *Parthians*, with which the Army was greatly incommoded, he made use of the following Device, practised often by the *Romans* on other occasions. He ordered the Soldiers, when the Enemy came near them, to cast themselves into the figure of the *Tessudo*, so that their Targets should close altogether above their Heads, and defend them from the missive Weapons discharged at them. In this case the first
Rank

Rank stood upright on their Feet, and the rest stooped lower and lower by degrees, till the last Rank kneeled down upon their Knees; so that every Rank covering with their Targets the Heads of all in the Rank before them, they represented a Tortoise-shell, or a sort of Pent-house. By this Contrivance he made good his Retreat, and arrived in *Syria* without considerable loss.

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XVIII. BEFORE I conclude this Chapter, it will naturally be expected I should explain what was the Practice and Discipline of the *Romans*, when they had finished the Day's March, and were arrived near the place of Incampment. In this case the military Tribunes and Centurions appointed for that Service, advanced before all the rest, diligently to view and consider the situation of the Place. When they had chosen the Ground, they began by marking the General's Quarter with a White Flag or Streamer, and distinctly set out its Boundaries. Then the Quarters of the several Tribunes were appointed, and afterwards those of the Legions, all with distinct Flags of several Colours. Every Legion, as well of the Allies as of the *Romans*, had their portion of Ground assigned and marked out, for drawing the Line round the Camp, which was set about immediately, part of the Troops continuing mean-while under Arms, to defend those that were at work upon the Intrenchment, in case of any sudden Surprise.

All

CHAP. All this was finished in a very short space.
 VI. the *Romans* being remarkably expert in it by
 constant Practice; for they never altered the
 figure of their Camp, nor omitted to fortify
 it in all the forms, tho' but for one Night's
 continuance. But this naturally leads me to
 the subject of the next Chapter.

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Of INCAMPMENTS.

I. **O**NE of the most necessary and beneficial Parts of the military Art is, to know how to incamp well, and to practise it constantly. No wonder therefore that the *Romans*, among whom military Discipline was carried to such a degree of Perfection, and who exacted the most rigorous Submission to all the Laws and Rules of it, were particularly attentive to this Article. And indeed the Armies of that People, tho' still in the Territory of *Rome*, and tho' they had only one Night to pass in a place, incamped nevertheless in all the forms, with no other difference than that the Camp was less fortified there perhaps than in the Enemy's Country. It was always of a square form, contrary to the custom of the *Greeks*, who made theirs round. The Ditch and Rampart, which consisted of four equal sides, was equally distributed
 to

to be raised by the two *Roman* Legions, and the two Legions of the Allies, who perfected it without intermission. If the Enemy were near, part of the Troops continued under Arms, whilst the rest were employed in throwing up the Intrenchments. They began by digging Trenches of greater or less depth, according to the occasion. They were at least eight Foot broad by six deep: but we often find them twelve Foot in breadth, sometimes more, to fifteen or twenty. Of the Earth dug out of the Trenches, and thrown up on the side of the Camp, they formed the Rampart; and to make it the firmer, mingled it with Turf cut in a certain size and form. Sometimes they drove double rows of Stakes into the Earth, leaving so much of the length above Ground, as the height of the Work was to be of; and then interweaving them with Twigs, in the manner of Basket-work, filled the space between with the Earth rising out of the Ditch. This was an expeditious and safe way of forming the Line, and appears to have been always practised, when they incamped in places where these Materials were to be found. Upon the brow of the Rampart the Palisades were planted. *Polybius*, speaking of the Order given by *Q. Flaminius* to his Troops, to cut Stakes against there should be occasion for them, offers several very curious Remarks upon this subject: and as that judicious Historian, who was himself an expert Warrior, seems

CHAP. VI. seems to lay great stress upon the Conduct of the *Romans* in this Point, I shall beg leave to lay some of his Observations before the Reader.

II. THIS Custom says *Polybius*, which is easy to put in practice amongst the *Romans*, passes for impossible with the *Greeks*. They can hardly support their own weight upon their Marches, whilst the *Romans*, notwithstanding the Buckler which hangs at their Shoulders, and the Javelins which they carry in their Hands, load themselves also with Stakes or Palisades, which are very different from those of the *Greeks*. With the latter those are best, which have many strong Branches about the Trunk. The *Romans*, on the contrary, leave but three or four at most upon it, and that only on one side. In this manner a Man can carry two or three bound together, and much more use may be made of them. Those of the *Greeks* are more easily pulled up. If the Stake be fixed by itself; as its Branches are strong, and in great number, two or three Soldiers will easily pull it away, and thereby make an opening for the Enemy, without reckoning that the neighbouring Stakes will be loosened, because their Branches are too short to be interwoven with each other. But this is not the case with the *Romans*. The Branches of their Palisades are so strongly inserted into each other, that it is hard to distinguish the Stake they belong

long to : and it is as little practicable to thrust
 the Hand thro' these Branches to pull up the
 Palifades ; because being well fastened and
 twisted together, they leave no opening, and
 are carefully sharpened at their ends. Even
 tho' they could be taken hold of, it would not
 be easy to pull them out of the Ground, and
 that for two Reasons. The first is, because
 they are driven in so deep, that they cannot
 be moved : and the second, because their
 Branches are interwoven with each other in
 such a manner, that one cannot be stirred
 without several more. Two or three Men
 might unite their strength in vain to draw
 one of them out, which however if they
 effected, by drawing it a great while to and
 fro 'till it was loose, the opening it would
 leave would be almost imperceptible. These
 Stakes therefore have three Advantages. They
 are every where to be had ; they are easy to
 carry ; and are a secure Barrier to a Camp,
 because very difficult to break thorough. In
 my Opinion, adds the Historian, there is no-
 thing practised by the *Romans* in War, more
 worthy of being imitated.

III. THE form and distribution of the several
 parts of the *Roman* Camp, admits of great
 Difficulties, and has occasioned many Disputes
 amongst the learned. The following De-
 scription is taken chiefly from *Polybius*, who
 of all the Ancients is the most full and ex-
 plicit upon this Article. He speaks of a con-

sular Army, which in his time consisted of two *Roman* Legions, and two Legions of the Allies. A *Roman* Legion contained four thousand two hundred Foot, and three hundred Horse. A Legion of the Allies was equal to the number of Infantry, and generally double in Cavalry. All together therefore, *Romans* and Allies, they made eighteen thousand six hundred Men. After the place for the Camp was marked out, which was always chosen for its convenience in respect to Water and Forage, a part of it was allotted for the General's Tent, called otherwise the *Prætorium*, because the ancient *Latins* stiled all their Commanders *Prætores*. The Ground pitched upon for this purpose was generally higher than the rest of the Camp, that he might with the greater ease see all that passed, and dispatch the necessary Orders. A Flag was planted upon it, and round that a square space marked out in such manner, that the four sides were an hundred Feet distant from the Flag, and the Ground occupied by the Consul about four Acres. Near this Tent were erected the Altar on which Sacrifices were offered, and the Tribunal for dispensing Justice. The two *Roman* Legions had each six Tribunes, which made twelve in all. Their Tents were placed in a right Line parallel to the front of the *Prætorium*, at the distance of fifty Foot. In this space of fifty Foot were the Horses, Beasts of burden, and the whole Equipage of the Tribunes. Their
Tents

Tents were pitched in such a manner, that they had the *Prætorium* in the rear, and in the front all the rest of the Camp. The Tents of the Tribunes, at equal distance from each other, took up the whole breadth of the Ground upon which the two *Roman* Legions were incamped.

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IV. BETWEEN the Tents of the Legions and Tribunes, a space of an hundred Foot in breadth was left, which formed a large Street called *Principia*, that ran across the whole Camp, and divided it into two parts, the upper and the lower. Beyond this Street were placed the Tents of the Legions. The space which they occupied was divided in the midst into two equal parts by a Street of fifty Foot broad, which extended the whole length of the Camp. On each side of this Street, in so many several Lines, were the Quarters of the *Horse*, the *Triarii*, the *Principes* and the *Hastati*. The *Velites* had no distinct Quarters, but were variously mingled with the rest of the Foot, four hundred and eighty of them being joined to the *Hastati*, a like number to the *Principes*, and two hundred and forty to the *Triarii*. To form a distinct idea of the *Roman* Camp, we must call to mind, that the Cavalry of each Legion was divided into ten Troops, thirty Men to a Troop; and that the *Triarii*, *Principes*, and *Hastati*, were likewise severally divided into ten Maniples of an hundred and twenty Men each, except those

CHAP. those of the *Triarii*, which consisted only of
VI. half that number. In conformity to this
distribution, the Lines on which these several
Bodies incamped, were each divided into ten
Squares, extended length-wise from the Tents
of the Tribunes. These Squares were an
hundred Foot every way, except in the Lines
of *Triarii*, where, because of the smaller
number of Troops, they were only fifty Foot
broad by an hundred long, and may there-
fore more properly be termed half Squares.
Across the middle of these Lodgments, be-
tween the fifth and sixth Squares, ran a Street
of fifty Foot broad, cutting the Lines at right
Angles, and extending from one side of the
Camp to the other. It was called *Quintana*,
because it opened beyond the fifth Maniple.

V. THE order and disposition of the several
Lines was as follows. On each side the mid-
dle Street, that ran according to the length
of the Camp, the Cavalry of the two Legions
were quartered facing each other, and sepa-
rated by the whole breadth of the Street. As
there were ten Squares on each side, and
every Square lodged thirty Horse, the twenty
together contained just six hundred, which
made the intire Cavalry of two Legions. Ad-
joining to the Cavalry the *Triarii* were quar-
tered, a Maniple behind a Troop of Horse,
both in the same form. They joined as to the
Ground, but faced differently, the *Triarii*
turning their Backs upon the Horse. And
here,

here, as we have already observed, because CHAP.
 the *Triarii* were less in number than the VI.
 other Troops, the Ground assigned to each
 Maniple was only half as broad as long. Front-
 ing the *Triarii* on each side, was a Street
 of fifty Foot broad, running parallel to that
 between the Quarters of the Horse. On the
 opposite side of this Street was the Line of
 Lodgments belonging to the *Principes*. Be-
 hind the *Principes* the *Hasati* were quarter-
 ed, joining as to the Ground, but fronting the
 other way.

VI. Thus far we have described the Quar-
 ters of the two *Roman* Legions. It remains
 that we dispose of the Allies. Their Infantry
 equalled that of the *Romans*, and their Cavalry
 was twice the number. In removing for the
Extraordinarii a fifth part of the Foot, or
 sixteen hundred and eighty Men, and a
 third of the Horse, or four hundred Men,
 there remained in the whole seven thousand
 five hundred and twenty Men, Horse and
 Foot, to quarter. These were disposed upon
 the two Wings of the Legions, being separat-
 ed from the *Hasati* on each side, by a Street
 of fifty Foot. The Cavalry were directly
 opposite to the *Hasati*, upon a breadth of an
 hundred and thirty-three Foot, and some-
 thing more. Behind them, and on the same
 Line, the Infantry were incamped, upon a
 breadth of two hundred Foot. The *Præfecti*
 were lodged at the sides of the Tribunes,

CHAP. over-against their respective Wings. At the
 VI. head of every Troop and Maniple, were
 the Tents of the Captains of Horse and
 Centurions. On the right side of the *Præ-*
torium stood the *Quæstorium*, assigned to the
Quæstor, or Treasurer of the Army, and
 hard by the *Forum*. This last served not
 only for the sale of Commodities, but also for
 the meeting of Councils, and giving audience
 to Ambassadors. On the other side of the
Prætorium were lodged the *Legati*, or Lieu-
 tenant-Generals. On the right and left, still
 in the same Line with the *Prætorium*, and
 directly behind the Præfects of the Allies,
 were the Quarters of the extraordinary Ca-
 valry *Evocatorum*, and of the other volunteer
Roman Horse, *Selectorum*. All this Cavalry
 faced on one side towards the *Forum* and
 place of the *Quæstor*, and on the other to-
 wards the Lodgments of the *Legati*. They
 not only incamped near the Consul's Person,
 but commonly attended him upon Marches,
 that they might be at hand to execute his
 Orders. The extraordinary and volunteer
Roman Foot adjoined to the Horse last spoken
 of, forming the extremities of the Line to-
 wards the two sides of the Camp. Above
 this Line was a Street of an hundred Foot
 broad, extending the whole breadth of the
 Camp, and beyond that the Quarters of the
 extraordinary Horse of the Allies, facing the
Prætorium, Treasury, and the Tents of the
Legati. The extraordinary Foot of the Allies
 were

were directly behind their Horse, fronting the Intrenchment and upper extremity of the Camp. The void spaces that remained on both sides were allotted to Strangers and Allies, who came later than the rest.

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VII. BETWEEN the Rampart and the Tents, there was an open Place or Street of two hundred Foot in breadth, which was continued all along the four equal sides of the Camp. This Interval was of very great use, either for the entrance or departure of the Legions. For each Body of Troops advanced into that Space by the Street before it, so that marching thither different ways, they were in no danger of crowding and breaking each other's Ranks. Besides which, the Cattle, and whatever was taken from the Enemy, was placed there, where a Guard was kept during the night. Another considerable Advantage of it was, that in the Attacks by night, neither Fire nor Dart could do any great execution in the Camp; the Soldiers being at so great a distance, and under cover of their Tents. But the principal Intention of it seems to have been, for the drawing up of the Troops who were to defend the Line, and to leave sufficient room for the Cavalry to scour it. My Lord Orrery however is of opinion, that it was rather too narrow to answer both these Services. If it was only designed for the Foot, they lost the benefit of their Horse, which experience teaches us to be of singular use on

CHAP. such Occasions. For whatever Foot storm
 VI. a Line, must enter it in great Confusion and
 Disorder, and can very hardly indeed resist
 small Squadrons of Horse, who are ready
 to receive them, and charge them all along
 the inside of the Line. For these Reasons he
 considers the narrowness of this Space as a
 defect in the *Roman* method of incamping, and
 thinks that a breadth of three hundred Foot
 at least ought to have been allowed for the
 the defence and scouring of the Line. It is
 probable the *Romans* would have done so, had
 they not found the other sufficient; and we
 have this to say in their favour, that tho' their
 Camps were frequently attacked, we meet with
 but few Instances in History of their being
 forced.

VIII. THE Gates were only four in number, one to each side. *Livy* says so in express Terms. *Ad quatuor Portas exercitum instruxit, ut, signo dato, ex omnibus Portibus eruptionem facerent.* "He drew up his Men facing the four Gates, that, upon a signal given, the Army might sally from all the several Gates at once." These are afterwards called by the same Author, *the Extraordinary, the right Principal, the left Principal, and the Quæstorian.* They have also other Names, about which it is not a little difficult to reconcile Authors. It is believed that the *Extraordinary* Gate was so called, because near the Place where the extraordinary
 nary

nary Troops incamped; and that it was the same as the *Prætorian*, which took its Name from its nearness to the *Prætorium*. The Gate opposite to this, at the other extremity of the Camp, was called *Porta Decumana*, because near the *ten* Maniples of each Legion; and without doubt is the same with the *Quæstorian*, mentioned by *Livy* in the Place above cited. As to the *right* and *left Principals*, they had their Name from being on the *right* and *left* of the Camp, fronting the Street called *Principia*. I shall conclude this Description of the *Roman* Camp with observing, that when a Consular Army consisted of more than four Legions, they were lodged still in the same order, only the figure of the Camp was a long Square, in proportion to the additional Forces which were to be contained in it. When both the Consular Armies were united, they took up the Ground of two such perfect Squares.

IX. A wonderful Order was observed Night and Day throughout the Camp, in respect to the Watch-word, Centinels, and Guards; and it was in this its Security and Quiet consisted. To render the Guard more regular and less fatiguing, the Night was divided into four Parts or Watches, and the Day into four Stations. There seems to have been assigned one Company of Foot, and one Troop of Horse; to each of the four Gates every Day. The *Roman* Discipline

CHAP. VI. was extremely strict in this particular, punishing with an exemplary Severity such as deserted their Post, or abandoned their Corps of Guard. *Polybius* takes notice of the excellent Effects of this Discipline, upon occasion of the Siege of *Agrirentum* in *Sicily*, during the first *Punick* War. The *Roman* Guards had dispersed themselves a little too far in quest of Forage. The *Carthaginians* laying hold of the Opportunity, made a vigorous Sally from the Town, and had well nigh forced the Camp; when the Soldiers, sensible of the extreme Penalty they had incurred by neglecting their Duty, resolved to repair the Fault by some remarkable Behaviour; and accordingly rallying together, they not only sustained the Shock of the Enemy, to whom they were far inferior in number, but in the end made so great a slaughter among them, as compelled them to retreat into the Town, tho' they were upon the very point of carrying the *Roman* Lines. The Night-Guards were four out of every *Manipulus*, who continued on Duty three Hours, and were then relieved by those next in turn. To keep the Soldiers alert, they had the *Circuitio Vigilum*, or Patrols, performed commonly four times in the Night by some of the Horse. Upon extraordinary Occasions, the Tribunes and Lieutenant-Generals, and sometimes the General himself made these Circuits in person, and took a strict view of the Watch in every part of the Camp.

X. WHAT we have hitherto said regards only the Plan, Disposition, and well ordering of the *Roman* Camp. But there are many other Particulars to be taken into consideration, in incamping an Army to advantage: the choice of the Ground; the convenience of Provision and Forage; the security of Convoys; and the Precautions needful to prevent Surprise, or the being taken at a Disadvantage. We cannot however here enter into a particular Detail of the *Roman* Practice, with relation to these several Articles; because not being subject to any fixed and invariable Rules; they depend in a manner intirely upon the Prudence and Discretion of the General, who must therein be guided by the nature of the Country, the posture of the Enemy, and his own Strength. Two things in particular they were more than ordinarily attentive to; Health, and Safety. The first they endeavoured to secure, by avoiding all Morasses and fenny Places, or where the Wind was cold and unwholsom; which Unwholsomness they did not so much compute from the situation of the Place, as from the Appearance and Complexion of the Inhabitants. Exercise contributes greatly to Health, and therefore the *Romans* took care to keep their Troops always employed, either in casting up new Works round the Camp, or in hunting after Provision and Forage, or in performing those several Exercises, that tend to render the Body robust and active. It is observed in

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our Days, that the immoderate Labour Soldiers are obliged to undergo, destroys our Armies: and yet it was by incredible Labour that the *Romans* preserved themselves. The reason of the difference I take to be this: their Fatigues were continual and without respite; whereas our Men are perpetually shifting from the extremes of Labour to the extremes of Idleness, than which nothing can be more destructive. Who could believe, that there was nothing, even to Cleanliness, of which particular care was not taken in the *Roman Camp*. As the great Street situated in the front of the *Prætorium* was much frequented by the Officers and Soldiers, who passed through it to receive and carry Orders, and upon their other Occasions; a number of Men were appointed to sweep and clean it every Day in Winter, and to water it in Summer to prevent the Dust.

XI. BUT besides Health, Safety was likewise another important Consideration with the *Romans*. To this end, in choosing a place of Incampment, they always had a particular eye to the convenience of Water, Provisions, and Forage. We see evidently in *Cæsar's Commentaries*, that there was nothing about which he was more solicitous, than the contriving his Marches in such manner, as to have his Camp seated near some navigable River, and a Country behind him, whence he could be easily, and at a reasonable rate, supplied with

with every thing necessary for the subsistence of his Army. Other Inconveniences may find a remedy in time, but Hunger, the longer it lasts, the more infallibly it destroys. And hence it was, that where the above-mentioned Advantages could not be obtained, the *Romans* made it their first Care, after fortifying their Camp, to lay in such a quantity of all necessary Stores, as might be sufficient for the time of their continuance in it. Nor were they less attentive to the strength of their Camp, and the Precautions necessary for its defence. This is a part of the *Art of War* in which they incontestibly excelled all Nations. Constant Practice made them expert in it; for they never quartered their Troops in Towns and open Villages, but always in standing Camps, which were carefully intrenched and fortified, in proportion to the Danger to which they fancied themselves exposed. And here we may observe, that whereas the *Greeks* chose always to incamp where there was some River, or Wood, or Bank, or other natural Rampart to defend them; the *Romans*, on the contrary, stood not so much on the strength of Situation, as on their own ways of fortifying. Hence the *Grecian* Camps were often without Intrenchments, and varied in their form, according to the nature of the Place; but among the *Romans* one constant Method was inviolably observed, nor would they ever lodge in a Camp,
that

CHAP. that was not furrounded with a Ditch and a
VI. Rampart.

XII. THIS Practice of intrenched and fortified Camps was attended with many solid and defireable Advantages. The Army was hereby kept safe, and freed from the Danger of having any of its Quarters beat up, by Surprise or a sudden Attack. It was eased of the trouble of keeping many and great Guards, since a few serves the turn for all, when all are at hand in case of an Attempt. It could never be compelled to fight against its will, than which no greater Misfortune can befall an Army. In fine, as the success of Arms is uncertain, it had always a secure Retreat in case of the worst. These things considered, it will not appear wonderful, that the *Romans* were so strict in this Article, and considered the Custom of fortifying Camps regularly, as one of the most essential parts of military Discipline. In the War with the *Gauls*, the Commanders of the *Roman* Army were reproached with having omitted this wise Precaution, and the loss of the Battle of *Allia* was in part attributed to it. Hence it was, that to avoid the like Misfortune for the time to come, it became in a manner an established Law amongst them, never to hazard a Battle 'till they had finished their Camp. *Paulus Æmilius*, in the second *Macedonian* War, suspended and arrested the Ardor of his whole Army to attack *Perseus*, for no other

other Reason, but because they had not formed CHAP.
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 their Camp. The fortified Camp, in case of a Disaster, put a stop to the Enemy's Victory, received the Troops that retired in safety, enabled them to renew the Battle with more Success, and prevented their being intirely routed; whereas without the refuge of a Camp, an Army, tho' composed of good Troops, was exposed to a final Defeat, and to being inevitably cut in pieces. I may add to all these Advantages, that an intrenched Camp, by reason of the open Air, the healthiness of its Situation, which always must be minded, and the cleanliness which may and ought to be kept in it, is exceedingly less subject to Infection and Sicknes, than Villages and strong Towns; insomuch that some great Captains have concluded, an Army will be likelier preserved, and kept sound and untainted three Months in a well seated and regulated Camp, than three Weeks in the ordinary Villages and Country Towns.

XIII. I have the longer and more particularly insisted on this Practice of intrenched Camps, because it appears evident from History, that the *Romans* owed as many of their Victories to their Ability in this part of War, as to their other excellent military Discipline and Valour. It would be almost endless to enumerate, what Kingdoms and Provinces they kept in obedience by their standing Camps; and how often they warded off
 Dangers,

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Dangers, and brought their Wars to a fortunate issue by the same Proceeding. For having first wearied out their Enemies by safe and beneficial Delays, they would on some great Advantage give them Battle and defeat them; which artful Method of making War they neither could have effected nor rationally attempted, but by their thoroughly knowing how to incamp advantageously, by constantly practising it, and by a timely providing of Food and Forage. *Vegetius* observes, that one of the principal Causes of the ruin of the *Roman* Empire was, that they had lost the Art of fortifying their Camp; by which Negligence they were easily overwhelmed by the Barbarian Horse. And indeed when under the Emperors, they had ascertained the Limits of their Dominion, resolving to extend their Conquests no farther, but to rest satisfied with maintaining the possession of what they had acquired; it is well known, that they effectually accomplished this design by means of the standing Camps, which they kept upon the *Euphrates*, the *Danube*, and the *Rhine*. And so long as this Method was followed, the bordering Nations found it impossible to break through the *Roman* Barriers, or hurt the Tranquillity of their Empire. But when in process of time, the military Discipline began to decline, and the *Art of incamping*, in particular, was lost, or grew into disuse; the *Romans*, by abandoning the Banks of these several Rivers, opened a free passage

passage to the Barbarians, who meeting now CHAP.
VI. with no resistance, poured in upon them like a Torrent, and easily overwhelmed a feeble race of Men, whom Luxury, and an undisturbed Peace of many Ages, had rendered utterly unfit for War.

XIV. AND here, as it falls so naturally in my way, and has a strict Connexion with my Subject, I cannot forbear observing, that in the last Age, the *French*, who had many excellent Commanders, if not the most of any one Nation, and to whom the *Art of War* owes much of its present Improvement, began to revive, and with great Benefit to themselves, this almost obsolete part of it. For when the Prince of *Orange*, the *Imperialists* under the Count de *Souches*, and the *Flemish* Forces were united; the Prince of *Conde*, one of the greatest Captains that any Age has produced, being sent to oppose them, would not give them Battle, but incamped himself advantageously on the *French* Frontiers, so that they were justly afraid to enter them, and leave him at their Backs. By this Management he kept them long at bay, and when he found his Opportunity, gave them at *Senef* so considerable a Blow, that the *French*, from having been on the defensive, became afterwards the Assaulters, and closed that Campaign with taking some of the Enemy's Towns. The Marshal de *Turenne* also, who was sent General to the War in *Germany*, and who in the military Art had

CHA P had hardly a superior, having there to do with
 VI. the Count *de Montecuculi*, one of the greatest
 Captains of his time ; would still by intrenched
 Camps, when the *Germans* were the strongest,
 preserve himself and Army, spin out the War,
 and cover those Territories and Places he had
 won, while he himself had been the most
 powerful.

XV. AND here it is particularly worthy of
 notice, that when upon the Marshal *de Tu-*
renne's death, the *French* King sent the Prince
 of *Conde* to command in his stead, he also by
 intrenched Incampments weathered that Storm,
 which in itself was so threatening, not only by
 the sudden loss of so great a Captain, but also
 by the *Germans* being led by the Count *de Mon-*
tecuculi, and the Duke of *Lorain*, two Persons
 as considerable as the very Forces they headed.
 I say it particularly deserves our observation,
 that two such justly celebrated Commanders,
 as the Prince of *Conde*, and Monsieur *Turenne*,
 should observe the very same Methods, in
 managing the same War ; whereas usually
 when one General succeeds another, in head-
 ing the same Army, and ordering the same
 War, the last comer judges it a kind of dimi-
 nution to his own Skill, to tread in the very
 Paths of his Predecessor. But as the Prince
 of *Conde* observed a quite different Conduct on
 this occasion, we may thence naturally gather
 the three following Particulars. *First*, that he
 judged himself so justly secure in his own Re-
 putation,

putation, that it could receive no diminution, by his following the Steps of the dead General, more especially as he had done the like before, and successfully, in *Flanders*. *Secondly*, that a wise and great Captain will rather, by imitating his Predecessor, confirm that Course to be the best which he knows to be so in itself, than try new Methods of War, whereby out of a mere Hope to do the like thing by a different way, he may hazard his Reputation, his Army, and the Country he is to cover and protect. *Thirdly*, what two such Generals have practised, all Circumstances considered, amounts to little less than a Demonstration, that by Camps intrenched and well posted, a Country may be best secured, an invading Enemy best resisted, and in time, all Advantages being judiciously taken, defeated or made to retire.

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XVI. THESE Examples ancient and modern, sufficiently evince the Benefit of this Practice, and with what Judgment the *Romans* made it an essential part of their military Discipline. I shall only add, as an indisputable Argument in its favour, that the great *Cæsar* himself has given his sanction to it, by constantly following it in his Wars with the *Gauls*. He had to do with a brave and a warlike Nation, passionately fond of Liberty, and therefore extremely averse to the *Roman* Yoke. To keep them in awe, he established standing Camps in different parts of the Country, where the Soldiers were quartered in large Bodies,

CHAP. Bodies, and furrounded with strong Intrench-
 VII. ments. This he thought the likeliest Method
 to prevent Insurrections, or suppress them
 speedily when they should happen, as the
 Troops would be always in a readiness to
 march, and in condition to act. It was like-
 wise the best security against Treachery and
 Surprise. Accordingly we find, that all the
 Efforts of the *Gauls* to recover their Liberty
 were without effect, the *Roman* Camps stand-
 ing as so many Bulwarks, against which tho'
 they made frequent Attacks, they were yet
 never able to prevail.

C H A P. VII.

Of B A T T L E S.

I. **H**AVING raised our Troops, armed and
 disciplined them, put them upon the
 March, and lodged them in a Camp; it is
 now time to draw them out into the Field,
 that we may see how they acquitted them-
 selves on a Day of Battle. It is in this view
 military Merit appears in all its extent. To
 know whether a General were worthy of that
 Name, the *Romans* examined the Conduct he
 observed on this critical Occasion. They did
 not expect Success from the number of Troops,
 which is often a Disadvantage, but from his
 Prudence

Prudence and Valour, the Cause and Assurance of Victory. They considered him as the Soul of his Army, that directs all its Motions, whose Dictates every thing obeys, and upon whose good or bad Conduct the issue of the Battle depends. The first Consideration, and that which demands the greatest force of Judgment is, to examine whether it be proper or no to come to an Engagement, and to balance exactly the Advantages with the Disadvantages. The blind Temerity of *Varro*, notwithstanding his Colleague's Remonstrances, and the Advice of *Fabius*, drew upon the Republick the unfortunate Battle of *Cannæ*; whereas a delay of a few Weeks, would probably have ruined *Hannibal* for ever. *Perseus*, on the contrary, let slip the Occasion of fighting the *Romans*, in not taking the advantage of the Ardor of his Army, and attacking them instantly after the defeat of their Horse, which had thrown their Troops into Disorder and Consternation. *Cæsar* had been lost after the Battle of *Dyrrbachium*, if *Pompey* had known how to improve his Advantage. Great Enterprises have their decisive Moments. The important Point lies, in wisely resolving what to choose, and in seizing the present Occasion, which never returns when once neglected.

II. BUT not to insist any longer upon this, which rests intirely in the Breast of the General; we shall suppose the Resolution to fight taken, and proceed to examine, what Precau-

CHAP. VII. tions the *Romans* made use of, in order to secure the Victory. These may in the general be reduced to two. *First*, the inspiring their Troops with Courage and Confidence. *Secondly*, the ranging them judiciously in order of Battle. To inspire their Troops with Confidence, they began by consulting the Gods, and endeavouring to incline them in their favour. They consulted them either by the flight or singing of Birds, by the inspection of the Entrails of Victims, by the manner in which the sacred Chickens pecked their Corn, and by things of the like nature. They laboured to render them propitious by Sacrifices, Vows, and Prayers. Many of the Generals, especially in the earlier times, discharged these Duties with great Solemnity and Sentiments of Religion; and would never hazard an Engagement, until by some favourable Omens they had brought the Troops to believe that the Gods were on their side. *Paulus Æmilius*, before he gave *Perseus* Battle, sacrificed twenty Oxen successively to *Hercules*, without finding any favourable Sign in all those Victims. It was not 'till the one and twentieth, that he believed he saw something which promised him the Victory. This attention to Religion was highly necessary among a People strongly addicted to Superstition, and over whom the Omens of which we speak, however trifling in themselves, had yet a powerful Influence. Hence the Generals who neglected this Precaution, had often but too just cause to repent of

of their Folly; as it tended greatly to dispirit the Troops, and begot an ill Opinion of their Conduct; infomuch that we seldom find them successful in their Undertakings. The wisest and best Commanders chose always to comply with the Prejudices of the Vulgar, and even where they despised these Ceremonies in their Hearts, affected yet a greater Veneration for them in publick.

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III. AFTER having paid these Duties to the Gods, they applied themselves to Men, and the General exhorted his Soldiers. It seems to have been an established Custom with all Nations among the Ancients, to harangue their Troops before a Battle; nor can we deny that the Custom was very reasonable in itself, and might contribute greatly to the Victory. When an Army is upon the point of engaging an Enemy, what can be more proper, than to oppose the fear of a seemingly approaching Death with the most powerful Reasons, and such as, if not capable of totally extinguishing it, may yet in some measure allay and overcome it. Such Reasons are the Love of our Country, the Obligation to defend it at the price of our Blood, the remembrance of past Victories, the necessity of supporting the Glory of our Nation, the Injustice of a violent and cruel Enemy, the Dangers to which the Fathers, Mothers, Wives, and Children of the Soldiers are exposed: these Motives, I say, and many of the like nature, represented from the

CHAP. Mouth of a General, beloved and respected by
VII. his Troops, may make a very strong Impression
upon their Minds. Not, as *Cyrus* in *Xenophon* observes, that such Discourses can in an Instant change the Disposition of the Soldiers, and from timorous and abject as they might be, make them immediately bold and intrepid: but they awaken, they rouse the Courage Nature had before given them, and add a new Force and Vivacity to it. To judge rightly of this Custom of haranguing the Troops, as constantly practised among the *Romans*, we must go back to the Ages wherein they lived, and consider their Manners with particular Attention. Their Armies were composed of the same Citizens, to whom, in the City, and in time of Peace, it was customary to communicate all the Affairs of the State. The General did no more in the Camp, or in the Field of Battle, than he would have been obliged to do in the Rostrum or Tribunal of Harangues. He did his Troops Honour, and attracted their Confidence and Affection in imparting to them his Designs, Motives, and Measures. Add to this, that the sight of the Generals, Officers, and Soldiers assembled, communicated a reciprocal Courage and Ardor to them all. Every one piqued himself at that time upon the goodness of his Aspect and Appearance, and obliged his Neighbour to do the same. The Fear of some was abated or intirely banished by the Valour of others. The Disposition of particular Persons became
that

that of the whole Body, and gave Affairs their Aspect. CHAP.
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IV. LET me observe here, that there were many Occasions besides Battles, when it was necessary to excite the Good-will and Zeal of the Soldier: if, for instance, a difficult and hasty March was to be made, to extricate the Army out of a dangerous situation, or obtain one more commodious: if Courage, Patience, and Constancy were required, for supporting Famine, and other Distresses, painful to Nature: if some difficult, dangerous, but very important Enterprize was to be undertaken: if it was necessary to console, encourage, and reanimate the Troops after a Defeat: if an hazardous Retreat was to be made in view of the Enemy, in a Country he was master of: in fine, if only a generous Effort was wanting to terminate a War, or some important Undertaking. Upon these and the like Occasions, the Generals never failed to speak in publick to the Army, in order to sound their Dispositions by their Acclamations more or less strong; to inform them of their Reasons for such and such Conduct, and conciliate them to it; to dispel the false Reports, which exaggerated Difficulties, and discouraged them; to let them see the Remedies preparing for the Distresses they were under, and the Success to be expected from them; to explain the Precautions it was necessary to take, and the Motives for taking them. It was the General's

CHAP. VII. Interest to flatter the Soldier, in making him the Confident of his Designs, Fears and Expedients, in order to engage him to share in them, and act in concert, and from the same Motives with himself. The General in the midst of Soldiers, who, as well as himself, were all not only Members of the State, but had a share in the Authority of the Government, was considered as a Father in the midst of his Family.

V. It may not be easy to conceive how he could make himself heard by the Troops : but if we call to mind, that the Armies of the *Roman* People were not very numerous, that Difficulty will in a great measure vanish. Besides, I pretend not to say that the Generals were heard distinctly, or in any other manner than the Orators in the publick Assemblies. All People did not hear : yet the whole People were informed, the whole People deliberated and decided, and none of them complained of not having heard. It sufficed that the most ancient, the most considerable, the principals of Companies and Quarters were present at the Harangue, of which they afterwards gave an account to the rest. On the Column of *Trajan*, the Emperor is seen haranguing the Troops from a Tribunal of Turf, raised higher than the Soldiers Heads, with the principal Officers around him upon the Platform, and the Multitude forming a Circle at a distance. The great Men at *Rome* accustomed themselves from

from their youth to speak upon occasion with a strong and clear Voice ; and as these Harangues were made in the Camp to the Soldiers quiet and unarmed, it is not easy to conceive in how little room a great number of them could stand upright, when they pressed close to each other. I insist the longer upon this, because many blame the Historians of Antiquity, for the supposititious Harangues, as they call them, which they have inserted in their Works. It must indeed be owned, that the Discourses made by Generals on the occasions of which we speak, were not always exactly the same as Historians have repeated them. For most Authors, writing in the time when the Art of Eloquence was highly in esteem, have endeavoured, in adorning and enlarging the Harangues they record, to leave Proofs to Posterity, that they were not less excellent Orators than Historians. But the Fact itself, that Generals frequently spoke in publick to their Troops, is evident beyond dispute. *Cæsar*, whose Commentaries are a plain and naked relation of what he himself performed at the head of his Army, furnishes many Examples of this kind. When he marched against *Ariovistus*, a sudden Consternation seizing the Soldiers, which was like to be attended with very disagreeable Effects, he assembled them, reprehended them in a long and severe Speech, and thereby put a stop to the growing Evil. In like manner, upon occasion of a considerable Check received before

CHAP. *Gergovia*, owing to the too forward Valour of
 VII. the Troops, and their neglect of his Injun-
 ctions, he judged it necessary to call them to-
 gether, expostulate with them upon their ill-
 timed Bravery, and fortify them against any
 Damp their late Disaster might have thrown
 upon their Spirits. I could easily produce
 other Instances of the same kind, but these
 are abundantly sufficient to evince the Point in
 question,

VI. WHEN the Armies were numerous,
 and upon the point of giving Battle, the An-
 cients had a very simple and natural way of
 haranguing the Men. The General on
 horseback rode thro' the Ranks, and spoke
 something to the several Bodies of Troops in
 order to animate them. Where he had to do
 with different Nations, as very often happened,
 he addressed those of his own Language in
 person, and made known his Views and De-
 signs to the rest by Interpreters. *Hannibal*
 acted in this manner at the Battle of *Zama* in
Africa. He thought it incumbent on him to
 exhort his Troops: and as every thing was
 different among them, Language, Customs,
 Laws, Arms, Habits, and Interests, so he
 made use of different Motives to animate
 them. To the auxiliary Troops, he proposed
 an immediate Reward, and an augmentation
 of their Pay out of the Booty that should be
 taken. He inflamed the peculiar and natural
 Hatred of the *Gauls* against the *Romans*. As
 for

for the *Ligurians*, who inhabited a mountainous and barren Country, he set before them the fertile Valleys of *Italy*, as the fruit of their Victory. He represented to the *Moors* and *Numidians*, the cruel and violent Government of *Mafniffa*, to which they would be subjected, if overcome. In this manner he animated these different Nations, by the different views of Hope and Fear. As to the *Carthaginians*, he omitted nothing that might excite their Valour, and addressed himself to them in the warmest and most pathetic Terms. He put them in mind of their Country, their household Gods, the Tombs of their Ancestors, the Terror and Consternation of their Fathers and Mothers, their Wives and Children; in fine, that the Fate of *Carthage* depended upon that Battle, the Event of which would either ruin and reduce her into perpetual Slavery, or render her Mistress of the Universe, every thing being extreme which she had either to hope or fear. This is a very fine Discourse; but how did he make these different Nations understand it? *Livy* informs us: He spoke to the *Carthaginians* himself, and ordered the Commanders of each Nation to repeat to their respective Troops what he had said. In this manner the General sometimes assembled the Officers of his Army, and after having explained what he desired the Troops might be told, he sent them back to their several Brigades or Companies, in order to report what they had heard,

CHAP. heard, and animate them for the Battle. *Ar-*
VII. *rian* observes this particular of *Alexander the*
Great, before the famous Battle of *Arbela*.

VII. AFTER inspiring the Troops with Resolution and Confidence, and disposing them to act courageously against the Enemy, the next care of the General was, to range them judiciously in order of Battle. The manner of drawing up the Infantry in three Lines, continued long in use among the *Romans*, and with uniformity enough. The *Hastati* were placed in the front, in thick and firm Ranks; the *Principes* behind them, but not altogether so close; and after them the *Triarii* in so wide and loose an order, that upon occasion, they could receive both the *Principes* and *Hastati* into their Body in any Distress. The *Velites*, and in latter times the Bowmen and Slingers, were not drawn up in this regular manner, but disposed of either before the front of the *Hastati*, or scattered up and down among the void spaces of the same *Hastati*, or sometimes placed in two Bodies in the Wings: but wherever they were fixed, these light Soldiers began the Combat, skirmishing in flying Parties with the first Troops of the Enemy. If they prevailed, which very seldom happened, they prosecuted the Victory; but upon a repulse, they fell back by the flanks of the Army, and rallied again in the Rear. When they were retired, the *Hastati* advanced against the
Enemy;

Enemy; and in case they found themselvesC HAP.
 overpowered, retiring softly towards the *Prin-* VII.
cipes, fell into the intervals of their Ranks,
 and, together with them, renewed the Fight.
 But if the *Principes* and *Haslati* thus joined
 were too weak to sustain the fury of the
 Battle, they all fell back into the wider inter-
 vals of the *Triarii*, and then all together be-
 ing united into a firm mass, they made ano-
 ther Effort, much more impetuous than any
 before. If this Assault proved ineffectual,
 the Day was intirely lost as to the Foot, there
 being no farther reserves. This way of mar-
 shalling the Foot, was exactly like the or-
 der of Trees, which Gardcners call the
Quincunx; as appears from the beautiful com-
 parison between them in *Virgil's* second *Geor-*
gick. And as the reason of that position of
 the Trees, is not only for Beauty and Figure,
 but that every particular Tree may have room
 to spread its Roots and Boughs, without in-
 tangling and hindering the rest; so in this
 ranking of the Men, the Army was not only
 set out to the best advantage, and made the
 greatest show, but every particular Soldier
 had free room to use his Weapons, and to
 withdraw himself between the void spaces
 behind him, without occasioning any Confu-
 sion or Disturbance.

VIII. THE Stratagem of rallying thus
 three times, has been reckoned almost the
 whole Art and Secret of the *Roman* Discipline;
 and

and 'twas almost impossible it should prove unsuccessful, if duly observed. For Fortune, in every Engagement, must have failed them three several times, before they could be routed; and the Enemy must have had the Strength and Resolution to overcome them in three several Encounters, for the decision of one Battle: whereas most other Nations, and even the *Grecians* themselves, drawing up their whole Army as it were in one front, trusted themselves and fortunes to the success of a single Charge. The *Roman* Cavalry was posted at the two Corners of the Army, like the Wings on a Body; and fought sometimes on foot, sometimes on horseback, as occasion required, in the same manner as our Dragoons. The confederate or auxiliary Forces composed the two Points of the Battle, and covered the whole Body of the *Romans*. As to the Stations of the Commanders, the General commonly took up his Post near the middle of the Army, between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*, as the fittest place to give orders equally to all the Troops. The *Legati* and Tribunes were usually posted by him; unless the former were ordered to command the Wings, or the others some particular Part of the Army. The Centurions stood every Man at the head of his Century, to lead them up; tho' sometimes, out of Courage and Honour, they exposed themselves in the van of the Army, or were placed there for particular Reasons by the General: as *Salust* reports of *Catiline*,

Catiline, that he posted all his choice Centu-
 rions, with the *Evocati*, and the flower of
 the common Soldiers, in the front of the
 Battle. But the *Primipili*, or chief Centu-
 rions, had the Honour to stand with the
 Tribunes near the General's person. The
 common Soldiers were placed in several Ranks,
 at the discretion of the Centurions, according
 to their Age, Strength, and Experience,
 every Man having three Foot square allowed
 him to manage his Arms in; and it was reli-
 giously observed in their Discipline, never to
 abandon their Ranks, or break their Order
 upon any account.

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IX. BUT besides the common Methods
 of drawing up a *Roman* Army, which are
 sufficiently explained by every Historian of
 any note; there were several other very sin-
 gular Methods of forming their Battle into
 odd Shapes, according to the nature of the
 Body they were to oppose. Of this kind was
 the *Cuneus*, when the Army was ranged in
 the figure of a Wedge, the most proper to
 pierce and break the Order of the Enemy.
 This was otherwise called *Caput Porcinum*,
 which it in some measure resembled. And
 here I beg leave to observe; that this last
 Name seems to confirm the Conjecture of the
 Chevalier *Folard*, who maintains that the
Cuneus was no other than the *Column*, or a
 Battalion drawn up with a small front and
 great depth. The triangular Order he looks
 upon

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upon as childish and absurd, and such as never was nor could be practised with Success, because of the extreme weakness of the Angles. The Authors, however, who give that form to the *Cuneus*, have invented another order of Battle in opposition to it, which they term the *Forfex*. This was when the Army was drawn up in the figure of a Pair of Sheers, as it were on purpose to receive the *Cuneus*, in case the Enemy should make use of that Disposition. For while he endeavoured to open, and as it were to cleave their Squadrons with his Wedge, by keeping their Troops extended like the Sheers, and receiving him in the middle, they not only hindered the Damage designed to their own Men, but commonly cut the adverse Body in pieces. The *Globus* was when the Soldiers cast themselves into a circular Order, upon an apprehension of being surrounded. *Cæsar*, in the fifth Book of his Commentaries, speaks of this Disposition as very proper in cases of Danger and Extremity. The *Turris* represented an oblong Square, after the fashion of a Tower, with very few Men in a File, and the Ranks extended to a great length. This seems of very ancient Original, as being mentioned in *Homer*. The last order I shall take notice of is the *Serra*, or Saw; when the first Companies in the front of the Army, beginning the Engagement, sometimes proceeded, and sometimes drew back; so that by the help of a large Fancy, one might find some resemblance

resemblance between them and the Teeth of CHAP.
that Instrument. VII.

X. IT was usual enough among the *Romans*, to raise great Cries, and to strike their Swords against their Bucklers, as they advanced to charge an Enemy. This Noise, joined to that of the Trumpets, was very proper to suppress in them, by a kind of Stupor, all fear of Danger, and to inspire them with a Courage and Boldness, that had no view but Victory, and defied Death. But tho' such Shoutings were allowed, nay even encouraged as useful, going towards the Enemy, yet a deep Silence was observed by the Soldiery, when they were about to engage, that the orders of the Officers, and the words of Command, might be clearly heard, and punctually obeyed. 'Tis observed that the *Greeks* went always silently to Battle, alledging for it, that they had more to do than to say to their Enemies. But the Shoutings of which we speak, is in reality a kind of Doing, as it stirs up the Men, and often damps the Enemy. The Troops marched sometimes softly and coolly to the Charge, and sometimes, when they approached the Enemy, they sprung forward with impetuosity as fast as they could move. Great Men have been divided in Opinion upon these different Methods of attacking. It seems however to be generally agreed, that where two Armies engage in a plain Field, a Commander ought never

CHAP. VII. to allow, much less order his Men to receive the Charge, but still to meet the Enemy in giving it. *Pompey*, in the decisive Battle of *Pharsalia*, by the advice of *Triarius*, commanded his Soldiers to receive *Cæsar's* Assault, and to undergo the Shock of his Army, without removing from the place whereon they stood, as by this means *Cæsar's* Men would be disordered in their advance, and *Pompey's*, by not moving, keep their Order. But *Cæsar* himself observes upon it, that according to his Judgment, the Advice was against all Reason; because there is a certain keenness and alacrity of Spirit naturally planted in every Man, who is inflamed with a desire to fight, and therefore no Commander should repress or restrain it, but rather increase and set it forward. The Event justified *Cæsar's* Opinion, and showed that it was well-grounded.

XI. HITHERTO we have contented ourselves with general Observations: but as it is impossible from these alone, to give any tolerable Idea of the Address and Ability of a Commander in a Day of Battle, because his Conduct must vary according to Circumstances; I shall now beg leave to lay before the Reader, an Account of some celebrated Actions of Antiquity, taken from the Descriptions of such Historians, as being themselves military Men, have traced them with the utmost Exactness, and distinctly explained the Reasons of the several Steps taken. The first Instance
of

of this kind that we meet with in History, is the famous Battle of *Thymbra*, between *Craesus* and *Cyrus*, which transferred the Empire of *Asia* from the *Assyrians* of *Babylon* to the *Medes* and *Persians*. Tho' this Action does not so immediately and strictly regard the Subject we are upon, as having no Relation to the *Roman* History, I shall yet give a particular Description of it here, not only because it is the first pitched Battle, of which we have any full and circumstantial Account, but because *Cyrus* being looked upon as one of the greatest Captains of Antiquity, those of the Profession may be glad to trace him in all his Steps, thro' this important Engagement; and the rather, as what we shall present them with on this Subject is taken from *Xenophon*, one of the greatest Commanders, as well as finest Writers, of the Age in which he lived.

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XII. IN *Cyrus's* Army the Companies of Foot consisted of a hundred Men each, exclusive of the Captain. Each Company was subdivided into four Parts, which consisted severally of four and twenty Men, not including the Person who commanded the Platoon. Each of these Subdivisions was again divided into two Files, consisting in consequence of twelve Men. Every ten Companies had a particular superior Officer to command them, who sufficiently answers to what we call a Colonel. Over ten of these again was another superior Commander, whom we shall

CHAP. term a Brigadier. When *Cyrus* came at the
VII. Head of the thirty thousand *Persians*, who had
been sent to the Aid of his Uncle *Cyaxares*,
he made a considerable Change in the arms
of his Troops. 'Till then, two thirds of
them made use only of Javelins and Bows,
and therefore could not fight but at a distance
from the Enemy. Instead of these, *Cyrus*
armed the greatest part of them with Cuirasses,
Bucklers, and Swords or Battle-axes, and left
only a few of his Soldiers in light Armour.
The *Persians* did not know at that Time what
it was to fight on horse-back. *Cyrus*, who
was convinced that nothing was of so great
Importance towards the gaining of a Battle
as Cavalry, was sensible of the great Incon-
venience he laboured under in that respect,
and therefore took wise and early Precautions
to remedy that Evil. He succeeded in his
Design, and by little and little formed a Body
of *Persian* Cavalry, which amounted to ten
thousand Men, and were the best Troops in
his Army.

XIII. XENOPHON has not acquainted us with
the precise Number of Troops on both sides,
but as this may be in some sort collected, by
putting together certain scattered Passages of
our Author, we shall endeavour to fix it in
the best manner we can. *Cyrus's* Army
amounted in the whole to an hundred and
ninety-six thousand Men, Horse and Foot. Of
these there were seventy thousand natural born
Persians,

Perfians, viz. ten thousand Cuirassiers of Horse, twenty thousand Cuirassiers of Foot, twenty thousand Pikemen, and twenty thousand light-armed Soldiers. The rest of the Army, to the number of one hundred and twenty-six thousand men, consisted of an hundred thousand *Median*, *Armenian*, and *Arabian* Foot, and twenty-six thousand Horse of the same Nations. Besides these Troops, *Cyrus* had three hundred Chariots of War, armed with Scythes, each Chariot drawn by four Horses a-breast, covered with Trappings that were shot-proof; as were also the Horses of the *Persian* Cuirassiers. He had likewise ordered a great Number of Chariots to be made of a larger size, upon each of which was placed a Tower of about eighteen or twenty Foot high, in which were lodged twenty Archers. Each Chariot was drawn upon Wheels by sixteen Oxen yoked in a breast. There was moreover a considerable Number of Camels, upon each of which were two *Arabian* Archers, back to back; so that one looked towards the Head, and the other towards the Tail of the Camel.

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XIV. CROESUS's Army was above twice as numerous as that of *Cyrus*, amounting in all to four hundred and twenty thousand Men, of which sixty thousand were Cavalry. The Troops consisted chiefly of *Babylonians*, *Lydians*, *Phrygians*, *Cappadocians*, of the Nations about the *Hellespont*, and of *Egyptians*, to the number of three hundred and sixty thousand

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Men. The *Egyptians* alone made a body of an hundred and twenty thousand. They had Bucklers that covered them from head to foot, very long Pikes, and short Swords, but very broad. The rest of the Army was made up of *Cyprians, Cilicians, Lycaonians, Paphlagonians, Thracians, and Ionians*. The Army in Order of Battle was ranged in one Line, the Infantry in the Centre, and the Calvary on the two Wings. All the Troops, both Foot and Horse, were thirty Men deep: but the *Egyptians*, who, as we have taken notice, were an hundred and twenty thousand in number, and who were the principal Strength of *Cræsus's* Infantry, in the Centre of which they were posted; were divided into twelve large Bodies or square Battalions, of ten thousand Men each, which had an hundred Men in front, and as many in depth, with an Interval or Space between every Battalion, that they might act and fight independent of, and without interfering with one another. *Cræsus* would gladly have persuaded them to range themselves in less depth, that he might make the wider Front. For the Armies being in an immense Plain, which gave room for extending their Wings to right and left, he was in hopes by this means of surrounding and hemming in the Enemy. But he could not prevail with the *Egyptians* to change the Order of Battle to which they had been accustomed. His Army, as it was thus drawn out into one Line, took

took up near forty Stadia, or five Miles in length. CHAP. VII.

XV. ARASPES, who under pretence of Discontent had retired to *Cræsus's* Army, and had received particular Orders from *Cyrus*, to observe well the Manner of that General's ranging his Troops, returned to the *Persian* Camp the Day before the Battle. *Cyrus* in drawing up his Army, governed himself by the Disposition of the Enemy, of which that young *Median* Nobleman had given him an exact account. The *Persian* Troops had been generally used to engage four and twenty Men deep, but *Cyrus* thought fit to change that Disposition. It was necessary for him to form as wide a Front as possible, without too much weakening his Phalanx, to prevent his Army's being inclosed and hemmed in. His Infantry was excellent, and most advantageously armed with Cuirasses, Partizans, Battle-axes, and Swords; and provided they could join the Enemy in close Fight, there was but little reason to believe the *Lydian* Phalanx, that were only armed with light Bucklers and Javelins, could support the Charge. *Cyrus* therefore thinned the Files of his Infantry one half, and ranged them only twelve Men deep. The Cavalry was drawn out on the two Wings, the Right commanded by *Chrysantes*, and the Left by *Hystaspes*. The whole Front of the Army took up but thirty-two Stadia, or four Miles in Extent, and consequently was at each

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end near four Stadia, or half a Mile short of the Enemy's Front. Behind the first Line at a little distance, *Cyrus* placed the Spear-men, and behind them the Archers. Both the one and the other were covered by the Soldiers in their front, over whose Heads they could fling their Javelins, and shoot their Arrows at the Enemy.

XVI. BEHIND all these he formed another Line, to serve for the Rear, which consisted of the Flower of his Army. Their Business was to have their Eyes upon those that were placed before them, to encourage those that did their Duty, to sustain and threaten those that gave way, and even to kill those as Traitors that persisted obstinately in flying ; by that means to keep the Cowards in awe, and make them have as great a terror of the Troops in the Rear as they could possibly have of the Enemy. Behind the Army were placed those moving Towers which I have already described. These formed a Line equal and parallel to that of the Army, and did not only serve to annoy the Enemy by the perpetual Discharges of the Archers that were in them, but might likewise be looked upon as a kind of moveable Forts or Redoubts, under which the *Persian* Troops might rally, in case they were broken and pushed by the Enemy. Just behind these Towers were two other Lines, which also were parallel and equal to the Front of the Army: the one was formed of the Baggage,
and

and the other of the Chariots which carried the Women, and such other Persons as were unfit for Service. To close all these Lines, and to secure them from the Insults of the Enemy, *Cyrus* placed in the Rear of all two thousand Infantry, two thousand Horse, and the Troop of Camels, which was pretty numerous. *Cyrus's* Design in forming two Lines of the Baggage was, not only to make his Army appear the more numerous, but likewise to oblige the Enemy, in case they were resolved to surround him, as he knew they intended, to make the longer Circuit, and consequently to weaken their Line, by stretching it out so far. We have still the *Persian* Chariots of War armed with Scythes to speak of. These were divided into three Bodies of an hundred each. One of these Bodies, commanded by *Abradates*, King of *Susiana*, was placed in the Front of the Battle, and the other two upon the Flanks of the Army.

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XVII. WHEN the two Armies were in sight of each other, and the Enemy had observed how much the Front of theirs exceeded that of *Cyrus*, they made the Centre of their Army halt, whilst the two Wings advanced projecting to the right and left, with design to inclose *Cyrus's* Army, and begin their Attack on every Side on the same time. This Movement did not at all alarm *Cyrus*, because he expected it; but observing that many of his Officers, and even *Abradates* himself, discovered some uneasy

CHAP. Apprehensions; These Troops disturb you, says
VII. he; believe me they will be the first routed,
and to you *Abradates* I give that as a Signal,
for the falling upon the Enemy with your
Chariots. When the two detached Bodies of
the *Lydians* were sufficiently extended, *Cræsus*
gave the Signal to his main Battle to march up
directly to the Front of the *Persian* Army,
whilst the two Wings, that were wheeling
round upon their Flanks, advanced on each
Side; so that *Cyrus's* Army was inclosed on
three Sides; and, as *Xenophon* expresses it,
looked like a small Square drawn with-
in a great one. In an Instant, on the first
Signal *Cyrus* gave, his Troops faced about on
every side, keeping a profound silence in ex-
pectation of the Event. The Prince himself
at the head of some Horse, briskly followed
by a Body of Foot, fell upon the Forces that
were marching to attack his right Flank, and
put them in great Disorder. The Chariots
then driving furiously upon the *Lydians* com-
pleted the Defeat. In the same moment the
Troops of the left Flank, knowing by the
Noise that *Cyrus* had begun the Battle on the
Right, advanced to the Enemy; and im-
mediately the Squadron of Camels was made
to advance likewise, as *Cyrus* had ordered. The
Enemy's Cavalry did not expect this, and their
Horses at a distance, as soon as they were sen-
sible of the Approach of those Animals, whose
Smell they cannot endure, began to snort and
prance, to run foul upon and overturn one
another,

another, throwing their Riders, and treading them under their Feet. Whilst they were in this Confusion, a small Body of Horse, commanded by *Artagefes*, pushed them very warmly to prevent their rallying; and the Chariots armed with Scythes falling furiously upon them, they were intirely routed, with a dreadful slaughter.

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XVIII. THIS being the Signal which *Cyrus* had given *Abradates* for attacking the Front of the Enemy's Army, he drove like Lightning upon them with all his Chariots. Their first Ranks were not able to stand so violent a Charge, but gave way and were dispersed. Having broken and overthrown them, *Abradates* came up to the *Egyptian* Battalions, which being covered with their Bucklers, and marching in such close order, that the Chariots had not room to pierce amongst them, gave him much more trouble, and would not have been broken, had it not been for the Violence of the Horses that trod upon them. 'Twas a most dreadful Spectacle to see the Heaps of Men and Horses, overturned Chariots, broken Arms, and all the direful Effects of the sharp Scythes, which cut every thing in pieces that came in their way. But *Abradates's* Chariot having the Misfortune to be overturned, he and his Men were killed, after they had signalized their Valour in a very extraordinary manner. The *Egyptians* then marching forward in close Order, and covered with their Bucklers, obliged

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ed the *Persian* Infantry to give way, and drove them beyond their fourth Line, as far as to their Machines. There the *Egyptians* met with a fresh Storm of Arrows and Javelins, that were poured upon their Heads from the rolling Towers : and the Battalions of the *Persians* Rear-guard advancing sword in hand, hindered their Archers and Spear-men from retreating any farther, and obliged them to return to their Charge.

XIX. CYRUS in the mean time having put both the Horse and Foot to flight on the left of the *Egyptians*, did not amuse himself in pursuing the Runaways, but pushing on directly to the Centre, had the Mortification to find his *Persian* Troops had been forced to give way ; and rightly judging that the only means to prevent the *Egyptians* from gaining farther ground, would be to attack them behind, he did so, and fell upon their Rear. The Cavalry came up at the same time, and the Enemy was pushed with great Fury. The *Egyptians* being attacked on all sides, faced about every way, and defended themselves with wonderful bravery. Cyrus himself was in great Danger ; his Horse, which a Solder had stabbed under the Belly, sinking under him, he fell in the midst of his Enemies. Here was an Opportunity, says *Xenophon*, of seeing how important it is for a Commander to have the Affection of his Soldiers. Officers and Men, equally alarmed at the Danger in which they saw their Leader,

ran

ran headlong into the thick forest of Pikes to rescue and save him. He quickly remounted another Horse, and the Battle became more bloody than ever. At length *Cyrus*, admiring the Valour of the *Egyptians*, and being concerned to see such brave Men perish, offered them honourable Conditions, if they would surrender, letting them know at the same time that all their Allies had abandoned them. The *Egyptians* accepted the Conditions, after which the *Persians* meeting with no farther Opposition, a total Rout of the Enemy ensued.

XX. 'Tis allowed that *Cyrus's* Victory was chiefly owing his *Persian* Cavalry, which was a new Establishment, and entirely the Fruit of that Prince's Care and Activity in forming his People, and perfecting them in a part of the military Art, of which till his Time they had been utterly ignorant. The Chariots armed with Scythes did good Service, and the use of them was ever after retained among the *Persians*. The Camels too were not unserviceable in this Battle, tho' *Xenophon* makes no great account of them, and observes, that in his time they made no other use of them, than for carrying the Baggage. I shall not undertake here to enlarge upon *Cyrus's* Merit. 'Tis sufficient to observe, that in this affair we see all the Qualities of a great General shine out in him. Before the Battle, an admirable sagacity and foresight in discovering and disconcerting the Enemy's Measures ; an infinite Exactness

CHAP. actness in the detail of Affairs, in taking care
 VII. that his Army should be provided with every
 thing necessary, and all his Orders punctually
 obeyed at the time prefixed; a wonderful application to gain the Hearts of his Soldiers, and to inspire them with Confidence and Ardor: in the heat of Action, what a Spirit and Activity? what a presence of Mind in giving Orders as Occasion requires? what Courage and Intrepidity, and at the same time what Humanity towards the Enemy, whose Valour he respects, and whose Blood he is unwilling to shed? I have met with but one Objection to the Manner in which he drew up his Troops in Order of Battle, namely, his placing no Troops to cover his Flanks, to sustain his armed Chariots, and to oppose the two Bodies of Troops which *Cræsus* had detached to fall upon the Flanks of his Army. But it is very possible that such a Circumstance might escape *Xenophon* in describing the Battle; tho' it must be owned, that the Fall of *Abradates*, which was immediately followed by the Attack of the *Persian* Infantry, hardly leaves room for such a Conjecture.

XX. I shall now present the Reader with the Description of two Battles in which the *Romans* were concerned, those of *Cannæ* and *Zama*, distinguished by the importance of their Consequences, and the Abilities of the Generals who commanded in them. *Hannibal* having defeated the *Romans* in three successive Engagements,

gagements, and desirous of bringing them to another general Action, that by one decisive Blow he might put an end to the War, removed his Camp to the Neighbourhood of *Cannæ*, an open champian Country, and fit for Cavalry to act in, in which he was greatly superior to the Enemy. The *Romans*, headed by the Consuls *Paulus Æmilius* and *Varro*, followed him thither, where after some Disputes *Paulus* was obliged to give way to the Obstinacy of his Colleague, who was resolutely bent upon fighting. The two Armies were very unequal as to number. There was in that of the *Romans*, including the Allies, fourscore thousand Foot, and something more than six thousand Horse; and in that of the *Carthaginians*, forty thousand Foot, all well disciplined and inured to War, and ten thousand Horse. *Varro*, at day-break, having made the Troops of the great Camp pass the *Aufidus*, drew them up immediately in Battle, after having joined them with those of the little Camp. The whole Infantry were upon one Line, closer and of greater depth than usual. The Cavalry was upon the two Wings: that of the *Romans* on the right, defended by the *Aufidus*; and that of the Allies on the left Wing. The light-armed Troops were advanced in the Front of the Battle to some distance. *Paulus Æmilius* commanded the right Wing of the *Romans*, *Varro* the left, and *Servilius Geminus*, the Consul of the preceding year, was in the Centre.

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XXII. HANNIBAL immediately drew up his Army in one line. He posted his *Spanish* and *Gallick* Cavalry on the left, sustained by the *Aufidus*, to oppose the *Roman* Horse ; and upon the same Line, half his heavy-armed *African* Infantry: then the *Spanish* and *Gallick* Infantry, which properly formed the Centre ; on their right the other half of the *African* Infantry ; and lastly the *Numidian* Horse, who composed the right Wing. The light-armed Troops were in the Front, facing those of the *Romans*. *Asdrubal* had the left, *Hanno* the right ; *Hannabal*, having his Brother with him, reserved the Command of the Centre to himself. The *African* Troops might have been taken for a Body of *Romans*, so much did they resemble them by their Arms, which they had gained in the Battles of *Trebia* and *Thrasymenus*, and which they now employed against those who had suffered them to be taken from them. The *Spaniards* and *Gauls* had Shields of the same Form ; but their Swords were very different. Those of the former were equally proper for cutting and thrusting, whereas those of the *Gauls* cut only with the Edge, and at a certain Distance. The Soldiers of those two Nations, especially the *Gauls*, had a dreadful aspect, in consequence of their extraordinary Stature. The latter were naked from their Belts upwards. The *Spaniards* wore linen Habits, the extreme whiteness of which, exalted by a border of a purple colour, made a surprisingly splendid Appearance.

pearance. *Hannibal*, who knew how to take
his Advantages as a great Captain, forgot no-
thing that could conduce to the Victory. A
Wind peculiar to that Region, called in the
Country *Vulturnus*, blew always at a certain
Period. He took care to draw up in such a
manner, that his Army, facing the North,
had it in their Backs, and the Enemy fronting
the South, had it in their Faces; so that he
was not in the least incommoded with it, where-
as the *Romans*, whose Eyes it filled with Dust,
scarce saw before them. From hence we may
judge how far *Hannibal* carried his Attention,
which nothing seems to escape.

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XX. THE two Armies marched against each other, and began the Charge. After that of the light-armed Soldiers on both sides, which was only a Prelude, the Action began by the two Wings of the Cavalry on the side of the *Ausidus*. *Hannibal's* left Wing, which was an old Corps, to whose Valour he was principally indebted for his Successes, attacked that of the *Romans* with so much Force and Violence, that they had never experienced the like. This Charge was not made in the usual manner of Attacks of Cavalry, by sometimes falling back, and sometimes returning to the Assault; but in fighting man to man, and very near, because they had not room enough to extend themselves, being pent up on one side by the River, and on the other by the Infantry. The Shock was furious, and equally sustained on both sides;

sides ; and whilst it was still doubtful to which side the Victory would incline, the *Roman* Horse, according to a Custom usual enough in their Corps, and which was sometimes successful, but was now very ill applied, dismounted and fought on Foot. When *Hannibal* was informed of this, he cried out : I am as well pleased with them in that Posture, as I should be to have them all delivered up to me to be bound hand and foot. Accordingly, after having defended themselves with the utmost Valour, most of them fell upon the Spot. *Asdrubal* pursued those that fled, and made a great slaughter of them.

XXIV. WHILEST the Horse were thus engaged, the Infantry of both Armies advanced also against each other. The Battle began at first in the Centre. As soon as *Hannibal* perceived that his left Wing began to have the advantage, he made the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* move that were in the main Body, and whom he commanded in Person. In proportion as he advanced, he rounded his front in form of a Half-moon, with its convex side towards the Enemy. At first, the opposite Centre of the *Romans* charged them. After some resistance the *Spaniards* and *Gauls* began to give way, and to lose ground. The rest of the *Roman* Infantry also moved on in order to take them in flank. They fell back according to the Orders they had received, continuing to fight, and regained the ground where they had

had at first been drawn up in Battle. The *Romans*, seeing that the *Spaniards* and *Gauls* continued to retreat, continued also to pursue them. *Hannibal*, well pleased to see every thing succeed according to his Design, and perceiving the moment was come for acting with all his Forces, gave orders, that his *Africans* should wheel to the right and left upon the *Romans*. Those two Bodies, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order, having wheeled about suddenly towards the space or hollow, into which the *Romans* had thrown themselves in disorder and confusion, charged them on both sides with vigour, without giving them time to look about them, or leaving them ground to form themselves.

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XXV. IN the mean time the *Numidian* Cavalry on the right Wing, was engaged also with the Enemy opposite to them, namely the Cavalry of the Allies of the *Romans*. Tho' they did not distinguish themselves in this Battle, and the advantage was equal on both sides, they were however very useful: for they found the Enemies which they had in their front sufficient employment, to prevent them from having time to assist their own People. But when the left Wing where *Asdrubal* commanded had routed, as we have said, the whole Horse of the right Wing of the *Romans*, and had joined the *Numidians*, the Cavalry of the Allies did not wait to be attacked by them, but fled with the utmost

precipitation. It is said, that *Asdrubal* then did a thing, which no less shews his Prudence, than it contributed to the success of the Battle. As the *Numidians* were very numerous, and never did their Duty better than when an Enemy fled, he ordered them to pursue the *Romans* to prevent their rallying, and led on the *Spanish* and *Gallick* Horse to the Charge, to support the *African* Infantry. Accordingly he fell upon the *Roman* Foot in the Rear, which being attacked at the same time in the Flanks, and surrounded on all sides, was entirely cut to pieces, after having acted prodigies of Valour.

XXVI. THE Battle of *Zama*, between *Hannibal* and *Scipio*, is one of the most memorable recorded in History; the disposition on both sides being the masterpiece of two of the greatest Generals that ever the World produced. *Scipio* drew up his Troops in the following manner. He posted the *Hastati* in the front Line, leaving intervals between the Cohorts. In the second Line he placed the *Principes*, with their Cohorts not behind the spaces of the first Line, as was the custom of the *Romans*, but behind the Cohorts of that front Line, in order to leave openings for the Elephants of the Enemy which were very numerous. The *Triarii* formed the third Line in the same order, and served as a Body of reserve. He placed *Lælius* on the left Wing with the *Italian* Cavalry, and *Masniissa* on

on the right with his *Numidians*. In the spaces of the first Line he placed the light-armed Soldiers, and ordered them to begin the Battle in such a manner, that if they could not sustain the Charge of the Elephants, they should retire; such of them as were most speedy, behind the whole Army, thro' the spaces that divided it in right Lines; and those who should find themselves too much pressed, thro' the spaces between the Lines on the right and left, in order to leave those Animals a passage, in which they would be exposed to the Darts discharged upon them on all sides. As to *Hannibal*, in order to give the Enemy more Terror, he placed in the front his four-score Elephants, a number which he never had before in any Battle. In the first Line he posted the auxiliary Troops of the *Ligurians* and *Gauls*, with the *Balearians* and *Moors*, who amounted in all to twelve thousand Men. The second Line, in which the principal force of the Army consisted, was composed of *Africans* and *Carthaginians*. He posted the Troops he had brought with him from *Italy* in the third Line, and placed them above a stadium from the second Line. The *Numidian* Cavalry were upon the left Wing, and the *Carthaginian* upon the right.

XXVII. EVERY thing being ready for the Battle, and the *Numidian* Cavalry on both sides having long skirmished, *Hannibal* gave orders for the Elephants to move against the

CHAP. Enmey. The *Romans* immediately made the
VII. Trumpets sound, and at the same time raised
such great Cries, that the Elephants which
advanced against the right of the *Romans*,
turned back, and put the *Moors* and *Numidi-
ans* that formed *Hannibal's* left into Disorder.
Mafiniffa seeing their Confusion, easily put
them intirely to the Rout. The rest of the
Elephants advanced between the two Armies
into the Plain, and fell upon the light-armed
Romans, a great number of whom they crush-
ed to Death, notwithstanding the continual
shower of Darts discharged upon them from
all sides. At length being terrified, some of
them ran thro' the spaces *Scipio* had prudently
left, and others in their flight returned upon
their own right Wing, pursued by the *Roman*
Horse, who with their Spears drove them
quite out of the Field of Battle. *Lælius* took
this instant for charging the *Carthaginian* Ca-
valry, who turned about and fled full speed.
He pursued them warmly, whilst *Mafiniffa*
did the same on his Side.

XXVIII. THE Army of the *Carthaginians*
was uncovered on the right and left by its
Cavalry. The Infantry then on both sides
advanced slowly and in good order, except
that which *Hannibal* had brought from *Italy*,
which formed the third Line, and continued
in its first Post. When they were near each
other, the *Romans* raising great Cries according
to their Custom, and striking their Swords
upon

upon their Shields, charged the Enemy with CHAP. VII.
 vigour. On the side of the *Carthaginians*,
 the Body of foreign Troops that formed the
 front Line, also raised great Cries, but con-
 fused, and dissonant from each other, because
 they were of different Nations. As they
 could use neither Swords nor Javelins; but
 fought hand to hand, the Strangers at first
 had some advantage over the *Romans* by their
 agility and boldness, and wounded a great
 number. However, the latter having the su-
 periority by their good Order, and the nature
 of their Arms, gained ground, supported by
 the second Line who followed, and incessantly
 encouraged them to fight with Valour; where-
 as the Strangers being neither followed nor
 assisted by the *Carthaginians*, whose inaction
 on the contrary intimidated them, lost courage,
 gave way, and believing themselves openly
 abandoned by their own Troops, fell, in re-
 tiring, upon their second Line, and attacked
 it in order to open themselves a passage. The
 latter found themselves obliged to defend their
 Lives courageously: so that the *Carthaginians*
 attacked by the Strangers, contrary to their
 Expectation, saw they had two Enemies to
 fight, their own Troops, and the *Romans*.
 Quite out of their Senses, and in a manner
 transported with fury, they made a great
 slaughter of both, and put the *Hastati* into
 disorder. Those who commanded the *Prin-*
cipes having made their Troops advance,
 rallied them without difficulty. The greatest

part of the Strangers and *Carthaginians* fell in this Place, partly cut in pieces by one another, and partly by the *Romans*. *Hannibal* would not suffer those that fled to mingle with those who remained, lest full of Terror as they were, and covered with Wounds, they might induce Disorder among those who had received no Blow hitherto: he even ordered the front Rank to present their Pikes, which obliged them to retire along the Wings into the Plain.

XXIX. THE Space between the two Armies being then covered with Blood, and with the dead, *Scipio* was in Perplexity enough; for he did not know how to make his Troops move in good Order, over that confused heap of Arms and dead Bodies, still bleeding and lying upon each other. He ordered the wounded Men to be carried behind the Army; the Retreat to be sounded for the *Hastati*, who were pursuing the Enemy; posted them opposite to the Centre of the *Carthaginians* in expectation of a new Charge; and made the *Principes* and *Triarii* advance on both Wings. When they were upon the same front with the *Hastati*, a new Battle began between the two Armies. The Infantry alternately gave way, and returned to the Charge with great Courage and Vigour. As Number, Resolution, and Arms were equal on both sides, and they fought with such obstinacy that they fell in their Posts rather than give way, the fate of the Battle was

was long doubtful, and it could not be conjectured which side would remain masters of the Field. Things being in this state, *Laelius* and *Masimissa*, after having pursued the Enemy's Cavalry a considerable time, returned very opportunely for attacking the Infantry in the rear. This last Charge decided the Victory. A great number of the *Carthaginians* were killed upon the field of Battle, where they were surrounded on all sides. Many of them having dispersed in the Plains round about, were cut off by the *Roman Cavalry* that occupied all the Country. The *Carthaginians* left above twenty thousand dead upon the spot, as well of their own Citizens as Allies. Almost as many were taken, with an hundred and thirty Ensigns and Standards, and eleven Elephants. *Hannibal* escaped with a small number of Horse to *Adrumetum*, after having tried, both before and during the Battle, all possible means for obtaining the Victory. The *Romans* lost only fifteen hundred Men.

XXX. HAVING thus given an Account of some of the most memorable Battles of Antiquity, explained the Conduct of the Generals, and laid open the Reasons of that Conduct; I shall conclude this Chapter with a few general Remarks, tending still farther to illustrate this great Branch of War, and which in some measure offer themselves in consequence of what has been already said. The first is, that tho' most Nations had a certain fixed and particular


CHAP. VII Particular form of giving Battle, yet they never adhered to it so closely, as not to vary when Circumstances required it. The drawing up an Army to the very best advantage, is doubtless a great furtherance to the gaining of the Victory. But the doing so depends much, not only on the Wisdom and Skill of the General, the Nature of the Ground, and the Quality of his own Forces, but also on those of his Enemies, and on the Disposition of him who commands them. Hence the greatest Captains of older times, whose military Knowledge and Practice the Moderns so justly value, always acted herein according to their own Judgment, without confining themselves to any standing Rules. We have seen that *Cyrus* being to fight against *Cræsus* in a large Plain, where he found the Enemy taking measures to surround him, drew up his Men but twelve deep in File, whereas formerly the File was twenty-four deep. By this means he augmented the front of his Army double, prevented his being too much over-winged by *Cræsus*, and won the Victory. It is observable too of *Scipio* at the Battle of *Zama*, that he placed the Battalions of his several Lines directly behind one another, and not facing the Intervals of the Lines before them, as was the common Custom. His Design in this was, to give free issue to the Elephants, whose Shock might otherwise have disordered his Men, and rendered them incapable of making any resistance.

Cæsar,

Cæsar, at the Battle of *Pharsalia* against *Pompey*, CHAP. VII.
quite altered the manner of the Roman Imbat-
telling. For having found that *Pompey* ex-

ceedingly outnumbered him in Horse, he covered one of his Flanks with a little River, and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank; among the Squadrons whereof he placed Bodies of this best Infantry, and there began the Battle. By this means, having all his Horse in one Wing, and those accompanied with select legionary Foot, he soon routed that half of *Pompey's* Horse which opposed all his, and then falling into the flanks and rear of his Enemy, gained the Victory.

XXXI. THE drawing up the Army in several Lines, as the nature of the Ground, and the number of the Forces would allow, is what was most peculiar to the *Roman* Discipline, and has been found so consonant to Reason and Experience, that it is established as a standing Maxim of War at this Day. In effect these Lines are so many Armies: and the second Line being intire, tho' the first should be broken, often recovers the Day; especially if the second Line be at so just a distance from the first, as not to be disordered by it when overthrown; and also so near, that some Battalions of the second Line can come up timely enough to redress any beginnings of a breach in the first, without too much discomposing itself. It has likewise been often observed, that whoever in a Battle keeps together

CHAP. VII.  gether a Body of Men, that are not led to fight until all the Enemy's Squadrons have fought, rarely misses to carry away the Victory; and that he who has the last Reserves, is the likeliest in the end to have the Honour of the Day. One signal Illustration of this Truth among many I shall instance. At the Battle of *Dreux* in *France*, where the Constable *Montmorency*, and *Francis* Duke of *Guise*, the greatest Captains of that Age, commanded the Royalists; and *Lewis* Prince of *Condé*, and the Admiral *Chatillon* the Protestants; the two last defeated all the Forces they saw, took the Constable Prisoner, past over the Bellies of the *Switzers*, who made almost a miraculous resistance, and concluded they had therefore won the Victory. In the mean while the Duke of *Guise*, who led the left Wing of the *French* King's Army, either by design, as his Enemies said, or as an Act of high Conduct, so covered his Troops with the Village of *Blainville*, and the Trees and Shrubs about it, that he was not so much as seen by the Protestants; nor moved from thence, until the Constable was taken Prisoner, the Marshal *de St. André* killed, and all those Forces which were considered by the Protestants as the whole Army of the Royalists, intirely routed, and so confusedly flying, that he was in no danger of having his Squadrons disordered by the Run-aways of his own Party. But then, advancing with his Troops which were intire, he soon turned

turned the fortune of the Day, took the Prince **CHAP.**
of *Condé* Prisoner, and overthrew all that op- **VII.**
posed him. For 'tis a tedious and difficult, if
not an impossible Task, to put into good Or-
der again an Army that has newly fought, so
as to bring it suddenly to renew the Charge ;
some being busied about the Pillage and Pri-
soners they had taken, or are pursuing ; others
being loth to return to new Dangers ; and all
in effect being so heated and disordered, that
they do not, or will not hear the Commands
of their Superiors.

XXXII. ONE thing among the *Romans* par-
ticularly deserves our Notice, and that is, that
tho' they strove with incredible Emulation to
obtain the first Posts in the Army, yet that
Ambition once gratified, they did not disdain to
accept of inferior Offices after the higher, and
to serve under those over whom they had com-
manded. It is amazing to consider what a mul-
titude of consular Senators fell in the Battle of
Cannæ. We have seen that *Fabius*, who had
been thrice Consul, and Dictator, served as
Lieutenant under his own Son : and that the
great *Scipio* accepted the same Character from
his Brother. Nor are these to be considered as
Instances singular in their kind, for it was in
reality the common Practice. Hence it was
always in the power of a *Roman* General, to
have expert, vigilant, and valiant Commanders,
at the head of those several larger Divisions,
of which an Army is usually composed in a

CHAP. Day of Battle: Men of Judgment, Authority,
VII. and Presence of Mind, to remedy all Disorders,
and to improve all Advantages in the critical

Moment; than which there is nothing of greater importance in general Engagements, as the least Delay or Remissness is but too often irreparable. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the most able and consummate General, neither is nor can be of himself sufficient to redress all Disorders, and lay hold of all Advantages in an instant, when Armies are once engaged. The utmost he can do is, to choose well the Field of Battle, to draw up his Army according thereto to most advantage, to give his general Orders with Prudence and Foresight, and to give the best Orders wherever he is in person: but he cannot be every where, nor send his Orders timely enough to every Place to have them successfully obeyed. And therefore 'tis indisputably necessary, that he have under him expert chief Officers, at the head of all the great Divisions of the Army, who may supply what is impossible for him singly to command. For he can be well obeyed but to the time he sends his Troops to the Charge: after that, those only who lead them, and are with them, can actuate them according to the general Orders, or as the Occasion requires; which those under him must have the Judgment to lay hold of as it were in the twinkling of an Eye, so short are the Moments to acquire the Victory!

XXXIII. THE placing the best Men in the Wings of an Army, is very ancient, and seldom has been omitted, but to the loss of those who were guilty of such Omission. The Reason is, that the Troops on the Wings are not wedged in, as the Troops in the main Battle are; but are at liberty to take all Advantages, which Accident, the good Conduct of the Commander in chief, or the ill Conduct of the Enemy, throw in their way: nor can a General so much as rationally hope to fall into the flank and rear of his Enemy, but by attacking one of his Wings; because he cannot overwing him, but only by falling upon one of his outward Flanks. Hence an able Commander chooses always to begin the Battle on that side, where he judges himself the strongest, and his Enemy the weakest; advancing with those Troops as expeditiously as he can, whilst the rest of the Army moves as slowly as they may. For if his first Impression be successful, he may fall into the flank and part of the rear of the Enemy, while the residue of the whole Army is marching to attack them in front: but then the motion of the Army must be quicker, as soon as ever they see that the advanced Wing is successful. Such was the Conduct of *Epaminondas*, at the famous Battles of *Leuctra* and *Mantineæ*. Such too was the Method followed by *Julius Cæsar*, when he fought against *Ariovistus* and the *Germans*. *Hannibal*, so justly celebrated for his Skill

CHAP Skill in drawing up an Army, at the famous
VII. Battle of *Cannæ*, placed, as we have seen, all
his best Men in his two Wings, and his worst
Men in the Centre; whereby, when the *Romans* came to the Charge, who had placed
their choicest Men in their main Battle, they
soon pierced into the Body of *Hannibal's* Army,
which was the very thing he designed they
should do: for then with his two Wings, in
which were the flower of all his Troops, he
immediately wheeled upon the *Romans*, and
totally defeated them.

XXXIV. AFTER the Battle was fought, and
the Victory apparently won, the great Danger
was, as it still is, to pursue with too much
Ardor, without regard to what passed in the
rest of the Army. Hence that Custom so in-
violably observed among the *Romans*, of never
suffering the Legions to follow the Chace, or
break their Ranks upon any Occasion what-
ever. Only the Horse, the light-armed Men,
and what Soldiers were not of the Legions,
were sent upon this Service; and the Pursuit
was conducted with so much Caution, that a
certain number of Squadrons always followed
in good Order, ready to fall upon and break
the Enemy anew, should they rally and face
about. How many Victories seemingly won,
have in an instant been lost, for want of care
in these two Particulars of such high Con-
cernment, which therefore ought never to be
omitted. It is certain that nothing more en-
courages

courages flying Enemies to rally, and fight again, than the seeing a disorderly Pursuit of them. For in such a Pursuit, all the Advantages of the prevailing Party immediately vanish, if the Chaced do but turn about ; such an Evidence of restored Valour, too often daunting those who are to oppose it : nor can any thing more deter the flying Party from such a Step, than to see several Bodies in good Order following close behind them, and ready to make them repent of their Confidence, should they venture upon any farther Opposition. And tho' brave Officers will not cease pressing, promising, and even threatening their Men that fly, to face about ; yet the private Soldier, who sees those Bodies ready to fall on, concludes it is safer to run than to resist, and therefore is too often deaf to all Oratory or Menaces of that nature : for where once Terror has seized the Minds of the Troops, they hear no Counsels but those which their own Fears suggest.

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C H A P. VIII.

Of the Attack and Defence of Places.

I. **W**HAT we have to offer upon this Subject falls naturally under three general Heads. *First*, The manner of fortifying Towns in use among the Ancients. *Secondly*, The Machines of War employed by them in Sieges. *Thirdly*, The Nature and Conduct of an *Attack* and *Defence*. As to the first, how far soever we look back into Antiquity, we find amongst the *Greeks* and *Romans*, Cities fortified in a regular manner, with their Fossés, Curtains and Towers. *Vitruvius*, in treating of the Construction of Places of War in his time, says, that the Towers ought to project beyond the Walls, in order that when the Enemy approaches, the Defenders upon the right and left may take them in flank : that they ought to be round, and faced with many Stones, because such as are square, are soon beat bown by the Machines of War and battering Rams, which easily break their Angles: and that near the Towers the Wall should be cut within-side the breadth of the Towers, and the ways broke in this manner only be joined and continued by Beams laid upon the

two Extremities, without being made fast with Iron, that in case the Enemy should make himself master of any part of the Wall, the Besieged might remove this wooden Bridge, and thereby prevent his passage to the other parts of the Wall, and into the Towers. The best Towns of the Ancients were situated upon Eminences. They inclosed them sometimes within two or three Walls and Ditches. *Be-rosus*, cited by *Josephus*, informs us that *Nebuchadnezzar* fortified *Babylon* with a triple Inclosure of Brick Walls, of a surprising strength and height. *Polybius*, speaking of *Syringa*, the Capital of *Hyrkania*, which *Antiochus* besieged, says, that City was surrounded with three Ditches, each forty-five Foot broad, and twenty-two deep. Upon each side of these was a double Intrenchment, and behind all a strong Wall. The City of *Jerusalem*, says *Josephus*, was surrounded by a triple Wall, except on the side of the Valleys, where there was but one, because they were inaccessible. To these they had added many other Works, one of which, continues the Historian, had it been compleated, would have rendered the City impregnable. The Stones of which it was built, were thirty Foot long by fifteen broad, which made it so strong, that it was in a manner impossible to sap, or shake it with Machines. The whole was flanked with Towers from Space to Space of extraordinary solidity, and built with wonderful Art.

CHAP. II:
VIII.

their Walls on the inside with Earth, in the manner of the *Talus* or Slope, which made the Attacks more dangerous. For tho' the Enemy had gained some footing upon them, he could not assure himself of taking the City. It was necessary to get down, and to make use of the Ladder by which he had mounted; and that descent exposed the Soldier to very great danger. *Vitruvius* however observes, that there is nothing renders a Rampart so strong, as when the Walls both of the Curtain and Towers are supported by Earth. For then neither Rams, Mines, nor any other Machines can shake them. The Places of War of the Ancients were not always fortified with Stone Walls. They were sometimes inclosed within good Ramparts of Earth, of great firmness and solidity. The manner of coating them with Turf was not unknown to them, nor the Art of supporting the Earth with strong Fascines, made fast by Stakes, and of arming the top of the Rampart with a Ruff or Fraise of Palisades, and the foot of the Parapet, or *Pas de Souris*, with another. They often planted Palisades also in the Ditch, to defend themselves against sudden Attacks. They made Walls also with Beams crossed over one another, with spaces between them in manner of a Chequer, the void parts of which they filled up with Earth and Stones. Such almost were the Walls of the City of *Bourges*, which

which *Cæsar*, in the seventh Book of his Wars with the *Gauls*, describes as follows. The Walls of *Bourges*, and almost those of the Country, were made of pieces of Wood forty Foot in length, laid along the Earth at the distance of two Foot from each other, and crossed over by others of equal length and at equal distance, with their ends to the front of the Wall. The spaces on the inside were filled up with Earth and Fascines, and on the outside with solid Stones. He adds, that the Work by this disposition was agreeable to the Eye, and very strong; because the Wood was of great force against the Ram, and the Stones against Fire: besides which, the thickness of the Wall, which was generally forty Foot, or the length of the Beams, made it next to impossible either to make a breach in it, or throw it down in any manner.

III. WHAT I shall say in the sequel, when I come to explain the manner of attacking and defending Places, will shew more distinctly what kind of Fortifications those of the Ancients were. It is pretended that the Moderns excel them very much in this point. But as the method of *Attack* and *Defence* is intirely different, no just Comparison can be made. The use of Muskets, Bombs, Cannons, and other Fire-arms since the invention of Gunpowder, has occasioned many alterations in the way of conducting Sieges, the duration of which has been very much abridged of late.

But these Changes are not so considerable as many imagine, and have added nothing either to the Merit or Capacity of Generals. The Moderns have imagined nothing that the Ancients could use, and have not used. We have borrowed from them the breadth and depth of Fossés, the thickness of Walls, the Towers to flank the Curtains, the Palisades, the Intrenchments within the Ramparts and Towers, the advantage of many Flanks, in multiplying of which consists the chief Improvement of modern Fortification, and which Fire-arms make the more easy to execute. These are the Remarks of Men of Ability and Judgment, who to a profound knowledge of the manner in which the Ancients made War, unite a perfect Experience of the modern Practice of it.

IV. BUT let us now proceed to the Machines made use of by the Ancients in their Sieges. The principal of these were, the *Tortoise*, the *Catapulta*, the *Balista*, the *Ram*, and *moving Towers*. The *Tortoise* was a Machine composed of very strong and solid timber-work. The height of it, to the uppermost Beam, which sustained the Roof, was twelve Foot. The Base was square, and each of its fronts twenty-five Foot. It was covered with a kind of quilted Mattress made of raw Hides, and prepared with different Drugs, to prevent its being set on fire by Combustibles. This heavy
Machine

Machine was supported upon four wheels, and had the name of *Tortoise* from its serving as a very strong covering and defence, against the enormous weight thrown down on it; those under it being safe in the same manner as a Tortoise under her Shell. It was used both to fill up the Ditch, and for sapping. For the filling up of the Ditch, it was necessary to join several of them together in a Line, and very near one another. *Diodorus Siculus*, speaking of the Siege of *Halicarnassus* by *Alexander the Great*, says, that he first caused three Tortoises to approach, in order to fill up the Ditch, and that afterwards he planted his Rams upon the space filled up, to batter the Wall. This Machine is often mentioned by Authors. There were, without doubt, Tortoises of different forms and sizes. Some indeed are of opinion, that because of its enormous weight, it could not be moved from place to place on Wheels, but was pushed forwards on Rollers. Under these Rollers the way was laid with strong Planks, to facilitate its motion, and prevent its sinking into the Ground, from whence it would have been very difficult to have removed it. The Ancients have observed, that the Roof had a thicker covering of Hides, Hurdles, Sea-weed, &c. than the Sides, as it was exposed to much greater Shocks from the weight thrown upon it by the Besieged. It had a Door in front, which was drawn up by a Chain as far as was necessary, and covered the Soldiers at work in filling up the Ditch.

CHAP.
VII.

V. THE *Musculus*, tho' very little understood by modern Authors, who have represented it variously, was undoubtedly a kind of Tortoise, very low, and with a sharp Roof. Such was that of *Cæsar* at the Siege of *Marseilles*. It was sixty Foot in Length, and was moved forward to the Walls upon Rollers, where it was fixed over the part of the Ditch filled up. The Tower of Brick which he built there, communicated with this *Musculus* and the Trenches. *Cæsar* says the Planks of the Roof were covered with Bricks and Mortar, over which Hides were laid, to prevent the Mortar from dissolving by the Water which the Besieged might pour down upon it: and to secure it from Stones and Fire, it was again covered over with thick quilted Mattresses properly prepared. All this was done under Mantles, after which it was thrust forward on a sudden from the Tower to the Walls. Besides this, there was another kind of *Musculus*, that was used for levelling the Ground, and laying the Planks on which the Tortoises and moving Towers were to advance to the Ditch. They were like this, of greater length than breadth, and equal in breadth to the way they were to level. There were several other Machines intended to cover the Soldiers, called *Crates*, *Plutei*, *Vinea*, which I shall not undertake to describe here, to avoid Prolixity. They may be comprised in general under the Name of Mantles, or Sheds.

VI. THE

VI. THE *Catapulta* and *Balista* were intend-
 ed for discharging Darts, Arrows, and Stones. CHAP. VIII.
 They were of different sizes, and consequently
 produced more or less effect. Some were
 used in Battles, and might be called Field-
 pieces: others were employed in Sieges, which
 was the use most commonly made of them. The
Balista must have been the heaviest and most
 difficult to carry, because there was always a
 greater number of *Catapultæ* in the Armies.
Livy, in his Description of the Siege of *Car-*
thage, says, that there were an hundred and
 twenty great, and more than two hundred
 small *Catapultæ* taken, with thirty-three great
Balista, and fifty-two small ones. *Josephus*
 mentions the same difference amongst the *Ro-*
mans, who had three hundred *Catapultæ*, and
 forty *Balista*, at the Siege of *Jerusalem*. These
 Machines had a force which it is not easy to
 comprehend, but which all good Authors at-
 test. *Vegetius* says, that the *Balista* discharg-
 ed Darts with so much rapidity and violence,
 that nothing could resist their Force. *Athe-*
neus tells us, that *Agefistratus* made one of little
 more than two Foot in length, which shot
 Darts almost five hundred Paces. These Ma-
 chines were not unlike our Cross-bows. There
 were others of much greater force, which
 threw Stones of three hundred weight, up-
 wards of an hundred and twenty-five Paces.
 We find surprising effects of them in *Josephus*.
 The Darts of the *Catapultæ*, he tells us, de-

CHAP. stroyed abundance of People. The Stones
 VIII. from the *Balistæ* beat down the Battlements,
 and broke the Angles of the Towers ; nor was
 there any Phalanx so deep, but one of these
 Stones would sweep a whole File of it from
 one end to the other. *Folard*, in his Com-
 mentary upon *Polybius*, says their Force was
 very near equal to that of Artillery.

VII. THE *Ram* was composed of a large
 long Beam, armed at one end with Iron in the
 form of a Ram's Head, and of the same big-
 ness with the Beam. This piece of Wood was
 suspended by Chains in *æquilibrio*, in order to
 be set in motion with the greater ease. An
 hundred Men, more or less, worked it by main
 Strength, to strike it against a Wall or Ram-
 part, in order to beat them down after having
 shaken them by repeated Blows. Care was
 taken to clothe this Beam with wet Leather,
 to prevent its being set on fire. It was slung
 under a kind of moving Tortoise or Gallery,
 which covered more than half of it, in order
 to shelter those who worked the Ram from the
 Stones and Darts of the Besieged. The effects
 of this Machine were prodigious. As it was
 one of those that did most hurt, many Me-
 thods were contrived to render it useless. Fire
 was darted upon the Roof that covered, and
 the Timber that supported it, in order to burn
 them with the Ram. To deaden its Blows,
 Sacks of Wool were let down against the
 Place at which it was levelled. A Machine
 was

was also made use of against it, called the *Wolf*, by way of opposition to the Ram, with which they endeavoured to grapple it, in order to draw it to themselves, or break it. *Josephus* relates a surprising action of a *Jew*, who, at the Siege of *Jotopbat*, threw a Stone of an uncommon size upon the Head of the Ram with such Violence, that he loosened it from the the Beam, and made it fall down. He leaped afterwards from the top of the Wall to the bottom, took the Head from the midst of the Enemy, and carried it back with him. He received five Arrows in his Body; and notwithstanding those Wounds, boldly kept his Post till through loss of Blood and Strength, he fell from the Wall, and the Ram's Head with him, with which he would never part.

CHAP.
VIII.

VIII. THE *moving Towers* were made of an assemblage of Beams and strong Planks, not unlike a House. To secure them against the Fires thrown by the Besieged, they were covered with raw Hides, or with pieces of Cloth made of Hair. Their height was in proportion to their Base. They were sometimes thirty Foot square, and sometimes forty or fifty. They were higher than the Walls or even Towers of the City. They were supported upon several Wheels according to mechanic Principles, by the means of which the Machine was easily made to move, how great soever it might be. The Town was in great danger if this Tower could approach the Walls :

CHAP. Walls: for it had Stairs from one Story to another, and included different methods of attack.
 VIII. At bottom it had a Ram to batter the Wall, and on the middle Story a Draw-bridge, made of two Beams with Rails of Basket-work, which let down easily upon the Wall of the City, when within reach of it. The Besiegers passed upon this Bridge to make themselves masters of the Wall. Upon the higher Stories were Soldiers armed with Partizans, and missile weapons, who kept a perpetual discharge upon the Works. When Affairs were in this posture, a Place seldom held out long; for what could those hope who had nothing to confide in but the height of their Ramparts, when they saw others suddenly appear which commanded them? The People of *Namur* demanded to capitulate, when *Cæsar's* Tower, of which they had made a Jest whilst at a distance, was seen to move towards them very fast. They believed this a Prodigy, says *Cæsar*, and were astonished that Men of our size should think of carrying so vast and heavy a Machine to their Walls. Their Deputies observed, that the *Romans* were doubtless assisted by the Gods in their Wars, since they could make Machines of so enormous a size advance so swiftly. It is indeed no wonder they were surprised, as they had neither seen nor heard of any such thing before, and as this Tower seemed to advance by Incantment and of itself, the mechanic Powers that moved it being imperceptible to those of the Place.

Place. These Towers were sometimes sur-
 founded with Corridors or Galleries at each
 Story, to prevent their being set on fire : and
 indeed nothing better could have been invent-
 ed for this purpose, as the Galleries were filled
 with Troops armed with missive Weapons,
 who made their discharges from behind the
 Parapets, if we may so term them, and were
 always ready to pull out the Darts of Fire,
 and extinguish all other Combustibles thrown
 against the Tower ; so that it was impossible
 for the Fire to make the least progress, the
 Remedy being always at hand. These Corri-
 dors were built upon Beams that projected five
 or six Foot beyond the Tower, several of
 which kind are still to be seen upon *Trajan's*
 Column.

IX. HAVING thus described the principal
 Machines made use of by the Ancients in
 Sieges, I now proceed to the *Attack and De-
 fence of Places*, which I shall treat in as brief
 a manner as possible, confining myself to the
 most essential Parts. When Cities were ex-
 tremely strong and populous, they were sur-
 rounded with an Intrenchment on the side
 next the Town, and another on that towards
 the Country. These were called Lines of
 Circumvallation and Contravallation. The
 Besiegers pitched their Camp between these
 two Lines. Those of Contravallation were
 against the besieged City, the others against
 Attempts from without. When it was fore-
 seen

seen that the Siege would be of long duration, it was often changed into a Blockade, and then the two Lines in question were solid Walls of strong Masonry, flanked with Towers at proper distances. There is a remarkable Example of this at the Siege of *Platæa* by the *Lacedæmonians* and *Thebans*, of which *Thucydides* has left us a very particular Account. The two surrounding Lines were composed of two Walls sixteen Foot distant, and the Soldiers lay in that Space, which was divided into Quarters; so that it might have been taken for only one Wall with high Towers from distance to distance. These Towers occupied the whole Interval, in order to enable the Besiegers to defend themselves at the same time against those within and those without. The Quarters of the Soldiers could not be gone round without crossing the Towers, and the top of the Wall was skirted with a Parapet of Osier. There was a Ditch on each side, the Earth of which had been used to make Bricks for the Wall. In this manner *Thucydides* describes these two surrounding Walls, which were of no great circumference, the City being very small. This Siege, or rather Blockade, was very famous among the Ancients, and the more on account of the surprising escape of the Garrison, notwithstanding all these Fortifications. For this purpose they applied Ladders to the inward Wall. After they had got upon the Platform, and seized the two adjoining Towers, they drew up

up the Ladders, and let them down on the other side of the outward Wall, by which they descended to the bottom, drawing up in Line of Battle as fast as they came down. In this manner by the favour of a dark Night, they got safe to *Athens*.

CHAP. VIII.

X. THE Camp of the *Roman* Army before *Numantia*, took up a much greater extent of Ground. That City was four and twenty Stadia in circumference, that is to say, a League. *Scipio*, when he invested it, caused a Line of Circumvallation to be drawn, which inclosed more than twice the Ground the City stood upon. When this Work was finished, another Line was thrown up against the Besieged, at a reasonable distance from the first, composed of a Rampart of eight Foot thick by ten high, which was strengthened with strong Palisades. The whole was flanked with Towers of an hundred Foot from each other. It is not easy to comprehend in what manner the *Romans* compleated these immense Works; a Line of Circumvallation of more than two Leagues in compass! but nothing is more certain than the Fact. He also erected four Posts upon the Banks of the River *Duera*, contiguous to the Lines; and contrived a Stoccado or Chain of floating Beams, pierced through cross-wise with long Stakes pointed with Iron, to prevent Barks from entering, and Divers from getting any Intelligence of what was doing in the Camp.

XI.

CHAP.
VIII.XI. CÆSAR's Circumvallation before *Alesia*,

was formed of Fascines instead of Turf, with its Parapet and Fraise made of large Stakes, whose Branches were cut in points, and burnt at the ends, like Stags Horns. They seemed like Wings at the foot of the Parapet, or like the Oars of a Galley inclining downwards. Of the same nature are the Fraises of the Moderns, that are far from being so well imagined, and are smooth-pointed Palisades, bending downwards to prevent scaling. The Moderns fix them in the same manner at the bottom of the Parapet, where they form a kind of Cincture very agreeable to the Eye. The Battlements mentioned by *Cæsar* were like the modern Embrazures for Cannon. Here the Archers were placed. Upon the Parapet of the Towers, field Balistas were planted to flank the Works. Towers were not always of Wood, but sometimes of Earth covered with Turf, or strengthened with Fascines. They were much higher than the rest of the Intrenchment, and sometimes had Towers of Wood raised upon them for battering the Places that commanded the Camp. Some Authors have believed, that these Intrenchments and Works of the Ancients in the Field, were perpendicular: but that Opinion is very absurd. These had a Platform with its Talus or Slope, and sometimes Banquettes, in the form of Steps for ascending; besides which, at the Towers, there were Ways made to go up.

up. All this was indispensibly necessary in **CHAP.**
Cæsar's Lines, as they were very high, to pre- **VIII.**
 vent the Earth from falling away.

XII. Thus much for the two Lines of Circumvallation. We proceed now to the Ground inclosed between the two Fossés; which is far the most curious part of this celebrated Blockade. and will be best explained in *Cæsar's* own Words. "As the Soldiers
 " were employed at the same time to fetch
 " Wood and Provisions from a considerable
 " distance, and to work at the Fortifications,
 " and the Enemy often sallied at several Gates
 " to interrupt them; *Cæsar* found it necessary
 " to make some addition to his Lines, that
 " they might not require so many Men to
 " guard them. He therefore took Trees of
 " no great height, or large Branches, which
 " he caused to be made sharp at the ends,
 " and running a Trench of five Foot deep
 " before the Lines, he ordered them to be
 " put into it, and made fast at bottom, so that
 " they could not be pulled up. This Trench
 " was again filled up in such a manner that
 " nothing but the tops of the Branches ap-
 " peared, of which the points must have run
 " into those who should have endeavoured to
 " pass them. As there were five Rows of
 " them interwoven in a manner with each
 " other, they were unavoidable. In the front
 " of these he caused Pits of three Foot deep
 " to be dug, in the form of the *Quincunx*.

" In

CHAP. VIII. " In those Pits he fixed strong Stakes, burnt
 " and sharpened at the top, which rose only
 " four Inches above the level of the Ground,
 " into which they were planted three Foot
 " deeper than the Pits, for the sake of firm-
 " ness. The Pits were covered over with
 " Bushes to deceive the Enemy. There were
 " eight Rows of them, at the distance of
 " three Foot from each other. In the front
 " of all he sowed the whole space between
 " the Pits and the advanced Ditch, with
 " Crows Feet of an extraordinary size, which
 " the Soldiers called *Spurs*." The other Line,
 to prevent Succours from without, was intirely
 the same with this.

XIII. THO' Trenches, oblique Lines, Mines,
 and other the like Inventions, seem neither
 often nor clearly expressed in Authors, we can
 hardly suppose with reason, that they were
 not in use amongst the *Greeks* and *Romans*. Is
 it probable, that with the Ancients, whose
 Generals, among their other excellent Quali-
 ties, had in an eminent degree that of taking
 great care to spare the Blood and Lives of their
 Soldiers, Approaches were made in besieging
 without any precautions against the Machines
 of the Besieged, whose Ramparts were so well
 provided, and Defence so bloody? Tho' there
 were no mention of this in any of the Histo-
 rians, who might possibly in the Description
 of Sieges omit this Circumstance, as well
 known

known to all the World ; we should not conclude that such able Generals either did not know, or neglected things, on the one side so important, and on the other so easy ; and which must naturally have entered the thoughts of every Man, ever so little versed in attacking Places. But several Historians speak of them ; of which one shall suffice for all the rest : this is *Polybius*, where he relates the Siege of the City *Echinna* by *Philip*. He concludes the Description of it with these Words : “ To cover from the Arrows of the
 “ Besieged, as well those that went from the
 “ Camp to the Works, as those who returned
 “ from the Works to the Camp, Trenches
 “ were drawn from the Camp to the Tortoises, and those Trenches covered at top.” Long before *Philip*, *Demetrius Poliocertes* had used the same method at the Siege of *Rhodes*. *Diodorus Siculus* tells us, that famous Warrior caused Tortoises, and Galleries cut in the Earth, or covered Mines, to be made, for communication with the Batteries of Rams ; and ordered a Trench with Blinds over head, to cover and secure the Troops, in going and coming from the Towers and Tortoises. The Seamen and Marines were appointed for this Service : the Work was four Stadia in length, that is to say, five hundred Paces.

XIV. BUT tho’ their Approaches were not intirely like those of the Moderns, nor so deep in the Earth, the Fire from our Works being of a quite different nature from that of the

CHAP. *Catapultæ* and *Balistæ*, tho' surprisingly violent ;
 VIII. yet it is certain from the above Accounts, and
 others that might be produced in great number, that they went under cover from their Camp to their Batteries, and used more or less Precaution, according to the Strength and Valour of the Besieged, and the number of their Machines, by which they regulated the form of their Approaches or Trenches. These were of two sorts. The first were composed of a Blind of Hurdles or strong Fascines, placed on the side of each other, without any space between them ; so that they formed a kind of Wall of five or six Foot high, with Loop-holes cut from space to space, between the Fascines, or through the Hurdles. To support this Blind, it is supposed they planted forked pieces of Wood in the Ground, upon which long Poles were laid cross-wise, with the Fascines or Hurdles made fast to them. The other kind of Approaches was very different from the former, and consisted of several Trenches or Galleries of Communication covered at top, drawn in a right line from the Camp to the Works, or to the Parallels, not much unlike ours. The Galleries of Communication were cut ten or twelve Foot broad in the Earth. The Workmen threw up the Earth on both sides, which they supported with Fascines, and covered the space with Hurdles and Earth laid upon Poles and Rafters. The whole length of these Galleries in the Earth, they cut Loop-holes through the sides and issues to go out at. On the sides of those covered Trenches or
 Com-

Communications were Esplanades, or places of Arms, which extended the whole front of the Attack. These Places were spacious, and capable of containing a great Body of Troops in order of Battle : for here they were posted to support their Towers, Tortoises, Batteries of Rams, Balistas, and Catapultas, against the Sallies of the Besieged. CHAP. VIII.

XV. THE first parallel Trench, next the Body of the Place, was drawn along the side of the Fossé, and served as a Communication to the battering Towers and Tortoises of the Besiegers. This sort of Communications to the moving Towers were sometimes covered at top by a Blind of Hurdles and Fascines ; because as they ran along the side of the Counterscarp, they were exposed to the downright discharges of the Towers and Ramparts of the Besieged. Loop-holes were cut in the sides of them, through which the Besiegers battered without intermission the Works. These covered Lines served besides for filling up the Fossés, and had Passages of Communication with the battering Tortoises cut in them, which Tortoises were pushed forward upon the part of the Fossé filled. When the Walls of a Place were not high, these Trenches were not covered with Blinds, either at top or in front, but only with a Parapet of the Earth dug out of them, like those of the Moderns. At some distance from this Parallel another was cut behind it, which left a space

CHAP. between them of the nature of our Esplanades
 VIII. or Places of Arms. Here the Batteries of
 Balistas and Catapultas were erected, which differed from ours only in being higher. There was sometimes a third upon the same parallel Line. These Places of Arms contained all the Troops that guarded the Works. The Lines communicated by the Galleries or Trenches covered at top.

XVI. It is certain therefore the use of Trenches was well known to the Ancients, without which they could have formed no Siege. These Trenches are often mentioned in Authors by the *Latin Word Aggeres*, which does not always signify Cavaliers or Platforms. The Cavaliers were Mounts of Earth, on which Machines were planted, and were thrown up in the following manner. The Work was begun at a small distance from that side of the Fossé next the Country. It was carried on under the cover of Mantles or moving Sheds of considerable height, behind which the Soldiers worked in security from the Machines of the Besieged. This sort of Mantles or Galleries were not always composed of Hurdles and Fascines, but of raw Hides, Mattresses, or of a Curtain made of strong Cables, the whole suspended between very high Masts fixed in the Ground, which broke the force of whatever was discharged against it. The Work was continued to the height of these suspended Curtains, which were raised in proportion with it. At the same time the void
 spaces

spaces of the Platform were filled up with Stones, Earth, and other Materials; whilst some were employed in levelling and beating down the Earth, to make it firm, and capable of sustaining the weight of the Towers and Machines to be planted upon it. From these Towers and Batteries of Balistas and Catapultas, an hail of Stones, Arrows, and large Darts were discharged upon the Ramparts and Works of the Besieged.

CHAP.
VIII.

XVII. THE Terrass which *Alexander the Great* caused to be raised against the Rock of *Coriencæ* was very surprizing. That Rock, which was supposed impregnable, was two thousand five hundred Paces high, and seven or eight hundred round. It was excessively steep on all sides, having only one path hewn out of the rock, by which no more than one Man could ascend without difficulty. It was besides surrounded with a deep Abyss, which served instead of a Fossé, and which it was necessary to fill up, in order to approach it. All these Difficulties were not capable of discouraging *Alexander*, to whose Valour and Fortune nothing appeared impossible. He began therefore by ordering the high Fir-trees, that surrounded the Place in great numbers, to be cut down, in order to use them as Stairs to descend into the Fossé. His Troops worked night and day in filling it up. Tho' the whole Army were employed in their turns at this Work, they could do no more than thirty Foot a Day, and something less a Night, so difficult

CHAP. was the Work. When it was more advanced,
 VIII. and began to come nearer the due height, they
 drove Piles into both sides of the Fossé at proper distances from each other, with Beams laid cross, in order to support the weight to be laid on it. They then formed a kind of Floor or Bridge of Wicker and Fascines, which they covered with Earth to equal the height of the side of the Fossé, so that the Army could advance on a Way even with the Rock. 'Till then the Barbarians had derided the Undertaking, believing it utterly impracticable: but when they saw themselves exposed to the Darts of the Enemy, who worked upon their Terrass behind the Mantles; they began to lose courage, demanded to capitulate, and soon after surrendered the Rock to *Alexander*.

XVIII. THE filling up of the Fossés was not always so difficult as in this Instance, but never failed to require great Precautions and Labour. The Soldiers worked under cover in the Tortoises, and other the like Machines. The Fossés were filled up with Stones, the trunks of Trees, and Fascines, the whole mingled with Earth. It was necessary that these Works should be of great solidity, to bear the prodigious weight of the Machines planted upon them, which would have made them fall in, if this kind of Causeway had been composed only of Fascines. If the Fossés were full of Water, they began by drawing it off, either intirely or in part, by different Drains, which they cut for that purpose.

XIX.

XIX. WHILST the Works were carrying CHAP. on, the Besieged were not idle. They ran VIII. many Mines under the Fossé to the part of it filled up, in order to carry off the Earth, which they handed from Man to Man into the City. This hindered the Work from advancing, the Besieged carrying off as fast as the Besiegers laid on. They used also another more effectual Stratagem, which was to cut large Cavities underneath the Works of the Enemy. After having removed some of the Earth without its being discovered, they supported the rest with Props or large Beams, which they smeared over with Grease and other Combustibles. They then filled up the void space between the Props with dry Wood, and such things as would soonest burn, and set them on fire. Hence when the Props gave way, the whole fell into a kind of Gulf, with the Tortoises, battering Rams, and the Men employed in working them.

XX. THE Besiegers used the same Artifice to make the Walls of Places fall down. When *Darius* besieged *Chalcedon*, the Walls were so strong, and the Place so well provided of all Necessaries, that the Inhabitants were in no pain about the Siege. The King did not make any Approaches to the Walls, nor lay waste the Country; he lay still, as if he expected a considerable Reinforcement. But whilst the People of *Chalcedon* had no other thought than that of guarding their Walls,

CHAP. Walls, he opened at the distance of three
 VIII. quarters of a League from the City, a Mine,
 which the *Persians* carried on as far as the
 Market-place. They judged themselves directly under it, from the Roots of the Olive-Trees which they knew grew there. They then opened their Mine, and entering by that Passage, took the Place, whilst the Besieged were still employed in keeping guard upon the Walls. In the same manner *A. Servilius* the Dictator took the City *Fidenæ*, having caused several false Attacks to be made on different sides, whilst a Mine carried on as far as the Citadel, opened him a passage there for his Troops. Another Dictator, the celebrated *Camillus*, could not terminate the long Siege of *Veii* but by this Stratagem. He undertook to run a Mine as far as the Citadel of that Place; and that the Work might not be discontinued, nor the Troops discouraged by the length of it, he divided them into six Brigades, who relieved each other every six Hours. The Work being carried on night and day, it extended at length to the Citadel, and the City was taken. At the Siege of *Athens* by *Sylla*, it is astonishing to consider the Mines and Countermines used on both sides. The Miners were not long before they met and fought furiously under Ground. The *Romans* having cut their way as far as the Wall, sapped a great part of it, and supported it in a manner in the Air on Props of Wood, to which they set fire without loss of Time. The Wall fell suddenly into the Fosse with an incredible Noise and Ruins, and all that were upon it perished.

XXI. THE Mines from the Camp to the CHAP. VIII.
 inside of a Place were long used before the in-
 vention of Sapping, and consisted at first in
 only running the Mine from the Camp to the
 Wall, and from thence a considerable way in-
 to the Place, underneath some large Temple,
 or other great Building little frequented in the
 Night. When they came thither they cut a
 large Space, which they propped up with
 large Timbers. They then opened a Passage
 of the whole breadth of this Space, for en-
 tering the Place in great numbers, whilst the
 Soldiers advanced into it through the Mine
 with the utmost Diligence. The other kind
 of Mines, for sapping the Foundation of a
 Wall, were opened very near the Camp to
 avoid being discovered, and were carried un-
 der the Fossé to the foot of the Wall, when
 they were enlarged to the right and left of the
 Foundations. This latter part was made very
 large, to receive the great number of Work-
 men, and long in proportion to the extent of
 the Wall to be thrown down. This being done,
 they began to sap at bottom, and as the Stones
 were pulled out, and the Work advanced,
 they propped the Superstructure with Tim-
 bers four foot high, which were fixed under
 the bottom Stones of the Foundation. As
 soon as the Work was finished, they laid Fag-
 gots and other Combustibles between the
 Props; and after they had set them ~~on~~ fire 072
 they quitted that part of the Mine, and re-
 passed the Fossé to avoid being stifled with the
 Smoke;

CHAP. Smoke; besides which, there was reason to
VIII. fear, that the Wall in falling would break into
the Mine, and bury all under it in its Ruins.

XXII. THE Ancients used several Methods to defend themselves against the Enemy after the Breach was made. Sometimes, but not so frequently, they made use of Trees cut down, which they extended along the whole front of the Breach very near each other, in order that the Branches might mingle together: they tied the Trunks very firmly to one another, so that it was impossible to separate these Trees, which formed an impenetrable Fence, behind which a multitude of Soldiers were posted, armed with Pikes and long Partizans. Sometimes the Breaches were made so suddenly, either by Saps above, or under Ground, or by the violent Blows of the Rams, that the Besieged often found their Works laid open when they least thought of it. They had recourse on such occasions to a very simple Refuge, in order to gain time to look about them, and to intrench behind the Breach. They threw down upon the ruins of the Wall a prodigious quantity of dry Wood, and other combustible Matter, to which they set fire. This occasioned so violent a Flame, that it was impossible for the Besiegers to pass through it, or approach the Breach. The Garrison of *Haliartus* in *Bæotia* thought of this Remedy against the *Romans*.

XXXIII.

XXIII, BUT the most usual Method was CHAP. VIII.
 to erect new Walls behind the Breaches, which are now called *Retirades*, or Retrenchments. These Works generally were not parallel with the ruined Walls, but described a kind of Semi-circle towards the Place, of which the two ends joined the two sides of the Wall that remained whole. They did not omit to cut a very large and deep Ditch before this Work, in order that the Besiegers might be under the necessity of attacking it with no less difficulty, and all the Machines employed against the strongest Walls. *Sylla* having beat down great part of the Walls of the Piræum with his battering Rams, caused the Breach to be immediately attacked, where so furious a Battle ensued, that he was obliged to found a Retreat. The Besieged improving the opportunity this gave them, immediately ran a second Wall behind the Breach. *Sylla* perceiving it made his Machines advance to batter it, rightly judging, that being newly built, it could not resist their Violence. The effect answered with no great difficulty, and he immediately ordered the Assault to be given. The Action was warm and vigorous, but he was at last repulsed with Loss, and obliged to abandon his Design. History abounds with Examples of this kind.

XXIV. HAVING thus given some Account of the Fortifications of the Ancients, described the principal Machines made use of by them
 in

CHAP. in their Sieges, and explained their Conduct
 VIII. in the *Attack and Defence of Places*; I might
 here, agreeably to what I have done in the
 Chapter upon *Battles*, entertain the Reader
 with a Description of some of the most cele-
 brated Sieges of Antiquity, in order to give
 him the juster Idea of this part of War. But
 as this would too much swell the DISCOURSE,
 and is besides rather curious than useful, be-
 cause of the great Changes that have been in-
 troduced by the invention of Artillery and
 Gun-powder, I shall content myself with refer-
 ring to the Historians themselves, where these
 Sieges are related at large. *Thucydides*, *Poly-*
bios, *Livy*, and *Josephus* furnish abundant Ex-
 amples of this kind. The most curious and
 remarkable are those of *Platæa* by the *Lace-*
dæmonians and *Thebans*; of *Syracuse* by the
Athenians; of *Lilybæum*, *Syracuse*, *Carthage*,
 and *Numantia* by the *Romans*; but above all
 of *Alesia* by *Julius Cæsar*, and of *Jerusalem*
 by *Titus Vespasian*. These two last are so
 minutely and circumstantially described; the
 one by *Cæsar*, who formed and conducted it;
 the other by *Josephus*, who was an Eye-wit-
 ness of all that passed, that whoever peruses
 them attentively, will meet with every thing
 that is worth knowing upon this Subject, and
 be enabled to form a clear and comprehensive
 Judgment of the high degree of Perfection
 to which the Ancients, and in particular the
Romans, had carried this important Branch of
 the *Art of War*.

C. JULIUS

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS in GAUL.
BOOK I.

VOL. I.

B

THE ARGUMENT.

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C. JULIUS CÆSAR'S
COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK I.

THE whole Country of *Gaul* is divided into three Parts: of which the *Bel-*
gians inhabit one; the *Aquitains* another; and a People called in their
 own Language *Celts*, in ours *Gauls*, the third. BOOK I.
 These all differ from each other in their Language, Customs, and Laws. The *Gauls* are divided from the *Aquitains* by the River *Garonne*, and by the *Marne* and the *Seine* from the *Belgians*. Of all these Nations the *Belgians* are the most warlike; as being farthest removed from the Culture and Refinements of the Province, and but little resorted to by Merchants, who furnish the Means of Luxury and Voluptuousness. They are also situated next to the *Germans*, who inhabit beyond the *Rhine*, with whom they are continually engaged in War. For this Reason likewise the *Helvetians* are distinguished by their Bravery beyond

BOOK I. yond the rest of the *Gauls*; because they are almost constantly at war with the *Germans*, either for the Defence of their own Territories, or acting themselves as the Aggressors. One of these Divisions, that which we have said was possessed by the *Gauls*, begins at the River *Rhine*, and is bounded by the *Garonne*, the Ocean, and the Territories of the *Belgians*. It touches also, towards the *Helvetians* and *Sequani*, upon the River *Rhine*, extending itself northward. The Country of the *Belgians*, commencing from the remotest Confines of *Gaul*, stretches as far as the lower *Rhine*, running all the way between the North and East. *Aquitain* extends from the *Garonne* to the *Pyrenean* Mountains, and that part of the Ocean which borders upon *Spain*. Its Situation is North-West.

II. ORGETORIX was by far the richest and most illustrious of the *Helvetians*. This Nobleman, in the Consulship of *M. Messala* and *M. Piso*, prompted by an aspiring Ambition, formed a Confederacy of the principal Men of the State; and persuaded the People to quit their Country in a Body, representing: "that as they surpassed all the Nations around them in Valour, it would be easy for them to gain the intire Sovereignty of *Gaul*." He the sooner brought them into this Design, because the *Helvetians*, by the Nature of their Situation, are every where confined within very narrow Territories: On one side by the *Rhine*, a broad and deep River, which separates their Country from that of the *Germans*: On the other by Mount *Jura*, a high Ridge of Hills, which runs between them and the *Sequani*: Lastly, by the Lake *Lemanus*, and the River *Rhone*, which is the Boundary on the

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

5
BOOK I.

the side of the *Roman* Province. By this means it happened, that they could not so easily enlarge their Territories, or make Conquests on the neighbouring States; which, to Men of a war-like Spirit, and fond of Fighting, was abundant cause of Discontent: For being a numerous People, and of great Fame for their Bravery, they thought themselves much too strained in a Country, which was but two hundred and forty Miles in length, and about one hundred and eighty in breadth.

III. URGED by these Considerations, and still more by the Authority and Persuasions of *Orgetorix*, they resolved to provide every thing necessary for an Expedition; to buy up a great number of Waggon and Carriage-Horses; to form large Magazines of Corn, that they might have sufficient to supply them in their March; to establish Peace and Amity with the neighbouring States. They imagined two Years would be sufficient for these Preparations, and obliged themselves by a Law to begin their March on the third. The whole Management of this Design was committed to *Orgetorix*, who undertook an Embassy to the neighbouring States. On this Occasion he persuaded *Casticus*, the Son of *Catamantales*, of the Nation of the *Sequani*, whose Father had for many Years enjoyed the Sovereignty over that People, and been stiled Friend and Ally by the Senate of *Rome*, to possess himself of the supreme Authority in his own Country, which his Father had held before him. He likewise persuaded *Dumnorix* the *Æduan*, the Brother of *Divitiacus*, who was at that time the leading Man in his own State, and greatly beloved by the People, to attempt the same among the *Æduans*: and the more to secure him to his Interest, gave him his Daughter in Marriage. He

BOOK told them, " That they might with the greatest

I. " Facility accomplish their Designs ; as he was
 " himself assured of attaining the supreme Autho-
 " rity in his own State, which was without Dis-
 " pute the most powerful and considerable of all
 " Gaul ; and would then employ his whole Inte-
 " rest and Forces, to establish them in their re-
 " spective Sovereignities." Moved by these Con-
 siderations, they reciprocally bound themselves by
 a solemn Oath ; not doubting, when they had once
 attained the chief Sway in their several States, with
 the united Forces of three such powerful and
 mighty Nations, to render themselves Masters of
 all Gaul. The *Helvetians* having Notice of this
 Design, obliged *Orgetorix*, according to the Custom
 of their Country, to answer to the Charge brought
 against him in Chains : and had he been found
 guilty, the Law condemned him to be burnt alive.
 On the Day appointed for his Trial, he assembled
 all his Slaves and Domesticks, amounting to ten
 thousand Men ; and all his Clients and Debtors, of
 which the Number was very great : By their means
 he rescued himself out of the Hands of his Judges.
 While the People, provoked at this Contempt of
 the Laws, were preparing to support their Autho-
 rity by Force, and the Magistrates had assembled
 a great Number of Men for that Purpose ; *Orgeto-
 rix* died : Nor are the *Helvetians* without Suspicion
 of his having made away with himself.

V IV. AFTER his Death, the *Helvetians* still con-
 tinued to prosecute with the same Diligence, the De-
 sign they had formed of quitting their Country.
 When they had completed their Preparations, they
 set fire to all their Towns, to the Number of
 twelve ; to their Boroughs and Villages, which
 amounted to four hundred ; and to their other pri-
 vate

vate Buildings. They likewise burnt all their **BOOK**
 Corn, except what they had resolved to carry I.
 along with them; that having no Hope of re-
 turning to their own Country, they might be the
 more disposed to confront all Dangers. Each Man
 had Order to carry out with him Provisions for three
 Months. The *Rauraci*, *Tulingians*, and *Latobrigians*,
 neighbouring Nations, being persuaded to follow
 the same Counsel, likewise set fire to their Towns
 and Villages, and joined with them in the Ex-
 pedition. The *Boians* too, who had formerly in-
 habited beyond the *Rhine*, and passing over into
Noricum, had settled in that Country, and possessed
 themselves of *Noreia* its Capital City, were affo-
 ciated into the Design.

V. THERE were only two Ways by which they
 could march out of their own Country: One
 through the Territories of the *Sequani*, between
 Mount *Jura* and the *Rhone*, narrow and difficult,
 insomuch that in some Places a single File of
 Waggon could hardly pass. The impending
 Mountain was besides very high and steep, so that
 a handful of Men was sufficient to stop them.
 The other lay through our Province, far easier
 and readier; because the *Rhone*, which flows be-
 tween the Confines of the *Helvetians* and *Allobro-*
gians, a People lately subjected to the *Romans*,
 was in some Places fordable: And *Geneva*, a
 frontier Town of the *Allobrogians*, adjoining to the
 Territories of the *Helvetians*, had a Bridge belong-
 ing to this last People. They therefore doubted
 not, either of persuading the *Allobrogians*, who
 as yet seemed to bear no great Affection to the
 People of *Rome*; or at least of obliging them by
 Force, to grant them a Passage through their
 Territories. Every thing being now ready for the

BOOK Expedition, they appointed a Day for their general

I. Rendezvous on the Banks of the *Rhone*. The Day fixed on was the Twenty-eighth of *March*, in the Consulship of *L. Piso* and *A. Gabinus*.

VI. CÆSAR having notice of these Proceedings, and that it was the Design of the *Helvetians* to attempt a Passage through the Province, hastened his Departure from *Rome*; and posting by great Journeys into farther *Gaul*, came to *Geneva*. He began with breaking down the Bridge over the *Rhone*; and as there was at that time but one *Roman* Legion in *Transalpine Gaul*, he ordered great Levies to be made throughout the whole Province. The *Helvetians* being informed of his Arrival, deputed several Noblemen of the first Rank, with *Numeius* and *Verodocius* at their head, to wait upon him in the Name of the State, and represent, "that they meant not to offer the least Injury to the *Roman* Province; that Necessity alone had determined them to the Design of passing through it, because they had no other way by which to direct their March; that they therefore intreated they might have his Permission for that purpose." But *Cæsar* bearing in mind, that *L. Cassius* the Consul had been slain, and his Army routed, and made to pass under the Yoke by the *Helvetians*, did not think proper to grant their Request. Neither could he persuade himself, that Men so ill affected to the People of *Rome*, if permitted to pass through the Province, would abstain from Acts of Hostility and Violence. However, that he might gain time, till the Troops he had ordered to be raised could assemble; he told the Ambassadors he would consider of their Demand, and that if they returned by the Nineteenth of *April*, they should have his final Answer.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile with the Legion he then had, and the Soldiers that came to him from all Parts of the Province, he ran a Wall sixteen Feet high, and nineteen Miles in length, with a Ditch, from the Lake *Lemanus* into which the *Rhone* discharges itself, to Mount *Jura*, which divides the Territories of the *Sequani* from the *Helvetians*. This Work finished, he raised Redoubts from space to space, and manned them with Troops, that if the Enemy should attempt to force a Passage, he might be in a condition to hinder them. When the Day appointed came, and the Ambassadors returned for an Answer, he told them; that he could not, consistent with the Usage and Behaviour of the People of *Rome* on the like Occasions, grant any Troops a Passage through the Province: and should they attempt it by Force, he let them see he was prepared to oppose them.

VII. THE *Helvetians* driven from this Hope, endeavoured to force the Passage of the River; some with Boats coupled together, or Floats which they had prepared in great Numbers; others by the Fords of the *Rhone*, where was the least Depth of Water; sometimes by Day, but oftener in the Night: but being repulsed by the Strength of the Works, the Concurrence of the Troops, and the Discharge of Darts, they at last abandoned the Attempt. There was still one Way left through the Territories of the *Sequani*, by which however, without the Consent of the Natives, they could not march, because of the Narrowness of the Pass. As they were not able to prevail by their own Application, they sent Ambassadors to *Dumnorix* the *Æduan*, that thro' his Intercession they might obtain this Favour of the *Sequani*. *Dumnorix* by his Popularity and Generosity had great Influence with

BOOK with the *Sequani*, and was also well affected to the
 I. *Helvetians*, because from among them he had married the Daughter of *Orgetorix*. Besides, urged by ambitious Views, he was framing to himself Schemes of Power, and wanted to have as many States as possible bound to him by Offices of Kindness. He therefore charged himself with the Negotiation, obtained for the *Helvetians* the Liberty of passing through the Territories of the *Sequani*, and engaged the two Nations mutually to give Hostages. The *Sequani*, not to molest the *Helvetians* in their March; and the *Helvetians*, to pass without offering any Insult or Injury to the Country.

VIII. CÆSAR soon had Intelligence of their March, and that they now designed to pass through the Country of the *Sequani* and *Æduans* into the Territories of the *Santones*, which border upon those of the *Tolosatians*, a State that makes Part of the *Roman* Province. Should this happen, he foresaw many Inconveniencies likely to arise, from the Neighbourhood of a warlike and disaffected People, in an open and plentiful Country. For these Reasons he gave the Command of the new Works he had raised to *T. Labienus* his Lieutenant, and he himself hastened by great Journeys into *Italy*. There he raised two Legions, and drew three more, that were cantoned round *Aquileia*, out of their Winter-quarters; and with these five Legions, took the nearest way over the *Alps* into farther *Gaul*. The *Centrones*, *Graioceli*, and *Caturigians*, seizing the higher Grounds, endeavoured to oppose his March. But having repulsed them in several Encounters, he in seven Days after setting out from *Ocelum*, a City in the extreme Confines of the nearer Province, arrived among the *Vocentians*, whose Territories lie within the farther Province. Thence he

he led his Army into the Country of the *Allobrogians*; and crossing their Territories, entered upon the Lands of the *Segusians*. These are the first on the other side the *Rhone*, beyond the Boundaries of the *Roman* Province. BOOK I.

IX. THE *Helvetians* had by this Time marched their Forces through the narrow Pass of Mount *Jura*, and the Territories of the *Sequani*; and were come into the Country of the *Aeduans*, plundering their Lands. The *Aeduans*, unable to defend themselves and Possessions from the Violence of their Enemies, sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to request Aid. They told him, "That such at all times had been their Merit with the People of *Rome*, that they might challenge greater Regard, than to have their Lands laid waste, their Children led into Captivity, and their Towns assaulted and taken, almost in the very Sight of a *Roman* Army." At the same time also the *Ambarri*, Friends and Allies of the *Aeduans*, sent to inform him: "That compelled to abandon the open Country, they could hardly defend their Towns from the Rage of the Enemy." The *Allobrogians* likewise, who had Dwellings and Possessions beyond the *Rhone*, fled to him for Protection, and assured him: "That there was nothing left them but a naked and desolate Country." Whereupon *Cæsar*, moved by these Complaints and Remonstrances, resolved not to wait 'till the Fortunes of his Allies should be consumed, and the *Helvetians* arrive in the Territories of the *Santones*.

K. THE River *Arar* flows into the *Rhone*, thro' the Confines of the *Aeduans* and *Sequani*, with a Current incredibly smooth and gentle, insomuch that it is impossible to distinguish by the Eye, which way its Waters glide. The *Helvetians* were
at

BOOK at this time employed in passing it on Floats and

I. a Bridge of Boats. When *Cæsar* was informed by

his Spies, that three Parts of their Forces were got over the River, and that the fourth still remained on this Side; he left his Camp about midnight with three Legions, and came up with the Party of the Enemy that had not yet passed. As he found them unprepared, and incumbered with their Baggage, he attacked them immediately, and killed a great Number on the Spot. The rest fled, and sheltered themselves in the nearest Woods. This was called the *Tigurine* Canton, being one of the four into which the whole Body of the *Helvetians* are divided. This very Canton, in the Memory of our Fathers, marching out of their own Territories, had vanquished and killed the Consul *L. Cassius*, and obliged his Army to pass under the Yoke. Thus, whether by Chance or the Direction of the immortal Gods, that Part of the *Helvetian* State which had brought so signal a Calamity upon the *Roman* People, were the first to feel the Weight of their Resentment. In this *Cæsar* avenged not only the publick, but likewise his own domestick Injuries; because in the same Battle with *Cassius*, was slain also *L. Piso* his Lieutenant, the Grandfather of *L. Piso*, *Cæsar's* Father-in-law.

XI. AFTER this Battle, that he might come up with the remaining Forces of the *Helvetians*, he caused a Bridge to be made across the *Arar*, and carried over his Army. The *Helvetians* dismayed at his sudden Approach, as he had spent only one Day in passing the River, which they had with the utmost Difficulty accomplished in twenty, sent an Embassy to him, at the head of which was *Divico*, who had been General of the *Helvetians* in the War against *Cassius*. He addressed *Cæsar* to this

this Effect: "That if the People of *Rome* were disposed to conclude a Peace with the *Helvetians*, they would go and settle in whatever Country *Cæsar* should think fit to assign them: but if they persisted in the Design of making War, he would do well to call to mind the ancient Disgrace of the *Roman* People, and the Valour of the *Helvetic* Nation: That in having surprised one of the Cantons, while the others, who had passed the River, could not return to succour it, there was no Reason to be much elated on the Advantage, nor to despise his Enemies: That the *Helvetians* had learned of their Ancestors, to depend more on Courage than on Cunning and Ambushes; and it therefore imported him to beware, not to render the Place where they were then posted famous and memorable with Posterity, by a new Defeat of the *Roman* People, and the Destruction of their Army."

XII. To this *Cæsar* replied: "That he therefore the less doubted of the Issue, as he well knew all the Circumstances of the Affair to which the *Helvetians* referred; and resented them the more strongly, as they had happened undeservedly to the *Roman* People: That had they been conscious of any Injury on their Side, it would have been easy for them to have kept upon their Guard; but herein were they deceived, that neither did they know of any thing which might give them cause of Fear, nor could they apprehend they had any thing to fear without cause: That supposing him inclined to overlook old Injuries, could they expect he would also forget their late Insults, in attempting, against his Will, to force a Passage through the Province, and laying waste the Territories of the *Eduans*,

BOOK " *Æduans, Ambarri, and Allobrogians?* That their
 I. " boasting so insolently of their Victory, and wondering that Vengeance had been deferred so long, were a new Set of Provocations. But they ought to remember, that the immortal Gods were sometimes wont to grant long Impunity, and a great run of Prosperity to Men, whom they pursued with the Punishment of their Crimes, that by the sad Reverse of their Condition, Vengeance might fall the heavier. Tho' these were just Grounds of Resentment, yet, if they would satisfy the *Æduans* and their Allies for the Ravages committed in their Country, as likewise the *Allobrogians*, and give Hostages for the Performance of their Promises, he was ready to conclude a Peace with them." *Divico* replied: " That such were the Institutions of the *Helvetians*, derived from their Ancestors, that they had been accustomed to receive, not to give Hostages; and that no body knew it better than the *Romans*." Having returned this Answer, he departed.

XIII. THE next Day they decamped. *Cæsar* did the same; and ordered all the Cavalry, whom, to the Number of four thousand, he had raised in the Province, and drawn together from the *Æduans* and their Allies, to go before, and observe the Enemy's March. But pressing too close upon their Rear, they were obliged to engage in a disadvantageous Place, and lost a few Men. The *Helvetians*, encouraged by this Success, as having, with no more than five hundred Horse, repulsed so great a Multitude, began to face us more boldly, and sometimes to sally from their Rear, and attack our Van. *Cæsar* kept back his Men from fighting; thinking it sufficient for the present, to strait-

en the Enemy's Forages, and prevent their ravage-BOOK
 ing and plundering the Country. In this manner I.
 the Armies marched for fifteen Days together; in-
 somuch that between our Van, and the Rear of the
Helvetians, the Distance did not exceed five or six
 Miles.

XIV. IN the mean time *Cæsar* daily pressed the
Æduans for the Corn which they had promised in
 the name of the Publick. For by reason of the
 Coldness of the Climate, (*Gaul*, as we have said,
 lying considerably to the North,) he was so far
 from finding the Corn ripe in the Fields, that
 there was not even sufficient Forage for the Horses.
 Neither could he make use of those Supplies which
 came to him by the way of the *Arar*, because the
Helvetians had turned off from the River, and he
 was determined not to leave them. The *Æduans*
 put him off from day to day with fair Speeches;
 sometimes pretending that it was bought up, and
 ready to be sent; sometimes, that it was actually
 on the way. But when he saw no End of these
 Delays, and that the Day approached for deliver-
 ing out Corn to the Army; calling together their
 Chiefs, of whom he had a great Number in his
 Camp; among the rest *Divitiacus*, and *Liscus* their
 supreme Magistrate, who is stiled *Vergobret* in the
 Language of the Country, and created yearly,
 with a Power of Life and Death; he severely in-
 veighed against them: "That at a time when
 " Corn was neither to be procured for Money, nor
 " had out of the Fields, in so urgent a Conjun-
 " ture, and while the Enemy was so near, they
 " had not taken care to supply him;" adding,
 " that as he had engaged in that War chiefly at
 " their Request, he had the greater Reason to
 " complain of their abandoning him."

XV. UPON

BOOK XV. UPON this, *Liscus*, moved by *Cæsar's*

I.

Speech, thought proper to declare what he had hitherto concealed : “ That there were some among them whose Authority with the People was very great ; and who, tho’ but private Men, had yet more Power than the Magistrates themselves : “ That these, by artful and seditious Speeches, alarmed the Multitude, and persuaded them to keep back their Corn ; insinuating, that if their own State could not obtain the Sovereignty of *Gaul*, it would be better for them to obey the *Helvetians*, *Gauls* like themselves, than the *Romans* ; there not being the least Reason to question, but these last, after having subdued the *Helvetians*, would, along with the rest of *Gaul*, deprive the *Æduans* also of their Liberty : That the very same Men gave Intelligence to the Enemy of all the Designs of the *Romans*, and whatsoever was transacted in their Camp ; his Authority not being sufficient to restrain them : “ Nay, that tho’ compelled by necessity, he had now made a Discovery of the whole matter to *Cæsar*, he was not ignorant of the Danger to which he exposed himself by such a Conduct ; and had, for that reason, chosen to be silent, as long as he thought it consistent with the Safety of the State.” *Cæsar* perceived, that *Dumnorix*, the Brother of *Divitiacus*, was pointed at by this Speech. But as he was unwilling that these Matters should be debated in the Presence of so many Witnesses, he speedily dismissed the Council, retaining only *Liscus*. He then question’d him apart on what he had just said, and was answered with greater Courage and Freedom. He put the same Questions to others also in private, who all confirmed the Truth of what had been told him : “ That *Dumnorix* was a Man of an enterprising
“ Spirit,

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

17

BOOK

I.

“ Spirit, fond of Revolutions, and in great fa-
 “ vour with the People, because of his Liberality :
 “ That he had for many Years farmed the Cu-
 “ stoms, and other publick Revenues of the *Æ-*
 “ *duans*, at a very low price ; no one daring to
 “ bid against him : That by this means he had
 “ considerably increased his Estate, and was en-
 “ abled to extend his Bounty to all about him :
 “ That he constantly kept a great Number of
 “ Horsemen in pay, who attended him wherever
 “ he went : That his Interest was not confined
 “ merely to his own Country, but extended like-
 “ wise to the neighbouring States : That the better
 “ to support this Interest, he had married his
 “ Mother to a Man of principal Rank and Au-
 “ thority among the *Biturigians*, had himself tak-
 “ en a Wife from among the *Helvetians*, and
 “ matched his Sister and the rest of his Kindred
 “ into other the most powerful States : That he
 “ favoured and wished well to the *Helvetians* on
 “ the score of that Alliance, and personally hated
 “ *Cæsar*, and the *Romans*, because by their Arrival
 “ his Power had been diminished, and *Divitiacus*
 “ his Brother restored to his former Credit and
 “ Authority : That should the *Romans* be over-
 “ thrown, he was in great hopes of obtaining the
 “ Sovereignty by means of the *Helvetians*. On
 “ the contrary, should they prevail, he must not
 “ only give up these Hopes, but even all Expecta-
 “ tion of retaining the Influence he had already
 “ acquired.” *Cæsar* likewise found upon Inquiry,
 that in the last Engagement of the Horse, *Dum-*
norix, who commanded the *Æduan* Cavalry, was
 the first that fled, and by that flight struck a Ter-
 ror into the rest of the Troops.

BOOK XVI. THESE things appearing, and other undoubted Circumstances concurring to heighten his Suspicions : That he had procured for the *Helvetians* a Passage through the Territories of the *Sequanians* : That he had effected an Exchange of Hostages between the two Nations : That he had done all this not only without Permission from him, or his own State, but even without their Knowledge and Participation : That he was accused by the chief Magistrate of the *Æduans* : They seemed altogether a sufficient ground to *Cæsar*, why he should either himself take cognizance of the Matter, or order the State to proceed against him. One thing, however, still kept him in suspense ; the Consideration of his Brother *Divitiacus*, a Man of singular Probity, Justice, and Moderation ; a faithful Ally of the *Roman* People, and on the foot of Friendship with *Cæsar*. That he might not therefore give offence to one for whom he had so great a Value : before he took any farther Step in the Affair, he sent for *Divitiacus* ; and having removed the usual Interpreters, addressed him by *C. Valerius Procillus*, a Prince of the Province of *Gaul*, his intimate Friend, in whom he reposed the greatest Confidence. He put him in mind of what had been said of *Dumnorix* in his own presence in the Council of the *Gauls*, and repeated the fresh Complaints made to himself against him in private. He urged, and even requested, that without Offence to him, he might either proceed against him himself, or order the State to take the Matter under Consideration. *Divitiacus* embracing *Cæsar* with many Tears, begged him not to take any severe Resolution against his Brother. " He was " sensible," he told him, " of the Truth of all " that was alledged, and had himself more reason " to

“ to be dissatisfied than any Man : That at a time BOOK
 “ when his Authority was great, both at home I.
 “ and in the other Provinces of *Gaul*, and his ~~~~~
 “ Brother but little considered on account of his
 “ Youth, he had used his Interest to bring him
 “ into Credit : That though *Dumnorix* had made
 “ use of that Power acquired by his means, to di-
 “ minish his Favour with the People, and even to
 “ urge on his Ruin, he nevertheless still found
 “ himself swayed by his Affection, and a Regard
 “ for the Esteem of the Publick : That should
 “ his Brother meet with any rigorous Treatment
 “ from *Cæsar*, while he himself possessed so large a
 “ share of his Favour, all Men would believe it
 “ done with his Consent, and the Minds of the
 “ *Gauls* be for ever alienated from him.” *Cæsar* ob-
 serving his concern, took him by the Hand, com-
 forted him, desired him to make an end of speaking,
 assured him, that such was his Regard for him, he
 would for his sake overlook not only his own In-
 juries, but even those of the Republick. He then
 sent for *Dumnorix*, call'd him into his Brother's
 Presence, declared the Subjects of Complaint he
 had against him, mentioned what he himself knew,
 what was laid to his Charge by the State, and ad-
 monished him for the future to avoid all cause of
 Suspicion ; adding, that he would forgive what
 was past for the sake of his Brother *Divitiacus*.
 He appointed, however, some to have an Eye
 over him, that he might be informed of his Be-
 haviour, and of those he conversed with.

XVII. THE same Day, having learnt by his
 Scouts, that the Enemy had posted themselves un-
 der a Hill about eight Miles from his Camp, he
 sent out a Party to view the Ground, and examine
 the ascent of the Hill. These reporting it to be

BOOK extremely easy, he detached *T. Labienus* his Lieutenant about midnight, with two Legions, and the same Guides who had examined the Ground the Day before; and having acquainted him with his Design, ordered him to get possession of the Top of the Hill. He himself set out three Hours after with the rest of the Army, by the same Rout the *Helvetians* had taken, and sent all the Cavalry before. *P. Confidius*, an Officer of Reputation, who had served in the Army of *L. Sylla*, and afterwards that of *M. Crassus*, advanced with a small Party to get Intelligence.

XVIII. AT Day-break, when *Labienus* had got possession of the top of the Hill, and *Cæsar* was within a Mile and a half of the Enemies Camp; while they in the mean time, as he afterwards learnt from his Prisoners, knew nothing either of his, or *Labienus's* Approach: *Confidius* came galloping back, and assured *Cæsar*, that the Summit of the Mountain was possessed by the Enemy, and that he had seen the *Gallick* Arms and Ensigns there. *Cæsar* retired to a neighbouring Hill, and drew up his Men in order of Battle. *Labienus*, whose Instructions were, not to engage the Enemy till he saw the rest of the Army approaching their Camp, that the Attack might be made on all Sides at the same time; having gained the Top of the Hill, waited the Arrival of our Men, without stirring from his Post. At length, when the Day was far spent, *Cæsar* understood by his Spies, that *Labienus* was in possession of the Mountain, that the Enemy had decamped, and that *Confidius*, blinded by Fear, had reported what he never saw. The rest of that Day he followed the Enemy at the usual Distance, and encamped within three Miles of them.

XIX. THE

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

XIX. THE Day after, as the time drew near BOOK I.
for delivering out Corn to the Army, and as he was not above eighteen Miles from *Bibracte* the Capital of the *Aduans*, where he hoped to find sufficient Supplies for the Subsistence of his Troops; he quitted the Pursuit of the *Helvetians*, and directed his March thither. The Enemy being informed of this Motion by some Deserters, who had belonged to the Troop of *L. Emilius*, an Officer of Horse among the *Gauls*; and either ascribing it to Fear in the *Romans*, the rather, because they had not attacked them the Day before, though possessed of the higher Ground; or flattering themselves with the Hopes of intercepting their Provisions: all on a sudden changed their Resolution, and instead of continuing their former March began to pursue and harass our Rear. *Cæsar* observing this, retired to a neighbouring Hill, and sent his Cavalry to sustain the Charge of the Enemy. In the mean time he drew up his four veteran Legions in three Lines towards the middle of the Hill; in such a manner, that the two Legions newly raised in *Cisalpine Gaul*, and all the Auxiliaries, were posted above them; and the whole Mountain was covered with his Troops. He ordered all the Baggage to be brought into one Place, and committed it to the Charge of those who stood on the upper Part of the Hill. The *Helvetians* following with all their Forces, drew their Carriages likewise into one Place; and having repulsed our Cavalry, and formed themselves into a Phalanx, advanced in close Order to attack our Van.

XX. *CÆSAR* having first sent away his own Horse, and afterwards those of all his Officers, that by making the Danger equal, no Hope might

72 CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES OF

BOOK I: remain but in Victory; encouraged his Men, and began the Charge. The *Romans*, who fought with the Advantage of the higher Ground, pouring their Darts upon the Enemy from above, easily broke their Phalanx; and then fell upon them Sword in Hand. What greatly incumbered the *Gauls* in this Fight, was, that their Targets being many of them pierced and pinned together by the Javelins of the *Romans*, they could neither draw out the Javelins, because forked at the Extremity, nor act with Agility in the Battle, because deprived in a manner of the use of their left Arms: so that many, after long tossing their Targets to and fro to no purpose to disengage them, chose rather to throw them away, and expose themselves without Defence to the Weapons of their Enemies. At length however, being overpowered with Wounds, they began to give ground; and observing a Mountain at about a Mile's distance, gradually retreated thither. Having gained the Mountain, and our Men pursuing them; the *Boians* and *Tulingians*, who to the Number of fifteen thousand covered their Retreat, and served as a Guard to their Rear, falling upon the *Romans* in Flank as they advanced, began to surround them. This being perceived by the *Helvetians*, who had retired to the Mountain, they again returned upon us, and renewed the Fight. The *Romans* facing about, charged the Enemy in three Bodies; their first and second Line making head against those who had been forced to retreat, and their third sustaining the Assault of the *Boians* and *Tulingians*. The Battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful; but the Enemy being at last obliged to give way, one Part withdrew towards the Hill whither they had before retreated, and the rest sheltered themselves behind the Carriages. During

ing this whole Action, tho' it lasted from one o'clock in the Afternoon till Evening, no Man saw the Back of an Enemy. The Fight was renewed with great Obstinacy at the Carriages, and continued till the Night was far spent: for the *Gauls* making use of their Carts by way of a Rampart, darted their Javelins upon us from above; and some thrusting their Lances through the Wheels of the Waggon, wounded our Men. After a long Dispute, we at last got possession of their Baggage and Camp. A Son and Daughter of *Orgetorix* were found among the Prisoners. Only an hundred and twenty thousand of the Enemy survived this Defeat; who retreating all that Night, and continuing their March without Intermission, arrived on the fourth Day in the Territories of the *Lingones*. The *Romans* mean-while made no Attempt to pursue them; the Care of their Wounded, and of burying their Dead, obliging them to continue upon the Spot three Days. *Cæsar* sent Letters and Messengers to the *Lingones*, not to furnish them with Corn or other Necessaries, if they would avoid drawing upon themselves the same Treatment with the Fugitives; and after a Repose of three Days, set forward to pursue them with all his Forces.

XXI. THE *Helvetians*, compelled by an extreme Want of all Things, sent Ambassadors to him to treat about a Surrender. These meeting him on the Way, and throwing themselves at his Feet; in suppliant Terms, and with many Tears, begged for Peace. *Cæsar* gave them no express Answer at that time; only ordered the *Helvetians* to wait for him in the Place where they then were, which they did accordingly. Upon his Arrival, he demanded Hostages, their Arms, and the Slaves

BOOK who had deserted to their Camp. As the Execution of all this took up some time; about four thousand Men of the Canton called *Urbigenus*, either fearing Punishment should they deliver up their Arms, or induced by the Hopes of escaping; because in so great a Multitude they fancied their Flight might be concealed, nay perhaps remain altogether unknown; stole out of the Camp in the beginning of the Night, and took the Rout of *Germany* and the *Rhine*. *Cæsar* being informed of it, dispatched Orders to those through whose Territories they must pass, to stop and send them back wherever they should be found, if they meant to acquit themselves of favouring their Escape. He was obeyed, and the fugitive *Urbigenians* were treated as Enemies. All the rest, upon delivering the Hostages that were required of them, their Arms, and the Deserters, were admitted to a Surrender. The *Helvetians*, *Tulingians*, and *Latobrigians*, had Orders to return to their own Country, and rebuild the Towns and Villages they had burnt. And because having lost all their Corn, they were utterly without the means of subsisting themselves, he gave it in charge to the *Allobrogiens* to supply them. *Cæsar's* Design in this was, that the Lands deserted by the *Helvetians* might not be left vacant, lest the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*, drawn by the Goodness of the Soil, should be tempted to seize them, and thereby become Neighbours to the *Allobrogiens* and the *Roman* Province in *Gaul*. The *Boians*, at the Request of the *Æduans*, who esteemed them highly on account of their Valour, were permitted to settle in their Territories; where they assigned them Lands, and by degrees admitted them to all the Rights and Privileges of Natives. A Roll was found in the *Helvetian* Camp, written in *Greek* Characters, and brought to *Cæsar*. It contained

a Lift of all who had set out upon this Expedition BOOK
I.
capable of bearing Arms; likewise of the Children, Women, and old Men. By this it appeared, that the Number of the *Helvetians* was two hundred and sixty-three thousand, of the *Tulingians* thirty-six thousand, of the *Latobrigians* fourteen thousand, of the *Rauraci* twenty-three thousand, of the *Boians* thirty-two thousand; in all three hundred and sixty-eight thousand, of which ninety-two thousand were fit to bear Arms. A Review being made by *Cæsar's* Command, of those that returned to their own Country, the Number was found to be an hundred and ten thousand.

XXII. THE War with the *Helvetians* being ended, Ambassadors from all Parts of *Gaul*, Men of principal Consideration in their several States, waited upon *Cæsar* to congratulate his Success. They told him; "That tho' they were sensible the People
" of *Rome*, in the War against the *Helvetians*,
" meant chiefly to avenge the Injuries formerly
" received from that Nation, yet had the Event of
" it been highly advantageous to all *Gaul*; be-
" cause in a time of full Prosperity, the *Helvetians*
" had left their Territories with design to make War
" upon the other States; that having brought them
" under Subjection, they might choose themselves
" a Habitation at pleasure, and render all the rest
" of the Country tributary." They requested,
" That they might have his Permission to hold by
" a Day prefixed, a general Assembly of all the
" Provinces of *Gaul*; there being some things they
" wanted to discuss and propose to him, which
" concerned the whole Nation in common." Leave being granted accordingly, they fixed the Day for the Assembly, and bound themselves by an Oath, not to discover their Deliberations to
any,

BOOK any, unless named for that purpose by genera

I. Consent.

XXIII. UPON the rising of the Council, the same Chiefs of the States as before, returned to *Cæsar*, and begged to be admitted to confer with him in private, of Matters that regarded their own and the common Safety. Their Desire being granted, they all threw themselves at his Feet, and with Tears represented ; “ That it was of no less
 “ Importance to them to have their present Deliverations kept secret, than to succeed in the
 “ Request they were going to make ; because
 “ should any Discovery happen, they were in
 “ danger of being exposed to the utmost Cruelties.”
Divitiacus the *Æduan* spoke in the name of the rest. He told him ; “ That two Factions divided all *Gaul* ;
 “ one headed by the *Æduans*, the other by the
 “ *Averni* ; that after a Contention of many Years
 “ between these for the Superiority, the *Averni*
 “ and *Sequani* came at last to a Resolution of
 “ calling in the *Germans* : That at first only fifteen
 “ thousand had crossed the *Rhine* ; but being a
 “ wild and savage People, and greatly liking
 “ the Customs, Manners, and plenteous Country
 “ of the *Gauls*, others soon followed ; infomuch
 “ that at present there were not less than an hundred
 “ and twenty thousand of them in *Gaul* : That
 “ the *Æduans*, and their Allies, had frequently
 “ tried their Strength against them in Battle ; but
 “ by a Succession of Defeats had lost all their
 “ Nobility, Senate, and Cavalry : That broken
 “ by these Calamities and Losses, tho’ formerly
 “ they had held the first sway in *Gaul*, both by
 “ their own Valour, and the Favour and
 “ Friendship of the People of *Rome*, yet now they
 “ were reduced to the necessity of sending their
 “ principa

“ principal Noblemen as Hostages to the *Sequani*,
 “ and of obliging themselves by an Oath, neither
 “ to demand their Hostages back, nor implore the
 “ Assistance of the *Roman* People, nor refuse a per-
 “ petual Submission to the Dominion and Autho-
 “ rity of the *Sequani* : That he alone of all the
 “ *Eduans* had refused to take the Oath, or give
 “ his Children for Hostages, and on that account
 “ had fled his Country, and came to *Rome* to im-
 “ plore the Assistance of the Senate ; as being the
 “ only Man in the State, whom neither Obligation
 “ of Oath, nor the Restraint of Hostages, with-
 “ held from such a Step : That after all it had
 “ fared worse with the victorious *Sequani*, than with
 “ the vanquished *Eduans* ; because *Ariovistus* King
 “ of the *Germans* had seated himself in their Terri-
 “ tories; had seized a third of their Lands, the
 “ most fertile in all *Gaul*, and now ordered them
 “ to give up another third in behalf of the *Ha-*
 “ *rudes*, who had passed the *Rhine* a few Months
 “ before with twenty-four thousand Men; and
 “ wanted a Settlement and Habitations : That in a
 “ few Years, all the native *Gauls* would be driven
 “ from their Territories, and all the *Germans* trans-
 “ plant themselves over the *Rhine*, the Climate
 “ being far superior to that of their own Country,
 “ and the way of living not admitting a Com-
 “ parison : That *Ariovistus*, ever since the Defeat
 “ of the *Gauls* at *Amagetobria*, had behaved with
 “ unheard-of Tyranny and Haughtiness, demand-
 “ ing the Children of the first Nobility as Hostages,
 “ and exercising all manner of Cruelties upon
 “ them, if his Orders were not implicitly followed
 “ in every thing : That he was a Man of a savage,
 “ passionate, and imperious Character, whose
 “ Government was no longer to be born ; and un-
 “ less some resource was found in *Cæsar* and the
 “ People

BOOK I. " People of *Rome*, the *Gauls* must all follow the
 " Example of the *Helvetians*, and like them abandon their Country, in order to find some other
 " Habitation and Settlement, remote from the
 " *Germans*, wherever Fortune should point it
 " out to them : That were these Complaints and
 " Representations to come to the Knowledge of
 " *Ariovistus*, he made no doubt of his inflicting the
 " severest Punishments upon all the Hostages in
 " his Hands : but that it would be easy for
 " *Cæsar*, by his own Authority, and that of the
 " Army he commanded ; by the fame of his late
 " Victory, and the Terror of the *Roman* Name ; to
 " hinder any more *Germans* from passing the *Rhine* ;
 " and to defend *Gaul* from the Insults of *Ariovistus*."

XXIV. WHEN *Divitiacus* had made an end of speaking, all who were present, with many Tears, began to implore *Cæsar's* Aid. He observed that the *Sequani* alone did nothing of all this ; but pensive, and with downcast Looks, kept their Eyes fixed upon the Ground. Wondering what might be the Cause, he questioned them upon it. Still they made him no Answer, but continued silent, as before, with the same Air of Dejection. When he had interrogated them several times, without being able to obtain one Word in return, *Divitiacus* the *Æduan* again resumed the Discourse, and observed : " That the Condition of the *Sequani* was
 " by so much more deplorable and wretched than
 " that of the rest of the *Gauls* ; as they alone durst
 " not, even in secret, complain of their Wrongs, or
 " apply any where for Redress ; and no less dreaded
 " the Cruelty of *Ariovistus*, when absent, than if
 " actually present before their Eyes : That other
 " States had it still in their Power to escape by Flight ;
 " but the *Sequani*, who had received him into their
 " Territories,

“ Territories, and put him in possession of all their BOOK
 “ Towns, were exposed upon Discovery to every I.
 “ kind of Torment.” *Cæsar* being made acquainted
 with these Things, encouraged the *Gauls*, and
 promised to have a regard to their Complaints.
 He told them: “ That he was in great Hopes
 “ *Ariovistus*, induced by his Intercession, and the
 “ Authority of the People of *Rome*, would put an
 “ end to his Oppressions.” Having returned this
 Answer, he dismissed the Assembly.

XXV. MANY urgent Reasons occurred upon this Occasion to *Cæsar*, why he should consider seriously of the Proposals of the *Gauls*, and redress the Injuries of which they complained. He saw the *Æduans*, Friends and Allies of the People of *Rome*, held in Subjection and Servitude by the *Germans*, and compelled to give Hostages to *Ariovistus* and the *Sequani*; which, in the present flourishing State of the *Roman* Affairs, seemed highly dishonourable both to himself and the Commonwealth. He saw it likewise of dangerous Consequence, to suffer the *Germans* by little and little to transport themselves over the *Rhine*, and settle in great multitudes in *Gaul*. For that fierce and savage People, having once possessed themselves of the whole Country of *Gaul*, were but too likely, after the Example of the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, to break into the *Roman* Province, and thence advance to *Italy* itself; more especially as the *Rhone* was the only Boundary by which the *Sequani* were divided from the Territories of the Republick. It therefore appeared necessary to provide without Delay against these Evils; and the rather, because *Ariovistus* was become so insolent, and took so much upon him, that his Conduct was no longer to be endured.

BOOK XXVI. For these Reasons he thought proper to
 I. send Ambassadors to *Ariovistus*, to desire he would
 appoint a Place for an Interview, that they might
 discourse together about some publick Affairs of the
 highest Importance to them both. *Ariovistus* re-
 plied: " That if he had wanted any thing of
 " *Cæsar*, he would himself have waited on him for
 " that purpose; and if *Cæsar* had any thing to
 " desire of him, he must likewise come in Person
 " to demand it: That for his own part, he could
 " neither venture into these Provinces of *Gaul*
 " where *Cæsar* commanded without an Army,
 " nor bring an Army into the Field without great
 " Trouble and Expence: That he besides wondered
 " extremely, what Business, either *Cæsar*, or the
 " People of *Rome*, could have in his Division of
 " *Gaul*, which belong'd to him by right of Con-
 " quest." This Answer being reported to *Cæsar*,
 he again sent an Embassy to him to this effect:
 " That since, notwithstanding the great Obligations
 " he lay under both to himself and the People of
 " *Rome*, in having, during his Consulship, been de-
 " clared King and Ally by the Senate; he yet
 " manifested so little Acknowledgment to either, as
 " even to refuse an Interview, and decline treating
 " of Affairs that regarded the common Interest;
 " these were the Particulars he required of him:
 " First, not to bring any more *Germans* over the
 " *Rhine* into *Gaul*. Secondly, to restore the Hor-
 " stages he had taken from the *Æduans*, and per-
 " mit the *Sequani* likewise to do the same. Lastly,
 " to forbear all Injuries towards the *Æduans*, and
 " neither make War upon them nor their Allies.
 " That his Compliance with these Conditions
 " would establish a perpetual Friendship and
 " Amity between him and the People of *Rome*.
 " But if he refused Conditions so just; as the
 " Senate

“ Senate had decreed in the Consulship of *M. Messala* and *M. Piso*, that whoever had the charge of the Province of *Gaul*, should, as far as was consistent with the Interest of the Commonwealth, defend the *Eduans*, and the other Allies of the People of *Rome* ; he thought himself bound not to overlook their just Complaints.”

XXVII. To this *Ariovistus* replied : “ That by the Laws of War, the Conqueror had a right to impose what Terms he pleased upon the Conquered : That in consequence of this, the People of *Rome* did not govern the vanquished by the Prescriptions of another, but according to their own Pleasure : That if he did not intermeddle with the *Roman* Conquests, but left them to the free Enjoyment of their Rights, no more ought they to concern themselves in what regarded him : That the *Eduans* having tried the Fortune of War, had been overcome and rendered tributary ; and it would be the highest Injustice in *Cæsar* to offer at diminishing his just Revenues : That he was resolved not to part with the Hostages the *Eduans* had put into his hands ; but would nevertheless engage, neither to make War upon them nor their Allies, provided they observed the Treaty he had made with them, and regularly paid the Tribute agreed upon ; if otherwise, the Title of Friends and Allies of the People of *Rome* would be found to stand them but in little stead : That as to *Cæsar*’s Menace of not overlooking the Complaints of the *Eduans*, he would have him know, no one had ever entered into a War with *Ariovistus*, but to his own Destruction : That he might when he pleased bring it to a trial, and would, he doubted

“ not,

BOOK "not, soon be made sensible what the invincible

I. "Germans, trained up from their Infancy in the

"Exercise of Arms, and who for fourteen Years
"together had never slept under a Roof, were
"capable of atchieving."

XXVIII. AT the same time that *Cæsar* received this Answer, Ambassadors also arrived from the *Æduans* and *Treviri*. From the *Æduans*, to complain: "That the *Harudes*, who had lately come
"over into *Gaul*, were plundering their Territories;
"inasmuch, that even by their Submissions and
"Hostages they were not able to obtain Peace of
"*Ariovistus*." From the *Treviri*, to inform him:
"That an hundred Cantons of the *Suevians*, headed by two Brothers, *Nafua* and *Cimberius*, were
"arrived upon the Banks of the *Rhine*, with design
"to cross that River." *Cæsar* deeply affected with this Intelligence, determined to undertake the War without delay, left this new Band of *Suevians*, joining the old Forces of *Ariovistus*, should enable him to make a greater Resistance. Having therefore with all diligence provided for the Subsistence of his Army, he advanced towards him by great Marches.

XXIX. THE third Day he was informed that *Ariovistus* approached with all his Forces to take possession of *Vesontio*, the Capital of the *Sequani*; and that he had already got three Days March beyond his own Territories. *Cæsar* judged it by all means necessary to prevent him in this Design, as the Town itself was not only full of all sorts of warlike Ammunition, but likewise strongly fortified by Nature, and commodiously situated for carrying on the War. For the River *Doux* forming a Circle round it, as if described with a pair of Compasses,
leaves

leaves only an Interval of six hundred Feet, which is also inaccessible by reason of a very high and steep Mountain, whose Roots are washed on each Side by the River. This Mountain is shut in with a Wall, which forming a Citadel, joins it to the Town. Hither *Cæsar* marched Day and Night without intermission; and having possessed himself of the Place, put a Garrison into it.

XXX. WHILST he tarried here a few Days, to settle the Order of his Convoys and Supplies, the Curiosity of our Men, and the Talk of the *Gauls*, (who proclaimed on all Occasions the prodigious Stature of the *Germans*, their invincible Courage, and great Skill in Arms; insomuch that in the frequent Encounters with them, they had found it impossible to withstand their very Looks) spread such a sudden Terror thro' the whole Army, that they were not a little disturbed by the Apprehensions it occasioned. This Fear first began amongst the Military Tribunes, the Officers of the Allies, and others that had voluntarily followed *Cæsar* from *Rome*; who being but little acquainted with military Affairs, lamented the great Danger to which they fancied themselves exposed. Some of these, upon various Pretences, desired leave to return. Others, out of shame, and unwilling to incur the suspicion of Cowardise, continued in the Camp. But these last, incapable of putting on a chearful Countenance, and at times even unable to suppress their Tears, sculked in their Tents, either bemoaning their Fate, or discoursing with their Companions upon the common Danger. Wills were made all over the Camp, and the Consternation began to seize even those of more experience, the veteran Soldiers, the Centurions, and the Officers of the Cavalry. Such among them as affected a greater

BOOK shew of Resolution, said it was not the Enemy they

I. feared, but the narrow Passes and vast Forests that lay between them and *Ariovistus*, and the Difficulty there would be in furnishing the Army with Provisions. Some even told *Cæsar*, that when he gave Orders for marching, the Army, attentive to nothing but their Fears, would refuse to obey.

XXXI. CÆSAR observing the general Consternation, called a Council of War; and having summoned all the Centurions of the Army to be present, inveighed against them with great severity; for presuming to enquire, or at all concern themselves, which way, or on what design they were to march. "*Ariovistus*," he told them, "during his Consulship, had earnestly sought the Alliance of the *Roman* People. Why therefore should any one imagine, he would so rashly and hastily depart from his Engagements? That on the contrary, he was himself firmly persuaded, that as soon as he came to know his Demands, and the equal Conditions he was about to propose to him, he would be very far from rejecting either his Friendship, or that of the People of *Rome*. But if urged on by Madness and Rage, he was resolved upon War, what, after all, had they to be afraid of? Or why should they distrust either their own Bravery, or his Care and Conduct? That they were to deal with Enemies of whom trial had been already made in the memory of their Fathers, when by the Victory of *C. Marius* over the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, the Army itself acquired no less Glory than the General who commanded it: That trial had likewise been lately made of them in *Italy* in the servile War, when they had also the Advantage

“ vantage of being exercised in the *Roman* Disci-BOOK
 “ pline; on which Occasion it appeared, how I.
 “ much Resolution and Constancy were able to
 “ effect; since they had vanquished in the end those
 “ very Enemies armed and flushed with Victory,
 “ whom at first they had without Cause dreaded
 “ even unarmed. In fine, that they were the very
 “ same *Germans*, with whom the *Helvetians* had so
 “ often fought, not only in their own Country, but
 “ in *Germany* itself, and for the most part come off
 “ victorious, tho’ they had by no means been a
 “ match for our Army: That if the Defeat and
 “ Flight of the *Gauls* gave uneasiness to any, these
 “ would readily find upon enquiry, that *Arivistus*
 “ confining himself many Months to his Camp
 “ and Fastnesses, and declining a general Action,
 “ had thereby tired out the *Gauls* with the length
 “ of the War; who despairing at last of a Battle,
 “ and beginning to disperse, were thereupon attack-
 “ ed and routed, rather by Conduct and Craft,
 “ than the superior Valour of the *Germans*. But
 “ tho’ a Stratagem of this kind might take with
 “ rude and uncultivated People, yet could not
 “ even the *German* himself hope that it would avail
 “ against a *Roman* Army: That as to those who
 “ sheltered their Cowardise under the Pretence
 “ of narrow Passes, and the Difficulty of pro-
 “ curing Provisions, he thought it argued no small
 “ Presumption in them, either to betray such a
 “ distrust of their General’s Conduct, or offer
 “ to prescribe to him what he ought to do: That
 “ these things fell properly under his Care: That
 “ the *Sequani*, *Leuci*, and *Lingones* were to furnish
 “ him with Provisions: That the Corn was now
 “ ripe in the Fields; and that themselves would
 “ soon be Judges as to what regarded the Ways:
 “ That the Report of the Army’s refusing to obey
 “ him

BOOK

I.

“ him gave him not the least Disturbance; because
 “ he very well knew, that no General had ever
 “ been so far slighted by his Soldiers, whose ill
 “ Success, Avarice, or other Crimes, had not
 “ justly drawn that Misfortune upon him: That
 “ in all these respects he fancied himself secure,
 “ as the whole Course of his Life would witness
 “ for his Integrity, and his good Fortune had
 “ shewn itself in the War against the *Helvetians*:
 “ That he was therefore resolved to execute with-
 “ out delay, what he otherwise intended to have
 “ put off a little longer; and would give Orders
 “ for decamping the very next Night, three
 “ Hours before Day, that he might as soon as
 “ possible know, whether Honour and a Sense of
 “ Duty, or an ignominious Cowardise had the
 “ ascendant in his Army: Nay, that should all the
 “ rest of the Troops abandon him, he would
 “ nevertheless march with the tenth Legion alone,
 “ of whose Fidelity and Courage he had no man-
 “ ner of doubt, and which should serve him for
 “ his *Pretorian Guard*.” *Cæsar* had always prin-
 “ cipally favoured this Legion, and placed his chief
 Confidence in it, on account of its Valour.

XXXII. THIS Speech made a wonderful Change
 upon the Minds of all, and begot an uncommon
 Alacrity and Eagerness for the War. The tenth Le-
 gion in particular, returned him thanks by their
 Tribunes, for the favourable Opinion he had ex-
 press'd of them, and assured him of their readiness
 to follow him. Nor were the other Legions less
 industrious, by their Tribunes and principal Cen-
 turions; to reconcile themselves to *Cæsar*; protest-
 ing they had never either doubted or feared, nor
 ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to the
 General, to direct in matters of War. Having
 accepted

accepted of their Submission, and informed himself by means of *Divitiacus*, in whom of all the *Gauls* he most confided, that by taking a Circuit of above forty Miles, he might avoid the narrow Passes, and lead his Army thro' an open Country; he set forward three Hours after midnight, as he had said; and after a March of seven Days successively, understood by his Scouts, that he was within four and twenty Miles of *Ariovistus's* Camp.

XXXIII. *ARIOVISTUS* being informed of his Arrival, sent Ambassadors to acquaint him: "That he was now willing to accept of an Interview, as they were come nearer one another, and he believed it might be done without Danger." *Cæsar* did not decline the Proposal, imagining he was now disposed to listen to reason, since he offered that of his own accord, which he had before refused at his request: Neither was he without hope, that in regard of the Benefits he had received, both from himself and the People of *Rome*, he would, upon knowing his Demands, desist from his Obstinacy. The fifth Day after was appointed for the Interview. Mean-time, as Ambassadors were continually passing and repassing, *Ariovistus*, under pretence that he was afraid of an Ambuscade, demanded: "That *Cæsar* should bring no Infantry with him to the Conference: That they should both come attended by their Cavalry only: That otherwise he could not resolve to give him a meeting." *Cæsar* unwilling to drop the Design of the Interview; but neither caring to trust his Safety to the *Gauls*; thought the best way was, to dismount all the *Gallick* Cavalry, and give their Horses to the Soldiers of the tenth Legion, who had the greatest share of his Confidence; that in case of Danger, he might have a Guard on which

BOOK he could rely. This being done accordingly, one
 I. of the Soldiers of that Legion said pleasantly enough;
 { " That *Cæsar* had done even more than he had
 " promised ; that he had only given them hopes
 " of becoming his *Pretorian* Guard; and now he
 " had raised them to the Rank of Horse."

XXXIV. THERE was a large Plain, and in the
 midst of it a rising Ground of considerable height,
 equally distant from both Camps. At this Place,
 by Appointment, the Conference was held. *Cæsar*
 stationed the legionary Soldiers, whom he had
 brought with him on the Horses of the *Gauls*, two
 hundred Paces from the Mount. *Ariovistus* did
 the same with the *German* Cavalry. The Conver-
 sation was on horseback, each being accompanied
 by ten Friends or principal Officers, for so *Ario-*
vistus had desired. When they were come to the
 Place ; *Cæsar* began by putting him in mind of the
 Favours he had received both from himself and the
 People of *Rome* ; " That he had been stiled Friend
 " and Ally by the Senate; that very consider-
 " able Presents had been sent him; that these
 " Honours conferred by the *Romans* on very few,
 " and only for signal Services to the State, had
 " yet been bestowed on him, not on account of
 " any just Claim on his Side, but merely by the
 " Favour of *Cæsar*, and the Bounty of the Senate."
 He told him likewise, " of the just and ancient
 " Alliance between the *Romans* and the *Æduans* ;
 " of the many honourable Decrees of the Senate
 " in their Favour : That they had always held the
 " first Rank and Authority in *Gaul*, even before
 " their Alliance with *Rome* : That it was the con-
 " stant Maxim of the *Roman* People, not only to
 " defend their Friends and Allies in the possession
 " of their just Rights, but likewise to study the
 " Enlargement

“ Enlargement of their Honour, Interest, and BOOK
 “ Dignity: That it could never therefore be sup- I.
 “ posed, they would submit to see them strip of those
 “ Privileges which had belonged to them, before
 “ they were received into their Friendship.” In
 fine, he concluded with repeating the same Demands
 which he had before made by his Ambassadors;
 “ That he would not make War upon the *Æduans*
 “ or their Allies; that he would restore their
 “ Hostages; that if he could not oblige any of
 “ the *Germans* to repass the *Rhine*, at least he would
 “ suffer no more of them to come into *Gaul*.”

XXXV. ARIOVISTUS spoke little to *Cæsar*'s
 Demands, but enlarged greatly on his own Virtues:
 “ That he had crossed the *Rhine*, not of his own
 “ motion, but invited and intreated by the *Gauls*
 “ themselves: That the great Hopes and Expec-
 “ tations they had given him, had been his only
 “ Inducement to quit his Country and Relations:
 “ That he had Settlements in *Gaul* assigned by the
 “ *Gauls* themselves; Hostages voluntarily sent;
 “ and a Tribute in consequence of the Rights of
 “ War; it being the constant Practice of Con-
 “ querors, to impose that Mark of Subjection on
 “ those they had subdued: That he had not made
 “ War upon the *Gauls*, but the *Gauls* upon him:
 “ That though all their several States had united
 “ against him, and brought up their Forces with
 “ design to crush him, he had yet found means to
 “ vanquish and disperse them in one Battle: That
 “ if they were again resolved to try the Fortune
 “ of War, he was ready and prepared to receive
 “ them; but if they rather chose Peace, it was
 “ unjust in them to refuse a Tribute, which they
 “ had hitherto voluntarily paid: That the Friend-
 “ ship of the People of *Rome* ought to be an Ho-

“ nour and Security to him, not a Detriment ;
“ nor had he courted it in any other view : but
“ if by their Alliance he must submit to lose his
“ Tributes, and his Right over the People he had
“ subdued, he was no less willing to give it up,
“ than he had been ambitious to obtain it : That
“ he had indeed brought over a Multitude of
“ *Germans* into *Gaul*, yet not with any Design of
“ disturbing the Country, but merely for his own
“ Security; as appeared by his not coming but at
“ the Request of the Natives; and his not attack-
“ ing them, but defending himself: That his
“ Arrival in *Gaul* was prior to that of the *Romans*,
“ whose Army had never till that time passed the
“ Boundaries of their own Province. What could
“ they mean by coming into a Country that be-
“ longed to him? Or why should they concern
“ themselves with a part of *Gaul* that was no less
“ his Property, than the Province itself was that
“ of the People of *Rome*? If it would not be
“ allowable in him to make any Attempt upon
“ their Possessions, neither could they without In-
“ justice disturb him in the Enjoyment of his
“ Rights. That as to the pretence of Alliance
“ between the *Romans* and *Eduans*, he was not so
“ much a *Barbarian*, nor so wholly a Stranger to the
“ Affairs of the World, as not to know; that neither
“ had the *Eduans* assisted the *Romans*, in the late
“ War against the *Allobrogiens*; nor received any
“ Assistance from them, in their many Conflicts
“ with himself and the *Sequani*. That he ought to
“ be jealous of *Cæsar*'s pretended Regard to the
“ *Eduans*; and had but too much reason to suspect;
“ that the Continuance of the *Roman* Army in
“ *Gaul* could be with no other Design than that of
“ oppressing him. That if he did not therefore
“ depart, and withdraw his Troops out of those
“ Parts,

“ Parts, he would no longer look upon him as a BOOK
 “ Friend, but an Enemy. That he was well af- I.
 “ fured, should he even flay him in Battle, he }
 “ should do a Pleasure to many of the Nobles
 “ and great Men at *Rome*, who had explained
 “ themselves to him by Couriers, and whose Fa-
 “ vour and Friendship he might procure by his
 “ Death: but that if he would retire, and leave
 “ him in the undisturbed Possession of *Gaul*, he
 “ would not only amply reward him, but engage,
 “ at his own Cost and Hazard, to put an end to
 “ any War *Cæsar* should think fit to undertake.”

XXXVI. MANY Reasons were offered by *Cæsar*,
 in return to this Speech, why he could not depart
 from his first Demands: “ That neither his own
 “ Honour, nor that of the People of *Rome*, would
 “ suffer him to abandon Allies, who had deserved
 “ so well of the Commonwealth: That it no way
 “ appeared to him, wherein *Ariovistus* had a juster
 “ Claim to the Possession of *Gaul* than the *Romans*:
 “ That the *Avérni* and *Ruteni* had been subdued
 “ by *Q. Fabius Maximus*; who yet contented with
 “ their Submission, had neither reduced their
 “ Country into a Province, nor subjected it to a
 “ Tribute: That if Antiquity of Title was to
 “ decide, the *Romans* had an undoubted Right to
 “ the Sovereignty of *Gaul*: If, on the contrary,
 “ the Decree of the Senate was to take place,
 “ *Gaul* must remain free, and subject only to its
 “ own Laws.”

XXXVII. WHILEST these things passed at the
 Interview, *Cæsar* was informed, that *Ariovistus's*
 Cavalry were drawing nearer the Mount, and had
 even assaulted the *Romans* with Stones and Darts.
Cæsar immediately broke off the Conference, re-
 treated

BOOK treated to his own Men, and strictly charged them
 I. to forbear all Acts of Hostility towards the Enemy. He did not fear the Success of an Action, with that chosen Legion, against the *German* Cavalry; but he was willing to maintain a Conduct perfectly clear, and not give the Enemy the least handle to assert, that they had been treacherously drawn into an Ambuscade by a pretended Conference. When it was known in the Camp, with what haughtiness *Ariovistus* had behaved at the Interview; that he had ordered the *Romans* to depart out of *Gaul*; that his Cavalry had fallen upon *Cæsar's* Guard; and that an end had thereby been put to the Conference; a much greater Alacrity and Desire of fighting spread themselves thro' the whole Army.

XXXVIII. Two Days after, *Ariovistus* sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, to propose a renewal of the Negotiation begun; and that he would either again appoint a Day for a Conference, or depute some one to bring the Treaty to a Conclusion. *Cæsar* saw no reason for granting a second Interview, more especially when he considered, that the time before, the *Germans* could not be restrained from falling upon our Men. Neither was he inclined to send any of his principal Officers; it seeming too great a venture, to expose them to the Perfidy of these Barbarians. He therefore cast his Eyes upon *C. Valerius Procillus*, the Son of *C. Valerius Caburus*, a young Man of great Merit and Politeness, whose Father been made free of the City by *C. Valerius Flaccus*. His singular Integrity, and Knowledge of the Language of the *Gauls*, which *Ariovistus*, by reason of long stay in those Parts, spoke readily; fitted him in a particular manner for this Embassy: and, as he was likewise

likewise one towards whom it would no way avail BOOK
 the *Germans* to use any treachery, he thought him I.
 less liable to an Insult of that kind. *M. Mettius* }
 was joined in Commission with him, who was allied
 to *Ariovistus* by the rights of Hospitality. Their
 Instructions were, to hear the *German's* Proposals,
 and carry back a report of them to *Cæsar*. But no
 sooner were they arrived in *Ariovistus's* Camp, than
 in presence of the whole Army, calling out to know
 their Business, and whether they were come as Spies,
 he commanded them to be put in Irons, without
 suffering them to make any reply.

XXXIX. The same Day he came forward
 with all his Forces, and lodged himself under a
 Hill, about six Miles from our Camp. The Day
 after he went two Miles beyond it, to cut off
Cæsar's Communication with the *Æduans* and *Se-*
quani, from whom he received all his Provisions.
Cæsar, for five Days continually, drew up his
 Men in order of Battle before the Camp, that if
Ariovistus had a mind, he might not be without an
 Opportunity of coming to an Engagement. The
Germans kept all that time within their Lines; only
 we had daily Skirmishes with their Cavalry, whose
 manner of fighting was this. They had about
 six thousand Horse, who chose a like number out
 of the Foot, each his Man, and all remarkable for
 Strength and Agility. These continually accom-
 panied them in Battle, and served as a Rear-guard,
 to which, when hard pressed, they might retire:
 if the Action became dangerous, they advanced to
 their relief: if any Horseman was considerably
 wounded, and fell from his Horse, they gathered
 round to defend him; if speed was required, ei-
 ther for a hasty Pursuit, or sudden Retreat, they
 were become so nimble and alert by continual Ex-
ercise,

BOOK I. exercife, that laying hold of the Mains of the Horses, they could run as fast as they.

XL. CÆSAR finding that *Ariovistus* declined a Battle, thought it necessary to provide for the freedom of his Convoys. With this view he marked out a Place for a Camp, six hundred Paces beyond that of the Enemy, whither he marched with his whole Army drawn up in three Lines. The first and second Line had Orders to continue under Arms, and the third to employ themselves in fortifying the Camp. *Ariovistus* sent sixteen thousand light-armed Foot, and all his Horse, to alarm our Men, and hinder the Work. But *Cæsar* remained firm to his first Design, ordering the two Lines that continued under Arms to keep off the Enemy, and the third to go on with the Intrenchments. The Work being finished, he left two Legions there, with part of the Auxiliaries, and carried back the other four to his former Camp. The next Day he assembled all his Troops from both Camps, drew them up according to Custom, and offered the Enemy Battle: but they still refusing to come to an Engagement, he retired again about Noon. *Ariovistus* then detached part of his Forces to attack the lesser Camp. A sharp Conflict ensued, that lasted 'till Night. At Sun-set *Ariovistus* thought proper to sound a Retreat, after many Wounds given and received. *Cæsar* inquiring of the Prisoners, why *Ariovistus* so obstinately refused an Engagement, found: that it was the Custom among the *Germans*, for the Women to decide by Lots and Divination, when it was proper to hazard a Battle; and that these had declared, the Army could not be victorious, if they fought before the new Moon.

XLI.


XLI. THE Day after, *Cæsar* having left a sufficient Guard in his two Camps, ranged all the auxiliary Troops before the lesser Camp, placing them directly in view of the Enemy for the greater show, because the number of legionary Soldiers was but inconsiderable, compared with that of the *Germans*. Then advancing at the head of all his Forces in three Lines, he marched quite up to the Enemy's Camp. Upon this the *Germans*, compelled by Necessity, appeared before their Intrenchments; and having distributed their Troops by Nations, and disposed them at equal distances one from another, the *Harudes*, *Marcomani*, *Tribocci*, *Vangiones*, *Nemetes*, *Sabellians*, and *Suevians*; encompassed the whole Army with a Line of Carriages, to take away all hopes of Safety by Flight. The Women mounted upon these Carriages, weeping and tearing their Hair, conjured the Soldiers as they advanced to Battle, not to suffer them to become Slaves to the *Romans*. *Cæsar* having appointed a Lieutenant and Questor to each Legion, to serve as Witnesses of every Man's Courage and Behaviour, began the Battle in Person at the Head of the right Wing, observing the Enemy to be weakest on that side. The Signal being given, our Men charged so briskly, and the Enemy advanced so swiftly and suddenly to meet them, that the *Romans* not having time to throw their Darts, betook themselves immediately to their Swords. But the *Germans* quickly casting themselves into a Phalanx, according to the Custom of their Country, sustained the shock with great Firmness. Many of our Soldiers leaped upon the Phalanx, tore up the Bucklers of the Enemy with their Hands, and wounded those that lay under them. Their left Wing was soon routed and put to flight; but on the right they

BOOK I. they had the Advantage, and were like to overcome the *Romans* by their numbers. Young *Craffus*, who commanded the Cavalry, and was more at liberty than those immediately engaged in the Fight, observing this, made the third Line advance to support them. Upon this the Battle was renewed, and the Enemy every where put to the rout : nor did they cease their Flight 'till they had reached the Banks of the *Rhine*, about fifty Miles distant from the place of Combat. There only a few escaped ; some by swimming, others by Boats. Of this last number was *Ariovistus*, who embarking in a small Vessel he found by the edge of the River, got safe to the other side. All the rest were cut to pieces in the Pursuit by our Cavalry. *Ariovistus* had two Wives ; one a *Suevian*, whom he had brought with him from *Germany* ; the other a *Norican*, Sister to King *Vocion*, whom he had married in *Gaul*. Both perished in this Flight. Of his two Daughters, one was killed, the other taken Prisoner. *C. Valerius Procillus*, whom his Keepers dragged after them in their Flight, bound with a triple Chain, fell in with *Cæsar* in Person, as he was pursuing the *German* Cavalry. Nor was the Victory itself more grateful to that General, than his good Fortune in recovering out of the hands of the Enemy a Man, the most distinguished for his Probity of the whole Province of *Gaul*, his intimate and familiar Friend ; and to find the Joy and Success of that Day no way diminished or clouded, by the loss of a Person he so highly esteemed. *Procillus* told him, that Lots had been thrice drawn in his own presence, to decide whether he should be burnt alive upon the Spot, or reserved for another time ; and that the Lot three times favourable, had preserved his Life. *Mettius* was likewise recovered and brought.

XLII. THIS Battle being reported beyond the *Rhine*, the *Suevians*, who were advanced as far as the Banks of that River, thought proper to return to their own Country. But retreating in disorder and confusion, they were attacked by the *Ubians*, a People bordering upon the *Rhine*, and many of them cut to pieces. *Cæsar* having in one Campaign put an end to two very considerable Wars, went into Winter-quarters somewhat sooner than the Season of the Year required. He distributed his Army among the *Sequani*, left *Labienus* to command in his absence, and set out himself for *Cisalpine Gaul*, to preside in the Assembly of the States.

BOOK
I.

C. JULIUS



C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS in GAUL.
BOOK II.

VOL. I.

E

THE ARGUMENT.

- I. *The Confederacy of the Belgians against the People of Rome.* III. *The Rhemi submit upon the Approach of Cæsar.* IV. *And inform him of the Strength and Designs of the Confederates.* VI. *Cæsar passes the Axona with his Army.* VII. *Bibrax, a Town belonging to the Rhemi, assaulted by the Belgians.* VIII. *Cæsar relieves it, and obliges the Belgians to retire.* IX. *The Armies drawn up on both sides, but without coming to an Engagement.* XI. *The Belgians despairing of Success, decamp and return home.* XII. *Cæsar attacks their Rear, and makes great Slaughter.* XIII. *He then marches against the Sueffiones, and obliges them to submit.* XIV. *Advancing next into the Country of the Bellovaci, he pardons them at the Intercession of Divitiacus.* XVI. *The Ambiani surrender, but the Nervians stand on their Defence.* XXIII. *They are defeated however in a long and bloody Engagement, and almost all cut off.* XXIX. *Cæsar prepares to attack the Attuatici.* XXXI. *They submit.* XXXIII. *But falling treacherously upon the Romans during the Night,* XXXIV. *Are many of them cut to pieces, and the rest sold for Slaves.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
 OF HIS
WARS in GAUL.

B O O K I I .

IN the Winter, whilst *Cæsar* was in Hither *Gaul*, as we have intimated above; he was alarmed by frequent Reports, which were also confirmed by Letters from *Labienus*, that all the *Belgians*, who, as has been said, possessed one of the three Divisions of *Gaul*, had joined in a League against the People of *Rome*, and ratified it by an Exchange of Hostages. The Causes of this Confederacy were: First, their fear lest the *Romans*, having subdued all the rest of *Gaul*, should next turn their Arms against them: And then the Persuasions and Importunity of some among the *Celtæ*; many of whom, as they had greatly disliked the Neighbourhood of the *Germans* in *Gaul*, so were they no less displeased to see a *Roman Army* take up Winter-quarters and grow habitual in the Country: Others, from a Levity and Inconstancy of

BOOK Temper, were fond of every Project that tended

II. to a Revolution. In fine, some were influenced by ambitious Views, it being usual in *Gaul*, for such as were most powerful in their several States, and had Men and Money at command, to exercise a kind of Sovereignty over their Fellow-subjects, which they foresaw would be greatly checked by the Authority and Credit of the *Romans* in *Gaul*.

II. CÆSAR, roused by these Messages and Reports, levied two new Legions in Hither *Gaul*; and early in the Spring, sent *Q. Pedius* his Lieutenant to conduct them over the *Alps*. Himself, as soon as there began to be Forage in the Fields, came to the Army. He commissioned the *Senones*, and other *Gauls* who bordered on the *Belgians*, to inform themselves of the Motions and Designs of the Confederates, and send him from time to time an exact Account. They all agree in their Reports; that they were levying Troops, and drawing their Forces to a general Rendezvous. Whereupon thinking he ought no longer to delay marching against them, and having settled the necessary Supplies for his Army, he decamped, and in fifteen Days arrived on the Confines of the *Belgians*.

III. As his Approach was sudden, and much earlier than had been expected; the *Rhemi*, who of all the *Belgians* lay the nearest to *Celtic Gaul*, dispatched *Iccius* and *Autobrigius*, the two principal Men of their State, to represent to *Cæsar*: "That they put themselves and Fortunes under the Power and Protection of the *Romans*, as having neither approved of the Designs of the rest of the *Belgians*, nor had any share in their Confederacy against the People of *Rome*: That on the contrary, they were ready to give Hostages,

" to

“ to execute his Commands, to receive him into
 “ their Towns, and to furnish him with Corn and
 “ other Supplies for his Army: That indeed the
 “ rest of the *Belgians* were all in Arms, and that
 “ the *Germans* on this side the *Rhine* had asso-
 “ ciated with them: Nay, that so universal and
 “ prevalent was the Infatuation, they had not even
 “ been able to draw off the *Suessiones*, a People
 “ united to them by the nearest Ties of Blood
 “ and Friendship, who were subject to the same
 “ Laws, lived under the same Form of Govern-
 “ ment, and acknowledged but one common Ma-
 “ gistrate.”

IV. CÆSAR inquiring of the Ambassadors, what States had taken up Arms, of what Name and Consideration, and what Forces they could bring into the Field; found: That the *Belgians* were for the most part *Germans* originally, who having formerly crossed the *Rhine*, had been drawn by the Fertility of the Country to settle in those Parts, after driving out the ancient Inhabitants: That in the late Irruption of the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, when all the other Provinces of *Gaul* were over-run, they alone had ventured to stand upon their Defence; nor suffered the *Barbarians* to set foot in their Territories; whence it happened, that presuming on so well-known an Instance of their Bravery, they laid claim to great Authority, and challenged high military Renown. As to their Numbers, the *Rbethi* told him they could give him the most exact Information; because in consequence of their Affinity and Neighbourhood, they had Opportunities of knowing what Quota of Men each particular State had promised to furnish in the common Council of *Belgium*. “ That the *Bello-*
 “ *vaci* held the most distinguished Rank, as sur-



passing all the other States in Prowess, Authority, and Number of Forces: That they were able to muster an hundred thousand fighting Men, and had promised out of that Number sixty thousand chosen Troops, in consideration of which they demanded the whole Administration of the War. That next to them in Dignity were the *Suesshones*, a People bordering upon their own Territories, and possessed of a very large and fruitful Country, over which even of late Years *Divitiacus* had been King, one of the most powerful Princes of all *Gaul*, and who besides his Dominions in those Parts, reigned also over *Britain*: That their present Sovereign was *Galba*, whose singular Prudence and Justice had procured him, by the consent of all the Confederates, the supreme Command in the War: That these had within their Territories twelve fortified Towns, and promised to bring into the Field fifty thousand Men. That the like Number had been stipulated by the *Nervians*, who inhabiting the remotest Provinces of *Gaul*, were esteemed the most fierce and warlike of all the *Belgian* Nations. That the *Atrebatians* were to furnish fifteen thousand: The *Ambiani* ten thousand: The *Morini* twenty-five thousand: The *Menapians* nine thousand: The *Caletes* ten thousand: The *Velocassians* and *Veromanduan*s the like Number: The *Atuatici* twenty-nine thousand: And the *Condrusians*, *Eburones*, *Cerefians*, and *Pæmani*, all comprehended under the common Name of *Germans*, forty thousand.

V. CÆSAR exhorting the Men of *Rheims* to continue firm in their Alliance, and promising amply to reward their Fidelity, ordered the whole Body of their Senate to repair to his Camp, and the Sons
of

of their principal Nobility to be brought him as Hostages; all which was accordingly performed by the Day appointed. He then addressed himself to *Divitiacus* the *Æduan*, representing in the warmest manner, of what Consequence it was to the common Cause, to divide the Forces of the Enemy, that he might not be reduced to the Necessity of encountering so great a Multitude at once. This he told him, might easily be effected, if the *Æduans* would march their Forces into the Territories of the *Bellovaci*, to plunder and lay waste the Country. With these Instructions he dismissed them.

VI. MEAN-TIME, being informed by his Scouts, and the People of *Rheims*, that all the Forces of the *Belgians* were marching towards him in a Body, and that they were even advanced within a few Miles, he made all the haste he could to pass his Army over the *Axona*, which divides the *Rhemi* from the rest of the *Belgians*, and encamped on the farther side of that River. By this Situation he secured all behind him, covered one side of his Camp with the River, and rendered the Communication with the *Rhemi*, and those other States, whence he expected to be supplied with Provisions, safe and easy. Adjoining to his Camp was a Bridge over the River; there he placed a strong Guard, and left *Q. Titurius Sabinus* his Lieutenant on the other side with six Cohorts. He then drew round his Camp a Ditch eighteen Foot broad, strengthened with a Rampart twelve Foot high.

VII. THE *Belgians* in their March fell furiously upon *Bibrax*, a Town belonging to the *Rhemi*, about eight Miles distant from *Cæsar's* Camp. The Inhabitants with great difficulty held out against that

BOOK Day's Assault. The manner of storming a Town is

II. the same among the *Belgians* as among the *Gauls*:
 for having surrounded the Walls with the whole
 Body of their Army, and by a continual Discharge
 from their Slings cleared the Ramparts, they ap-
 proach the Gates under covert of their Bucklers, and
 undermine the Walls. This was easy in the present
 Case; because the Multitude employed in throwing
 Stones and Darts was so great, that none of the
 Garrison durst appear upon the Walls. When
 Night had put an end to the Assault, *Iccius*, who
 then commanded in the Town, a Man of princi-
 pal Rank and Authority among the *Rhemi*, and
 one of those who had come Ambassadors to *Cæsar*
 to treat about a Peace, dispatched Messengers to
 acquaint him, that unless he was speedily relieved,
 it would be impossible for him to hold out any
 longer.

VIII. HEREUPON *Cæsar*, making use of those
 for Guides who had come express to his Camp from
Iccius, detached about midnight a Party of *Cretan*
 and *Numidian* Archers, with some *Balearean* Sling-
 ers, to the assistance of the Garrison. Their Ar-
 rival encouraged the besieged to stand upon their
 defence, and inspired them with hopes of repul-
 sing the Enemy, who now began to despair of Suc-
 cess, when they heard that a Reinforcement had
 entered the Town. Wherefore, after a short stay
 before the Place, having plundered all the Country
 round about, and burnt the Houses and Villages
 wherever they came, they marched in a Body to-
 wards *Cæsar's* Camp, and posted themselves within
 two Miles of his Army, inclosing a space of more
 than eight thousand Paces in Circumference, as
 near as could be computed from the Smoke
 and Fires of their Camp,

IX.

IX. CÆSAR at first resolved to avoid coming to a Battle, as well on account of the numbers of the Enemy, as the high Opinion entertained of their Courage. He suffered the Horse however to engage daily in small Skirmishes, that he might the better judge of the Valour of the *Belgian* Troops, and the Resolution and Bravery of his own Men. Finding that the *Romans* were nothing inferior to the Enemy in Courage, he resolved to wait for them before his Camp; the Ground being very commodious, and as it were formed by Nature for the reception of an Army. For the Hill on which the Camp stood, rising with an easy ascent from the Plain, was but just of a sufficient breadth on the side facing the Enemy, to receive the several Lines of the Army drawn up in Order of Battle. On the right hand and on the left the descent was steep; whereby the Mountain swelling in front, but gradually abating its declivity as you advanced towards the Bottom, came at last to a Plain. Along each Side of the Hill *Cæsar* dug a Trench of about four hundred Paces in length, and built Forts at the Extremities, where he placed Engines to repulse the Enemy, should they offer to attack him in flank, or endeavour, during the Fight, to surround him with their numbers. These Dispositions being made, and having left the two new levied Legions in his Camp, as a Body of Reserve in case of Need, he drew up the other six in order of Battle. The *Belgians* likewise drew up their Troops, and stood fronting our Army.

X. BETWEEN *Cæsar* and the Enemy there was a small Morass. The *Belgians* waited to see if we would pass it: Our Men on the other hand were ready in Arms, that should the Enemy attempt to come

BOOK come over, they might fall upon them, and take

II. advantage of their Confusion. Mean-time the
 Cavalry on both sides engaged; but as neither Army would hazard the passage of the Morafs, *Cæſar*, who had the better in the Skirmiſh of the Horſe, led back his Men to their Camp. The *Belgians* marched directly towards the *Axona*, which, as we have ſaid, lay behind our Camp; and having found a Ford, endeavoured to paſs over part of their Army. Their Deſign was, if poſſible, to make themſelves maſters of the Fort where *Q. Titurius* commanded, and break down the Bridge; or, ſhould they fail in that Attempt, to ravage and lay waſte the Territories of the *Rbemi*, whence our Army was ſupplied with Proviſions.

XI. CÆSAR being informed of theſe things by *Titurius*, croſſed the Bridge with his Cavalry, light-armed *Numidians*, Archers, and Slingers, and marched to attack the Enemy. A very ſharp Conflict enſued: for the *Romans* falling upon them while they were yet paſſing the River, and by reaſon of their Diſorder unable to defend themſelves, ſlew great numbers. The reſt, who with undaunted Courage advanced upon the Bodies of their Companions, were repulſed by the Multitude of Darts from our Men; and the Cavalry ſurrounding thoſe that were already got over, put them all to the Sword. The *Belgians* being thus diſappointed, both in their Deſign upon *Bibrax*, and the Paſſage of the *Axona*; finding too that Proviſions began to be ſcarce, and that our Army could not be drawn to fight them at a diſadvantage, called a Council of War. It was there judged moſt expedient to ſeparate, and return every Man to his own Country; with a Reſolution however to aſſemble from all Parts, in defence of that State, whoſe Territories

Territories should be first invaded by the *Romans*: BOOK II.
 for they concluded it much safer to carry on the War at home, where they might have Provisions and every thing at command, than venture a Battle within the Confines of a foreign State. These Reasons were at the same time backed by a still more powerful Consideration: for the *Bellovaci* having Intelligence that *Divitiacus* and the *Aeduians* were advancing towards their Territories, could not be restrained from marching directly homewards, to defend their own Country.

XII. THIS Resolution being taken; about the second Watch of the Night, they left their Camp with great Noise and Tumult, regarding neither the Order of their March, nor the due Subordination of Command, but each Man pressing for the foremost Rank, that he might get the sooner home, inasmuch that their Retreat had all the Appearance of a precipitate Flight. *Cæsar*, who had immediate Notice of this from his Spies, apprehending some Stratagem, because he as yet knew nothing of the Reason of their Departure, would not stir out of his Trenches. But early in the Morning, upon more certain Intelligence of their Retreat, he detached all the Cavalry, under *Q. Pedius* and *L. Arunculeius Cotta*, his Lieutenants, to harass and retard them in their March. *T. Labienus* had Orders to follow with three Legions. These falling upon their Rear, and pursuing them many Miles, made a dreadful slaughter of the flying Troops. Whilst the Rear, upon finding themselves attacked, faced about, and valiantly sustained the Charge of our Men; the Vanguard, as fancying themselves out of danger, were not to be restrained either by Necessity or the Voice of their Commanders, but upon hearing the Alarm behind them, broke their Ranks,

BOOK Ranks, and betook themselves to flight. Thus
 II. the *Romans*, with little or no Loss on their side,
 continued the Slaughter all the remaining part of
 the Day. About Sun-set they gave over the Pursuit,
 and in obedience to the Orders they had received,
 returned to their Camp.

XIII. THE next Day, before the Enemy had time to rally, or recover out of their Consternation, *Cæsar* led his Army into the Territories of the *Suessiones*, which join to those of the *Rhemi*; and after a long March reached *Noviodunum*. He was in hopes of carrying the Town by Assault, because he understood it was destitute of a Garrison: but as the Ditch was broad, and the Wall very high, the Defendants, tho' few in number, withstood all his Efforts. Wherefore having fortified his Camp, he began to provide Engines, and get every thing in readiness for a Siege. Mean-time such of the *Suessiones* as had escaped the late Slaughter, threw themselves during the Night into the Town. But *Cæsar* advancing his Preparations with great Expedition, and approaching under cover of his Mantelets to the very Walls, where he cast up a Mount, and planted his battering Towers; the *Gauls* astonished at the Greatness of the Works, as having never seen or heard of any such before, and at the Dispatch wherewith they were carried on, sent Deputies to treat about a Surrender, and by the Mediation of the *Rhemi* obtained Conditions of Peace.

XIV. CÆSAR having received the principal Men of their State as Hostages, amongst whom were the two Sons of *Galba* their King; and obliged them to deliver up all their Arms, admitted the *Suessiones* to a Surrender, and led his Army against the *Bellovaci*. These retiring with their Effects
 into

into *Bratuspantium* their capital City, and under-BOOK
standing that *Cæsar* was advanced within five Miles II.
of the Town, sent a Deputation of all their old Men,
who came forth in venerable Proceſſion to meet
him, ſignifying by out-ſtretched Hands, and in
the moſt ſubmiſſive Terms, that they put them-
ſelves under his Power and Protection, nor pretend-
ed to appear in Arms againſt the People of *Rome* :
and when he approached ſtill nearer the City, and
encamped within view of the Walls, the Women
and Children from the Ramparts, with extended
Arms, according to the Cuſtom of their Country,
beſought the *Romans* for Peace.

XV. HEREUPON *Divitiacus*, who after the Re-
treat of the *Belgian* Army, had diſmiſſed the *Æ-*
duans, and returned to *Cæſar*'s Camp, interpoſed
in their behalf, repreſenting: “ That the *Bellovaci*
“ had always lived in ſtrict Friendſhip and Alli-
“ ance with the *Æduans* : That the artful Inſinua-
“ tions of their Chiefs, who miſrepreſented *Cæſar*,
“ as one that had enſlaved the *Ædunan* State, and
“ held it under an ignominious Tyranny and Op-
“ preſſion, had alone induced them to forſake their
“ ancient Allies, and take up Arms againſt the
“ People of *Rome* : That the Authors of this
“ Advice, ſeeing its pernicious Effects; and the
“ Ruin they had brought upon their Country,
“ were retired into *Britain* : That not only the *Bel-*
“ *lovaci* themſelves, but the *Æduans* too, in their
“ behalf, implored his Clemency and Forgiveneſs :
“ That in granting their Requeſt, he would greatly
“ enlarge the Credit and Authority of the *Æduans*
“ among the *Belgian* States ; which was of ſo much
“ the greater moment, as in all their Wars they
“ were wont to have recourſe to them for Aſſiſt-
“ ance.” *Cæſar*, out of regard to *Divitiacus* and the

BOOK II. the *Eduans*, promised to grant them Pardon and Protection; but as they were possessed of very extensive Territories, and surpassed in Power and number of Forces all the other *Belgian* States, he demanded six hundred Hostages.

XVI. THESE being accordingly delivered, together with all their Arms, *Cæsar* left their City, and advanced into the Country of the *Ambiani*; who submitted immediately upon his Approach. Adjoining to them were the *Nervians*; of whose Manners and Genius *Cæsar* inquiring, found: "That they suffered no resort of Merchants into their Cities, nor would allow of the importation of Wine, or other Commodities tending to Luxury; as imagining that thereby the Minds of Men were enfeebled, and their martial Fire and Courage extinguished: That they were Men of a warlike Spirit; but altogether unacquainted with the Refinements of Life: that they continually inveighed against the rest of the *Belgians*, for ignominiously submitting to the *Roman* Yoke, and abandoning the steady Bravery of their Ancestors: In fine, that they had openly declared their Resolution, of neither sending Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, nor accepting any Terms of Peace." *Cæsar*, after a March of three Days cross their Territories, understood from some Prisoners: "That he was now advanced within ten Miles of the *Sambre*, on the other side of which the Enemy had posted themselves, and there waited the coming up of the *Romans*: That they had been joined by the *Atrebatians* and *Veromanduns*, neighbouring Nations, whom they had persuaded to take part in, and share the Fortune of the War: That they expected also to be reinforced by the *Atuatici*, who were already on their

“ their March: And that all their Women, and
 “ such as on account of their Age were unfit to
 “ bear Arms, had been conveyed to a Place of
 “ safety, inaccessible by reason of the Marshes
 “ that surrounded it.”

BOOK II.

XVII. CÆSAR, upon this Intelligence, sent his Scouts and Centurions before, to choose out a convenient Place for his Camp. Mean-time, as many of the *Belgians* who had lately submitted, and also not a few *Gauls*, followed the *Roman* Army; some of these, as was afterwards known from the Prisoners, observing the Order and Disposition of our March, deserted in the Night to the Enemy, and informed them: “ That the several Legions were separated from one another, by a number of Carriages posted between them: that they would therefore have a favourable Opportunity, as soon as the first Legion was arrived in the Camp, and while the rest were yet a great way behind, of falling upon it incumbered with the Baggage, and obtaining an easy Victory; by which, and the Plunder of the Carriages, they would strike such a terror thro’ the whole Army, as must necessarily draw after it a total Defeat.” This Advice was the more readily listened to, because of old the *Nervians*, being very weak in Horse, (nor even as yet have they greatly increased their Strength this way, placing their whole Confidence in their Foot,) in order to secure themselves against the Inroads of the Cavalry of the neighbouring Nations, had every where fortified the Country with Barricades of young Trees; which being split in the middle, and bent down on both sides; the void Spaces were so closely interwoven with Brambles, Thorns, and a multitude of Boughs,
 issuing

BOOK issuing from the Trees themselves, that they formed

II. a Fence not only impossible to be passed, but even to be seen through. As these therefore must greatly impede and perplex the March of the *Roman* Army, they thought the Advice given them by the *Belgians* was by no means to be neglected.

XVIII. THE Place chosen by our Men for their Camp was a Hill, running with an even descent from the summit 'till it reached the Banks of the *Sambre*. Directly opposite to this, on the farther side of the River, and at the distance of about two hundred Paces, was another Hill, of a like acclivity with the former, plain and open round the Bottom, but covered on the Top with Woods, so thick that they hindered the Prospect. Among these Woods the Enemy lay concealed, and only a few Squadrons of Horse appeared on the open Ground by the River-side, whose depth in that Place did not exceed three Foot.

XIX CÆSAR having sent the Cavalry before, followed himself with the rest of the Army. But the Order and Disposition of his March differed from the Account given in to the Enemy by the *Belgians*. For knowing that the *Nervians* were near, he led up six Legions in front, ready equipped for Battle, according to his usual Custom. After them followed the Baggage of the whole Army; and then the two new Legions, who closed the March and served as a Guard to the Carriages. Mean-time the *Roman* Cavalry, with the Slingers and Archers, having passed the River, engaged the Enemy's Horse: but as they retired from time to time into the Woods, and again sallied upon our Men, who durst not pursue them beyond

the open Ground ; the six Legions that formed the **BOOK**
 Van coming up during these successive Rencoun- **H.**
 ters, began to intrench themselves. When the first
 Line of our Carriages appeared within sight of
 those that lay concealed in the Woods, which was
 the time previously concerted by the Enemy for
 giving the Onset : the *Nervians*, who stood ready
 drawn up within the Thicket, and had mutually
 exhorted one another to a resolute Behaviour, rush-
 ed suddenly forward with all their Forces, and fell
 furiously upon our Cavalry. These being easily
 repulsed and broken ; they ran down with incredi-
 ble speed to the *Sambre*, insomuch that at one and
 the same instant, they seemed to be in the Woods,
 in the River, and charging our Men on the
 other side. Nor were they less expeditious in
 mounting the Hill, and attacking those who were
 employed in fortifying the Camp.

XX. Now had *Cæsar* all the Parts of a Gene-
 ral upon his hands at once : to erect the Standard,
 which was the Signal for the Men to fly to Arms :
 to proclaim the Battle by sound of Trumpet : to
 draw off the Soldiers from the Works : to recal
 those that were gone to fetch Materials for the
 Rampart : to draw up the Army in Order of
 Battle : to encourage his Men : and give the Word
 of Onset : in most of which he was prevented by
 the shortness of the Time, and the sudden Assault
 of the Enemy. In this Emergency, two things
 chiefly contributed to the Preservation of the *Ro-
 mans* : one, the Ability and Experience of the
 Soldiers, who practised in former Battles, knew
 their Duty, and what was expedient in the present
 Conjunction, no less than the Officers themselves :
 the other, the Orders given by *Cæsar* to his several
 Lieutenants, not to quit the Works, and the Le-

BOOK II. gions where they commanded, 'till the Fortifications of the Camp were finished. For these, upon seeing the Danger, and sudden Approach of the Enemy, waited not for new Instructions from the General, but gave forth such Orders, as their own Prudence, and the present Necessity suggested.

XXI. CÆSAR having made the necessary Dispositions, ran to encourage his Men; and, as Chance ordered it, fell in with the tenth Legion. When exhorting them in few Words to exert their wonted Bravery, and manfully sustain the Assault without Terror or Dismay; as he saw the Enemy within reach of Dart, he gave the Signal to engage. Hastening thence to another quarter of the Field, he found the Battle already begun. So short was the time allowed us to prepare ourselves, and such the Resolution and Impetuosity of the *Nervians* in rushing to the Encounter, that neither could the Officers find leisure to regulate the Ensigns, nor the Soldiers to put on their Helmets, or uncase their Targets. Each Man, as he arrived from the Works, joined himself to the first Standard that came in his way, that he might not lose that time in looking for his own Company, which was to be employed in fighting the Enemy.

XXII. THE Army being drawn up, rather according to the nature of the Place, the declivity of the Hill, and the particular necessity of the Time; than agreeable to Order and the Rules of War: as the Legions were forced to engage separately, some in one Place, some in another; and the View of the Fight was every where interrupted by the thick Hedges described above: it was not possible in these Circumstances, to distinguish with any certainty, where to send the necessary Supplies;
how

how to provide against the Exigencies of the Field; nor indeed for one Man to have an Eye to all the Occurrences that called for Notice and Redress. In such an unequal Situation of Things therefore, much room was left for the various Events and Interposition of Fortune.

BOOK
II.

XXIII. THE Soldiers of the ninth and tenth Legions, who were upon the left of the Army, having cast their Darts, advanced against the *Atrebatians*, with whom it was their fortune to engage. These now weary, breathless, and overpowered with Wounds, were quickly driven from the higher Ground quite back to the *Sambre*, where the *Romans* still pressing them Sword in hand, slew great numbers as they endeavoured to pass the River. Nor did our Men decline pursuing them to the other side: but following too far, 'till they were drawn into a Place of disadvantage, the Enemy suddenly faced about, and renewed the Charge; yet were a second time obliged to betake themselves to flight. So likewise, in another quarter of the Field, the eleventh and eighth Legions, having overthrown the *Veromandians* against whom they fought, drove them from the higher Ground to the very Banks of the River.

XXIV. As by this means the Front, and left side of the *Roman* Camp, lay in a manner quite exposed; for the twelfth Legion, and not far from that the seventh, were posted in the right Wing: the *Nervians* headed by *Boduognatus* their King, advanced thither in a close Body; and whilst one Party endeavoured to surround the Legions by taking them in flank, the rest mounted the Hill in order to get possession of the Camp. At the same time our Cavalry, with the light-armed Infan-

BOOK

II.

try, who in the very beginning of the Engagement had been repulsed and broken, as we have related above; returning to the Camp, and meeting the Enemy in Front, again betook themselves to flight. The Servants too of the Army, who from the Top of the Hill had beheld our Men victorious, and pursuing the Enemy cross the River; having sallied out for the sake of Plunder: when they now looked back, and saw the *Nervians* in possession of the Camp, fled with the utmost Precipitation. This Confusion was still more increased by the Clamour and Uproar of those that attended the Carriages; insomuch that the Panick spreading on all sides, each Man thought of providing for his Safety by Flight. The Cavalry of *Treves*, who were in the highest Esteem among the *Gauls* for their Valour, and had been sent by the State to reinforce *Cæsar's* Army; alarmed by these several Appearances: when they saw our Camp filled with Multitudes of the Enemy; the Legions overpowered, and in a manner quite surrounded; the Horse, Archers, Slingers, and *Numidians*, routed, dispersed, and flying on all hands: imagining all was lost, returned to their own Country, and reported; that the *Romans* were utterly overthrown, and their Camp and Baggage in possession of the Enemy.

XXV. CÆSAR having encouraged the tenth Legion, hastened to the right Wing of the Army. He there found his Men overpowered by the Enemy; the Ensigns of the twelfth Legion all crowded into one place, and the Soldiers themselves standing so close together, that they had not room to use their Arms; all the Centurions of the fourth Cohort slain, the Standard-bearer killed, and the Standard taken; the Centurions of the other Cohorts

ports almost all either killed or dangerously wounded; among these *P. Sextius Baculus*, the first Centurion of the Legion, a Man of great Courage, so weakened by the multitude of his Wounds, that he was hardly able to support himself; the rest discouraged and avoiding the Fight, and some even running away, because abandoned by the Troops that were to sustain them; the Enemy pressing vigorously in Front from the lower Ground, and at the same time flanking the Legions on either side with great Fury; in a word, things reduced to the last Extremity, and no Body of Reserve to restore the Battle. Whereupon snatching a Buckler from a Soldier who stood in the Rear of the Legion, for he himself was come thither without one; and pressing to the Front of the Battle; he called the Centurions by Name, encouraged the rest, and commanded the Soldiers to advance the Ensigns, and widen their Ranks, that they might be the more at liberty to use their Swords. His Arrival inspiring the Men with Hope, and reviving their Courage, as every one was ambitious of distinguishing himself in the presence of his General, and even in his greatest Extremity, redoubled his Efforts; the Progress of the Enemy was a little checked.

XXVI. *CÆSAR* observing that the seventh Legion, which fought at some distance from the other, was likewise very much pressed by the Enemy, commanded the military Tribunes to draw the two Legions together by degrees, and joining them back to back, oppose the Enemy with a double Front. This being done; as they were now in a Condition to support each other, and no longer feared being surrounded, they began to make a more vigorous Opposition, and fight with greater Courage. Mean-time the two new Legions that formed the Rear of our Army, and had been ap-

BOOK pointed to guard the Baggage; hearing of the
 II. Battle, advanced with all possible speed, and were
 seen by the *Nervians* from the top of the Hill:
 and *T. Labienus*, who had made himself Master of
 the Enemy's Camp, observing from the higher
 Ground how matters went on our side, detached
 the tenth Legion to our assistance. These under-
 standing, by the Flight of our Cavalry and Servants,
 the Distress we were in, and the Danger that
 threatened the Camp, the Legions, and the General,
 made all the haste they could to join us.

XXVII. THE Arrival of this Detachment pro-
 duced so great a Change in our Favour, that many
 of the Soldiers, who before lay oppressed with
 Wounds, now resuming Courage, and supporting
 themselves with their Shields, renewed the Fight.
 Nay the very Servants of the Camp observing the
 Consternation of the Enemy, unarmed as they
 were, rushed amongst their armed Battalions. The
 Cavalry too, striving by extraordinary Efforts of
 Valour to wipe away the Ignominy of their late
 Flight, charged the Enemy in all Places where
 the void Spaces between the Legions suffered
 them to advance. Mean-time the *Nervians*, tho'
 now reduced to the last Extremity, exerted them-
 selves with such determined Courage, that their
 front Ranks being cut off, those who stood behind
 mounted the Bodies of the slain, and thence con-
 tinued to maintain the Fight; and when these too
 by their Fall had raised a Mountain of Carcases,
 such as remained ascending the Pile, poured their
 Javelins upon us as from a Rampart, and even
 returned the Darts thrown at them by our Men.
 Fame therefore deceived not in proclaiming so
 loudly the Bravery of a People, who thus adven-
 tured to cross a very broad River, climb the steepest

Banks

Banks, and rush upon an Enemy possessed of all the Advantages of Ground: Difficulties, which though seemingly unfurmountable, appeared yet as nothing to Men of their Resolution and Magnanimity.

XXVIII. THE Battle being ended, and the Name and Nation of the *Nervians* in a manner quite extinguished; the old Men, who with the Women and Children, as we have related above, had been conveyed into a Place surrounded with Bogs and Marshes; hearing of this terrible Overthrow, and judging that nothing would now be able to stop the Progress of the Conquerors, or protect the Conquered from their victorious Arms, resolved, with the Consent of all that survived the late Disaster, to send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, and surrender themselves. These in reciting the Calamities of their Country, represented: That of six hundred Senators, there remained only three; and that from sixty thousand fighting Men, they were reduced to five hundred. *Cæsar*, as a proof of his Compassion towards this brave and unfortunate People, readily took them under his Protection, allowing them free and full Possession of their Towns and Territories, and strictly commanding all the neighbouring Nations, to abstain from Injuries and Wrongs.

XXIX. THE *Atuatici*, of whom mention has been made above, being upon their march with all their Forces to join the *Nervians*, and hearing of their Defeat, immediately returned home: when abandoning all their other Towns and Castles, they conveyed themselves and their Riches into a Place of great Strength, which Nature had fortified with uncommon Care. For it was on every side sur-

BOOK rounded with high Rocks and Precipices, having

II. only one Avenue of about two hundred Foot broad, that approached the Town with a gentle rising. Here they raised a double Wall of prodigious height, whereon, as a farther Security, they laid great numbers of huge Stones, and strong pointed Beams. This People were descended from the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, who in their March towards the *Alps* and *Italy*, left their heavy Baggage on this side the *Rhine*, with a Detachment of six thousand Men to guard it. These, after the final Overthrow of their Countrymen, being for many Years harassed and persecuted by the neighbouring States; sometimes invading others, sometimes defending themselves; at last, with the Consent of all the bordering Nations, obtained Peace, and chose this Place for a Habitation.

XXX. On the first Arrival of the *Roman* Army, they made frequent Sallies from the Town, and engaged our Men in small Skirmishes. But *Cæsar* having drawn a Line of Contravallation, twelve Feet high, fifteen Miles in Circumference, and every where well fortified with Redoubts; they kept themselves within their Walls. When we had now finished our Approaches, cast up a Mount, and were preparing a Tower of Assault behind the Works; they began at first to deride us from the Battlements, and in reproachful Language ask the meaning of that prodigious Engine, raised at such a distance! With what Hands or Strength, Men of our size and make, (for the *Gauls*, who are for the most part very tall, despise the small stature of the *Romans*,) could hope to bring forward so unwieldy a Machine against their Walls?

XXXI.

XXXI. But when they saw it removed, and approaching near the Town, astonished at the new and unusual Appearance, they sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to sue for Peace. These being accordingly introduced, told him: “ That they doubted not but the *Romans* were aided in their Wars by the Gods themselves; it seeming to them a more than human Task, to transport with such facility an Engine of that amazing height, by which they were brought upon a level with their Enemies, and enabled to engage them in close Fight. That they therefore put themselves and Fortunes into his Hands, requesting only, that if his Clemency and Goodness, of which they had heard so much from others, had determined him to spare the *Atuatici*, he would not deprive them of their Arms: That the neighbouring Nations were almost all their Enemies, as envying their superior Valour; nor would it be possible for them to defend themselves from their Attacks, if their Arms were taken away: In fine, that if such must be their Fate, they would rather choose to undergo any Fortune from the Hands of the *Romans*, than expose themselves to be cruelly butchered by those over whom they had been wont to exercise dominion.”

XXXII. To this *Cæsar* replied: “ That in regard of his usual Conduct on these Occasions, rather than for any merit of theirs, he was willing to grant them Terms of Peace, provided they submitted before the Battering-Ram touched their Walls; but that no Surrender would be accepted unless they agreed to deliver up their Arms: That he would take the same care of them as he had before done of the *Nervians*, and
“ lay

BOOK II. "lay his exprefs Commands upon the neighbour-
 "ing Nations, to abstain from all Injuries to-
 "wards a People who had put themselves under
 "the Protection of the *Romans*." The Ambassa-
 dors returning with this Answer to their Country-
 men, they accepted in Appearance the Conditions
 offered them by *Cæsar*, and threw so vast a Quantity
 of Arms into the Ditch before the Town, that the
 Heap almost reached to the top of the Wall.
 Nevertheless, as was afterwards known, they re-
 tained about a third part, and concealed them
 privately within the Town. The Gates being
 thrown open, they enjoyed Peace for the remain-
 ing part of that Day.

XXXIII. IN the Evening *Cæsar* ordered the
 Gates to be shut, and the Soldiers to quit the Town,
 that no Injury might be offered to the Inhabitants
 during the Night. Whereupon the *Atuatici*, in
 consequence of a Design they had before concerted,
 imagining that the *Romans*, after the Surrender of
 the Place, would either set no Guard at all, or at
 least keep watch with less Precaution: partly
 arming themselves with such Weapons as they had
 privately retained, partly with Targets made of Bark
 or Wicker, and covered over hastily with Hides;
 made a furious Sally about midnight with all
 their Forces, and charged our Works on that side
 where they seemed to be of easiest Access.

XXXIV. THE Alarm being immediately given
 by lighting Fires, as *Cæsar* had before commanded,
 the Soldiers ran to the Attack from the neigh-
 bouring Forts. A very sharp Conflict ensued: for
 the Enemy now driven to Despair, and having no
 hope but in their Valour, fought with all possible
 Bravery, though the *Romans* had the Advantage

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

75

of the Ground, and poured their Javelins upon them both from the Towers and the top of the Rampart. About four thousand were slain upon the spot, and the rest obliged to retire into the Town. Next Day the Gates were forced, no one offering to make the least Resistance; and the Army having taken possession of the Place, the Inhabitants, to the Number of fifty-three thousand, were sold for Slaves.

BOOK
II.

XXXV. ABOUT the same time *P. Crassus*, whom *Cæsar* had sent with a Legion against the *Venetians*, *Unellians*, *Osismians*, *Curiosolitæ*, *Sesuvians*, *Aulerci*, and *Rhedones*, Maritime States inhabiting along the Sea-coast; dispatched Messengers to acquaint him, that all these Nations had submitted to the Dominion and Authority of the *Romans*.

XXXVI. THE Campaign being ended, and all the Provinces of *Gaul* subdued; such was the Opinion conceived of this War amongst all the *Barbarians* round about, that even the Nations beyond the *Rhine* sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, offering to give Hostages, and submit to his Commands. But he being then in haste to return to *Italy* and *Illyricum*, ordered them to attend him the next Spring. Mean-time, having disposed his Army into Winter-quarters in the Territories of the *Andes*, *Turones*, and *Carnutes*, which States lay the nearest to the Provinces that had been the seat of the War, he himself set out for *Italy*. The Senate being informed of these Successes by *Cæsar's* Letters, decreed a Thanksgiving of fifteen Days: a Number never allowed to any General before.

C. JULIUS



C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in *GAUL.*

BOOK III.

THE ARGUMENT.

- I. *The Nantuates, Veragrians, and Seduni, fall unexpectedly upon Ser. Galba, Cæsar's Lieutenant.*
III. *But are overthrown with great Slaughter.* VI. *Galba leads back his Legion into the Country of the Allobrogians.* VII. *At the same time the Venetians and other States bordering upon the Ocean revolt.*
IX. *Cæsar prepares to attack them, not without great Difficulty.* X. *He divides his Army, and distributes it into the several Provinces of Gaul.*
XII. *The Advantages of the Venetians, and the manner of their Defence.* XIII. *A Description of their Shipping, and its suitableness to the nature of the Coast.* XIV. *Cæsar finding it in vain to attack them by Land, comes to a naval Engagement with them, and gets the Victory.* XVII. *Meantime Q. Titurius Sabinus his Lieutenant, by an artful Stratagem defeats the Unellians.* XXI. *At the same time P. Crassus in Aquitain, having vanquished the Sotiates, obliges them to submit,*
XXIV. *Together with several other States of the same Province.* XXIX. *Cæsar attacks the Morini and Menapians with success; but the Season being far advanced, he is obliged to send his Army into Winter-quarters.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR'S
COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

B O O K III.

I. **C**ÆSAR, upon his departure for *Italy*, sent *Sergius Galba* with the twelfth Legion, and part of the Cavalry, against the *Nantuates*, *Veragrians*, and *Seduni*, whose Territories extend from the Confines of the *Allobrogians*, the Lake *Lemanus*, and the River *Rhone*, all the way to the top of the *Alps*. His design in this Expedition was to open a free passage over those Mountains to the *Roman* Merchants, who had hitherto travelled them with great danger, and subject to many grievous Exactions. *Galba*, whose Orders also were, to put the Legion into Winter-quarters in those parts, if he saw it necessary; after some successful Encounters, and making himself master of several Forts, was addressed by Ambassadors from all Nations round. Having settled the Terms of Peace, and received Hostages
for

BOOK for their Fidelity ; he resolved to quarter two Co-

III. horts among the *Nantuates* ; and himself, with the other Cohorts, to winter in a Town of the *Veragrians*, called *Oftodurus*. This Town, which is situated in the midst of a Valley, upon a Plain of no great extent, is bounded on all sides by very high Mountains. As it was divided into two parts by a River, he left one part to the *Gauls*, and assigned the other to his Legion for their Winter-quarters, commanding it to be fortified with a Ditch and Rampart.

II. AFTER many Days spent here, and that Orders had been given for the bringing in of Corn to supply the Camp ; he was suddenly informed by his Spies, that the *Gauls* had abandoned in the Night that part of the City allotted to them, and that the impending Mountains were covered with great multitudes of the *Veragrians* and *Seduni*. Many Reasons conspired to induce the *Gauls* to this sudden Resolution of renewing the War, and falling upon our Men. First, the small number of the *Roman* Troops, who were therefore despised by the Enemy, as not amounting in all to one Legion ; two entire Cohorts having been detached, and even of those that remained with *Galba*, many being gone out in quest of Provisions : and then their Persuasion, that by reason of the inequality of the Ground, where it would be easy for them to pour upon us from the tops of the Mountains, and overwhelm us with their Darts, our Men would not be able to stand the very first Assault. Add to all this their inward Regret, at seeing their Children torn from them under the name of Hostages ; and that they firmly believed it to be the design of the *Romans*, in seizing the summits of the Mountains, not only to open a free Passage over the *Alps*, but
of

to secure to themselves the perpetual Possession of those Parts, and annex them to the adjoining Province. BOOK III.

III. UPON this Intelligence *Galba*, who had neither compleated the Fortifications of his Camp, nor laid in sufficient store of Corn and other Provisions; as little apprehending an Insurrection of this kind, among a People that had submitted and given Hostages; having speedily assembled a Council of War, began to ask their Advice in the present Exigence. As the Danger which threatened them was sudden and unexpected, and as they saw the Mountains on every side covered with multitudes of armed Soldiers; insomuch that there was no room to hope, either for Succours, or any Convoys of Provision, because the Enemy were in possession of all the Avenues to the Camp: some believing the Case to be altogether desperate, proposed to abandon the Baggage, and attempt by a Sally the recovery of their old Quarters. But the greater number were for reserving this Expedient to the last extremity, and in the mean time to wait the decision of Fortune, and in the best manner they were able defend the Camp.

IV. AFTER a short Space, and even before there was sufficient time for the putting in execution what had been resolved on; the Enemy, at a Signal given, came rushing upon us from all parts, and begun the Assault by a shower of Stones and Darts. Our Men at first made a brave and vigorous Resistance, plying them with their Javelins from the Ramparts, whence not a single Weapon was discharged in vain: and as any part of the Camp appeared hard pressed for want of Men to defend it, thither they ran, and made head against

BOOK III. the Affailants. But in this the *Gauls* had greatly the Advantage, that when fatigued with the length of the Fight, they found themselves under a necessity to retire, fresh Men succeeded in their place ; whereas on our side, by reason of the small number of Troops, no resource of this kind was left: so that not only such as were wearied with fighting were yet obliged to continue in their Posts ; but we could not even permit the wounded to retire, or for a Moment abandon the Charge.

V. THE Battle had now lasted upwards of six Hours without Intermiffion ; infomuch that the *Romans* not only found their Strength greatly exhausted, but even began to be in want of Weapons, wherewith to annoy the Enemy. The *Gauls*, on the other hand, urged the Combat with greater Fury than ever ; and meeting with but a faint Resistance, fell to demolishing the Rampart and filling up the Ditch. All was giving way before them, when *P. Sextius Baculus*, a Centurion of the first Rank, the same, who as we have related above, received so many Wounds in the Battle against the *Nervians* ; as likewise *C. Volusenus*, a military Tribune, one equally distinguished for his Conduct and Bravery ; came to *Galba*, and represented : That the only Refuge now left, was by a sudden Sally, to put all upon the issue of a bold Attack. Accordingly *Galba*, calling the Centurions together, by them gave immediate Notice to the Soldiers, to keep for some time only on the defensive ; and having provided themselves with the Weapons thrown at them by the Enemy, and a little recovered their Strength, upon a Signal given, to sally out of the Camp, and place all their hopes of Safety in their Valour. These Orders were exactly followed : and the *Romans* rushing furiously upon the Enemy,
from

from all parts, neither gave them time to comprehend the meaning of so unexpected an Attack, nor to recover out of the Confusion into which it had thrown them. Thus Fortune, changing Sides, they every where surrounded and put to the Sword the *Gauls*, who had so lately entertained hopes of mastering our Camp. Of thirty thousand armed Troops, which Number, as appeared afterwards, were present in this Assault, more than ten thousand perished in the Field. The rest fled in great Terror and Confusion, and were even forced to abandon the Summits of the Mountains. The *Romans* seeing the Enemy entirely dispersed, and obliged every where to throw down their Arms, quitted the Pursuit, and retired within their Intrenchments.

VI. AFTER this Battle; *Galba*, unwilling a second time to expose himself to the inconstancy of Fortune, and besides considering, that he had met with an Opposition he little expected, when he first resolved to winter in these Parts: above all, finding himself in great want of Corn and Forage; the next Day set fire to the Town, and began his march back into the Province. As there was no Enemy in the Field to disturb or oppose him in his Retreat, he brought the Legion safe into the Country of the *Nantuates*, and thence into the Territories of the *Allobrogiens*, where he put them into Winter-quarters.

VII. THE Insurrection being thus entirely quelled, *Cæsar* for many Reasons believed, that *Gaul* was now restored to a state of Tranquillity. The *Belians* had been overcome, the *Germans* expelled, and the *Seduni*, and other Inhabitants of the *Alps*, forced to submit. He therefore in the beginning of Winter ventured upon a Progress into *Illyricum*,

BOOK from a desire he had to visit those Nations, and
 III. acquaint himself with the Country; when all on a sudden a new War broke out in *Gaul*. The Occasion of it was as follows: The seventh Legion, commanded by young *Crassus*, was quartered among the *Andes*, a People bordering upon the Ocean. As there was great scarcity of Corn in these parts, *Crassus* sent some Officers of the Cavalry, and military Tribunes, to solicit a Supply from the neighbouring States. Of this number were *T. Terrasidius*, sent to the *Eusubians*; *M. Trebius Gallus*, to the *Curiosolitæ*; and *Q. Velanius*, and *T. Silius*, to the *Venetians*.

VIII. This last State is by far the most powerful and considerable of all the Nations inhabiting along the Sea-coast: and that not only on account their vast Shipping, wherewith they drive a mighty Traffick to *Britain*; and their Skill and Experience in naval Affairs, in which they greatly surpass the other maritime States: but because lying upon a large and open Coast, against which the Sea rages with great violence, and where the Havens being few in number, are all subject to their Jurisdiction; they have most of the Nations that trade in those Seas tributaries to their State. Among them the Revolt began by detaining *Silius* and *Velanius*; as by this means they hoped to recover the Hostages they had put into the Hands of *Crassus*. The neighbouring States, moved by their Authority and Example, as the *Gauls* are in general very sudden and forward in their Resolves, detained for the same Reason *Trebius* and *Terrasidius*; and speedily dispatching Ambassadors from one to another, they by their Princes entered into a Confederacy, of acting in all things with common Consent, and alike exposing themselves to the same issue of Fortune; earnestly soliciting at the same

same time the other Provinces, rather to stand up BOOK
in defence of that Liberty they had received of III.
their Ancestors, than tamely submit to the ignominious Yoke of the *Romans*. All the Nations upon the Sea-coast coming readily into this Alliance, they jointly sent Ambassadors to *Crassus*, to acquaint him; That if he expected to have his Officers restored, he must first send them back their Hostages.

IX. *CÆSAR* having Intelligence of these things from *Crassus*, and being then at a great distance from *Gaul*, ordered in the mean-time; that a number of Galleys should be built upon the *Loire*, a River which runs into the Ocean; and that Mariners, Rowers, and Pilots, should be drawn together from the Province. These Orders being executed with great dispatch, he himself, as soon as the Season of the Year permitted, came to the Army. The *Venetians*, and other States, in Alliance with them, having notice of his Arrival; and reflecting at the same time upon the greatness of their Crime in detaining and loading with Irons Ambassadors, a Name ever looked upon amongst all Nations as sacred and inviolable; began to make Preparations proportioned to the Danger that threatened them; more especially to provide themselves with all kinds of warlike Stores; and that with so much the greater Alacrity and Confidence, as the Nature and Situation of the Country gave them good hopes of being able to defend themselves. They knew that the Passes by Land were every where cut asunder, by the many Friths and Arms of the Ocean, that run up in those Parts; and that the Approach by Sea was not less difficult, on account of the small number of Harbours, and the little Knowledge the *Romans* had of the Coast.

BOOK Neither did they imagine it possible for our Army,
 III. to continue long in that Country, by reason of the
 great scarcity of Corn: and should even all these
 Expectations deceive them, they had still a mighty
 Confidence in the strength and number of their
 Shipping. The *Romans*, they were sensible, had
 but a very inconsiderable Fleet; and were besides
 perfect Strangers to the Ports, Islands, and Shal-
 lows of the Coast, where the chief weight of the
 War was like to fall. At the time they foresaw,
 that our Pilots, accustomed only to the Navigation
 of the *Mediterranean*, a Sea bounded and shut in
 on all sides by the Continent, must needs find them-
 selves greatly at a loss, when they came to enter
 the vast and open Spaces of the wide *Atlantick*
 Ocean. In consequence of these Reflections, and
 the Resolutions formed upon them, they set about
 fortifying their Towns, and conveying all their
 Corn into Places of strength, ordering as many
 Ships as could be got together to rendezvous in the
Venetian Ports; it appearing, that *Cæsar* intended
 to begin the War by attacking that State. They
 likewise brought over to their Alliance the *Osismi-*
ans, *Lexovians*, *Nannetes*, *Ambiani*, *Morini*, *Dia-*
blintes, and *Menapians*; and dispatched Amba-
 sadors into *Britain*, which lies over-against their
 Coast, to solicit Assistance from thence.

X. ALL these Difficulties before-mentioned at-
 tended the prosecution of this War: but *Cæsar*
 was urged by many Considerations to undertake
 and carry it on with Vigour: The Insult offered
 to the Commonwealth in detaining the *Roman*
 Knights: a Revolt, and Insurrection, after Sub-
 mission, and Hostages given: the Confederacy
 of so many States: above all his Fear, lest by
 neglecting to oppose these first Commotions, he
 should

should give Encouragement to the other Provinces of *Gaul* to follow the Example. Reflecting therefore upon the Genius and Temper of the *Gauls*, fond of Revolutions, and ever forward and ready to engage in new Wars; and considering at the same time, that it was the natural Bent and Disposition of Mankind, to aspire after Liberty, and abhor the Yoke of Servitude; he determined, before the Infection should spread wider, to divide his Army, and distribute it into the several Provinces of *Gaul*.

BOOK
III.

XI. PURSUANT to this Design, *T. Labienus* his Lieutenant was sent with the Cavalry to *Treves*, whose Territory extends along the Banks of the *Rhine*. To him he gave it in charge, to take a Progress to *Rheims*, and the other *Belgian* States, in order to retain them in Obedience; as likewise to oppose the *Germans*, should they attempt by Force the Passage of the River; a Report then prevailing that they had been invited over by the *Belgians*. *P. Crassus*, with twelve legionary Cohorts, and a great Body of Horse, had Orders to march into *Aquitain*, to prevent the Arrival of any Supplies from that Quarter, and the Junction of the Forces of so many powerful Nations. *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, at the head of three Legions, entered the Country of the *Unellians*, *Curiosolitæ*, and *Lexovians*, to find Employment for the Troops that had been drawn together in those Parts. To young *Brutus* he gave the Command of the Fleet, and of all the Vessels from *Gaul*, which he had ordered to be fitted out by the *Santones*, *Pictones*, and other Provinces that continued in Obedience; strongly recommending to him at the same time, to use the greatest Dispatch, and sail with all Expedition for the *Venetian* Coast.


BOOK Coast. He himself, at the head of the Land-army,
 III. set out upon his march thither.

XII. THE Situation of most of the Towns in those Parts is such, that standing upon the Edges of Promontories, or upon Points of Land that run out into the Sea, there is no approaching them with an Army at high-water, which happens always twice in twelve Hours. Neither is it possible for a Fleet to draw near: because upon the Recess of the Tide, the Ships would be in danger of being dashed against the Shallows and Banks of Sand. Both these Reasons therefore concurred to secure their Towns from Assault: and if at any time, by the greatness of the Works carried on against them, and huge artificial Mounts that served to prevent the Ingress of the Sea, and were raised to an Height nearly equalling their Walls, they saw themselves reduced to Extremity; then, by bringing up their Ships, of which they had always a great Number in readiness, they easily found means to carry off their Effects, and withdraw into the nearest Towns, where they again defended themselves by the same Advantages of Situation as before. In this manner did they elude all *Cæsar's* Attempts during a great part of the Summer, and that with so much the more Success, because our Fleet was kept back by Tempests, and found the Navigation extremely dangerous in that vast and boundless Ocean, where the Tides are great, and the Havens both few in Number, and at a considerable distance one from another.

XIII. For the *Venetian* Ships were built and fitted out in this manner. Their Bottoms were somewhat flatter than ours, the better to adapt themselves to the Shallows, and sustain without Danger
 the

the regrefs of the Tides. Their Prows were very high and erect, as likewise their Sterns, to bear the hugeness of the Billows, and the violence of Tempests. The Body of the Vessel was entirely of Oak, to stand the Shocks and Assaults of that tempestuous Ocean. The Benches of the Rowers were made of strong Beams of about a Foot in breadth, and fastened with iron Nails an Inch thick. Instead of Cables they secured their Anchors with Chains of Iron; and made use of Skins, and a sort of thin pliant Leather, by way of Sails: either because they wanted Canvas, and were ignorant of the Art of making Sail-cloth; or, which is more probable, because they imagined that Canvas-sails were not so proper to bear the Violence of Tempests, the Rage and Fury of the Winds, and to govern Ships of that Bulk and Burden. Between our Fleet, and Vessels of such a make, the nature of the Encounter was this; that in Agility, and a ready Command of Oars, we had indeed the Advantage; but in other Respects, regarding the Situation of the Coast, and the Assaults of Storms, all things ran very much in their Favour: for neither could our Ships injure them with their Beaks, so great was their Strength and Firmness; nor could we easily throw in our Darts, because of their height above us: which also was the Reason, that we found it extremely difficult to grapple the Enemy, and bring them to close Fight. Add to all this, that when the Sea began to rage, and they were forced to submit to the Pleasure of the Winds, they could both weather the Storm better, and more securely trust themselves among the Shallows, as fearing nothing from the Rocks and Cliffs, upon the Recess of the Tide. The *Romans*, on the other hand, had reason to be under a continual dread of these and such like Accidents.

BOOK XIV. CÆSAR having taken many of their

III.  Towns, and finding that he only fatigued his Army to no purpose, because he could neither prevent the Retreat of the Enemy, nor force their Garrisons to a Surrender; resolved to wait the Arrival of his Fleet. Which being accordingly come up, was no sooner descried by the *Venetians*, than about two hundred and twenty of their best Ships, well equipped for Service, and furnished with all kind of Weapons, stood out to Sea, and drew up in order of Battle against us. Neither *Brutus* who commanded the Fleet, nor the Centurions and military Tribunes who had the Charge of particular Vessels, knew what Course to take, or in what manner to conduct the Fight. For they were no Strangers to the Strength and Firmness of the *Venetian* Shipping, which rendered them proof against our Beaks: and when they had even raised Turrets upon the Decks, yet being still over-topped by the lofty Sterns of the Enemy, the *Romans* could not with any Advantage throw in their Darts; whereas those sent by the *Gauls*, coming from above, descended with great violence on our Men. In this Exigence, a particular kind of Instrument used by the Mariners, proved of signal Service in giving a favourable Issue to the Combat. They had provided themselves with long Poles, armed at one end with long Scythes, not unlike those made use of in attacking the Walls of Towns. With these they laid hold of the Enemy's Tackle, and drawing off the Galley by the extreme Force of Oars, cut asunder the Ropes that fastened the Sail-yards to the Mast. These giving way, the Sail-yards necessarily came down; insomuch that as all the Hopes and Expectations of the *Gauls* depended entirely on their Sails and Rigging, by depriving them
of

of this Resource, we at the same time rendered their Vessels wholly unserviceable. The rest depended altogether upon the Valour of the Troops, in which the *Romans* had greatly the Advantage; and the rather, because they fought within View of *Cæsar* and the whole Army, so that not a single Act of Bravery could pass unobserved: for all the adjoining Hills and Eminences, which afforded a near Prospect of the Sea, were covered with our Men.

BOOK
III.

XV. THE Enemy's Sail-yards being, as we have said, cut down; and many of their Ships singly surrounded by two or three of ours at a time; the *Romans* used their utmost Endeavours to board them. Which the *Venetians* observing, and that we had already made ourselves Masters of a great part of their Fleet; as they could fall upon no Expedient to prevent so great a Misfortune, they began to think of providing for their Safety by Flight. Accordingly they tacked about, in order to have the Advantage of the Wind; when all of a sudden so dead a Calm ensued, that not a Vessel could stir out of its Place. Nor could any thing have fallen out more opportunely towards putting at once a final Period to the War; for the *Romans* attacking their Ships one after another, took them with ease; insomuch that of all that vast Number that came out against us, but a very few, under favour of the Night, escaped safe to Land, after a Conflict that continued from nine in the Morning 'till Sun-set.

XVI. THIS Battle put an end to the War with the *Venetians*, and all the Nations upon the Sea-Coast. For as the entire Body of their Youth, and all those also of more advanced Age, who were capable

BOOK capable of serving their Country by their Credit and

III. Counsels, were present in the Action; and as they had likewise drawn together their whole naval Strength: such as survived this Defeat, having neither any place of Refuge whereunto to retire, nor means left of defending their Towns, surrendered themselves and their all to *Cæsar's* Mercy. But he thought it necessary to proceed against them with the greater Severity, that he might impress upon the Minds of the *Gauls* for the future, a more inviolable Regard to the sacred Character of Ambassadors. Having therefore caused all their Senators to be put to death, he ordered the rest to be sold for Slaves.

XVII. DURING these Transactions against the *Venetians*, *Q. Titurius Sabinus* entered the Territories of the *Unellians*, at the head of the Troops put under his Command by *Cæsar*. *Viridovix* was invested with the supreme Authority in these Parts, and had been appointed General in chief, by all the States concerned in the Revolt; out of which he had drawn together a very numerous and powerful Army. Nay but a very few Days before, the *Aulerci*, *Eburovices*, and *Lexovians*, having massacred their Senate, because they refused to engage in the War, had shut their Gates against the *Romans*, and joined themselves to *Viridovix*. Besides all this, he had very much strengthened his Army by the great numbers that flocked to him from all parts of *Gaul*; Men of desperate Fortunes, or accustomed to live by Robbery, whom the hopes of Plunder, and love of War, had drawn off from the daily Labours of their Calling and the Cares of Agriculture.

XVIII.

XVIII. SABINUS kept close within his Camp, BOOK
 which was situated in a manner every way advan- III.
 tageous; while *Viridovix*, who had posted himself
 at the distance of about two Miles, daily drew out
 his Men, and offered him Battle. This Behaviour
 of the *Roman* General, not only drew upon him
 the Contempt of the Enemy, but occasioned also
 some murmuring among his own Troops, and filled
 the *Gauls* with so high a Conceit of his Fear, that
 that they even adventured to come up to his very
 Trenches. The Reason of his acting in this man-
 ner was, that he thought it not justifiable in a
 Lieutenant, in the Absence of the Commander in
 chief, to hazard a Battle with so superior an Army,
 unless upon Terms of evident Advantage.

XIX. HAVING confirmed them in this Belief,
 that his Reserve was the effect of Fear; he made
 choice of a certain *Gaul* from among the Auxilia-
 ries, a Man of Address, and every way qualified
 for carrying on his Design. Him he persuaded by
 great Rewards, and still greater Promises, to go
 over to the Enemy, instructing him at the same
 time in the Part he was to act. This *Gaul* coming
 to their Camp as a Defter, laid before them the
 Fear of the *Romans*, and the Extremities to which
Cæsar was reduced in the War against the *Venetians*:
 nor did he fail to insinuate, that there was great
 Reason to believe *Sabinus* intended the next Night
 privately to draw off his Army, and march to *Cæ-*
sar's Assistance. No sooner was this heard by the
Gauls, than they all cried out with one Voice, that
 they ought not to lose so fair an Occasion of Suc-
 cess, but go and attack the *Roman* Camp. Many
 Reasons concurred to fix them in this Resolution:
 The Reserve of *Sabinus* for some Days past: the
 Intelligence

Intelligence from the Deserter confirming their belief of his Fear: the want of Provisions, of which they had taken no great Care to lay in a sufficient Stock: the Hopes conceived from the *Venetian* War: and in fine, that readiness with which Men are apt to believe what falls in with their Expectations and Wishes. Urged by these Considerations, they would not suffer *Viridovix* and the rest of the General Officers to dismiss the Council, before they had obtained their Consent for the taking up of Arms, and falling upon the *Roman* Camp. The Proposal being at last agreed to, they provided themselves with Fascines and Hurdles to fill up the Ditch, and joyfully began their march, as to a certain Victory.

XX. THE *Roman* Camp stood upon an Eminence, which rose with a gentle Ascent, for the space of about a Mile. Hither the *Gauls* advanced with so much haste, in order to come upon our Troops unprepared, that by that time they were arrived, they had run themselves quite out of Breath. *Sabinus* having encouraged his Men, whom he saw eager to engage, gave the Word of Onset. As the Enemy were very much incumbered with the Loads of Fascines they had brought to fill up the Ditch, he ordered a sudden Sally from the two several Gates of the Camp: and so well did it succeed, by reason of the Advantage of the Ground, the Inexperience and Weariness of the *Gauls*, the Bravery of the *Roman* Troops, and their Ability acquired in former Battles; that the Enemy could not sustain the very first Charge of our Men, but immediately betook themselves to flight. The *Romans*, who were fresh and vigorous, pursuing them under all these Disadvantages, put great numbers to the Sword; and the rest being followed by

by the Cavalry, very few escaped the Slaughter. BOOK III.
 Thus at one and the same time, *Sabinus* had an Account of the Defeat of the *Venetians* by Sea, and *Cæsar* of the Victory obtained by *Sabinus* at Land. All the several States in those Parts readily submitted to *Titurius*: for as the *Gauls* are very prompt and forward to undertake a War, so are they of a Disposition that easily relents and gives way to the Strokes of Adversity.

XXI. Much about the same time *P. Crassus* arrived in *Aquitain*; a Country, which as we have before observed, for extent of Territory, and number of Inhabitants, is deservedly counted a third Part of *Gaul*. This General understanding that he was to conduct a War in those Parts, where but a few Years before *L. Valerius Præconinus* had been slain, and his Army put to the rout; and whence *L. Manilius* the Proconsul had been driven with the loss of his Baggage: soon became sensible that he must act with more than ordinary Circumspection and Vigour. Having therefore made Provision of Corn, assembled his auxiliary Troops and Cavalry, and strengthened his Army with a choice Body of Volunteers, drawn together by name from *Toulouse*, *Carcafo*, and *Narbonne*, which States make up that Part of the *Roman* Province that lies the nearest to *Aquitain*; he advanced with all his Forces into the Territories of the *Sotiates*. These, upon the first notice of his Arrival, having levied a great Army, and attacking him in his March with the whole Body of their Cavalry, in which their chief strength consisted, were nevertheless repulsed and pursued by our Men. But all on a sudden their Infantry appearing in a Valley, where they had been designedly placed in Ambush, fell furiously upon the
 the

BOOK the *Romans* disordered with the Pursuit, and renewed the Fight.

XXII. THE Battle was long and obstinate. For the *Sotiates*, proud of their former Victories, imagined that the Fate of all *Aquitain* depended singly on their Bravery. The *Romans*, on the other hand, were ambitious of shewing what they could achieve under a young Leader, in the Absence of their General, and unsupported by the rest of the Legions. At length however, the Enemy overpowered with Wounds, betook themselves to flight; and a great Slaughter ensuing, *Crassus* marched immediately and invested their Capital; where meeting with a brave Resistance, he was forced to make his Approaches by Towers and Mantelets. The Enemy sometimes falling out, sometimes carrying on their Mines to our very Works, (in which kind of Service the *Aquitains* are particularly skilful, as inhabiting a Country that abounds in Veins of Copper;) when they saw that the Diligence of the *Romans* enabled them to surmount all these Difficulties, sent Ambassadors to *Crassus*, and requested they might be admitted to a Surrender. Which being accordingly agreed to, they in Obedience to his Desire delivered up their Arms.

XXIII. BUT while the *Romans* were wholly intent upon the execution of the Treaty: *Adiatomus*, who commanded in chief, endeavoured to escape on the other side of the Town, with a Body of six hundred sworn Friends, who in the Language of the Country are called *Soldurians*. Their condition and manner of Life is this: To live in a perfect Community of Goods with those to whom they have engaged themselves in Friendship: if any Misfortune befalls them, to share in it, or make away

away with themselves: nor is there a single In-BOOK
 stance of any one upon Record, who upon the III.
 death of him to whom he had vowed a Friendship, refused to submit to the same Fate. *Adiatomus*, as we have said, endeavouring to make his Escape with his Body of Friends, and the Alarm being given on that side of the Works, the Soldiers immediately ran to Arms; when a furious Combat ensued, in which he was at last repulsed, and driven back into the Town. He obtained however from *Crassus* the same Conditions of Surrender as had been granted to the rest of the Inhabitants.

XXIV. *CRASSUS* having received their Arms and Hostages, led his Troops into the Territories of the *Vocatians* and *Tarusatians*. But now the *Gauls*, roused by the unexpected Progress of the *Romans*, who had in a few Days after their Arrival made themselves masters of a Town strongly fortified both by Art and Nature; began to send Ambassadors into all Parts; to join in a mutual League; to ratify their Engagements by an exchange of Hostages; and to levy Troops. Ambassadors were likewise dispatched to all the States of *Hither Spain* that bordered upon *Aquitain*, to solicit a Supply of Troops and Leaders: upon whose Arrival, they immediately took the Field with great Confidence, and a numerous and well appointed Army. None were suffered to command but such as had served under *Sertorius*, and were therefore accounted Men of consummate Ability and Experience in the Art of War. These, according to the Custom of the *Romans*, made it their Study to choose a Camp to Advantage; to secure themselves by Lines and Intrenchments; and to intercept our Convoys. *Crassus* perceiving their Design; as his own Army was not strong enough

BOOK to admit of sending out Detachments; and as the

III. *Gauls* could upon all Occasions employ numerous Parties, possess themselves of the Passes, and at the same time have a sufficient number of Troops to guard the Camp; by which means he foresaw he must soon be reduced to great Straits for want of Provisions, while the Enemy would be every Day growing more powerful: he for all these Reasons resolved not to delay coming to an Engagement. Having laid his Design before a Council of War, and finding them unanimous in their Approbation of it, he appointed the next Day for the Engagement.

XXV. EARLY in the Morning he drew all his Forces out of the Camp, and disposing them in two Lines, with the auxiliary Troops in the Center, stood expecting what Resolution the Enemy would take. But the *Gauls*, tho' they believed they might safely hazard a Battle, on account of their Numbers, their former Renown in War, and the Handful of Men they were to oppose; yet thought it would be still better, by seizing the Passes, and intercepting our Convoys, to secure the Victory without Expence of Blood: and should the want of Provisions at length force the *Romans* to think of a Retreat; they might then fall upon them embarrassed in their March, incumbered with their Baggage, and dejected by their Misfortunes. This Resolution being approved by all their Leaders, they kept within their Camp, tho' our Men appeared before them in Order of Battle.

XXVI. CRASSUS perceiving their Design, and that this Delay served rather to abate the Courage of the Enemy, and add fresh Spirits to his own Men, among whom an universal Cry arose, that
he

he ought no longer to put off the Engagement, BOOK III.
 but march directly to their Camp: having encouraged his Troops, he resolved to give way to their present Ardor; and accordingly led them to the Assault. There some were employed in filling up the Ditch; others in driving the Enemy with their Darts from the Works; while the Auxiliaries, in whom *Crassus* had no great Confidence, yet that they might appear to have some share at least in the Engagement, were appointed to carry Stones and Darts to them that fought, and to supply Materials for raising the Mount. At the same time the Enemy fought with great Constancy and Resolution, and made no small Havock with their Darts, which came upon us from above. During this warmth of Opposition, the Cavalry having taken a Compass round the Camp, came and told *Crassus*, that the Intrenchments were not fortified with the same Care in all Parts, and that it would be easy to force an Entrance by the postern Gate.

XXVII. *CRASSUS* having exhorted the Officers of the Cavalry to encourage their Men by great Rewards and Promises, instructed them in the Part they were to act. They, in consequence of the Orders they had received, drawing out four Cohorts, which having been left to guard the Camp, were quite fresh and fit for Action; and fetching with them a large Compass, that they might not be seen from the Enemy's Camp; while the Eyes and Minds of all were intent upon the Combat, fell suddenly upon that Part of the Intrenchments of which we have spoken above; and having forced their way through, were actually got within the Camp before they were so much as seen by the Enemy, or any Apprehension entertained of what they were about. Upon this a great Up roar being

BOOK III. heard on that side, our Men redoubled their Efforts, and as always happens to Troops animated with the hopes of Victory, began to push the *Gauls* with greater Fury than ever. The Enemy thus surrounded on all Sides, and without hopes of retrieving their Affairs, endeavoured to make their Escape over the Rampart, and save themselves by Flight. But being pursued by the Cavalry, who soon came up with them in these open and level Plains: of fifty thousand Men that had been drawn together out of *Spain* and *Aquitain*, scarce a fourth Part escaped; nor did the Horse return to the Camp 'till very late in the Evening, after they had quite tired themselves with the Slaughter.

XXVIII. UPON the Report of this Defeat, the greatest part of *Aquitain* immediately submitted to *Crassus*, and of their own accord sent him Hostages. Of this number were the *Tarbelli*, *Bigeriones*, *Preciani*, *Vocates*, *Tarusates*, *Elusates*, *Garites*, *Ausci*, *Garumni*, *Siburzates*, and *Cocasates*. Only a few Nations, and those the most remote, relying on the Season of the Year, because the Winter was at hand, neglected to take this Step.

XXIX. MUCH about the same time *Cæsar*, tho' the Summer was now almost spent; yet because all the rest of *Gaul* being subdued, the *Morini* and *Menapians* were still in Arms, and had not sent Ambassadors to treat about a Peace; resolved to lead his Army against them, hoping he should soon be able to put an end to that War. Their manner of opposing him was very different from that of the other *Gauls*. For understanding that the most powerful Nations, when it came to a Battle, had always been overthrown and put to rout; and inhabiting themselves in a Country that abounded

abounded in Woods and Marshes, they retired BOOK
III.
thither with all their Effects. *Cæsar* coming to the Entrance of the Wood, began to intrench himself: and although no Enemy in the mean-time appeared, yet no sooner had our Men dispersed themselves in order to set about fortifying the Camp, than on a sudden they came pouring upon us from all parts of the Wood, and charged with great Briskness. The *Romans* immediately flew to their Arms, and drove them back with considerable Slaughter; but adventuring a little too far into the Wood, lost some Men.

XXX. *CÆSAR* spent the remaining Days in cutting down the Wood; and to screen his Men from any sudden and unexpected Attack, ordered the Trees that had been felled to be placed on each side the Army, that they might serve as a Barricade against the Attempts of the Enemy. Having with incredible Dispatch advanced a great way into the Wood in a few Days, insomuch that all their Cattle and Baggage fell into our Hands; they themselves retired into the thicker and more covered spaces of the Forest. The Season growing bad, we were forced to intermit the Work; and the Rains soon became so violent and continual, that the Soldiers could no longer endure to lie in their Tents. Wherefore *Cæsar* having laid waste their Lands, and set fire to their Towns and Houses, led back his Army, and disposed it into Winter-quarters among the *Aulerci*, *Lexovians*, and other States whom he had last subdued.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS in GAUL.

BOOK IV.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. *The Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German Nations, expelled by the Suevians, come over into Gaul.* II. *The Manners and way of Life of the Suevians.* III. *And of the Ubians.* IV. *The Usipetes and Tenchtheri drive the Menapians from their Habitations.* V. *Cæsar knowing the wavering and unsettled Temper of the Gauls, repairs early in the Spring to the Army.* VI. *Embassy of the Germans to Cæsar, and his Answer.* IX. *An Action between the Cavalry, in which the Germans have the advantage.* X. *But are afterwards driven from their Camp with great Slaughter.* XIII. *And pursued by Cæsar, who makes a Bridge over the Rhine for that purpose.* XVI. *Cæsar lays waste the Territories of Sigambri.* XVII. *And having freed the Ubians from the servitude under which they lived, returns into Gaul.* XVIII. *He then passes over into Britain.* XXII. *And lands his Army with great difficulty, the Natives making a vigorous Opposition.* XXIV. *They are defeated at length, and send Ambassadors to sue for Peace.* XXVI. *Cæsar's Fleet almost entirely ruined by a Storm, which induces the Britons to revolt.* XXIX. *Their way of fighting from their Chariots.* XXX. *Which disconcerts the Romans at first.* XXXI. *But being again put to flight, they obtain Peace.* XXXII. *After which Cæsar returns into Gaul.* XXXIII. *And marching against the Morini, whom the hope of Plunder tempted to fall upon some of his detached Parties, obliges them to submit.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
 COMMENTARIES
 OF HIS
 WARS in GAUL.
 BOOK IV.

I. **T**HE following Winter, being that in which *Cn. Pompey* and *M. Crassus* were Consuls, the *Usipetes* and *Tenctheri*, German Nations, passed the Rhine in a great Body, not far from its Mouth. The Cause of their taking this Step was, that being much exposed to the Hostilities of the *Suevians*, they had for many Years been harassed with continual Wars and hindered from cultivating their Lands.

II. THE *Suevians* are by far the most warlike and considerable of all the German Nations. They are said to be composed of a hundred Cantons, each of which sends yearly into the Field a thousand armed Men. The rest, who continue in their several Districts, employ themselves in cultivating their Lands, that it may furnish a sufficient Supply
 both

BOOK both for themselves and for the Army. These

IV. again take up Arms the following Campaign, and are succeeded in the care of the Lands by the Troops that served the Year before. Thus they live in the continual Exercise both of Agriculture and War. They allow of no such thing as Property or private Possession in the distribution of their Lands; their Residence, for the sake of Tillage, being confined to a single Year. Corn is not much in use among them, because they prefer a milk or flesh-diet, and are greatly addicted to Hunting. Thus the Quality of their Food, their perpetual Exercise, and free unconfined manner of Life (because being from their Childhood fettered by no Rules of Duty or Education, they acknowledge no Law but Will and Pleasure) contribute to make them strong, and of an extraordinary Stature. They have likewise accustomed themselves, though inhabiting a Climate naturally very cold, to bathe in their Rivers, and clothe themselves only with Skins, which as they are very small, leave great part of their Body quite uncovered. Merchants indeed resort to them, but rather to purchase their Spoils taken in War, than import any Goods into the Country: for even Beasts of Carriage, in which the *Gauls* take so much Delight, that they are ready to purchase them at any Price, are yet very little valued by the *Germani* when brought among them. And though those of their own Country are both small and very ill shaped, yet by daily Exercise they make them capable of all kinds of Service. Their Cavalry often dismount in time of Action, to fight on Foot; and their Horses are so train'd, that they stir not from the place where they are left, but wait the return of their Riders, who betake themselves to them again in case of Necessity. Nothing is more dishonourable in their
Account,

Account, or more opposite to their Customs, than BOOK
 the use of Horse-furniture: and therefore however IV.
 few themselves, they scruple not to attack any
 Number of their Enemies whom they see so equip-
 ped. They suffer no Wine to be imported into
 their Territories, as imagining that it both ener-
 vates the Mind, and unfits the Body for Exercise
 and Labour. It is accounted much to the Honour
 of the Nation, to have the Country for a great way
 round them waste and uninhabited; for by this
 they think is intimated, that the united Force of
 many States has been found insufficient to with-
 stand their single Valour. And hence it is, that
 on one side, the Country is said to lie desolate for
 the space of six hundred Miles.

III. On the other side they are bounded by the
Ubians, heretofore a flourishing and potent People,
 and somewhat more civilized than the other *German*
 Nations; because inhabiting along the Banks of
 the *Rhine*, they are much resorted to by Mer-
 chants; and have besides, by bordering upon the
 States of *Gaul*, given into many of their Customs.
 The *Suevians* having tried the Strength of this
 People in many Wars, and finding them too nu-
 merous and potent to be driven out of their Territo-
 ries; prevailed yet so far as to impose a Tribute
 upon them, and very much reduce and weaken
 their Power.

IV. THE *Uppetes* and *Tenchtheri*, of whom we
 have spoken above, were likewise engaged in this
 Quarrel; and after withstanding the Power of the
Suevians for many Years, were nevertheless at length
 driven from their Territories. Having wandered
 over many Regions of *Germany* during the space of
 three Years, they arrived at last upon the Banks
 of

BOOK of the *Rhine*, towards those Parts inhabited by the
 IV. *Menapians*, who had Houses, Lands, and Villages
 on both sides the River. But alarmed at the Approach of so prodigious a Multitude, they abandoned all their Habitations beyond the *Rhine*; and having disposed their Troops on this side the River, set themselves to oppose the Passage of the *Germans*. These having tried every Expedient; and finding they could neither force the Passage, because of their want of Shipping; nor steal over privately, by reason of the Guards kept by the *Menapians*; counterfeited a Retreat into their own Country; and after three Days March suddenly turned back: when their Cavalry recovering all this Ground in the space of one Night, easily overpowered the *Menapians*, little expecting or prepared for such a Visit: for having been apprised by their Scouts of the Departure of the *Germans*, they had returned, fearless of Danger, to their Habitations beyond the *Rhine*. These being all put to the Sword, and their Shipping seized; before the *Menapians* on this side had intelligence of their Approach, they passed the River: and seizing all their Towns and Houses, supported themselves the rest of the Winter with the Provisions there found.

V. CÆSAR being informed of these things, and dreading the Levity of the *Gauls*, who are very changeable in their Counsels, and fond of Novelties; determined to trust nothing to their Resolves. For it is the Custom of that People to stop Travellers even against their will, and enquire of them what they have heard or know relating to any Affair: and in their Towns, upon the Arrival of a foreign Merchant, they gather round him in crowds, and oblige him to tell what Country he comes from, and how things stood at his Departure. Moved
 by

by these Reports, they often enter upon the most important Deliberations, and concert Measures they soon have cause to repent, as being founded wholly on vain Rumours, and Answers feigned for the most part designedly to please them. *Cæsar*, who was aware of this Custom, fearing the War if neglected might become formidable, made all the haste he could to join the Army. Upon his Arrival he found, that things were fallen out exactly as he had foreseen. Some of the States of *Gaul* had sent Ambassadors to the *Germans*, inviting them to leave the Banks of the *Rhine*, and assuring them that all their Demands should be readily complied with. The *Germans*, allured by these Hopes, were already extending their IncurSIONS on all sides, and had penetrated into the Territories of the *Eburones* and *Condrusians*, both which Nations are under the Protection of the *Treviri*. *Cæsar* having assembled the Chiefs of the *Gauls*, dissembled his knowledge of their secret Designs; and endeavouring rather to win them over, and confirm them in their Alliance with the People of *Rome*; demanded a certain number of Cavalry of them, and prepared to march against the *Germans*.

VI. HAVING provided himself with Corn, and drawn together a select Body of Horse, he began his March towards those Parts where he understood the *Germans* then were. When he was come within a few Days journey of their Camp, Ambassadors arrived from them, who addressed him to this effect: " That the *Germans* had no Design of being the first to begin a War with the People of *Rome*; but neither, if they were attacked, would they decline having recourse to Arms: That it was the Custom of their Nation, handed down

" to

BOOK " to them by their Ancestors, rather to oppose the
 IV. " Efforts of their Enemies, than expect Relief
 { " from Remonstrances : but thus far they were
 " however willing to own, that it was against their
 " Inclination they were come into those Parts,
 " having been driven from their Habitations :
 " That if the *Romans* were disposed to accept of
 " their Friendship, they might become very useful
 " and serviceable Allies, and would rest satisfied
 " either with such Lands as they should think
 " proper to assign them, or in the quiet Possession
 " of those they had already obtained by force of
 " Arms : That they yielded in Valour to the
 " *Suevians* alone, for whom the immortal Gods
 " themselves were not an equal match ; but knew
 " of no other Nation under Heaven able to resist
 " the Efforts of their Bravery." *Cæsar* made
 such a Reply as best suited his present Views, but
 the Conclusion of his Speech was to this purpose :
 " That he could enter into no treaty of Friend-
 " ship with them so long as they continued in
 " *Gaul* : That Men who had been unable to defend
 " their own Territories were not likely to gain
 " Countries by force from others : That there
 " were no uncultivated Lands in *Gaul*, sufficient
 " to satisfy so great a multitude, without invading
 " the Properties of others : But that, if they
 " pleased, they might incorporate themselves with
 " the *Ubians*, whose Ambassadors were then in his
 " Camp, to complain of the Injuries of the
 " *Suevians*, and request his Aid against their In-
 " croachments : This he promised to obtain for
 " them of the *Ubians*." The Ambassadors replied,
 they would report this to their Countrymen, and in
 three Days return with an Answer : requesting in
 the mean-time, that he would not advance with his
 Army. But this *Cæsar* refused ; as knowing, that

a few Days before they had sent a great Body of Cavalry over the *Meuse*, to forage and plunder in the Territories of the *Ambivariti*. He therefore concluded, that they only waited the return of this Party, and with that View were for interposing Delays.

BOOK
IV.

VII. THE *Meuse* rises in the Mountains of *Vause*, in the Territories of the *Lingones*, and receiving a certain Branch of the *Rbine*, called the *Vabal*, forms with it the Island of the *Batavians*, about fourscore Miles below which it discharges itself into the Sea. The *Rbine* itself takes its rise in the Territories of the *Lepontians*, who inhabit the *Alps*; and after a long and rapid Course thro' the Country of the *Nantuates*, *Helvetians*, *Sequani*, *Mediomatrici*, *Treboci*, and *Treviri*, divides itself as it approaches nearer the Sea into several Channels, and forming a great number of very large Islands, inhabited for the most part by fierce and savage Nations, some of whom are reported to feed only on Fish and the Eggs of Birds; it at last discharges itself into the Ocean by many different Mouths.

VIII. CÆSAR being now only twelve Miles distant from the Enemy, was met upon his way by the Ambassadors on the Day appointed. They were very earnest in their Requests that he would advance no farther : but not being able to prevail, intreated ; that he would send to the Cavalry who made the Advance-Guard, to restrain them from beginning the Fight ; and in the mean-time permit them to send Ambassadors to the *Ubians* : from whose Senate and Magistrates if they could obtain the Conditions offered them by *Cæsar*, under the Sanction of a solemn Oath, they declared themselves ready to accept them ; requiring only that he would allow

BOOK allow them the Space of three Days to bring

IV. Matters to a final Issue. But *Cæsar* imagining all these Proffers to have no other Tendency than the delay of a few Days, 'till their Cavalry should arrive, told them nevertheless; that he would advance that Day only four Miles farther for the sake of Water; but desired their Chiefs to attend him the Day after, that he might know their Demands. Mean-time he sent Orders to the Officers of the Cavalry who were gone before, not to attack the Enemy; and in case they should be attacked themselves, only to maintain their Ground, 'till he should come up with the rest of the Army.

IX. But the Enemy, upon seeing our Horse advance, whose number amounted to five thousand; whereas they themselves did not exceed eight hundred, by reason of the Absence of those who had been sent to forage beyond the *Meuse*: yet falling suddenly upon the *Romans*, who had no Apprehension of their Design, because they knew their Ambassadors had been with *Cæsar* a little before, and obtained a Day's Truce; they easily put them into Disorder. And when our Men recovering a little began to make Resistance, they according to Custom dismounted, and stabbing our Horses under the Belly, and by that means overthrowing many of the Riders, in a very short time put the rest to flight; and so great was the Consternation, that they continued driving them before them, 'till at last they came within sight of the Army. In this Skirmish we lost seventy-four Men, and among them *Piso* of *Aquitain*, a Man of distinguished Valour and illustrious Descent, whose Grandfather had been sovereign Magistrate in his own State, and been honoured by the Senate of *Rome* with the title of Friend. This brave Officer, seeing his
Brother

Brother furrounded by the Enemy, ran to his Assistance, and rescued him: but his own Horse being wounded, and he overthrown, the Enemy fell upon him, against whom nevertheless he made a brave Resistance; till at last furrounded on all sides, he fell overpowered with Wounds. Which his Brother perceiving, who was by this time out of Danger, and had got to a considerable Distance; setting Spurs to his Horse, he rushed among the thickest of the Enemy, and was slain.

X. AFTER this Battle, *Cæsar* resolved neither to give audience to their Ambassadors, nor admit them to Terms of Peace; seeing they had treacherously applied for a Truce, and afterwards of their own accord broke it. He likewise considered, that it would be downright Madness to delay coming to an Action 'till their Army should be augmented, and their Cavalry join them; and the more so, because he was perfectly well acquainted with the Levity of the *Gauls*, among whom they had already acquired a considerable Reputation by this successful Attack, and to whom it therefore behoved him by no means to allow time to enter into Measures against him. Upon all these Accounts he determined to come to an Engagement with the Enemy as soon as possible, and communicated his Design to his Questor and Lieutenants. A very lucky Accident fell out to bring about *Cæsar's* Purpose; for the Day after, in the Morning, the *Germans* persisting in their Treachery and Dissimulation, came in great numbers to the Camp; all their Nobility and Princes making part of their Embassy. Their Design was, as they pretended, to vindicate themselves in regard to what had happened the Day before; because contrary to Engagements made and come under at their own Request, they

BOOK had fallen upon our Men; but their real Motive
IV. was to obtain if possible another insidious Truce.

Cæsar overjoyed to have them thus in his Power, ordered them to be secured, and immediately drew his Forces out of the Camp. The Cavalry, whom he supposed terrified with the late Engagement, were commanded to follow in the Rear.

XI. HAVING drawn up his Army in three Lines, and made a very expeditious March of eight Miles, he appeared before the Enemy's Camp, before they had the least Apprehension of his Design. All things conspiring to throw them into a sudden Consternation, which was not a little increased by our unexpected Appearance, and the Absence of their own Officers; and hardly any time left them, either to take Counsel, or fly to Arms: they were utterly at a loss what Course to take, whether to draw out their Forces and oppose the Enemy, or content themselves with defending the Camp, or in fine, to seek for Safety in flight. As this Fear was evident from the Tumult and Uproar we perceived among them, our Soldiers, instigated by the Remembrance of their treacherous Behaviour the Day before, broke into the Camp. Such as could first provide themselves with Arms made a shew of Resistance, and for some time maintained the Fight amidst the Baggage and Carriages. But the Women and Children (for the *Germans* had brought all their Families and Effects with them over the *Rhine*) betook themselves to flight on all sides. *Cæsar* sent the Cavalry in pursuit of them.

XII. THE *Germans* hearing the Noise behind them, and seeing their Wives and Children put to the Sword, threw down their Arms, abandoned their Ensigns, and fled out of the Camp. Being arrived


arrived at the confluence of the *Rhine* and the *Meuse*, and finding it impossible to continue their flight any farther; after a dreadful Slaughter of those that pretended to make resistance, the rest threw themselves into the River; where what with Fear, Weariness, and the force of the Current, they almost all perished. Thus our Army, without the loss of a Man, and with very few wounded, returned to their Camp, having put an end to this formidable War, in which the number of the Enemy amounted to four hundred and thirty thousand. *Cæsar* offered those whom he had detained in his Camp liberty to depart: but they dreading the Resentment of the *Gauls*, whose Lands they had laid waste, chose rather to continue with him, and obtained his Consent for that purpose.


XIII. THE War with the *Germans* being ended, *Cæsar* for many Reasons resolved to carry his Army over the *Rhine*. But what chiefly swayed with him was, that as he found the *Germans* were easily prevailed upon to transport their Forces into *Gaul*, he thought it might be of no small Service to alarm them upon their own Account, by letting them see, that the *Romans* wanted neither Ability nor Resolution to pass the *Rhine* with an Army. Add to all this, that the Cavalry of the *Usipetes* and *Tenctheri*, who, as we have related above, had passed the *Meuse* for the sake of Forage and Plunder, and by that means escaped the Disaster of the late Fight; upon hearing of the Defeat of their Countrymen, had repassed the *Rhine*, retired into the Territories of the *Sicambrians*, and joined their Forces to theirs. And upon *Cæsar's* sending Deputies to require, that these Troops, which had presumed to make War upon him and the *Gauls*, might be delivered up,

BOOK IV. he had received for Answer: "That the *Rhine* was the Boundary of the *Roman* Empire: That if he thought it unjustifiable in the *Germans* to pass over into *Gaul* without his leave, upon what Pretence could he claim any Power or Authority beyond the *Rhine*?"

XIV. BUT the *Ubians*, who alone of all the Nations beyond the *Rhine* had sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, entered into an Alliance with him, and given him Hostages, earnestly intreated him to come over to their Assistance, they being very hard pressed by the *Suevians*: "Or, if the Affairs of the Commonwealth would not allow of his being there in Person, that he would only order his Army to cross the *Rhine*, which would both be sufficient for their present Support, and also secure them for the time to come. Because such was the Reputation and Opinion conceived of a *Roman* Army, even amongst the most remote *German* Nations, from their defeating *Ariovistus*, and the Success of the last Battle, that their Friendship and Name would alone be a sufficient Defence. They promised likewise a great number of Ships for the transporting of the Army."

XV. CÆSAR for all these Reasons above-mentioned, determined to cross the *Rhine*. But to make use of Shipping appeared to him neither safe, nor suitable to the Dignity of the *Roman* Name. Wherefore, altho' he understood that the making of a Bridge would be attended with very great Difficulties, on account of the Breadth, Depth, and Rapidity of the River; yet was he of opinion, that in this manner alone ought he to carry over his Army, or lay aside the Design altogether. The form therefore and contrivance of the Bridge was thus:





A. The two Beams, each a foot and half
 B. The two Beams opposits to these, joine by Stakes.
 C. The Beam two feet thick, inserted betwixt two feet.
 to the other, D. The Braces,
 E. The Planks over which the Earth & T
 F. The Buttresses to support the Bridge against for laying of Hurdles on.
 G. The upper Defences against Vessels are
 Vol. I. P. 117

thus: Two Beams, each a Foot and a half thick, sharpened a little towards the lower end, and of a Length proportioned to the Depth of the River, were joined together at the distance of about two Feet. These were sunk into the River by Engines, and afterwards strongly driven with Rammers, not perpendicularly, but inclined according to the direction of the Stream. Directly opposite to these, at the distance of forty Feet lower down, were placed two other Beams joined together like the former, but sloping against the current of the River. These Stakes were kept firm by a large Beam, extended from one to the other, and which being two Feet in thickness, exactly filled the Interval of the two Stakes, and was strongly fastened at either end with iron Nails, so contrived, that the Violence of the Stream served only to bind the Work faster together. This being continued through the whole Breadth of the River, he ordered Planks to be laid across, which for the greater convenience of passing, were further covered with Hurdles. Towards the lower part of the Stream other Stakes were sunk in the form of Buttreffes, which supported the Bridge against the Violence of the Current; and above, at some distance, there were others; that if Trunks of Trees or Vessels should be sent down the River by the Enemy, to destroy the Work, the Shock might be broken by these Defences, and the Bridge thereby secured from damage.

XVI. THE Bridge being finished within ten Days from the time they began to fetch the Materials, *Cæsar* led over his Army; and leaving a strong Guard on each side of the River, marched directly into the Territories of the *Sicambri*. Mean-time Ambassadors arriving from several States to desire

BOOK

IV.

Peace, and court his Alliance, he gave them a very favourable Reception, and appointed them to send Hostages. The *Sicambri*, when they understood that the Bridge was begun, by Advice of the *Ufipetes* and *Tenchiberi* who had taken Shelter among them, resolved upon a Retreat: and having abandoned their Territories, and carried off all their Effects, withdrew into the neighbouring Woods and Defarts.

XVII. CÆSAR, after a short stay in their Country, having burnt all their Houses and Villages, and cut down their Corn, marched into the Territories of the *Ubians*. As he had promised these last his Assistance against the Attempts of the *Suevians*, he understood from them: that the *Suevians* being informed by their Spies of the Bridge built upon the *Rhine*, had, according to their Custom, called a Council, and dispatched Orders into all Parts for the People to forsake their Towns, and convey their Wives, Children, and Effects into the Woods; commanding at the same time, that all such as were able to bear Arms should meet at the Place of general Rendezvous, which they had appointed towards the middle of the Country, resolving there to wait the Arrival of the *Romans*, and give them Battle. *Cæsar*, upon this Intelligence, having accomplished all he intended in carrying his Army over the *Rhine*, by spreading an universal Terror among the *Germans*, taking Vengeance of the *Sicambri*, and setting the *Ubians* at liberty; after a stay of only eighteen Days beyond the *Rhine*, thinking he had done enough both for his own Reputation and the Service of the Republick, led back his Army into *Gaul*, and broke down the Bridge.

XVIII.

XVIII. THOUGH but a small part of the Summer BOOK
 now remained ; for in those Regions, *Gaul*, stretch- IV.
 ing very much to the North, the Winters begin
 early ; *Cæsar* nevertheless resolved to pass over into
Britain, having certain Intelligence, that in all his
 Wars with the *Gauls*, the Enemies of the Common-
 wealth had ever received Assistance from thence.
 He indeed foresaw, that the Season of the Year
 would not permit him to finish the War : yet he
 thought it would be of no small advantage, if he
 should but take a View of the Island, learn the
 Nature of the Inhabitants, and acquaint himself
 with the Coast, Harbours, and Landing-places,
 to all which the *Gauls* were perfect Strangers. For
 almost none but Merchants resort to that Island ;
 nor have even they any Knowledge of the Country,
 except the Sea-coast, and the Parts opposite to
Gaul. Having therefore called together the Mer-
 chants from all Parts, they could neither inform him
 of the largeness of the Island, nor what or how power-
 ful the Nations were that inhabited it, nor of their
 Customs, Art of War, or the Harbours fit to re-
 ceive large Ships. For these Reasons, before he
 embarked himself, he thought proper to send *C. Vo-*
luseus with a Galley, to get some knowledge of
 these things ; commanding him, as soon as he had
 informed himself in what he wanted to know, to re-
 turn with all expedition. He himself marched
 with his whole Army into the Territories of the
Morini, because thence was the nearest Passage into
Britain. Here he ordered a great many Ships from
 the neighbouring Ports to attend him, and the
 Fleet he had made use of the Year before in the
Venetian War.

BOOK XIX. MEAN-WHILE the *Britons* having notice

IV. of his Design, by the Merchants that resorted to their Island; Ambassadors from many of their States came to *Cæsar*, with an offer of Hostages, and Submission to the Authority of the People of *Rome*. To these he gave a favourable Audience; and exhorting them to continue in the same mind, sent them back into their own Country. Along with them he dispatched *Comius*, whom he had constituted King of the *Atrebatians*; a Man in whose Virtue, Wisdom, and Fidelity he greatly confided, and whose Authority in the Island was very considerable. To him he gave it in charge, to visit as many States as he could, and persuade them to enter into an Alliance with the *Romans*, letting them know at the same time that *Cæsar* designed as soon as possible to come over in person to their Island. *Volusenus* having taken a View of the Country, as far as was possible for one who had resolved not to quit his Ship, or trust himself in the hands of the *Barbarians*, returned on the fifth Day, and acquainted *Cæsar* with his Discoveries.

XX. WHILE *Cæsar* continued in those Parts, for the sake of getting ready his Fleet, Deputies arrived from almost all the Cantons of the *Morini*, to excuse their late War with the People of *Rome*, as proceeding wholly from a national Fierceness, and their Ignorance of the *Roman* Customs; promising likewise an entire Submission for the future. This fell out very opportunely for *Cæsar*, who was unwilling to leave any Enemies behind him, nor would the Season of the Year have even allowed him to engage in a War: besides, he judged it by no means proper so far to entangle himself in these trivial Affairs, as to be obliged to postpone the Expedition

Expedition into *Britain*. He therefore ordered them to send him a great Number of Hostages, and upon their being delivered, received them into his Alliance. Having got together about eighty Transports, which he thought would be sufficient for the carrying over two Legions; he distributed the Gallies he had over and above, to the Questor, Lieutenants, and Officers of the Cavalry. There were besides eighteen Transports detained by contrary Winds at a Port about eight Miles off, which he appointed to carry over the Cavalry. The rest of the Army, under the Command of *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, and *L. Arunculeius Cotta*, were sent against the *Menapians*, and those Cantons of the *Morini* which had not submitted. *P. Sulpicius Rufus* had the charge of the Harbour where he embarked, with a strong Garrison to maintain it.

XXI. THINGS being in this manner settled, and the Wind springing up fair, he weighed Anchor about one in the Morning, ordering the Cavalry to embark at the other Port, and follow him. But as these Orders were executed but slowly, he himself about ten in the Morning reached the Coast of *Britain*, where he saw all the Cliffs covered with the Enemy's Forces. The nature of the Place was such, that the Sea being bounded by steep Mountains, the Enemy might easily launch their Javelins upon us from above. Not thinking this therefore a convenient Landing-place, he resolved to lie by 'till three in the Afternoon, and wait the Arrival of the rest of his Fleet. Mean-while having called the Lieutenants and military Tribunes together, he informed them of what he had learnt from *Volufenus*, instructed them in the Part they were to act, and particularly exhorted them to do every thing with readiness and at a Signal given,

BOOK given, agreeable to the Rules of military Discipline, which in Sea Affairs especially required Expedition and Dispatch, because of all others the most changeable and uncertain. Having dismissed them, and finding both the Wind and Tide favourable, he made the Signal for weighing Anchor, and after sailing about eight Miles farther, stopp'd over-against a plain and open Shore.

XXII. BUT the Barbarians perceiving our Design, sent their Cavalry and Chariots before, which they frequently make use of in Battle ; and following with the rest of their Forces, endeavoured to oppose our landing. And indeed we found the Difficulty very great on many accounts: for our Ships being large, required a great depth of Water ; and the Soldiers, who were wholly unacquainted with the Places, and had their Hands embarrassed and loaden with a weight of Armour, were at the same time to leap from the Ships, stand breast-high amidst the Waves, and encounter the Enemy ; while they, fighting upon dry Ground, or advancing only a little way into the Water ; having the free use of all their Limbs, and in places which they perfectly knew, could boldly cast their Darts, and spur on their Horses, well inured to that kind of Service. All these Circumstances serving to spread a Terror among our Men, who were wholly strangers to this way of fighting ; they pushed not the Enemy with the same Vigour and Spirit as was usual for them in Combats upon dry Ground.

XXIII. CÆSAR observing this, ordered some Gallies, a kind of Shipping less common with the Barbarians, and more easily governed and put in motion, to advance a little from the Transports towards the Shore, in order to set upon the Enemy
in

in flank, and by means of their Engines, Slings, BOOK
and Arrows, drive them to some distance. This IV.
proved of considerable service to our Men: for
what with the surprise occasioned by the make of
our Gallies, the motion of the Oars, and the play-
ing of the Engines, the Enemy were forced to halt,
and in a little time began to give back. But our
Men still demurring to leap into the Sea, chiefly
because of the Depth of the Water in those parts;
the Standard-bearer of the tenth Legion; having
first invoked the Gods for Success, cried out aloud:
‘ Follow me, Fellow-Soldiers, unless you will be-
‘ tray the *Roman* Eagle into the Hands of the
‘ Enemy; for my part, I am resolved to discharge
‘ my Duty to *Cæsar* and the Commonwealth.’
Upon this he jumped into the Sea, and advanced
with the Eagle against the Enemy: whereat our
Men exhorting one another to prevent so signal a
Disgrace; all that were in the Ship followed him:
which being perceived by those in the nearest
Vessels, they also did the like, and boldly ap-
proached the Enemy.

XXIV. THE Battle was - obstinate on both
Sides: but our Men, as being neither able to keep
their Ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their
respective Standards; because leaping promiscu-
ously from their Ships, every one joined the first En-
sign he met; were thereby thrown into great Confu-
sion. The Enemy on the other hand being well
acquainted with the Shallows; when they saw our
Men advancing singly from the Ships, spurred on
their Horses, and attacked them in that perplexity.
In one Place great numbers would gather round an
handful of the *Romans*: others falling upon them
in flank, galled them mightily with their Darts.
Which *Cæsar* observing, ordered some small Boats

BOOK to be manned, and ply about with Recruits. By

IV. this means the foremost Ranks of our Men having got firm footing, were followed by all the rest; when falling upon the Enemy briskly, they were soon put to the rout. But as the Cavalry were not yet arrived, we could not pursue or advance far into the Island; which was the only thing wanting to render the Victory compleat.

XXV. THE Enemy being thus vanquished in Battle, no sooner got together after their Defeat, than they dispatched Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to sue for Peace; offering Hostages, and an entire Submission to his Commands. Along with these Ambassadors came *Comius* the *Atrebatian*, whom *Cæsar*, as we have related above, had sent before him into *Britain*. The Natives seized him as soon as he landed, and tho' he was charged with a Commission from *Cæsar*, threw him into Irons. But upon their late Defeat they thought proper to send him back, throwing the Blame of what had happened upon the Multitude, and begged of *Cæsar* to excuse a Fault proceeding from Ignorance. *Cæsar*, after some Complaints of their Behaviour, in that having of their own accord sent Ambassadors to the Continent to sue for Peace, they had yet without any Reason begun a War against him; told them at last he would forgive their Fault, and ordered them to send a certain number of Hostages. Part were sent immediately, and the rest, as living at some distance, they promised to deliver in a few Days. Mean-time they disbanded their Troops, and the several Chiefs came to *Cæsar*'s Camp, to manage their own Concerns, and those of the States to which they belonged.

XXVI.

XXVI. A Peace being thus concluded fourB O O K
 Days after *Cæsar's* Arrival in *Britain*, the eighteen IV.
 Transports appointed to carry the Cavalry, of whom we have spoken above, put to Sea with a gentle Gale. But when they had so near approached the Coast, as to be even within view of the Camp; so violent a Storm all on a sudden arose, that being unable to hold on their Course, some were obliged to return to the Port whence they set out, and others driven to the lower end of the Island westward, not without great Danger. There they cast Anchor: but the Waves rising very high, so as to fill the Ships with Water, they were again in the Night obliged to stand out to Sea, and make for the Continent of *Gaul*. That very Night it happened to be full Moon, when the Tides upon the Sea-coast always rise highest, a thing at that time wholly unknown to the *Romans*. Thus at one and the same time, the Gallies which *Cæsar* made use of to transport his Men, and which he had ordered to be drawn up on the Strand, were filled with the Tide; and the Tempest fell furiously upon the Transports that lay at Anchor in the Road. Nor was it possible for our Men to attempt any thing for their preservation. Many of the Ships being dashed to pieces, and the rest having lost their Anchors, Tackle, and Rigging, which rendered them altogether unfit for sailing, a general Consternation spread itself thro' the Camp. For there were no other Ships to carry back the Troops, nor any Materials to repair those that had been disabled by the Tempest. And as it had been all along *Cæsar's* design to winter in *Gaul*, he was wholly without Corn to subsist the Troops in those parts.

XXVII. ALL this being known to the *British*
 Chiefs, who after the Battle had repaired to *Cæ-*
 3 *sar's*

BOOK *far's* Camp, to perform the Conditions of the Trea-

IV.

ty; they began to hold Conferences among themselves. And as they plainly saw that the *Romans* were destitute both of Cavalry, Shipping, and Corn; and easily judged, from the smallness of the Camp, that the number of their Troops was but inconsiderable; in which Notion they were the more confirmed, because *Cæsar* having brought over the Legions without Baggage, had occasion to inclose but a small spot of Ground: they thought this a convenient Opportunity for taking up Arms, and by intercepting the *Roman* Convoys to protract the Affair 'till Winter; being confidently persuaded, that by defeating these Troops, or cutting off their Return, they should effectually put a stop to all future Attempts upon *Britain*. Having therefore entered into a joint Confederacy, they by degrees left the Camp, and began to draw the Islanders together. But *Cæsar*, tho' he was not yet apprized of their Design, yet guessing in part at their Intentions, by the Disaster which had befallen his Fleet, and the Delays formed in relation to the Hostages, determined to provide against all Events. He therefore had Corn daily brought in to his Camp, and ordered the Timber of the Ships that had been most damaged to be made use of in repairing the rest, sending to *Gaul* for what other Materials he wanted. As the Soldiers were indefatigable in this Service, his Fleet was soon in a Condition to sail, having lost only twelve Ships.

XXVIII. DURING these Transactions, the seventh Legion being sent out to forage according to Custom; as part were employed in cutting down the Corn, and part in carrying it to the Camp, without suspicion of attack; News was brought to *Cæsar*, that a greater Cloud of Dust than ordinary was

was seen on that side where the Legion was. *Cæsar* BOOK
suspecting how matters went, marched with the IV.
Cohorts that were upon Guard, ordering two
others to succeed in their room, and all the Soldiers
in the Camp to arm and follow him as soon as possible.
When he was advanced a little way from the
Camp, he saw his Men overpower'd by the Enemy,
and with great difficulty able to sustain the
Fight, being driven into a small Compass, and exposed
on every side to the Darts of their Adversaries.
For as the Harvest was gathered in every where
else, and one only Field left; the Enemy suspecting
that our Men would come thither to forage, had
hid themselves during the Night in the Woods;
and waiting 'till our Men had quitted their Arms,
and dispersed themselves to fall a reaping; they
suddenly attacked them, killed some, put the rest
into disorder, and began to surround them with
their Horses and Chariots.

XXIX. THEIR way of fighting with their
Chariots is this: First they drive their Chariots
on all sides, and throw their Darts; insomuch
that by the very terror of the Horses, and noise of
the Wheels, they often break the Ranks of the
Enemy. When they have forced their way into
the midst of the Cavalry, they quit their Chariots,
and fight on Foot. Mean-time the Drivers retire
a little from the Combat, and place themselves in
such a manner as to favour the Retreat of their
Countrymen, should they be overpower'd by the
Enemy. Thus in Action they perform the Part
both of nimble Horsemen, and stable Infantry:
and by continual Exercise and Use have arrived
at that Expertness, that in the most steep and
difficult Places, they can stop their Horses upon
a full stretch, turn them which way they please,
run along the Pole, rest on the Harness, and throw
themselves

BOOK themselves back into their Chariots with incredible
IV. Dexterity.

XXX. OUR Men being astonished and confounded with this new way of fighting, *Cæsar* came very timely to their Relief: for upon his Approach the Enemy made a stand, and the *Romans* began to recover from their Fear. This satisfied *Cæsar* for the present, who not thinking it a proper season to provoke the Enemy, and bring on a general Engagement, stood facing them for some time, and then led back the Legions to the Camp. The continual Rains that followed for some Days after, both kept the *Romans* within their Intrenchments, and withheld the Enemy from attacking us. Meantime the *Britons* dispatched Messengers into all parts, to make known to their Countrymen the small number of the *Roman* Troops, and the favourable Opportunity they had of making immense Spoils, and freeing their Country for ever from all future Invasions, by storming the Enemy's Camp. Having by this means got together a great Body of Infantry and Cavalry, they drew towards our Intrenchments.

XXXI. CÆSAR, tho' he foresaw that the Enemy, if beaten, would in the same manner as before escape the Danger by flight; yet having got about thirty Horse, whom *Comius* the *Atrebatian* had brought over with him from *Gaul*; he drew up the Legions in order of Battle before the Camp: and falling upon the *Britons*, who were not able to sustain the shock of our Men, soon put them to flight. The *Romans* pursuing them as long as their strength would permit, made a terrible Slaughter; and setting fire to their Houses and Villages a great way round, returned to the Camp.

XXXI,

XXXII. THE same Day Ambassadors came from the Enemy to *Cæsar* to sue for Peace. *Cæsar* doubled the number of Hostages he had before imposed upon them, and ordered them to be sent over to him into *Gaul*, because the Equinox coming on, and his Ships being leaky, he thought it not prudent to put off his Return till Winter. A fair Wind offering, he set sail a little after midnight, and arrived safe in *Gaul*. Two of his Transports not being able to reach the same Port with the rest, were driven into a Haven a little lower in the Country.

BOOK
IV.

XXXIII. In these two Vessels were about three hundred Soldiers, who having landed, and being upon their March to the Camp; the *Morini*, who had submitted to *Cæsar* upon his setting out for *Britain*, drawn by the hopes of Plunder, surrounded them at first with only a few Men, and ordered them to lay down their Arms under pain of being put to the Sword. But they, casting themselves into an Orb, stood upon their Defence; when all on a sudden six thousand more of the Enemy appeared, roused by the noise of the Combatants. *Cæsar* having notice of what passed, sent all his Cavalry to the assistance of the *Romans*. Meanwhile our Men withstood all the Attacks of the Enemy, and bravely maintained the Fight for upwards of six Hours, having slain great Numbers of the *Morini*, while on their side only a few were wounded. But no sooner did our Cavalry appear, than the Enemy, throwing down their Arms, betook themselves to flight, and were almost all slain in the Pursuit.

XXXIV. THE Day after *Cæsar* sent *T. Labienus*, with the Legions returned out of *Britain*, against

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the

BOOK the rebellious *Morini*; who being deprived by the
IV. Drought of the Benefit of their Marshes, which
had served them for shelter the Year before, almost
all fell into his Power. Mean-time Q. *Titurius*, and
L. Cotta, who had been sent against the *Menapians*,
having laid waste their Territories with Fire and
Sword, and plundered their Habitations, returned
to *Cæsar*, not being able to come up with the *Me-*
napians themselves, who had retired into impene-
trable Forests. *Cæsar* quartered all his Troops
among the *Belgians*. Only two of the *British* States
sent Hostages into *Gaul*, the rest neglecting to per-
form the Conditions of the Treaty. For these
Successes a Thanksgiving of twenty Days was de-
creed by the Senate.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS in GAUL.
BOOK V.

THE ARGUMENT.

- I. *Cæsar leaving Orders with his Lieutenants in Gaul to build a Fleet, sets out for Italy and Illyricum, where he puts a stop to the Incursions of the Pirustæ.*
- II. *Returning thence into Gaul, he marches against the Treviri, and quiets the Disturbances in that Province.*
- IV. *Dumnorix withdrawing from the Roman Camp with the Æduan Cavalry, is pursued and slain.*
- VII. *Cæsar passes over into Britain.*
- VIII. *And forces the Enemy from the Woods in which they had taken shelter.*
- IX. *But understanding that his Fleet had suffered greatly by a Storm, he quits the pursuit of the Britons, repairs his Fleet, fortifies his Camp, and then returns against the Enemy.*
- X. *A description of Britain, and its Inhabitants.*
- XI. *Cæsar defeats the Britons in various Encounters.*
- XIV. *Passes the Thames.*
- XIX. *Returns into Gaul.*
- XX. *And because of the great scarcity of Corn, distributes his Legions among the several States.*
- XXI. *Tasgetius slain among the Carnutes.*
- XXII. *Ambiorix and Cativulcus excite several States to a Revolt.*
- XXIII. *Ambiorix by an artful Speech persuades Titurius to quit his Camp, and attacking him in his March, cuts him off with his whole Party.*
- XXX. *Being afterwards joined by the Nervians, he falls upon Cicero's Camp.*
- XXXVI. *The noble Emulation of Pulpio and Varenus.*
- XXXVII. *Cæsar marches to Cicero's relief.*
- XL. *The Gauls quit the Siege, and advance to meet him.*
- XLII. *Cæsar defeats them in Battle.*
- XLIV. *And to prevent their continual Revolts, resolves to pass the Winter in Gaul.*
- XLV. *The Senones, Treviri, and other States, bear the Roman Yoke with impatience.*
- XLVII. *Indutiomarus attacks Labienus's Camp.*
- XLIX. *But being slain in the Attempt, the Gauls separate, and Tranquillity is in a great measure restored.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR'S
 COMMENTARIES
 OF HIS
 WARS in GAUL.
 BOOK V.

I. IN the Consulship of *Lucius Domitius*, and *Appius Claudius*, *Cæsar* leaving his Winter-quarters to go into *Italy*, as was his yearly Custom, gave Orders to his Lieutenants, who had the charge of the Legions, to build as many Ships as possible during the Winter, and to repair such as were old. He prescribed the form and manner of building; ordering them to be somewhat lower than was usual in the *Mediterranean*, for the convenience of embarking and landing his Men; which he judged the more necessary, as he had observed, that by reason of the frequent returns of the Tide, there was less depth of Water upon the *British* Coast. He likewise commanded them to be built broader than ordinary, that they might receive the greater number of Horses and Carriages; and to be contrived for lightness and expedition, to

BOOK which the lowness of their Decks greatly contributed.

V. He sent to *Spain* for the Materials necessary in building and equipping them; and having finished the Diet of *Cisalpine Gaul*, set out for *Illyricum*, upon advice that the *Pirustæ* were laying waste the Province by their Incursions. When he arrived there, he ordered the several States to furnish their Contingents, and appointed a Place of general Rendezvous. The Report of this no sooner spread among the *Pirustæ*, than they sent Ambassadors to inform him; that nothing had been done against the Province by publick Authority, and that they were ready to make what Satisfaction he required. *Cæsar* pleased with their Submission, ordered them to bring him Hostages, and named the Day by which they were to be delivered; threatening them with a fierce War in case of Disobedience. These being accordingly brought by the Day prefixed, he appointed Arbitrators between the contending States, to estimate the Damages, and determine what Reparation was to be made.

II. HAVING dispatched these Affairs, and held a general Diet of the Province, he returned again into *Cisalpine Gaul*, and thence went to the Army. Upon his Arrival, he visited all the Quarters of the Legions; and found, that by the singular Diligence of the Soldiers, notwithstanding the greatest scarcity of Materials, no less than six hundred Transports, such as we have described above, and twenty-eight Gallies, were in such forwardness, that in a few Days they would be ready to be launched. Having praised his Soldiers, and those whom he had set over the Works, he gave them what further Instructions he thought necessary, and ordered the whole Fleet to rendezvous at *Port-Itius*, whence he knew lay the most commodious Passage
to

to *Britain*; it being there not above thirty Miles distant from the Continent. Leaving what Soldiers he thought necessary for this Purpose, he advanced at the head of four Legions without Baggage, and eight hundred Horse, into the Country of the *Treviri*; because they neither appeared at the general Diets of *Gaul*, nor submitted to the Orders of the Commonwealth; and were besides reported to be soliciting the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*.

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III. THIS State is by far the most powerful of all *Gaul* in Horse: they have likewise a very strong and numerous Infantry; and, as we have before observed, border upon the *Rhine*. Two of their principal Men, *Indutiomarus* and *Cingetorix*, were at this time Competitors for the supreme Authority. *Cingetorix*, as soon as he heard of the Arrival of *Cæsar* and the Legions, came to him, and assured him; that he and all his Party would continue firm to their Duty, and never abandon the Interest of the *Romans*: at the same time he informed him of all that had passed among the *Treviri*. But *Indutiomarus*, drawing together great Numbers of Horse and Foot, and securing such as were unable to bear Arms in the Forest of *Arden*, which extends from the *Rhine* quit cross the Country of *Treves*, to the Territories of the *Rhemi*; resolved to try the fortune of War. But soon after, as several of the leading Men of the State, partly out of attachment to *Cingetorix*, partly terrified by the Approach of the *Roman* Army, came to *Cæsar* to solicit in their own behalf, since they found themselves incapable of effectually serving their Country: *Indutiomarus* fearing an universal Defection, sent likewise Ambassadors to him to acquaint him: " That he had chosen to stay at home, and forbear
" coming to the *Roman* Camp, with no other view

BOOK " but to keep the State in its Duty; left, in the

V. " Absence of the Nobility, the People might have

" been drawn into some rash Step: That the
 " whole Country was now at his Command; and
 " he ready, with *Cæsar's* Permission, to attend him
 " in Person, and put his own Concerns, as well
 " as those of the State, under his Protection."

Tho' *Cæsar* well understood the Reason of his present Submission, and by what Considerations he had been deterred from the prosecution of his first Design; yet unwilling to waste the whole Summer in the Country of *Treves*, when every thing was in readiness for his Expedition into *Britain*, he ordered *Indutiomarus* to attend him with two hundred Hostages. These being accordingly brought, and among them the Son, and all the nearest Relations of *Indutiomarus*, whom he had specified by name; *Cæsar* encouraged and exhorted him to continue firm in his Duty. Nevertheless, assembling all the principal Men of *Treves*, he reconciled them one after another to *Cingetorix*, as well on account of his singular Merit, as because he thought it of the greatest Importance, to establish thoroughly the Authority of a Man, of whose steady and inviolable Attachment he had such convincing Proof. *Indutiomarus* highly repented this Proceeding, which tended so much to the diminution of his Power; and as he had all-along been an Enemy to the *Romans*, this new Affront provoked him still more,

IV. THESE Affairs being settled, *Cæsar* arrived with his Legions at the Port of *Uis*. There he found, that about forty of his Ships, built in the Country of the *Belgians*, having been attacked by a Storm, and disabled from continuing their Voyage, had been obliged to put back. The rest were all equipped and rigged, ready to obey the first Signal.

Signal. All the Cavalry of *Gaul*, about four thousand in number, and the prime Nobility of the several States, met him likewise, by order, at this Place. His Design was, to leave only a few of these Nobles behind him in *Gaul*, on whose Fidelity he could rely; and to take the rest with him to *Britain* as Hostages, the better to prevent any Commotions during his Absence.

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V. DUMNORIX the *Æduan*, of whom we have spoken above, was one of those that attended him on this Occasion. Him in particular he resolved to carry along with him, as he knew him to be a lover of Novelties, ambitious, enterprising, and of great Interest and Authority among the *Gauls*. Besides all this, he had publickly said in an Assembly of the *Æduans*, that *Cæsar* had invested him with the Sovereignty of their State: which Resolution, tho' by no means pleasing to the *Æduans*, they yet durst not send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, either to oppose or get reversed: nor was *Cæsar* otherwise informed of the matter, but by those whom he had placed about *Dumnorix*, to have an Eye over his Conduct. *Dumnorix*, at first, earnestly petitioned to be left in *Gaul*; sometimes pretending he was unused to sailing, and afraid of the Sea; sometimes urging religious Engagements, which required him to stay at home. But finding all his Endeavours to no purpose, he began to solicit the Chiefs of the *Gauls*, discouraging them apart, and advising them not to leave the Continent. The more to awaken their Fears, he told them: "That *Cæsar* had his particular Reasons
" for carrying with him all the Nobility of *Gaul*;
" because not daring to dispatch them in their own
" Country, he was in hopes of finding a favourable
" Opportunity to execute his cruel Purpose in
" *Britain*." He therefore exhorted them to join

in

BOOK in a mutual Alliance, and oblige themselves by a
 V. solemn Oath, to pursue with common Consent such
 Measures as should appear necessary for the preservation of *Gaul*.

VI. THO' *Cæsar* was fully informed of these Practices; yet in consideration of his singular Regard for the *Æduans*, he contented himself with endeavouring to check and traverse his Designs: determined notwithstanding to continue inflexible, and at all hazards prevent any Misfortune to himself and the Commonwealth from a Spirit, which he found every Day growing more hardy and intrepid. Being therefore detained in this Place about five and twenty Days, during which the North-west Wind, very common on that Coast, hindered him from sailing; he studied by the ways of Gentleness and Persuasion, to keep *Dumnorix* in his Duty, without neglecting however to watch all his Motions. At last, the Wind springing up fair, he ordered the Horse and Foot to embark. As this universally engaged the Attention of the Camp, *Dumnorix*, unknown to *Cæsar*, drew off the *Æduan* Cavalry, and began his March homeward. *Cæsar* being informed of it, immediately put a stop to the Embarkation; and postponing every other Consideration, ordered out a strong Party of Horse to pursue and bring him back. If he made resistance, or refused to obey, they had Orders to kill him: for he judged, that a Man who had slighted his personal Authority, would not pay any great regard to his Commands in his Absence. When they had overtaken him, he refused to return; and defending himself Sword in hand, implored the Assistance of his Followers, often calling out, that he was free, and the Subject of a free State. The *Romans*, according to the Orders they had received, surrounded

ed and slew him; upon which all the *Æduan* Cavalry returned to *Cæsar*. BOOK
V.

VII. THIS Affair concluded; and *Labienuſ* being left in *Gaul* with three Legions, and two thousand Horſe, to defend the Port, provide Corn, have an eye upon the Tranſactions of the Continent, and take meaſures accordingly; *Cæſar* weighed Anchor about Sun-ſet with five Legions, and the ſame number of Horſe he had left with *Labienuſ*: and advancing with a gentle South-wind, continued his Courſe till midnight, when he found himſelf becalmed: but the Tide ſtill driving him on, at day-break he ſaw *Britain* on his left. When again following the return of the Tide, he rowed with all his might, to reach that part of the Iſland which he had marked out the Summer before, as moſt convenient for Landing. And on this occaſion the Diligence of the Soldiers cannot be enough commended; who labouring inceſſantly at the Oar, urged the Tranſports and Ships of Burden ſo ſwiftly, that they equalled the Courſe of the Gallies. The whole Fleet reached the Coaſt of *Britain* about Noon: nor did any Enemy appear in view. But as *Cæſar* afterwards underſtood from the Priſoners; though a great Army of *Britons* had repaired to the Coaſt; yet terrified by the vaſt Number of Ships, which, together with thoſe of the laſt Year's Expedition, and ſuch as had been fitted out by particular Perſons for their own uſe, amounted to upwards of eight hundred; they retired haſtily from the Shore, and hid themſelves behind the Mountains.

VIII. *CÆSAR* having landed his Army, and choſen a proper Place for his Camp; as ſoon as he underſtood from the Priſoners where the Enemy's Forces

BOOK Forces lay; leaving ten Cohorts upon the Coast,

V. together with three hundred Horse, to guard his Fleet; he set out about midnight in quest of the Enemy; being under the less concern for his Ships, because he had left them at Anchor upon a smooth and open Shore, under the Charge of *Q. Atrius*. After a March of twelve Hours during the Night, he came within sight of the Enemy; who having posted themselves behind a River with their Cavalry and Chariots, attacked us from the higher Ground, in order to oppose our Passage: but being repulsed by our Horse, they retreated towards the Woods, into a Place strongly fenced both by Nature and Art, and which, in all probability, had been fortified before on occasion of some domestick War: for all the Avenues were secured by strong Barricades of felled Trees. They never sallied out of the Wood but in small Parties, thinking it enough to defend the Entrance against our Men. But the Soldiers of the seventh Legion, advancing under cover of their Shields, and having cast up a Mount, forced the Intrenchments with little loss, and obliged the Enemy to abandon the Wood. *Cæsar* forbid all Pursuit; both because he was unacquainted with the nature of the Country; and the Day being far spent, he resolved to employ the rest of it in fortifying his Camp.

IX. EARLY the next Morning, he divided his Troops both Horse and Foot into three Bodies, and sent them out in pursuit of the Enemy. They were advanced but a little way, and just come within sight of the Rear of the *Britons*, when a Party of Horse from *Atrius* came to *Cæsar*, and informed him, "That a dreadful Storm arising the Night before, had fallen violently upon the Fleet, and driven almost all the Ships ashore: That neither
" Anchors

“ Anchors nor Cables, nor all the Address of the B O O K
 “ Mariners and Pilots, had been able to resist the V.
 “ Fury of the Tempest; which had done unspeak-
 “ able Damage to the Fleet, by reason of the Ships
 “ running foul of one another.” *Cæsar*, upon
 this Intelligence, recalls his Legions and Cavalry,
 commanding them to give over the Pursuit. He
 himself returns to his Ships, and finds every thing
 according to the Reports and Letters he had re-
 ceived; forty of them being entirely destroyed,
 and the rest so damaged that they were hardly re-
 pairable. He therefore set all the Carpenters of
 the Army to work, and wrote for others to *Gaul*;
 ordering *Labienus* at the same time, with the Le-
 gions under his Command, to build what Ships he
 could. He thought it likewise safest, though a
 Work of great Labour and Difficulty, to draw all
 his Ships on shore, and inclose them within the
 Fortifications of his Camp. Ten Days were spent
 in the Service, during which the Soldiers had no
 intermission of Fatigue, not even in the Night.
 The Ships being in this manner secured, and the
 Camp strongly fortified, he left the same Troops
 to guard it as before, and returned to the Place
 where he had quitted the Pursuit of the Enemy.
 Upon his Arrival he found the Forces of the *Britons*
 considerably increased. The chief Command and
 Administration of the War, was, by common
 Consent, conferred upon *Cassibelanus*; whose Ter-
 ritories were divided from the Maritime States by
 the *Thames*, a River eighty Miles distant from the
 Sea. This Prince had hitherto been engaged in
 almost continual Wars with his Neighbours: but
 the Terror of our Arrival making the *Britons* unite
 among themselves, they intrusted him with the
 whole Conduct of the War.

BOOK X. THE inland Parts of *Britain* are inhabited

V. by those, whom *Fame* reports to be the Natives of the Soil. The Sea-coast is peopled with *Belgians*, drawn thither by the love of War and Plunder. These last, passing over from different Parts, and settling in the Country, still retain the Names of the several States whence they are descended. The Island is well peopled, full of Houses built after the manner of the *Gauls*, and abounds in Cattle. They use brass Money, and iron Rings of a certain weight. The Provinces remote from the Sea produce Tin, and those upon the Coast Iron; but the latter in no great Quantity. Their Brass is all imported. All kinds of Wood grow here the same as in *Gaul*, except the Fir and Beech-tree. They think it unlawful to feed upon Hares, Pullets, or Geese; yet they breed them up for their Diversion and Pleasure. The Climate is more temperate than in *Gaul*, and the Colds less intense. The Island is triangular, one of its sides facing *Gaul*. The Extremity towards *Kent*, whence is the nearest Passage to *Gaul*, lies Eastward: the other stretches South-west. This side extends about five hundred Miles. Another side looks towards *Spain* westward. Over-against this lies *Ireland*, an Island esteemed not above half as large as *Britain*, and separated from it by an interval equal to that between *Britain* and *Gaul*. In this interval lies the Isle of *Mona*, besides several other lesser Islands, of which some write, that in the time of the Winter-solstice, they have Night for thirty Days together. We could make out nothing of this upon Enquiry, only discovered by means of our Hour-glasses, that the Nights were shorter than in *Gaul*. The length of this side is computed at seven hundred Miles. The last side faces the North-east, and is fronted by no part of the
the

the Continent, only towards one of its Extremities it seems to eye chiefly the *German Coast*. It is thought to extend in length about eight hundred Miles. Thus the whole Island takes in a Circuit of two thousand Miles. The Inhabitants of *Ment*, which lies wholly on the Sea-coast, are the most civilized of all the *Britons*, and differ but little in their Manners from the *Gauls*. The greater part of those within the Country never sow their Lands, but live on Flesh and Milk, and go clad in Skins. All the *Britons* in general paint themselves with Woad, which gives a bluish Cast to the Skin, and makes them look dreadful in Battle. They are long-hair'd; and shave all the rest of the Body except the Head and upper Lip. Ten or twelve of them live together, having their Wives in common; especially Brothers, or Parents and Children amongst themselves: but the Issue is always ascribed to him who first espoused the Mother.

XI. The Enemy's Horse, supported by their Chariots, vigorously charged our Cavalry on their March; yet we every where had the better, and drove them to their Woods and Hills: but after making great Slaughter, venturing to continue the Pursuit too far, we lost some Men. Some time after, falling unexpectedly from the Woods, and falling suddenly upon our Men while employed in fortifying their Camp, a sharp Conflict ensued between them and the advanced Guard. *Cæsar* sent two Cohorts to their Assistance; whom the *Britons* charging in separate Parties, so surprised with their new manner of fighting, that they broke through, routed them, and returned without Loss. *Q. Laberius Durus*, a military Tribune, was slain on this occasion: but some fresh Cohorts coming up, the *Britons* were at last repulsed.


XII.

BOOK

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XII. By this Action which happened within view of the Camp, and of which the whole Army were Spectators, it evidently appeared, that our heavy armed Legions, who could neither pursue those that retired, nor durst venture to forsake their Standards, were by no means a fit match for such an Enemy. Nor could even the Cavalry engage without great danger; it being usual for the *Britons* to counterfeit a Retreat, until they had drawn them a considerable way from the Legions; when suddenly quitting their Chariots, they charged them on Foot, and by this unequal manner of fighting, made it alike dangerous to pursue or retire. Add to all this, that they never fought in a Body, but in small Parties, and with considerable Intervals between. They had likewise their Detachments so placed, as easily to protect their flying Troops, and send fresh Supplies where needful.

XIII. THE next Day they stationed themselves among the Hills, at a distance from our Camp, and appeared only in small Bodies, nor seemed so forward to skirmish with our Cavalry as the Day before. But about Noon, *Cæsar* ordering out three Legions to forage, with all the Cavalry, under the Command of *C. Trebonius* his Lieutenant; they fell suddenly upon the Foragers on all sides, and even attacked the Legions and Standards. Our Men vigorously returning the Charge, repulsed them; and the Cavalry finding themselves supported by the Foot, continued the Pursuit till they had utterly broken them; insomuch that great Numbers being slain, they could neither find an opportunity to rally, descend from their Chariots, or face about to make Resistance. After this Defeat, the auxiliary Troops, which had come in
from

from all Parts, returned severally to their own BOOK
Homes; nor did the Enemy, from this time, ap- V.
pear any more against us with their whole Forces. 

XIV. CÆSAR perceiving their Design, marched towards the *Thames*, to penetrate into the Kingdom of *Cassibelanus*. This River is fordable only in one place, and that not without great difficulty. When he arrived, he saw the Enemy drawn up in great Numbers on the other side. They had likewise secured the Banks with sharp Stakes, and driven many of the same kind into the Bottom of the River, yet so as to be covered by the Water. *Cæsar* having Intelligence of this from the Prisoners and Deserters, sent the Cavalry before, ordering the Legions to follow close after; which they did with so much Expedition and Briskness, though nothing but their Heads were above the Water, that the Enemy, unable to sustain their Charge, quitted the Banks, and betook themselves to flight.

XV. CASSIBELANUS, as we have before intimated, finding himself unable to keep the Field, disbanded all his other Forces; and retaining only four thousand Chariots, watched our Motions, always keeping at some distance from us, and sheltering himself in Woods and inaccessible Places, whither he had likewise made such of the Inhabitants with their Cattle retire, as lay upon our Rout: and if at any time our Cavalry ventured upon a freer Excursion into the Fields, to plunder and lay waste the Country; as he was perfectly acquainted with all the Roads and Defiles, he would sally from the Woods with some of the Chariots, and fall upon our Men dispersed and in disorder. These frequent Alarms obliged us to be much upon our Guard; nor would *Cæsar* suffer

BOOK the Cavalry to remove to any distance from the
 V. Legions, or to pillage and destroy the Country;
 unless where the Foot was at hand to sustain them.

XVI. MEAN-TIME the *Trinobantes*, one of the most powerful States in those parts, send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*. Of this State was *Mandubratius*, who had fled for Protection to *Cæsar* in *Gaul*, that he might avoid the Fate of his Father *Inmanuentius*, whom *Cassibelanus* had put to death. The Ambassadors promised Obedience and Submission in the name of the Province; and withal intreated him to defend *Mandubratius* against the Violence of *Cassibelanus*, and restore him to the Government of their State. *Cæsar* ordered them to deliver forty Hostages, and furnish his Army with Corn; sending back at the same time *Mandubratius*. They yielded to his Demands without delay, sent the appointed number of Hostages, and supplied him with Corn.

XVII. THE Protection granted to the *Trinobantes*, securing them from the Insults of the Soldiers; the *Cenimagi*, *Segontiaci*, *Ancalites*, *Bibroci*, and *Cassi*, send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, and submit. From them he had Intelligence, that he was not far from the Capital of *Cassibelanus*, which was situated amidst Woods and Marshes, and whither great numbers of Men and Cattle were retired. A Town among the *Britons* is nothing more than a thick Wood, fortified with a Ditch and Rampart, to serve as a place of Retreat against the Incurfions of their Enemies. Thither he marched with his Legions: and tho' the Place appeared to be extremely strong both by Art and Nature, he nevertheless resolved to attack it in two several Quarters. The Enemy, after a short stand, were obliged at last to give way,
 and

and retire by another part of the Wood. Vast numbers of Cattle were found in the Place; and many of the *Britons* were either made Prisoners, or lost their lives in the Pursuit.

XVIII. WHILE these things passed beyond the *Thames*, *Cassibelanus* dispatched Messengers to *Kent*, which, as we have before observed, was situated along the Sea-coast. This Country was then under the Government of four Kings, *Cingetorix*, *Carnilius*, *Taximagulus*, and *Segonax*, who had Orders to draw all their Forces together, and fall suddenly upon the naval Camp of the *Romans*. But our Men falling upon them as they approached, made great slaughter of their Troops, took *Cingetorix* one of their Leaders Prisoner, and returned safe to the Camp. *Cassibelanus*, upon the News of this Battle, discouraged by so many Losses, the Devastation of his Territories, and above all the Revolt of the Provinces; sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to sue for Peace, by the Mediation of *Comius* of *Arras*.

XIX. *CÆSAR* designing to pass the Winter in *Gaul*, because of the frequent Commotions in that Country; and reflecting that but a small part of the Summer remained, during which it would be easy to protract the War; demanded Hostages, and appointed the yearly Tribute which *Britain* was to pay to the *Romans*. At the same time he strictly charged *Cassibelanus* to offer no Injury to *Mandubratius* or the *Trinobantes*. Having received the Hostages, he led his Troops back to the Sea-side, where he found his Fleet repaired. Orders were immediately given to launch it: and because the number of Prisoners was exceeding great, and several Ships had been destroyed by the Tempest, he resolved to carry over his Men at two Embarkations. Hap-

BOOK V. pily it so fell out, notwithstanding the great number of Ships, and their frequent passing and repassing, that not one perished either this or the preceding Year, which had any Soldiers on board: whereas those sent empty to him from the Continent, as well the Ships concerned in the first Embarkation, as others built afterwards by *Labienus*, to the number of sixty, were almost all driven back or lost. *Cæsar* having waited for them a considerable time to no purpose, and fearing to lose the proper Season for sailing, as the time of the Equinox drew near, chose to stow his Men on board the few Ships he had: and taking the Opportunity of an extraordinary Calm, set sail about ten at night, and by day-break brought his whole Fleet safe to the Continent of *Gaul*.

XX. HAVING laid up his Fleet, and held a general Assembly of the *Gauls* at *Samarobriva*; as the Crop had been very indifferent this Year by reason of the great Droughts, he was obliged to quarter his Legions otherwise than in former Winters, and canton them one by one in the several Provinces of *Gaul*. One Legion he quartered on the *Morini*, under the command of *C. Fabius*: another among the *Nervians*, under *Q. Cicero*: a third with the *Æduans*, under *L. Roscius*: and a fourth in the Country of the *Rhemi*, on the Borders of the *Treviri*, under *Labienus*. Three were sent into *Belgium*, over whom he appointed three Commanders; *M. Crassus* his Quæstor, *L. Munatius Plancus*, and *C. Trebonius*. The eighth and last, which *Cæsar* had newly raised on the other side of the *Po*, was sent, together with five Cohorts, among the *Eburones*, between the *Rhine* and the *Meuse*, where *Ambiorix* and *Cativolcus* reigned. At the head of this Body were two Commanders; *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, and
L.

L. Arunculeius Cotta. By this distribution of his BOOK Legions, he thought he had found an easy Remedy V. against the scarcity of Corn; and yet they all lay within the Compass of an hundred Miles, except that under *L. Roscius*, for which he was in no pain, as being quartered in a very quiet and friendly Country. He resolved however not to leave *Gaul* 'till he had received advice from all his Lieutenants, and was assured that their Quarters were established, fortified, and secured.

XXI. AMONG the *Carnutes* lived *Tasgetius*, a Man of distinguished Birth, and whose Ancestors had been possessed of the Sovereignty in that State. *Cæsar* had restored him to the Dignity of his Forefathers, in consideration of his Virtue and Affection to him, and the many signal Services he had done him in all his Wars. It was now the third Year of his Reign, when his Enemies, many of whom were of his own State, conspiring against him, openly assassinated him. The Affair was laid before *Cæsar*: who fearing lest the great number concerned in the Plot might draw the State into a Revolt, ordered *L. Plancus*, with a Legion from *Belgium*, to march speedily into the Country of the *Carnutes*, fix his Winter-quarters in that Province, and seizing all who had been concerned in the murder of *Tasgetius*, send them Prisoners to him. Mean-time he was informed by his Lieutenants and Questors, to whom he had committed the care of the Legions, that they were severally arrived at their appointed Quarters, and had fortified themselves in them.

XXII. ABOUT fifteen Days after the Arrival of the Legions in their Winter-quarters, a sudden Insurrection and Revolt broke out among the *Eburones*,

BOOK by the secret Practices of *Ambiorix* and *Cativolcus*,

V. These two Princes had been to meet *Sabinus* and *Cotta* on their Frontiers, and in a friendly manner had supplied them with Corn : but now instigated by *Indutiomarus* of *Treves*, they excited their People to take up Arms ; and having surprised some Soldiers that were gone to cut Wood, came with a great Body of Troops to attack the *Roman* Camp. Our Men immediately flew to Arms, ascended the Rampart, and sending out a Detachment of *Spanish* Horse, put their Cavalry to rout. Upon this, despairing of Success, they drew off their Men from the Attack ; and, according to their Custom, demanded a Conference ; pretending they had something to say which concerned the common Interest, and might serve to put an end to the present Differences,

XXIII. ACCORDINGLY *C. Arpinus*, a *Roman* Knight, the Friend of *Q. Titurius* ; and *Q. Junius* of *Spain*, who had frequently before been sent by *Cæsar* to *Ambiorix*, were deputed to treat. *Ambiorix* addressed them in Words to this effect : “ That he
 “ had in no sort forgot the many Obligations he
 “ lay under to *Cæsar* ; who had freed him from the
 “ Tribute he had been wont to pay the *Atuatii* ;
 “ and who had restored him his Son and Nephew,
 “ whom that People, after receiving them as Hostages, had treated as Slaves : That the Hostilities
 “ he had just committed were not the effect of his
 “ own private Animosity to the *Romans*, but in
 “ consequence of a Resolution of the State ; where
 “ the Government was of such a nature, that the
 “ People had as much Power over him, as he over
 “ the People : That even the State itself had been
 “ in a manner forced into this War, by a sudden
 “ Confederacy of all *Gaul* : That he could appeal
 “ to

“ to his own Weakness for the truth of what he
 “ said, being not so very unskilled in Affairs as to
 “ imagine, that the Forces of the *Eburones* were a
 “ match for the Power of the *Romans*: That it was
 “ a Project formed by all the States of *Gaul* in com-
 “ mon, who had agreed to storm in one Day, the very
 “ Day on which he spoke, all the Quarters of the
 “ *Roman Army*; so that no one might be able to
 “ succour another: That it was not easy for *Gauls*
 “ to resist the Importunity of those of their own
 “ Nation, especially in a Proposal to act in concert
 “ for the recovery of their Liberty: But that,
 “ after having performed what the common Voice
 “ of his Country demanded, he thought he might
 “ now listen to that of Gratitude: That he found
 “ himself compelled by his Attachment to *Cæsar*,
 “ and by his Friendship for *Sabinus*, to give notice
 “ of the extreme Danger to which the Legion was
 “ exposed: That a great Body of *Germans* had
 “ actually passed the *Rhine*, and would be there in
 “ two Days at farthest: That *Sabinus* and *Cotta*
 “ were to consider, whether it would not be proper
 “ to retire with their Troops, before the neighbour-
 “ ing States could be apprized of their Design,
 “ and go and join *Labienus* or *Cicero*, who were
 “ neither of them distant much above fifty Miles:
 “ That as far as regarded himself, he engaged by
 “ all that was sacred to secure their Retreat thro’
 “ his Territories; and undertook it the more
 “ readily, as he should thereby not only discharge
 “ his Duty to his Country, in delivering it from
 “ the Inconvenience of wintering the *Romans*, but
 “ at the same time manifest his Gratitude to *Cæsar*.”
 Having made this Speech he withdrew.

XXIV. *ARPINIUS* and *Junius* reported what they
 had heard to the Lieutenants; who alarmed at the

suddenness of the thing, thought the Information not to be neglected, tho' it came from an Enemy: nor were they a little moved by this Consideration, that it appeared to them altogether incredible, that the *Eburones*, a weak and inconsiderable State, should of their own accord presume to take up Arms against the *Romans*. They therefore laid the Matter before a Council of War, where a warm Debate arose. *L. Arunculeius*, with a great number of military Tribunes, and Centurions of the first rank, were against undertaking any thing hastily, or quitting their Winter-quarrrters, before they had received Orders to that purpose from *Cæsar*. They alledged: " That having strongly fortified their
 " Camp, they were able to defend themselves, even
 " against all the Forces of the *Germans*: That
 " the late Attempt of the *Gauls* was a sufficient
 " Proof of this, whom they had not only with-
 " stood with Courage, but repulsed with Loss:
 " That they had Provisions in abundance, and
 " might therefore securely wait the Arrival of Relief
 " from *Cæsar* and the neighbouring Legions: In
 " fine, that nothing could be more dishonourable,
 " or argue greater want of Judgment, than in
 " Affairs of the highest moment, to take Measures
 " upon the Information of an Enemy." *Titurius*, on the other hand, exclaimed: " That it would
 " be then too late to think of retiring, when the
 " Enemy in greater numbers, and strengthened by
 " the accession of the *Germans*, should come up
 " against them; or when the Quarters next them
 " should have received some signal Check: That
 " the time for Deliberation was short: That *Cæsar*,
 " he made no question, was gone into *Italy*; it not
 " being likely, that either the *Carnutes* would have
 " formed the Design of assassinating *Tasgetius*, or
 " the *Eburones* in so contemptuous a manner
 " assaulted

“ assailed the *Roman* Camp, had they not been
 “ assured of his Departure : That the Information
 “ of an Enemy weighed not with him, but the real
 “ Circumstances of Things. The *Rhine* was not
 “ far off. The *Germans* were much exasperated
 “ by the death of *Ariovistus*, and their late frequent
 “ Defeats. *Gaul* burnt with Impatience to throw
 “ off the *Roman* Yoke, avenge the many Losses
 “ they had sustained, and recover their former
 “ Glory in War, of which now scarce a Shadow
 “ remained. In short, who could imagine that
 “ *Ambiorix*, without a certainty of being supported,
 “ would have embarked in so dangerous an Enter-
 “ prize ? That his Opinion was in all Respects
 “ safe ; because, if no such Confederacy had been
 “ formed, they had nothing to apprehend in
 “ marching to the nearest Legion ; if, on the con-
 “ trary, all *Gaul* and *Germany* were united, Expe-
 “ dition alone could save them from Destruction :
 “ Whereas, by following the Advice of *Cotta*, and
 “ those who were against a Retreat ; tho’ the
 “ Danger perhaps might not prove immediate, yet
 “ were they sure in the end of perishing by Famine.”
 The Dispute continued for some time ; *Cotta*, and
 the principal Officers, strongly opposing the March
 of the Troops. At last *Sabinus* raising his Voice,
 that he might be heard by the Soldiers without :
 “ Be it so then, (says he,) since you seem so resolv-
 “ ed : I am not he among you who is most afraid of
 “ Death. But if any Misfortune happens, those
 “ who hear me will know whom to blame. In two
 “ Days, did not you oppose it, we might easily
 “ reach the Quarters next us ; and there, in con-
 “ junction with our Fellow-Soldiers, confront
 “ the common Danger : whereas by keeping the
 “ Troops separate and at a distance, you reduce
 “ them

BOOK "them to the Necessity of perishing by Sword or
V. "Famine."

XXV. THE Council was then going to rise: but the Officers, surrounding their Generals, conjured them not to put all to hazard by their Diffention and Obstinacy. They told them, "That
"whatever Resolution was taken, whether to go
"or stay, the Danger was by no means great;
"provided they acted with union among themselves; but their Disagreement threatened the
"Troops with inevitable Destruction." The Debate continued till Midnight: when at length *Cotta*, vanquished by Importunity, yielded to the Opinion of *Sabinus*. Orders were given for marching by break of Day. The remainder of the Night was none of it employed in sleep; each Man being taken up in choosing what things to carry along with him, and what of his Winter-necessaries to leave behind. In short, they did every thing to make their stay more dangerous; and by their Fatigue and want of Rest, incapacitate themselves for a vigorous Defence upon their March. At Day-break they left their Camp, not like Men acting by the advice of an Enemy, but as if *Ambiorix* had been their particular Friend; marching in a very extended Column, and followed by a great Train of Baggage.

XXVI. THE Enemy judging from the Hurry and Motion in the Camp, that the *Romans* intended to leave it, placed themselves in Ambuscade in two Bodies in a Wood; where, well-sheltered and covered from View, they waited at about two Miles distance their Arrival; and when the greatest part of the Army had entered a large Valley, suddenly appearing on both sides of it, they attacked them

them at the same time in Front and Rear, and obliged them to fight in a Place of great disadvantage. BOOK V.

XXVII. THEN at length *Titurius*, like one who had neglected all the necessary Precautions, unable to hide his Concern, ran up and down among the Troops, and began to dispose them in order of Battle; but with an Air so timid and disconcerted, that it appeared he had no hopes of Success; as happens for the most part to those who leave all to the last Moment of Execution. But *Cotta*, who had foreseen that this might happen, and had therefore opposed the Departure of the Troops, omitted nothing in his Power for the common Safety; calling to and encouraging the Men like an able General, and at the same time fighting with the Bravery of a common Soldier. And because the great Length of the Column rendered it difficult for the Lieutenants to remedy all Disorders, and repair expeditiously enough to the Places where their Presence was necessary; Orders were given to quit the Defence of the Baggage, and form into an Orb. This Disposition, though not improper in these Circumstances, was nevertheless attended with very unhappy Consequences; for being considered as the Effect of Terror and Despair, it discouraged our Men, and augmented the Confidence of the Enemy. Besides, as unavoidably happens on such Occasions, many of the Soldiers quitting their Ensigns, hastened to fetch from the Baggage what they had most of value, and filled all Parts with Up roar and Lamentation.

XXVIII. THE *Gauls* mean-while conducted themselves with great Prudence; their Officers proclaimed through the Ranks, "That not a Man
" should

BOOK V. " should stir from his Post ; that the Booty was theirs, and every thing belonging to the *Romans* must certainly fall into their Hands : but that " all depended upon securing the Victory." Our Men were not inferior to the Enemy either in Valour, Number, or way of fighting. Though they had neither General nor Fortune on their side, they hoped still by their Bravery to surmount all Difficulties ; and whenever any of the Cohorts sallied out, so as to join the Enemy, hand to hand, a considerable Slaughter of the *Gauls* ensued. This being perceived by *Ambiorix*, he ordered his Men to cast their Darts at a distance, to avoid a close Fight, retire before the *Romans* whenever they advanced, and pursue them as they returned to their Standards : in which way of fighting they were become so expert, by the lightness of their Arms, and daily Exercise, that it was impossible to do them any hurt. These Orders were exactly followed ; inso-much that when any Cohort left the Orb, and came forward to attack the Enemy, they retreated and dispersed in a moment : mean-while it uncovered its own Flanks, and exposed them to the Darts on either side. The Danger was still greater when they returned ; for then not only the Troops that stood next them, but those who had retired before them, surrounded and charged them on all hands. If, on the contrary, they chose to continue in their Post ; neither could their Valour any thing avail them, nor was it possible for Men standing so close together, to avoid the Darts of so great a Multitude. And yet notwithstanding all these Disadvantages, and the many Wounds they had received, they still maintained their Ground ; and though much of the Day was now spent, the Fight having continued from Sun-rise till two in the Afternoon, they did nothing in all that time unworthy

thy the Dignity of the *Roman* Name. At length *T. Balventius*, who the Year before had been made first Centurion of a Legion, a Man of distinguished Courage, and great Authority among the Troops, had both his Thighs pierced with a Dart. *Q. Lucanius*, an Officer of the same Rank, endeavouring to rescue his Son, whom he saw surrounded by the Enemy, was killed after a brave Resistance. And *L. Cotta* the Lieutenant, encouraging the several Cohorts and Companies, received a Blow on the Mouth from a Sling.

XXIX. So many Misfortunes quite dispirited *Titurius*; who perceiving *Ambiorix* at a distance animating his Troops, sent *Cn. Pompey* his Interpreter, to beg Quarters for himself and his Soldiers. *Ambiorix* replied; "That he was ready to grant him a Conference if he desired it: That he hoped to prevail with the Multitude to spare the *Romans*; and that as to *Sabinus* himself, he gave his Word no hurt should be done him." *Sabinus* communicated this Answer to *Cotta*, proposing that they should leave the Battle, and go and confer with *Ambiorix*, from whom he was in hopes of obtaining Quarter both for themselves and their Men. *Cotta* absolutely refused to treat with an armed Enemy, and persisted in that Resolution. *Sabinus* ordered the military Tribunes and principal Centurions that were about his Person to follow him, and when he drew near to *Ambiorix*, being commanded to lay down his Arms, obeyed; charging those that were with him to do the same. Mean-while, as they were treating about the Conditions, *Ambiorix* spinning out the Deliberations on purpose, he was by degrees surrounded and slain. Then the *Gauls*, according to their Custom, raising a Shout, and calling out Victory, charged
our

BOOK
V.

our Troops with great Fury, and put them into Disorder. *L. Cotta*, fighting manfully, was slain, with the greatest part of the Soldiers. The rest retreated to the Camp they had quitted in the Morning; of whom *L. Petroselinus*, the Standard-bearer, finding himself sore pressed by the Enemy, threw the Eagle within the Intrenchments, and was killed fighting bravely before the Camp. Those that remained, with much ado, sustained the Attack till Night; but finding themselves without Hope, they killed one another to the last Man. A few who escaped out of the Fight, got by different ways to *Labienus's* Camp, and brought him the News of this sad Event.

XXX. AMBIBORIX, elated with this Victory, marched immediately at the head of his Cavalry into the Country of the *Atuatii*, which bordered upon his Territories; and travelling Day and Night without intermission, left Orders for the Infantry to follow him. Having informed them of his Success, and roused them to Arms, he the next Day arrived among the *Nerviæ*, and urged them not to lose the favourable Opportunity of freeing themselves for ever from the Yoke of Slavery, and avenging the Injuries they had received from the *Romans*. He told them, "That two of their Lieutenants had been slain, and a great part of their Army cut to pieces: That it would be an easy matter, suddenly to attack and destroy the Legion quartered in their Country under *Cicero*: and that he was himself ready to assist them in the Enterprize." By this Speech he easily drew in the *Nerviæ*.

XXXI. ACCORDINGLY, having forthwith dispatched Messengers to the *Centrones*, *Grudii*, *Levaci*, *Plumosiæ*,

Pleumosiens, and *Garduni*, who are all subject to their State; they assembled what Forces they could, and came unexpectedly, upon *Cicero's* Quarters, who as yet had heard nothing of the Fate of *Titurians*. Here likewise it unavoidably fell out, that the Soldiers sent to cut Wood for Firing and the Fortifications of the Camp, were intercepted by the sudden Arrival of their Cavalry. Having put all these to the Sword; the *Eburones*, *Atuatici*, and *Nervi*ans, with their Allies and Tributaries, amounting to a formidable Army, came and attacked the Camp. Our Men immediately flew to Arms, ascended the Rampart, and with great difficulty sustained that Day's Assault; for the Enemy placed all their hopes in Dispatch, and firmly believed that if they came off Conquerors on this Occasion, they could not fail of Victory every where else.

XXXII: *CICERO's* first Care was to write to *Cæsar*, promising the Messengers great Rewards if they carried his Letters safe. But as all the ways were beset by the Enemy's Troops, his Couriers were continually intercepted. Mean-while of the Materials brought for fortifying the Camp, an hundred and twenty Towers were built during the Night with incredible Dispatch, and the Works about the Rampart compleated. Next Day the Enemy, with a much greater Force than before, attacked the Camp, filled the Ditch, but were again repulsed by our Men. This continued for several Days together. The Night was wholly employed in repairing the Breaches made by Day, in so much that neither the sick or wounded were permitted to rest. Whatever might be of use to resist the next Day's Assault, was prepared with great diligence during the Night. Stakes were hardened in the Fire; Palisades planted in great Number; Towers

BOOK V. Towers raised upon all Parts of the Rampart ; and the whole strengthened with a Parapet and Battlements. *Cicero* himself, though much out of order, would take no rest, even during the Night ; so that the Soldiers were obliged to force him from time to time to take some Repose.

XXXIII. MEAN-TIME such of the *Nervian* Chiefs and Leaders, as had any Intimacy or Friendship with *Cicero*, desired a Conference. This being agreed to, they addressed him in the same strain as *Ambiorix* had before used towards *Sabinus* : “ That all Gaul was in Arms : That the Germans had passed the *Rhine* : That *Cæsar* and the rest of the Troops were besieged in their Winter-quarters.” They told him likewise of the Fate of *Sabinus* ; and to gain Credit, produced *Ambiorix* ; adding : “ That it was in vain to expect Relief from those who were themselves in the utmost distress : That they meant not however any Injury to *Cicero* and the People of *Rome*, but merely to prevent their wintering in the Country, and establishing that Practice into a Custom : That he was therefore at liberty to leave his Quarters without Molestation, and retire in safety where he pleased.” To this *Cicero* only answered : “ That it was not usual with the People of *Rome* to accept Conditions from an armed Enemy : But if they would lay down their Arms, he promised to interpose his Mediation, and permit them to send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, from whose Justice they might reasonably expect Redress.”

XXXIV. THE *Nervians*, driven from this Hope, surrounded the Camp with a Line, whose Rampart was eleven Foot high, and Ditch fifteen
Foot

Foot deep. They had learnt something of this in their former Wars with *Cæsar*, and the Prisoners they had made gave them further Instructions. But being unprovided of the Tools necessary in this kind of Service, they were obliged to cut the Turf with their Swords, dig up the Earth with their Hands, and carry it in their Cloaks. And hence it will be easy to form some judgment of their Number: for in less than three Hours they completed a Line of fifteen Miles in Circuit. The following Days were employed in raising Towers, proportioned to the height of our Rampart; and in preparing Scythes, and wooden Galleries, in which they were again assisted by the Prisoners.

XXXV. ON the seventh Day of the Attack, a very high Wind arising; they began to throw red-hot Balls of Clay, and burning Javelins, upon the Barracks of the *Romans*, which after the manner of the *Gauls* were thatched with Straw. These soon took fire; and the Flames were in a moment spread by the Wind into all parts of the Camp. The Enemy falling on with a mighty Shout, as if already secured of Victory, advanced their Towers and Galleries, and prepared to scale the Rampart. But such was the Constancy and presence of Mind of the Soldiers; that tho' the Flames surrounded them on every side, and they were oppressed with the multitude of the Enemy's Darts; tho' they saw their Huts, their Baggage, and their whole Fortunes in a blaze; yet not only did they continue firm in their Posts, but scarce a Man offered so much as to look behind him; so intent were they on fighting and repelling the Enemy. This was much the hardest Day for our Troops; but had nevertheless this fortunate Issue, that far the greatest number of the Enemy were on that Day

BOOK V. wounded or slain: for as they had crowded close up to the Rampart, those behind prevented the front Ranks from retiring. The Flames abating by degrees, and the Enemy having brought forward one of their Towers to the very foot of the Rampart; the Centurions of the third Cohort drew off their Men a little, beckoning to the *Gauls*, and challenging them to enter: but as not a Man would run the hazard, they attacked them on all sides with Stones, drove them from the Tower, and set it on fire.

XXXVI. In this Legion were two Centurions of distinguished Valour, *T. Pulso*, and *L. Varenus*, who stood fair for being raised to the first Rank of their Order. These were perpetually disputing with one another the Pre-eminence in Courage, and at every Year's Promotion contended with great Eagerness for Precedence. In the heat of the Attack before the Rampart, *Pulso* addressing *Varenus*: "What hinders you now (says he,) or " what more glorious Opportunity would you desire of signalizing your Bravery? This, this is " the Day for determining the Controversy between " us." At these Words he sallied out of the Camp, and rushed amidst the thickest of the *Gauls*. Nor did *Varenus* decline the Challenge; but thinking his Honour at stake, followed at some distance. *Pulso* darted his Javelin at the Enemy, and transfixed a *Gaul* that was coming forward to engage him: who falling dead of the Wound, the Multitude advanced to cover him with their Shields, and all poured their Darts upon *Pulso*, giving him no time to retire. A Javelin pierced his Shield, and stuck fast in his Belt. This Accident entangling his right Hand, prevented him drawing his Sword, and gave the Enemy time to surround him.

Varenus

Vareus his Rival flew to his Assistance, and endeavoured to rescue him. Immediately the Multitude quitting *Pulso*, as fancying the Dart had dispatched him, all turned upon *Vareus*. He met them with his Sword drawn, charged them hand to hand; and having laid one dead at his feet, drove back the rest: but pursuing with too much eagerness, stepped into a Hole, and fell down. *Pulso* in his turn hastened to extricate him; and both together, after having slain a Multitude of the *Gauls*, and acquired infinite Applause, retired unhurt within the Intrenchments. Thus Fortune gave such a turn to the Dispute, that each owed his Life to his Adversary; nor was it possible to decide, to which of them the Prize of Valour was due.

XXXVII. As the Defence every Day became more difficult and hazardous, chiefly by the great Multitude of killed and wounded, which considerably lessened the number of Defendants; *Cicero* sent Letter upon Letter to inform *Cæsar* of his Danger. Many of these Couriers falling into the Enemy's Hands, were tortured to death within view of our Soldiers. There was at that time in the Roman Camp a *Nervian* of Distinction, by name *Vertico*, who in the beginning of the Siege had fled to *Cicero*, and given ample Proofs of his Fidelity. This Man, by the hopes of Liberty, and a promise of great Rewards, engaged one of his Slaves to carry a Letter to *Cæsar*. Having concealed it in his Javelin, and passed thro' the Camp of the *Gauls* without suspicion, as being himself of that Nation, he arrived safe at *Cæsar's* Quarters, who by this means was informed of the Danger of *Cicero* and the Legion.


XXXVIII. CÆSAR, receiving the Letter about five in the Afternoon, immediately dispatched a Messenger to *M. Crassus*, who was quartered among the *Bellovaci*, twenty-five Miles off, ordering him to draw out his Legion at midnight, and march with all the expedition he could to join him. *Crassus*, according to his Orders, came along with the Courier. He sent likewise to *C. Fabius*, directing him to lead his Legion into the Country of the *Atrebatians*, which lay in the way to *Cicero*. He wrote to *Labienus*, if it could be done with safety, to meet him upon the Frontiers of the *Nervians*. He himself in the mean-time assembled about four hundred Horse from the nearest Garrisons, resolving not to wait for the rest of the Army, which lay at too great a distance.

XXXIX. AT nine in the Morning he had notice from his Scouts of the Arrival of *Crassus*. That Day he marched twenty Miles, leaving *Crassus* with a Legion at *Samarobriva*, where he had deposited the Baggage, Hostages, publick Papers, and all the Provisions which had been laid up for the Winter. *Fabius*, in consequence of his Instructions, having made all the haste he could, met him with his Legion. *Labienus*, who had been informed of the Death of *Sabinus*, and the Destruction of the Troops under his Command, and who saw all the Forces of *Treves* advancing against him; fearing lest if he should quit his Quarters, the Enemy might construe it as a Flight, and that it would be impossible for him to sustain their Attack, especially as they were flushed with their late Success; wrote to *Cæsar*, informing him of the Danger that would attend the quitting his Camp, of the Disaster that happened among the *Eburones*, and that all the Forces of the *Treviri*, both Horse and

and Foot, were encamped within three Miles of him. BOOK
V.

XL. CÆSAR approving his Reasons; tho' he thereby found himself reduced from three to two Legions, was yet sensible that all depended upon expedition. He makes forced Marches; and reaching the Territories of the *Nervians*, learnt from some Prisoners the state of the Siege, and the danger the Legion was in. Immediately he engages a *Gaulish* Horseman, by the Promise of great Rewards, to carry a Letter to *Cicero*. It was wrote in *Greek* Characters, that if it fell into the Enemy's Hands, it might not be intelligible to them. The Messenger had Orders, in case he found it impracticable to penetrate himself into the *Roman* Camp, to tie the Letter to a Javelin, and throw it in. In this Letter *Cæsar* sent *Cicero* word that he was already on the March to relieve him, and would be up very soon; exhorting him in the mean-time, to defend himself with his wonted Bravery. The *Gaul*, dreading a discovery, threw the Letter into the Camp as he had been ordered: but the Javelin by accident sticking in a Tower, remained there two Days unperceived. On the third a Soldier saw it, took it down, and brought it to *Cicero*; who immediately read it in full Assembly, and diffused the common Joy thro' the whole Camp. At the same time they perceived the Smoke of the Villages fired by *Cæsar* in his March, which put the Arrival of the Succours beyond all doubt.

XLI. THE *Gauls* having notice of it also by their Scouts, thought proper to quit the Siege, and go to meet *Cæsar*. Their Army consisted of about sixty thousand Men. *Cicero*, now at liberty, applied again to *Vertico*, for the Slave spoken of

BOOK above; and having admonished him to use the utmost Diligence and Circumspection, dispatched
 V.  him with a Letter to *Cæsar*, informing him that the Enemy had raised the Siege, and were advancing against him with all their Forces. *Cæsar* received the Letter about midnight, communicated the Contents to his Army, and exhorted them to meet the Enemy with Courage. Next Day he decamped early, and after a March of four Miles, discovered the *Gauls* on the other side of a large Valley, with a River in front. It was dangerous to engage so great a Force upon unequal Ground. Knowing therefore that the Siege of *Cicero's* Camp was raised, and having no longer any Reason to be in a hurry, he encamped in the most convenient Spot he could find, and completed his Intrenchments. His Army consisting of no more than seven thousand Men without Baggage, required at best but a very small Camp; yet he purposely contracted it as much as possible, to inspire the Enemy with the greater Contempt of him. Mean-time sending out Scouts on all sides, he endeavoured to find where he might cross the Valley with most Safety.

XLII. THE rest of the Day passed in slight skirmishes between the Cavalry near the Brook; but the main Body of the Army on both sides kept within their Lines: the *Gauls*, in expectation of more Forces, which were not yet come up: *Cæsar*, that by pretending Fear, he might draw the Enemy on this side the Valley, and engage them before his Camp; or, if that could not be effected, that having discovered the Passes, he might be enabled to cross the Valley and Rivulet with less danger. Early next Morning the Enemy's Cavalry coming up to our Camp, charged our Horse; who, by *Cæsar's*

far's Orders purposely gave ground, and retired BOOK V.
 behind the Works. At the same time he caused the Ramparts to be raised higher, the Gates to be barrieaded, and cautioned the Soldiers, in the execution of these Orders, to run up and down tumultuously, and affect an air of Timidity and Concern. The Enemy, invited by all these Appearances, crossed the Valley, and drew up in a very disadvantageous Post. Our Men mean-while retiring from the Rampart, they approached still nearer, cast their Darts on all sides within the Trenches, and sent Heralds round the Camp to proclaim, that if any of the *Gauls* or *Romans* had a mind to come over to them, they should be at liberty so to do 'till nine o' Clock, after which no Quarter would be granted. Nay, so far did they carry their Contempt, that thinking they could not break in by the Gates, (which, to deceive them, were stopt up with single rows of Turf,) some began to scale the Rampart, others to fill up the Ditch. But then *Cæsar* sallying by all the Gates at once, and charging them briskly with his Cavalry, put them so precipitately to flight, that not a Man offered to make the least Resistance. Great numbers of them were slain, and the rest obliged to throw down their Arms.

XLIII. Not caring to pursue them far, on account of the Woods and Marshes that lay in his way; and finding that considerable execution had been done upon the spot, he the same Day joined *Cicero* with all his Forces; where beholding the Towers, Galleries, and other Works of the *Gauls*, he could not help being struck with Admiration. He then reviewed *Cicero's* Legion, and found that not a tenth Man had escaped without Wounds; which gave him a just Idea of the greatness of the


BOOK V. Danger to which they had been exposed, and of the vigorous Defence they had made. He bestowed great Commendations on the Legion, and its Commander; and addressed himself to the Centurions and military Tribunes by name, of whose Valour *Cicero* made honourable mention. He learnt particularly from the Prisoners all the Circumstances of the unhappy Affair of *Sabinus* and *Cotta*: and calling the Soldiers together next Day, gave them an Account of the whole Transaction, comforted them, confirmed their Courage, and told them; that a Disaster occasioned by the Imprudence and Rashness of the Lieutenant, ought to give them the less Disturbance; as by the Favour of the immortal Gods, and their Valour, Vengeance had followed so suddenly, that neither had the Joy of the Enemy for the Victory continued any time, nor their Grief for the Loss remained long without allay.

XLIV. MEAN-TIME the Report of *Cæsar's* Victory flew with incredible speed thro' the Country of the *Rbemi* to *Labienus*. For tho' he lay at the distance of fifty Miles from *Cicero's* Camp, whither *Cæsar* did not arrive 'till past three in the Afternoon; yet before midnight a Shout was raised at the Gates of his Camp, by which the *Rbemi* signified to him *Cæsar's* Victory, and their own Congratulation on that Success. The Report of this being carried to the *Treviri*; *Indutiomarus*, who the next Day had determined to attack *Labienus's* Camp, made off in the Night, and retired with all his Forces into his own Country. *Cæsar* sent back *Fabius* with his Legion to his former Quarters, resolving to winter himself near *Samarobriva* with three Legions, distributed in three different Cantonnments; and as all *Gaul* was in motion, to con-

tinue with the Army in Person. For the defeat BOOK
 and Death of *Sabinus* spreading every where, almost V.
 all the States of *Gaul* were meditating a Revolt; and
 with this view sent Messengers and Deputies into
 all Parts, to concert Measures, and contrive where
 to begin the War. Nay they held Assemblies by
 Night in desert Places; insomuch that during the
 whole Winter, scarce a Day passed, but *Cæsar* had
 Intelligence of some new Resolves or Insurrections
 of the *Gauls*. Among the rest, *L. Roscius* his
 Lieutenant, who commanded the thirteenth Le-
 gion, sent him word: that great numbers of *Gauls*,
 from the several States of *Armorica*, had assembled
 to attack him, and advanced within eight Miles of
 his Camp; but upon hearing of *Cæsar's* Victory,
 had separated so hastily, that their Retreat had all
 the appearance of a Flight.

XLV. BUT *Cæsar* summoning the principal No-
 blemen of every State to attend him; partly by
 Menaces, making them sensible he was no Stranger
 to their Designs; partly by Exhortations, found
 means to keep the greatest part of *Gaul* in its duty.
 The *Senones* however, a potent State, and of great
 Authority among the *Gauls*, formed the Design of
 publickly assassinating *Cavarinus*, whom *Cæsar* had
 given them for a King; whose Brother *Moritasgus*
 had held the Sovereignty at *Cæsar's* Arrival in *Gaul*,
 and whose Ancestors had long been in possession of
 the same Dignity. But he having Intelligence of
 the Plot, thought proper to fly; whereupon pur-
 suing him to the very Frontiers, they drove him
 from his Palace and Throne: and sending Amba-
 sadors to *Cæsar* to justify their Conduct; upon his
 ordering their whole Senate to repair to him, they
 refused to submit. So powerful was this Example
 amongst the Barbarians, that some at last were
 found

BOOK found of Courage enough to begin the War; and


V.  so great a Change did it produce in the Inclinations of all: that except the *Æduans* and *Rhemi*, who had been always particularly distinguished and favoured by *Cæsar*; the first, on account of their ancient and inviolable Fidelity to the People of *Rome*; the last, for their late Services in the *Gallick War*; scarce was there a single State in all *Gaul* that did not incur Suspicion. Nor is this, in truth, so much to be wondered at; as for many other Reasons, so particularly for this: that a People famed above all Nations for their military Virtues, could not with Patience bear to see themselves so far stript of their former Renown, as to be forced to submit to the Yoke of the *Romans*.

XLVI. *INDUTIOMARUS* and the *Treviri* ceased not, during the whole Winter, to send Ambassadors over the *Rhine*; soliciting the *German States*; offering them Money; and urging, that a great part of our Army having already been cut off, much the least considerable remained. But no part of that Country could be persuaded to come into their Designs: because having twice before tried their Fortune with the *Romans*, in the War with *Ariovistus*, and in the Defeat of the *Tenctiberi*; they were resolved, they told them, to run no more Hazards. *Indutiomarus*, disappointed of this Hope, was not less active in drawing Forces together, soliciting Recruits from the neighbouring States, providing Horses, and encouraging even Out-laws and Convicts, by the Promise of great Rewards, to engage in his Service. And so great an Authority had he by this means acquired in *Gaul*, that Ambassadors flocked from all Parts; some publickly, others in a private manner, to request his Protection and Friendship.

XLVII.

XLVII. FINDING himself thus voluntarily ap-BOOK
 plied to: on one side, by the *Senones* and *Carnutes*, V.
 impelled by a consciousness of the Guilt they had
 incurred; on the other, by the *Nervians* and *Atua-*
tici, who were preparing for a War with the Ro-
mans; and that if he once took the Field, Forces
 would not be wanting: he called an Assembly of
 the States in Arms. This, according to the Cu-
 stom of the *Gauls*, implies an actual commencement
 of War; and, by a standing Law, obliges all their
 Youth to appear at the Diet in Arms; in which
 they are so extremely strict, that whosoever has the
 misfortune to come last, is put to death in sight
 of the Multitude, with all manner of Torments.
 In this Assembly, *Cingetorix*, the head of the op-
 posite Faction, and Son-in-law of *Indutiomarus*;
 who, as we have related above, had declared for
Cesar, and still continued firm to him, was pro-
 claimed a publick Enemy, and his Estate confis-
 cated. After which *Indutiomarus* acquainted the
 Council, that the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and several
 other States of *Gaul* had solicited his Assistance;
 that he accordingly intended to join his Forces with
 theirs, taking his Rout thro' the Territories of the
Rbemi, and giving up their Lands to be plundered;
 but that before he began his March, he was desirous
 of mastering the Camp of *Labienus*. To that end
 he gave the necessary Directions.

XLVIII. LABIENUS, whose Camp, both by the
 nature of the Ground, and the Fortifications he
 had added, was extremely strong, feared nothing,
 either for himself or the Legion; but nevertheless
 was intent how he might give the Enemy some
 considerable Blow. Having therefore been in-
 formed by *Cingetorix* and his Adherents, of the
 Speech



C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS in GAUL.
BOOK VI.

THE ARGUMENT

I. Cæsar, apprehending greater Commotions in Gaul, augments his Forces. II. He reduces the Nervians by a sudden Invasion. III. And admits the Senones, Carnutes, and Menapians to a Surrender. VI. Labienus pretending Fear, suddenly attacks and routs the Treviri. IX. Cæsar passes the Rhine a second time. X. The Suevians prepare to oppose the Romans. XI. The Manners of the Gauls and Germans described. XII. The Æduans and Sequani at the head of two opposite Factions in Gaul. The Sequani declining in Power, the Rhemi substitute themselves in their Place. XIII. Description of the Druids. XV. The Religion of the Gauls. XVI. The Gauls and Germans differ much as to their Manners and Customs. XXIII. The Hercynian Forest. XXIV. A Bull with one Horn. XXV. Wild Asses. XXIV. Bufalos. XXVII. Cæsar, fearing the Want of Provisions, repasses the Rhine, and marches against Ambiorix. XXVIII. The great Power of Fortune. XXIX. Ambiorix disbands his Troops, and counsels them to provide for their own Safety. XXX. Cæsar divides his Army, and marches in Person in quest of Ambiorix. XXXI. Is obliged to proceed with great Circumspection in ravaging the Country. XXXII. The Sicambri cross the Rhine, and fall upon Cicero's Camp, XXXV. The astonishing Bravery of Sextius Baculus upon this Occasion. XXXVII. The Romans suffer some Loss. XXXVIII. The Germans at length relinquish the Attack, and return home. XL. Cæsar lays waste the Country of the Eburones. Ambiorix narrowly escapes being taken. XL. Cæsar returns to Italy.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
 COMMENTARIES
 OF HIS
 WARS in GAUL.

B O O K VI.

I. **C**ÆSAR, for many Reasons, expecting greater Commotions in *Gaul*, ordered his Lieutenants *M. Silanus*, *C. Antistius Reginus*, and *T. Sextius*, to levy Troops. At the same time he desired of *Cn. Pompey* the Proconsul, that since he was himself detained by publick Affairs at *Rome*, he would set on foot the Legion he had inlisted in *Cisalpine Gaul*, during his Consulship, and send it to him: for he considered it as of the utmost Importance towards securing a proper Respect from the *Gauls* for the time to come, to give them such an Idea of the Power of *Italy*, as might convince them that it was not only able speedily to repair any Losses sustained, but even to bring a greater Force into the Field. Friendship and the good of the Commonwealth equally determined *Pompey* to yield to this Request:

BOOK VI. and the Levies being compleated with great diligence by the Lieutenants, three new Legions were formed and brought into *Gaul* before the end of Winter. Thus, having doubled the Number of Cohorts lost under *Titurius*, he soon made the Enemy sensible, both by his Expedition and the Strength of the Reinforcement, of what they had to apprehend from the Power and Discipline of the *Romans*.

II. INDUTIOMARUS being slain, as we have related above, the *Treviri* conferred the Command on his Relations. They persisted likewise in soliciting the *Germans*, and making them offers of Money. But not being able to prevail with those that lay nearest them, they applied to some of the more remote States; and finding them inclined to treat, entered into a solemn Engagement with them, giving Hostages for Security of the Money stipulated, and associating *Ambiorix* into the Confederacy. *Cæsar* informed of these things, and finding that he was threatned with War on all sides; that the *Nervians*, *Atuatici*, and *Menapians*, with all the *Germans* on this side the *Rhine*, were actually in Arms; that the *Senones* refused to attend him according to Orders, and were tampering with the *Carnates* and other neighbouring States; and that the *Treviri* were soliciting the *Germans* by frequent Embassies; he judged it would be necessary to open the Campaign early. Accordingly, without waiting till the Winter was at an end, he drew together the four nearest Legions, and fell unexpectedly into the Territories of the *Nervians*, before they could either assemble in a Body, or find means to save themselves by Flight. Having carried off a great Number of Men and Cattle, enriched his Soldiers with the Booty, and laid waste the Country; he compelled them to submit

mit and give Hostages, and then led back his Legions to their Winter-quarters.

III. EARLY in the Spring, having summoned a general Assembly of *Gaul*, pursuant to his Design : as all the other States but the *Senones*, *Camutes*, and *Treviri* appeared ; looking upon this as the beginning of a Revolt, and willing to postpone every thing else, he adjourned the Diet to *Paris*. This City was upon the Borders of the *Senones*, and had been united with them about an Age before ; but was thought to have no share in their present Revolt. Having declared the Adjournment to the Assembly, he the same Day set out with his Legions against the *Senones*, and by great Marches reached their Territories. *Acco*, who was at the head of the Confederacy, hearing of his Approach, ordered the Multitude to shelter themselves in the Towns : but before that could be done, the *Romans* appeared. This obliged them to change their Measures, and send Deputies to *Cæsar*, to implore Forgiveness. They were seconded by the *Æduans*, the old and faithful Allies of the *Romans*, at whose Request *Cæsar* readily pardoned them ; and the rather, because the Summer being now come, he had no mind to spend the Season for Action in proceeding formally against the Guilty. He ordered them to send an hundred Hostages, whom he committed to the Custody of the *Æduans*. The *Carnutes* too, at the Intercession of the *Rhemi*, under whose Protection they were, having sent Deputies and Hostages, obtained the same Conditions. *Cæsar* then went to the Assembly of the States, put an end to the Diet, and ordered the *Gauls* to provide him Cavalry.

BOOK IV. TRANQUILLITY being restored in these Parts,
 VI. *Cæsar* turned all his Thoughts to the Management of the War with *Ambiorix* and the *Treviri*. He ordered *Cavarinus* to attend him with the Cavalry of the *Senones*, to prevent any new Commotions in his Absence, either in consequence of the Resentment of that Prince, or the Hatred he had incurred of the State. And having thus settled all things to his mind, as he knew *Ambiorix* was determined not to hazard a Battle, he set himself to watch his other Designs.

V. THE *Menapians*, whose Territories border upon those of the *Eburones*. are secured by Woods and Morasses on every side; and were the only People of *Gaul*, who had not sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to desire a Peace. He knew *Ambiorix* was in good Intelligence with them; and that by means of the *Treviri*, he had also entered into an Alliance with the *Germans*. He therefore thought it best to deprive him of these Resources, before he attacked him in person; lest despairing of being able to defend himself, he should either retire among the *Menapians*, or throw himself into the Arms of the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*. This Resolution being taken, he sent the Baggage of the whole Army to *Labienus* in the Country of the *Treviri*, ordered him a Reinforcement of two Legions, and marched himself against the *Menapians* with five Legions, who carried nothing with them but their Arms. That Nation trusting to their Situation, instead of assembling Forces, retreated to their Woods and Morasses, and carried all their Effects along with them. *Cæsar*, dividing his Forces with *C. Fabius* his Lieutenant, and *M. Crassus* his Questor; and having speedily finished his Bridges; entered their
 Country

Country in three Bodies, set all their Houses and Villages on fire, and carried off such Numbers of Men and Cattle, that the *Menapians* were at last constrained to sue for Peace. He granted it, on Condition they sent him Hostages, and engaged not to admit *Ambiorix* or any one from him into their Territories; threatening to treat them as Enemies if they did. These things settled, he left *Comius* of *Arras* there with a Body of Horse to keep them in Awe, and set out himself against the *Treviri*.

BOOK
VI.

VI. WHILST *Cæsar* was thus employed, the *Treviri*, having drawn together a great Number of Horse and Foot, were preparing to attack the Legion which had wintered in their Territories under *Labienus*. They were now advanced within two Days March of the Lieutenant's Camp, when they learnt that he had received a Reinforcement of two Legions from *Cæsar*. Upon this encamping at about fifteen Miles distance, they resolved to wait for the Auxiliaries they expected from *Germany*. *Labienus* having Intelligence of their Design, and hoping their Rashness might furnish him with an Opportunity of fighting, left the Baggage under a Guard of five Cohorts; and with the twenty-five remaining, and all his Cavalry, marched towards the Enemy, and pitched his Camp about a Mile from them.


VII. BETWEEN *Labienus* and the Enemy was a River, with steep Banks, and difficult to pass. And indeed neither was *Labienus* himself minded to try the Passage, nor did he expect the Enemy would offer at such an Attempt. The hope of being joined by the Auxiliaries grew stronger in the Camp of the *Gauls* every Day. *Labienus* declared publicly in a Council of War; "That as the

BOOK VI. "Germans were said to be upon their march, he was determined not to expose himself and the Army to danger, but would decamp early next Morning." This was soon carried to the Enemy; for as our Cavalry consisted mostly of *Gauls*, it was natural for some of them to favour their Countrymen. *Labienus* assembling the military Tribunes and principal Centurions during the night, laid before them his real Design: and the better to betray the Enemy into a suspicion of his being afraid, gave Orders for decamping with more Noise and Tumult than was usual in a *Roman* Army. By this means his March had all the Appearance of a Flight; and the Enemy, whose Camp was so very near, had notice of it before Day-break from their Spies.

VIII. SCARCE had our Rear got without the Trenches, when the *Gauls* encouraging one another not to lose so fair a Prey, or stay in Expectation of the *Germans*, at a time the *Romans* were retreating in such a Panick; and considering it as an Indignity, with so great a Superiority of Forces, to forbear attacking an handful of Men already put to Flight and incumbered with their Baggage; resolved to pass the River, and engage the *Romans*, notwithstanding the Disadvantage of the Ground. *Labienus*, who had foreseen this; that he might draw them all over the River, continued the Feint of his March, and went on quietly. Then sending the Baggage a little before, and ordering it to be placed upon a rising Ground: "Behold, Fellow-soldiers, says he, the Opportunity you so much desired: you have the Enemy at a disadvantage, and in a Place where they cannot sustain the Onset: shew only under my Command the Valour you have so often manifested to our General;

“ General; think him present, and that he sees and **BOOK**
 “ observes you.” At the same time he ordered **VI**
 them to face about, and form in Line of Battle;
 and detaching a few Troops of Horse to guard the
 Baggage, drew up the rest on the two Wings. Our
 Men gave a sudden Shout, and threw their Javelins,
 The Enemy, contrary to their Expectation, seeing
 those whom they imagined put to flight, marching
 against them with displayed Banners, could not
 sustain the very first Shock; but betaking them-
 selves immediately to flight, took Refuge in the
 nearest Woods. *Labienus* pursuing with his Ca-
 valry, put many of the Enemy to the Sword, and
 took a great Number of Prisoners; insomuch that
 within a few Days the whole State was obliged to
 submit: for the *Germans*, who were coming to their
 Assistance, upon hearing of their Defeat, returned
 home. The Relations of *Indutiomarus*, who had
 been the Authors of the Revolt, chose likewise
 to retire with them, and abandon their Country.
Cingetorix, who had always continued faithful to
 the *Romans*, was thereupon invested with the
 supreme Authority.

IX. *CÆSAR*, after his Arrival in *Treves*, from among
 the *Menapians*, resolved for two Reasons to pass the
Rhine: one, because the *Germans* had assisted the
Treviri against the *Romans*; the other, to deprive
Ambiorix of a Retreat into those Parts. In conse-
 quence of this Resolution, he set about making a
 Bridge on the River, but somewhat higher up than
 before. As the Form and Manner was known, the
 Soldiers, by their extraordinary Diligence, finished
 the Work in a few Days. Leaving a strong Guard
 on the side of *Treves*, to prevent any sudden In-
 surrection in that Country, he carried over the rest
 of his Army. The *Ubians*, who had before sub-

BOOK VI.  mitted and given Hostages, sent Ambassadors to him to vindicate their Conduct, and assure him, that they had neither sent Troops to the Assistance of the *Treviri*, nor in any Instance departed from their Engagements. They urged and requested, that he would spare their Territories, and not, out of a general Hatred to the *Germans*, involve the Innocent in the Punishment of the Guilty. If he desired more Hostages, they told him they were ready to send them. *Cæsar* finding upon Inquiry, that the Supplies had been sent by the *Suevians*, accepted the Submission of the *Ubians*: and preparing to march against the *Suevians*, informed himself of the Ways and Accesses to their Country.

X. A FEW Days after, he had Intelligence from the *Ubians*, that the *Suevians* were drawing their Forces to a general Rendezvous, and had sent Orders to all the Nations under their Jurisdiction, to furnish their Contingents of Horse and Foot. Upon this having furnished himself with Provisions, and chosen a proper Place for his Camp, he ordered the *Ubians* to retire into their Towns with their Cattle and Effects; hoping that so unskilful and barbarous an Enemy, might easily be drawn by the Want of Provisions, to fight in a Place of Disadvantage. He further enjoined the *Ubians* to send Spies into all Parts, to learn the Designs and Motions of the *Suevians*. They readily complied, and in a few Days brought him back word; " That the *Suevians*, upon certain Information of the Arrival of the *Roman* Army, had retired to the remotest Part of the Country, with all their own Forces, and those of their Allies: that there they had resolved to wait the coming up of the *Romans*, at the Entrance of a Forest

" of

“ of immense Extent, called *Bacenis*, which reach-BOOK
 “ ed a great way into the Country, and served as a VI.
 “ Barrier between the *Cberusci* and *Suevians*, to pre-
 “ vent their mutual Incurfions.”

XI. ON this Occasion it may not be improper to say somewhat of the Manners of the *Gauls* and *Germans*, and the difference of Customs between these two Nations. A spirit of Faction prevails throughout *Gaul*, and that not only in their several States, Districts, and Villages, but almost in every private Family. The Men of greatest Esteem and Consideration among them, are commonly at the head of these Factions, and give what turn they think proper to all publick Deliberations and Counsels. This Custom is of long standing, and seems designed to secure those of lower rank from the Oppression of the powerful: for the Leaders always take care to protect those of their Party, otherwise they would soon lose all their Authority. This equally obtains thro' the whole Continent of *Gaul*, the Provinces being in general divided into two Factions.


XII. WHEN *Cæsar* arrived in the Country, the *Æduans* were at the head of one Faction, and the *Sequani* of the other. These last being the weaker, because the *Æduans* had long bore the greatest sway, and had a number of considerable States in their dependence; they united with *Ariovistus* and the *Germans*, whom by great Presents and Promises they drew over the *Rhine* to their Assistance. This Alliance made them so powerful, that having worsted their Adversaries in several Battles, and killed almost all their Nobility; they forced the States dependent upon the *Æduans* to have recourse to them for protection; obliged the *Æduans* themselves

BOOKSelves to give the Children of their principal Nobility as Hostages, swear publicly not to attempt any thing against the *Sequani*, and resign up to their possession a part of their Territories; and by this means rendered themselves in a manner Sovereigns of all *Gaul*. *Divitiacus*, in this Necessity, applied to the Senate of *Rome* for Relief, but without effect. *Caesar's* Arrival soon changed the face of Affairs. The *Æduan* Hostages were sent back, their former Clients restored, and new ones procured them by *Caesar's* Interest; it appearing, that such as were under their Protection, enjoyed a more equal and milder Lot: by all which their Fortune and Authority being considerably enlarged, the *Sequani* were obliged to resign the Sovereignty. The *Rhemi* succeeded in their place: and as they were known to be in the same degree of Favour with *Caesar*, such as could not get over their old Animosity to the *Æduans*, put themselves under their Protection. The *Rhemi* were extremely attentive to the Interests of their Clients, and thereby both preserved their old Authority, and that which they had newly acquired. Such therefore was the then Situation of *Gaul*, that the *Æduans* possessing indisputably the first Rank, the *Rhemi* were next in Consideration and Dignity.

XIII. OVER all *Gaul*, there are only two Orders of Men, in any degree of Honour and Esteem: for the common People are little better than Slaves, attempt nothing of themselves, and have no share in the publick Deliberations. As they are generally oppressed with Debt, heavy Tributes, or the Exactions of their Superiors; they make themselves Vassals to the Great, who exercise over them the same Jurisdiction, as Masters do over Slaves. The two Orders of Men, with whom, as we have said,
all

all Authority and Distinctions are lodged, are the Druids and Nobles. The Druids preside in matters of Religion, have the care of publick and private Sacrifices, and interpret the Will of the Gods. They have the Direction and Education of the Youth, by whom they are held in great honour. In almost all Controversies, whether publick or private, the Decision is left to them : and if any Crime is committed, any Murder perpetrated ; if any Dispute arises touching an Inheritance, or the Limits of adjoining Estates ; in all such Cases, they are the supreme Judges. They decree Rewards and Punishments ; and if any one refuses to submit to their Sentence, whether Magistrate or private Man, they interdict him the Sacrifices. This is the greatest Punishment that can be inflicted among the *Gauls* ; because such as are under this Prohibition, are considered as impious and wicked : all Men shun them, and decline their Conversation and Fellowship, lest they should suffer from the Contagion of their Misfortunes. They can neither have recourse to the Law for Justice, nor are capable of any publick Office. The Druids are all under one Chief, who possesses the supreme Authority in that Body. Upon his death, if any one remarkably excels the rest, he succeeds : but if there are several Candidates of equal Merit, the Affair is determined by plurality of suffrages. Sometimes they even have recourse to Arms before the Election can be brought to an Issue. Once a Year they assemble at a consecrated Place in the Territories of the *Carnutes*, whose Country is supposed to be the middle of *Gaul*. Hither such as have any Suits depending flock from all parts, and submit implicitly to their Decrees. Their Institution is supposed to come originally from *Britain*, whence it passed into *Gaul* ; and even at this day, such as are desirous of being perfect

BOOK perfect in it, travel thither for Instruction. The

VI.  Druids never go to War, are exempted from Taxes and military Service, and enjoy all manner of Immunities. These mighty Encouragements induce multitudes of their own accord to follow that Profession; and many are sent by their Parents and Relations. They are taught to repeat a great number of Verses by heart, and often spend twenty Years upon this Institution: for it is deemed unlawful to commit their Statutes to Writing; tho' in other matters, whether publick or private, they make use of *Greek* Characters. They seem to me to follow this Method for two Reasons: to hide their Mysteries from the Knowledge of the Vulgar; and to exercise the Memory of their Scholars, which would be apt to lie neglected, had they Letters to trust to, as we find is often the case. It is one of their principal Maxims that the Soul never dies, but after Death passes from one Body to another; which, they think, contributes greatly to exalt Mens Courage, by disarming Death of its Terrors. They teach likewise many things relating to the Stars and their Motions, the Magnitude of the World and our Earth, the Nature of Things, and the Power and Prerogatives of the immortal Gods.

XIV. THE other Order of Men is the Nobles, whose whole Study and Occupation is War. Before *Cæsar's* Arrival in *Gaul*, they were almost every Year at War, either offensive or defensive; and they judge of the power and quality of their Nobles, by his Vassals, and the number of Men he keeps in his Pay: for these are the only marks of Grandeur they make any account of.

XV,

XV. THE whole Nation of the *Gauls* is extremely BOOK
addicted to Superstition: whence in threatening VI.
Distempers, and the imminent Dangers of War, they make no scruple to sacrifice Men, or engage themselves by Vow to such Sacrifices; in which they make use of the Ministry of the Druids: for it is a prevalent Opinion among them, that nothing but the life of Man can atone for the life of Man; insomuch that they have established even publick Sacrifices of this kind. Some prepare huge Colossus's of Osier Twigs, into which they put Men alive, and setting fire to them, those within expire amidst the Flames. They prefer for Victims such as have been convicted of Theft, Robbery, or other Crimes; believing them the most acceptable to the Gods: but when real Criminals are wanting, the innocent are often made to suffer. *Mercury* is the chief Deity with them: of him they have many Images, account him the Inventor of all Arts, their Guide and Conductor in their Journeys, and the Patron of Merchandize and Gain. Next to him are *Apollo*, and *Mars*, and *Jupiter*, and *Minerva*. Their Notions in regard to them are pretty much the same with those of other Nations. *Apollo* is their God of Physick; *Minerva* of Works and Manufactures; *Jove* holds the Empire of Heaven; and *Mars* presides in War. To this last, when they resolve upon a Battle, they commonly devote the Spoil. If they prove victorious, they offer up all the Cattle taken, and set apart the rest of the Plunder in a Place appointed for that purpose: and it is common in many Provinces, to see these Monuments of Offerings piled up in consecrated Places. Nay it rarely happens, that any one shews so great a Disregard of Religion, as either to conceal the Plunder,

BOOK Plunder, or pillage the publick Oblations; and

VI. the severest Punishments are inflicted upon such Offenders.

XVI. THE *Gauls* fancy themselves to be descended from the God *Pluto*; which, it seems, is an established Tradition among the *Druids*. For this Reason they compute the Time by Nights, not by Days; and in the Observance of Birth-days, new Moons, and the beginning of the Year, always commence the Celebration from the preceding Night. In one Custom they differ from almost all other Nations; that they never suffer their Children to come openly into their presence, until they are of Age to bear Arms: for the Appearance of a Son in publick with his Father, before he has reached the Age of Manhood, is accounted dishonourable.

XVII. WHATEVER Fortune the Woman brings, the Husband is obliged to equal it out of his own Estate. This whole Sum, with its annual Product, is left untouched, and falls always to the share of the Survivor. The Men have Power of Life and Death over their Wives and Children: and when any Father of a Family of illustrious Rank dies, his Relations assemble, and upon the least ground of Suspicion put even his Wives to the Torture like Slaves. If they are found guilty, Iron and Fire are employed to torment and destroy them. Their Funerals are magnificent and sumptuous, according to their Quality. Every thing that was dear to the deceased, even Animals, are thrown into the Pile: and formerly such of their Slaves and Clients as they loved most, sacrificed themselves at the Funeral of their Lord.

XVIII.

XVIII. In their best regulated States they have a Law, that whoever hears any thing relating to the Publick, whether by Rumor or otherwise, shall give immediate notice to the Magistrate, without imparting it to any one else: for the nature of the People is such, that rash and unexperienced Men, alarmed by false Reports, are often hurried to the greatest Extremities, and take upon them to determine in matters of the highest Consequence. The Magistrates stifle things improper to be known, and only communicate to the Multitude what they think needful for the service of the Commonwealth: nor do the Laws permit to speak of State Affairs, except in publick Council.

BOOK
VI.

XIX. THE *Germans* differ widely in their Manners from the *Gauls*. For neither have they Druids to preside in religions Affairs; nor do they trouble themselves about Sacrifices. They acknowledge no Gods but those that are Objects of Sight, and by whose Power they are apparently benefited; the Sun, the Moon, Fire. Of others they know nothing; not even by Report. Their whole Life is addicted to Hunting and War; and from their Infancy they are inured to Fatigue and Hardships. They esteem those most, who continue longest Strangers to Women; as imagining nothing contributes so much to Stature, Strength, and Vigour of Body: but to have any Commerce of this kind before the age of twenty, is accounted in the highest degree ignominious. Nor is it possible to conceal any Irregularity this way; because they bathe promiscuously in Rivers, and are clothed in Skins, or short Mantles of Fur, which leave the greatest part of their Bodies naked.

XX.

BOOK XX. AGRICULTURE is little regarded among
 VI. them, as they live mostly on Milk, Cheefe, and
 the Flesh of Animals. Nor has any Man Lands
 of his own, or distinguished by fixed Boundaries.
 The Magistrates, and those in Authority, portion
 out yearly to every Canton and Family, such a
 quantity of Land, and in what part of the Coun-
 try they think proper; and the Year following re-
 move them to some other Spot. Many Reasons
 are assigned for this Practice: lest seduced by Habit
 and Continuance, they should learn to prefer Til-
 lage to War: lest a desire of enlarging their Pos-
 sessions should gain ground, and prompt the
 stronger to expel the weaker: lest they should be-
 come curious in their Buildings, in order to guard
 against the extremes of Heat and Cold: lest Ava-
 rice should get footing amongst them, whence
 spring Factions and Discords: in fine, to preserve
 Contentment and Equanimity among the People,
 when they find their Possessions nothing inferior to
 those of the most powerful.

XXI. It is accounted honourable for States to
 have the Country all around them lie waste and de-
 populated: for they think it an argument of Va-
 lour to expel their Neighbours, and suffer none
 to settle near them; at the same time that they are
 themselves also the safer, as having nothing to ap-
 prehend from sudden Incurfions. When a State is
 engaged in War, either offensive or defensive, they
 make choice of Magistrates to preside in it, whom
 they arm with a Power of Life and Death. In
 time of Peace there are no publick Magistrates;
 but the Chiefs of the several Provinces and
 Clans administer Justice, and decide Differences
 within their respective Limits. Robbery has no-
 thing

thing infamous in it, when committed without the Territories of the State to which they belong: they even pretend that it serves to exercise their Youth, and prevent the growth of Sloth. When any of their Princes in this case offers himself publicly in Council as a Leader, such as approve of the Expedition rise up, profess themselves ready to follow him, and are applauded by the whole Multitude. They who go back from their Engagement are looked upon as Traytors and Deserters, and lose all Esteem and Credit for the time to come. The Laws of Hospitality are held inviolable among them. All that fly to them for Refuge, on whatever account, are sure of Protection and Defence; their Houses are open to receive them, and they plentifully supply their Wants.

XXII. FORMERLY the *Gauls* exceeded the *Germans* in Bravery, often made War upon them, and as they abounded in People beyond what the Country could maintain, sent several Colonies over the *Rhine*. Accordingly the more fertile Places of *Germany*, in the neighbourhood of the *Hercynian* Forest, (which I find mentioned by *Eratosthenes* and other *Greek* Writers under the name of *Orcinia*,) fell to the share of the *Volcae*, who settled in those Parts, and have ever since kept Possession. They are in the highest Reputation for Justice and Bravery, and no less remarkable than the *Germans* for Poverty, Abstinence, and Patience of Fatigue; conforming exactly to their Customs, both in habit and way of living. But the neighbourhood of the *Roman* Province, and an acquaintance with Traffick, has introduced Luxury and Abundance among the *Gauls*; whence becoming by little and little an unequal match for the *Germans*, and being

BOOK VI. worsted in many Battles, they no longer pretend to compare with them in Valour.

XXIII. THE *Hercynian* Forest, of which we have been just speaking, is about nine Days Journey in breadth : for as the *Germans* are ignorant of the use of Measures, there is no other way of computing it. It begins from the Confines of the *Helvetians*, *Nemetes*, and *Rauraci* ; and following directly the course of the *Danube*, extends to the Territories of the *Anartes* and *Dacians*. Thence turning from the River to the left, it runs thro' a multitude of different Regions : and tho' there are many in the Country, who have advanced six Days Journey into this Forest ; yet no one pretends to have reached the extremity of it, or discovered how far it extends. Many different species of Animals, unknown in other Countries, harbour here ; the most remarkable of which, and that best deserve to be mentioned, are these.

XXIV. THERE is a Bull that nearly resembles a Stag, with only one Horn rising from the middle of his Forehead, taller and straighter than those of our Cattle, and which at top divides into many large Branches. The Males and Females are shaped alike, and have Horns the same in size.

XXV. HERE are likewise a kind of wild Affes, shaped and spotted like Goats, but of a larger size ; without Horns, or Joints in their Legs ; that never lie down to sleep ; nor can raise themselves, if by any accident they are overthrown. They lean against Trees, which serve to support them when they sleep. Hence the Huntsmen, after having discovered their haunts, either loosen the Roots of the Trees, or saw them almost quite off ; so that when

when the Animal, according to Custom, reclines BOOK
 against them, they immediately give way, and both VI.
 fall down together. }

XXVI. A third species of Animals are the Uri, nearly equalling the Elephant in bulk; but in colour, shape, and kind, resembling a Bull. They are of uncommon strength and swiftness, and spare neither Man nor Beast that comes in their way. They are taken and slain by means of Pits dug on purpose. This way of Hunting is frequent among the Youth, and serves to inure them to Fatigue. They who kill the greatest number, and produce their Horns in publick as a proof, are in high Reputation with their Countrymen. It is found impossible to tame them, or conquer their fierceness, tho' taken never so young. Their Horns, both in largeness, figure, and kind, differ much from those of our Bulls. The Natives preserve them with great care, tip their edges with Silver, and use them instead of Cups on their most solemn Festivals.

XXVII. CÆSAR understanding from the *Ubian* Scouts, that the *Suevians* were retired into their Woods; and fearing the want of Provisions, because, as we have already observed, the *Germans* are but little addicted to Agriculture; resolved not to advance any farther. But to keep the Enemy still under some awe of his Return, and prevent their sending Succours to *Gaul*; having repassed the *Rhine*, he only broke down about two hundred Feet of his Bridge, on the *German* side; and to secure the rest, built at the extremity a Tower of four Stories, where he left a Garrison of twelve Cohorts, and strengthened the Place with all manner of Works. Young *C. Volcatius Tullus* had the charge of the Fort and Garrison. He himself, as

BOOK soon as the Corn began to be ripe, marched against

VI. *Ambiorix*; taking his way thro' the Forest of *Arden*, which is much the largest in all *Gaul*, and reaches from the Banks of the *Rhine*, and the Confines of *Treves*, quite to the *Nervians*, thro' a Space of more than five hundred Miles. *L. Minucius Basilius* was sent before with all the Cavalry, in hopes that the quickness of his March, and the opportunity of some lucky Conjunction, might enable him to do something considerable. He had orders to light no Fires in his Camp, the better to conceal his Approach from the Enemy; and *Cæsar* assured him, he would follow with all expedition. *Basilius* exactly followed his Instructions; and coming suddenly and unexpectedly upon the *Gauls*, surprised great numbers of them in the Field. Being informed by them of the Place whither *Ambiorix* had retired with a few Cavalry, he marched directly against him.

XXVIII. BUT as Fortune has a considerable share in all human Concerns, so particularly in those of War. For as it was a very extraordinary Chance, that he should thus come upon *Ambiorix* unprepared, and surprise him with his personal Arrival, before he had the least notice of it from Fame or Report: so was it an equal effect of Fortune, that the *Gaul* himself, after having lost his Arms, Horses, and Chariots, should yet find means to escape. This was principally owing to the situation of his House, which was surrounded with a Wood; it being customary among the *Gauls*, in order to avoid the Heats, to build in the neighbourhood of Woods and Rivers. By this means his Attendants and Friends, possessing themselves of a Defile, sustained for a time the Attack of our Cavalry; during which, one of his Servants having provided him with a Horse, he
 escaped

escaped into the Woods. Thus Fortune remarkably played her Part, both in bringing him into the Danger, and delivering him out of it. BOOK
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XXIX. AMBIORIX, after his Escape, made no Attempt to draw his Forces together; nor is it known whether he acted in this manner out of Choice, as not thinking it safe to hazard a Battle; or because he thought he should not have sufficient time, being surprised by the sudden Arrival of the Cavalry, and believing that all the rest of the Army followed. Dispatching therefore Messengers privately thro' the Country, he counselled every one to provide for his own Safety; upon which some took refuge in the Forest of *Arden*, and some in the adjoining Morasses. Those who lived upon the Sea-coast, hid themselves in the Islands formed by the Tide at High Water: and many abandoning their Country altogether, trusted themselves and their all to the Faith of Foreigners. *Cativulcus*, who jointly with *Ambiorix* was King of the *Eburones*, and had associated with him in all his Designs, being of a very advanced Age, and unable to bear the Fatigues of War or Flight; after many Imprecations against *Ambiorix*, who had been the prime Contriver of the Revolt; poisoned himself with an extract of Yew, a Tree very common in *Gaul* and *Germany*. The *Segni* and *Condrusi*, originally *German* Nations, whose Territories lay between those of *Treves* and the *Eburones*, sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to intreat: "That he would not consider them as Enemies, nor look upon all the *Germans* on this side the *Rhine* as equally obnoxious: That they had harboured no Thoughts of War, nor been any ways aiding to *Ambiorix*." *Cæsar* finding it to be so by the Answers of the Prisoners, ordered them to deliver

BOOK VI. up such of the *Eburones* as had fled to them for Refuge; and promised, upon that Condition, not to molest their Territories.

XXX. THEN dividing his Army into three Bodies, he sent all the Baggage to *Atuatua*, a Castle situated almost in the heart of the Country of the *Eburones*, where *Titurius* and *Arunculeius* had been quartered during the Winter. This Place he chose, as for other Reasons, so likewise because the Fortifications raised the Year before were still entire, which would lessen the Labour of his Soldiers. He left the fourteenth Legion to guard the Baggage, being one of the three lately levied in *Italy*, and brought thence into *Gaul*. *Q. Tullius Cicero* had the Charge both of the Legion and Fort, which was further strengthened with an additional Guard of two hundred Horse. The Army being thus divided; he sent *T. Labienus*, with three Legions, towards the Sea-coast, and the Provinces that border upon the *Menapians*; *C. Trebonius*, with a like number of Legions, to lay waste the Country adjoining to the *Atuatici*; and resolved to march himself with the other three towards the *Scheld*, which flows into the *Meuse*, and to the Extremities of the Forest of *Arden*, whither he was informed *Ambiorix* had retired with a few Horse. He promised, at his Departure, to return in seven Days; the Legion he had left in Garrison being provided with Corn only for that time: and exhorted *Labienus* and *Trebonius*, if they found it consistent with the publick Advantage, to return likewise with their Legions within the same Space; that joining counsel together, and taking their Measures from the Conduct of the Enemy, they might resolve where next to carry the War.

XXXI.

XXXI. THERE was, as we have already observed, no formed Body of Troops, no Garrison, no fortified Town to defend by Arms; but a Multitude dispersed on all sides. Wherever a Cave, or a Thicket, or a Morass offered them Shelter, thither they retired. These Places were well known to the Natives; and great Care and Caution was required on our part, not for the Security of the whole Army, (which had no danger to fear whilst in a Body, from Enemies dispersed and full of Terror;) but for the Preservation of each Individual. And yet even this regarded not a little the whole Army: for the Desire of Plunder drew many of the Men to a great distance; and the Woods full of Defiles and hidden Ways, hindered them from keeping together in a Body. If *Cæsar* meant to terminate the War altogether, and extirpate this Race of perfidious Men; the Soldiers must be divided into small Parties, and detached on all sides. If, on the contrary, he kept his Men together, as the Rules of War, and the *Roman* Discipline required; the Enemy were sheltered by their Situation, nor wanted Boldness to form Ambuscades, and cut off Stragglers. Amidst these Difficulties, all possible Precautions were taken; and although the Soldiers were eagerly bent upon Revenge, yet *Cæsar* chose rather not to push the Enemy too far, than expose his Men to danger. He therefore sent Messengers to the neighbouring States, inviting them all by the hopes of Plunder, to join in the Destruction of the *Eburones*; choosing rather to expose the Lives of the *Gauls* in the Woods, than of the legionary Soldiers; and hoping by the Multitude employed against them, totally to extirpate the Name and Memory of a State, whose Revolt had rendered them so obnoxious. Accord-

BOOK VI. ingly great Numbers flocked suddenly thither from all Parts.

XXXII. Thus were the *Eburones* attacked on all sides, and the Havock continued till the seventh Day, which *Cæsar* had appointed for returning to his Camp and Baggage. It then evidently appeared what Influence Fortune has over War, and how many Accidents spring from her Interposition. The Enemy being dispersed and full of Terror, as we have related above; there remained no Body of Troops in the Field, to give any the least ground of Fear. A Report spread among the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*, that the Territories of the *Eburones* were given up to Plunder, and all without distinction invited to share in the Spoil. The *Sicambri*, who inhabit upon the *Rhine*, and had afforded a Retreat to the *Usipetes* and *Tenctheri*, as mentioned above; assembled immediately a Body of two thousand Horse, passed the River in Barks about thirty Miles below *Cæsar*'s Bridge and Fort, and advanced directly towards the Territories of the *Eburones*. Many of those that fled, and had dispersed themselves up and down the Country, fell into their Hands; as likewise abundance of Cattle, of which the Barbarians are extremely covetous. Allured by this Success they advanced farther. Neither Woods nor Morasses proved any Obstacles to Men, trained up from their Infancy to Wars and Incurfions. Inquiring of the Prisoners concerning *Cæsar*, they understood that he was a great way off, and had left the Country with his whole Army. One in particular addressing them: "Why, says he, do you lose time in pursuit of so slight and trifling a Booty, when Fortune offers one of so much greater Value. In three Hours you may reach *Atuatuca*, where the
" *Romans*

“ *Romans* have deposited all their Wealth. The Garrison is hardly sufficient to line the Rampart, much less to fall out of their Intrenchments.”

Urged by this hope, they left their present Booty in a Place of Safety, and marched directly to *Atuatuca*, being conducted by the Captive who had given them the Information.

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XXXIII. CICERO, who hitherto had kept his Soldiers strictly within the Camp, according to *Cæsar's* Orders, nor suffered so much as a Servant to straggle beyond the Lines; seeing the seventh Day arrive, began to despair of *Cæsar's* Return, who, as he heard, was marched farther into the Country, and had sent him no notice of his Rout. Wherefore tired with the continual Murmurs of the Soldiers, who complained of his Patience, and told him they were kept like Men besieged; and not suspecting that any Accident could befall him, within the small Extent of three Miles; especially as the Enemy, opposed by nine Legions, and a very numerous Cavalry, were in a manner totally dispersed and cut off; he sent out five Cohorts to forage in an adjoining Field, separated from the Camp only by a single Hill. A great many sick Men had been left behind by *Cæsar*, of whom about three hundred, that were now pretty well recovered, joined the Detachment. These were followed by almost all the Servants of the Camp, together with a vast Number of Carts and Carriage-horses.

XXXIV. IN that very Instant, as Fortune would have it, the *German* Cavalry arrived; and without discontinuing their Course, endeavoured to force an immediate Entrance by the *Decuman* Gate. As their March had been covered by a Wood, they were not discovered till they were just upon

BOOK VI. upon the Camp; insomuch that the Sutlers, who kept their Booths under the Rampart, had not time to retire within the Intrenchments. Our Men were so surpris'd at this sudden and unexpected Attack, that the Cohort upon Guard could scarce sustain the first Onset. The Enemy spread themselves on all sides to find a Place of Entrance. The *Romans* with difficulty defended the Gates; the Rampart securing them every where else. The whole Camp was in an Uproar, every one inquiring of another the Cause of the Confusion; nor could they determine which way to advance the Standards, or where to post themselves. Some reported the Camp was already taken: others, that the *Germans*, having destroyed *Cæsar* and his Army, were come victorious to storm their Trenches. The greater Number, full of imaginary Fears, when they considered the Place in which they were encamped, called to mind the Fate of *Cotta* and *Titurius*, who perished in that very Fort. This universal Consternation being perceived by the Barbarians, confirmed them in the Belief of what the Prisoners had told them, that there was scarce any Garrison within to defend the Camp. They renewed their Endeavours to force the Intrenchments, and mutually exhorted one another, not to let so fair a Prize escape out of their hands.

XXXV. AMONG the sick in Garrison was *P. Sextius Baculus*, a Centurion of the first Rank, of whom mention has been made in former Battles, and who had not tasted Food for five Days. This Officer, anxious for his own Safety, and that of the Legion, rushed unarmed out of his Tent. He saw the Enemy at hand, and the Danger extreme. Snatching the first Arms that offered, he posted himself in the Gate of the Camp. The Centurions
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of the Cohort upon Guard followed the Example, and for a while sustained the Enemy's Charge. *Sextius* expired under a multitude of Wounds, and was with difficulty carried off by the Soldiers. This short Delay gave the rest time to resume their Courage; so far at least, as to mount the Rampart, and make a shew of defending themselves.

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XXXVI. MEAN-TIME our Foragers returning, heard the Noise at the Camp. The Cavalry advancing before, were soon apprized of the Danger. Here was no Fortification to shelter the frightened Troops. The new Levies, unexperienced in matters of War, fixed their Eyes upon the Tribunes and Centurions, waiting their Orders. Not a Man was found so hardy and resolute as not to be disturbed by so unexpected an Accident. The *Germans* perceiving our Ensigns at a distance, gave over the Attack of the Camp, imagining at first it was *Cæsar* and the Legions, which the Prisoners had informed them were marched farther into the Country. But soon observing how few they were, they surrounded and fell upon them on all sides.

XXXVII. THE Servants of the Camp fled to the nearest rising Ground; whence being immediately driven, they threw themselves amongst the Ranks of the Cohorts, and thereby increased their Terror. Some were for drawing up in form of a Wedge, and forcing their way thro' the Enemy: for as the Camp was so very near, they imagined, that if some fell, the rest at least must escape. Others were for retiring to an Eminence, and all sharing there the same Fate. The veteran Soldiers, who had marched out with the Detachment, could by no means relish this Proposal: wherefore mutually encouraging one another, and being led by

BOOK VI. *C. Trebonius* a Roman Knight, under whose command they were, they broke thro' the midst of the Enemy, and all to a Man arrived safe in the Camp. The Servants and Cavalry following them, and seconding their Retreat, were likewise by their Bravery preserved. But the Troops who had retired to the Hill, being unexperienced in military Affairs, could neither persist in the Resolution they had taken of defending themselves from the higher Ground, nor imitate that brisk and vigorous Effort which they saw had been so serviceable to their Companions : but endeavouring to gain the Camp, quitted the advantage of their Situation. The Centurions, some of whom had been selected from veteran Legions, and on account of their Bravery promoted to higher Stations among the new Levies; fought resolutely to maintain the Glory they had acquired, and endeavoured to sell their Lives as dear as they could. Their Valour obliging the Enemy to fall back a little, part of the Troops, contrary to Expectation, reached the Camp. The rest were surrounded and cut to pieces by the Barbarians.

XXXVIII. THE *Germans*, despairing to carry the Camp, as they saw our Men now prepared to defend the Works, repassed the *Rhine* with the Booty they had deposited in the Woods. But so great was the Terror of the *Romans* even after their Retreat, that *C. Volusenus* arriving in the Camp the same Night with the Cavalry, could not persuade them that *Cæsar* and the Army were safe. For Fear had taken so thorough a possession of their Minds, that as if bereft of Understanding, they persisted in believing the Infantry was wholly destroyed, and that the Cavalry alone had escaped : it seeming to them altogether incredible, that the
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Germans would have dared to attack the Camp, had no Misfortune befallen the *Roman* Army. But *Cæsar's* Arrival soon put an end to their Fears.

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XXXIX. UPON his Return, being informed of what had happened, he only complained of the sending out the Cohorts to forage; observing: "That in War nothing ought to be left to Fortune, whose Power appeared evidently in the sudden Arrival of the Enemy, and much more in their coming up unperceived to the very Gates of the Camp." But nothing in this whole Affair appeared to him more wonderful, than that the *Germans* having crossed the *Rhine* with design to plunder the Territories of *Ambiorix*, should by falling upon the *Roman* Camp do him a most acceptable Service.

XL. CÆSAR marched a second time to harrafs the Enemy, and having drawn a great number of Troops together from the neighbouring States, sent them into all Parts upon this Service. All the Houses and Villages were set on fire: the Plunder was universal: the vast number of Men and Horses not only destroyed great Quantities of Corn, but the Rains and advanced Season made Havock of all that was left; insomuch that if any of the Enemy escaped for the present, it seemed yet likely, that after the Retreat of the Army, they must perish by Famine. As the Cavalry were divided into many Parties, they often came to Places, where the Prisoners not only informed them they had seen *Ambiorix* flying, but that he could even yet be scarce out of view. The Hope of coming up with him made them leave nothing unattempted, as imagining they would thereby gain the highest Favour with *Cæsar*, whose good Fortune wanted only this to render it compleat.

BOOK compleat. But all their Endeavours were fruitless :

VI. for he still found means to hide himself in the Woods and Morasses; whence removing privately in the Night, he escaped into other Regions, accompanied with only four Horsemen, in whom alone he durst confide.

XLI. CÆSAR having destroyed the whole Country, led back his Army into the Territories of the *Rbemi*, with the loss of only two Cohorts. There he summoned a general Assembly of *Gaul*, to examine into the Affair of the *Senones* and *Carnutes* : and having passed a severe Sentence against *Acco*, the Contriver of the Revolt, ordered him to be executed on the spot. Some fearing a like fate, fled : whom having banished by a Decree of the Diet, he quartered two Legions in *Treves*, two among the *Lingones*, and the remaining six at *Agendicum*, in the Country of the *Senones*. And having provided the Army with Corn, he went pursuant to his Design, into *Italy*, to hold the Assemblies of *Cisalpine Gaul*.

The END of the FIRST VOLUME.

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